Exactly.
I am quite convinced that's a feature, not a bug; i.e it is by design."This combination has left other State and non-State actors– myself included – confused as to where the US stands and how it is likely to react in any given situation."
It has also been long and is now quite true and should be borne in mind by all...
Agreed
While the reaction can be seen as rational in the context of the moment that created it, it might not be seen as such before it occurs, - or after the fact when additional information has borne out that the reaction might have either been inappropriate or generated consequences we'd have preferred left in the bottle.
Those non-linear outcomes are in keeping with the nature of complex interactions where fear, honor and interest are at stake, and where the cost of military inaction is seen as too high (see Colin Gray's "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration" for a good discussion).
As Ken said, it is a feature - its simply a more visible feature when the stakes are perceived as higher and the mutual understanding between enemies/competitors is lower with regard to the stakes.
Best Rob
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 04-29-2008 at 09:56 PM.
Ken: By design?Originally Posted by Ken White
I was thinking more unintended but not unwelcome side effect. Although I am sure there is someone out there writing their book who will remember it differently. For it to be a design feature some prescient US foreign policy wonks on Sept. 12th must have 'felt the force' flowing through all those non-linear outcomes until they clearly saw the confusion a disproportionate response would sow in their enemies. Just a shame they could not have foreseen a few other things while they were at it.
And there was I thinking you were a cynic rather than a true believer.
Rob thanks for the link, I am about half way through (finding him slow to get to the point) and suspect I am not going to agree with his premise when I am done but we shall see.
By design or not
Ken et al,
Whether the ambiguity we have sown (regarding likely US response to other State and non-State actions) was by design or not, I think it is an incredibly important/dangerous development.
I think we can all agree that surprise is a good thing when applied to military activity (except of course when we surprise ourselves... hello this isn't the enemy we planned for... that is a not so good surprise).
An analogy (please bear with me)...
However, surprise is not so good when your girl friend's father comes home early and finds his baby naked and in your arms... However, you can deal with this surprise if you had some reasonable expectation of his reaction (e.g. throws you out of the house and tells you not to return).
If, however, his response is cut off your package, break both your knees, and drop you off naked in the middle of the country... well that is a rather bad surprise.
If there was this much ambiguity there would be very little dating and our supply of warrior babies would drop to a dangerously low level.
From Grand Strategy point of view we want and need to be predictable... one way or another... its the only way to maintain some semblence of global stability.
I vote for Fathers with a more predictable response...
Unless of course it involves my two teenage daughters... That blade is well honed
Live well and row
Hacksaw
Say hello to my 2 x 4
I understand your valid point but am not in total agreement
I think we have historically acted erratically in this sense. Most of our wars over the last 200+ years began,as did this one, because someone believed the flaky Americans would not react. Always a bad mistake.
We're busy worrying about Britney and what designer beer to buy and we do not have time for this esoteric 'war' B.S. -- so some idiot starts one and all we want to do is go in there and wreak death and destruction and get back to our navel contemplation.
Thus I contend that we ARE, historically, unpredictable in the depth and extent of our reaction. I have long (since 1979) contended that Carter could have backed Iran down on the hostages without war and that his failure to do so, followed by Reagan's, Clinton's and Bush 41's failures to react in the ME were an invitation to disaster.
Carter, in particular, acted unpredictably -- but down stream instead of of over reacting. So did the next three under react with bad consequences. Had any one of overreacted, it would've been simpler and easier than the position we are now in. A position we are in very much due to the fact that someone thought we had become predictable.
Quite wrongly. Fortunately...True, and if it's not the enemy we planned for, whose fault is that? Sounds like poor intel and / or poor planning to me. In any event, I suggest some Diplomatic uncertainty can preclude having to resort to military surprise...I think we can all agree that surprise is a good thing when applied to military activity (except of course when we surprise ourselves... hello this isn't the enemy we planned for... that is a not so good surprise)...Heh. We can really disagree on that. Teenage hormones and danger are like steak and cheese in Philly. There would be more, not less hanky panky. What would really happen is that the number of unwed mothers would drop slightly, not an overall bad thing.However, surprise is not so good when your girl friend's father comes home early and finds his baby naked and in your arms... However, you can deal with this surprise if you had some reasonable expectation of his reaction (e.g. throws you out of the house and tells you not to return).
If, however, his response is cut off your package, break both your knees, and drop you off naked in the middle of the country... well that is a rather bad surprise.
If there was this much ambiguity there would be very little dating and our supply of warrior babies would drop to a dangerously low level.Semblance is a good word. because that's what it is -- stability and the semblance thereof are two different things. I do not fully agree that predictability, one way or the other is desirable, much less necessary but I will say that if we had to go that route, I'd be inclined to go the route of the Great Khan. The meek may someday inherit the Earth but for the next couple of centuries they're more likely to just get buried early.From Grand Strategy point of view we want and need to be predictable... one way or another... its the only way to maintain some semblence of global stability.Having three sons and a daughter plus three Grandaughters, two in their 20s, do keep that blade honed. And do be alert. You'd be amazed at how fast these kids can get their clothes on and be ten feet apart...I vote for Fathers with a more predictable response...
Unless of course it involves my two teenage daughters... That blade is well honed.
Oh -- on the tell 'em to depart and never return bit? They'll just meet elsewhere. Trust me on that one, been there, had that done.
Oldest son is a cop, always made a point to be cleaning his firearms when a new male arrived at the house for the first time; annoyed the Granddaughter but it kept her (him???) straight...
Point there is that one can do what you suggest -- and what T.R. suggested; "Walk softly and carry a big stick." The key is that you cannot be hesitant in using the big stick. That's where the unpredictability has historically come from (including recent history)...
Last edited by Ken White; 04-30-2008 at 09:55 PM.
Ive always found one thing to be true in my life
There is one factor that will always be predictable,
Unpredictability
The key seems to be to Hope for the best, expect and plan for the worst and in the end generally things come out somewhere in between
That said as long as there is an accepted end state your aiming for it should be much easier to keep from getting thrown to far off track along the way no matter how confused things get.
North is always north the trick would be making sure we know which way north is from the start
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
With respect, the key is that using the big stick can lead to disaster, therefore you need to really understand the cost/benefits/risks of using the big stick. You need to recognize that using the big stick too often makes you a bully. Finally, need to use the big stick properly, thus the importance of your choosen profession.
The question of whether or not the people who hired Rumsfeld and Feith have learned enough about the nuances of using the big stick is an open one. I am optimistic, but frankly don't believe that they've earned the right to walk up to the brink. As opposed to - I'll be non partisan - Kennedy and Reagan who'd I'd trust in a game of brinkmanship.
With equal respect
the cost of not maintaining it or not using it at all can be even more disastrous. I suggest one with a big stick will not use it too often else there would be no need for the preceding phrase "walk softly..." I also suggest that if you have a big stick and use it no matter how carefully some -- many -- who do not possess such an instrument will call you a bully and the person it's used against is almost certain to do so.
I think your concern is misplaced, those people will soon be gone. I suggest concern might be better directed to those incompetents who will replace the current crowd of incompetents.The question of whether or not the people who hired Rumsfeld and Feith have learned enough about the nuances of using the big stick is an open one.We can agree on the first statement and disagree quite strongly on the last. Kennedy used the big stick to get involved in the wrong way at the wrong time in Viet Nam and SEA in an effort to show he was tough and boost the economy. Reagan OTOH used the stick marginally well in Libya but blew it totally in Lebanon by NOT using it, thus aiding and abetting Carter before him and Bush 41 after him (note my also non partisan stance... I am optimistic, but frankly don't believe that they've earned the right to walk up to the brink. As opposed to - I'll be non partisan - Kennedy and Reagan who'd I'd trust in a game of brinkmanship.) in failing Brinkmanship 101. Washington attracts incompetents...
Last edited by Ken White; 05-01-2008 at 02:57 AM.
Lawrence - by Rory Stewart
Re-opening an old thread is deserved here, plus the first one found that fitted.
Rory Stewart, a sometime UK diplomat and writer, has produced a BBC two-part documentary on Lawrence of Arabia: http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/awr...+(Kings+of+War)
Just started listening and hopefully will be available beyond the UK (I know sometimes copyright intervenes. Alas comments suggests UK only). Try other routes i.e. BBC website and an Ipod may exist.
davidbfpo
I think so...
That doesn't mean it was a major issue, merely a synergistic side effect.One of many such small benefits if the operation succeeded but that would not be too harmful should it not succeed.Eminently possible, we'll find out some day. Maybe.I was thinking more unintended but not unwelcome side effect. Although I am sure there is someone out there writing their book who will remember it differently. For it to be a design feature some prescient US foreign policy wonks on Sept. 12th must have 'felt the force' flowing through all those non-linear outcomes until they clearly saw the confusion a disproportionate response would sow in their enemies.We can agree on the thrust of that if not the wording. It was foreseen, those who foresaw were simply ignored.Just a shame they could not have foreseen a few other things while they were at it.Unsure what you mean by that. If it is that I am a supporter of the way things are being done, you're quite wrong. I have said before I wouldn't have done a lot of things the way they're being done. Wasn't my call. I do agree that some response above Afghanistan was long overdue and that Iraq makes strategic sense. Things don't have to be done my way to be work.And there was I thinking you were a cynic rather than a true believer.
Though it would usually be helpful to all if they were done that way
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