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    Default Lawrence: "strategy is eternal...tactics is the ever-changing language"

    Hello, folks.

    I was doing some research for my dissertation when a came across a 1933 letter from T. E. Lawrence to B. H. Liddell Hart. Lawrence is commenting on Liddel Hart's book The Ghost of Napoleon when he writes something I hadn't seen quoted anywhere else, which intrigued me:

    So far as I can see strategy is eternal, & the same and true: but tactics is the ever-changing language through which it speaks. A general can learn as much from Belisarius as from Haig--but not a soldier. Soldiers have to know their means.*
    First, I started wondering, "Do I agree with those characterizations of strategy and tactics? What about this comment 'soldiers have to know their means?'" Secondly, the contrast of Belisarius and Haig struck me. As the editor of the collection, Malcolm Brown, points out, Belisarius used "hit-and-run tactics" with minimal losses and Haig used "massed forces at high cost."** I have never been high on Haig, so I can't tell if Lawrence intends this as an ironic comment or not.

    At any rate, I wanted to throw the quote out and see what members of the council thought about it. Anything strike you? Agree? Disagree? What say you, SWC?

    * - T. E. Lawrence, T. E. Lawrence: The Selected Letters, edited by Malcolm Brown (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 473.

    ** - Ibid, 473n.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-08-2011 at 08:09 AM.
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    Judging by how much clausewitz gets qouted in awe on this board, I'd have to say that more posters will agree with it than they will actually admit.

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    Stanley, as the great Karl might have said, evasiveness is merely an extension of obfuscation by other methods.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    a.) Yes, soldiers have to understand their weapons performance and capabilities. So what? Lawrence is just coming to a realisation that most professional officers knew already.

    b.) Comparing Haig, with Belisarius is an exercise in futility and shows an very poor understanding of the considerable challenges that Haig faced.

    T.E. Lawrence was as much a charlatan and fraud as Liddell-Hart, albeit a possibly brave one. Why give any credence to a discussion of men poorly informed on the subject?
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    Default In Re: Wilf

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    a.) Yes, soldiers have to understand their weapons performance and capabilities. So what? Lawrence is just coming to a realisation that most professional officers knew already.

    b.) Comparing Haig, with Belisarius is an exercise in futility and shows an very poor understanding of the considerable challenges that Haig faced.

    T.E. Lawrence was as much a charlatan and fraud as Liddell-Hart, albeit a possibly brave one. Why give any credence to a discussion of men poorly informed on the subject?
    Some things are eternal... when I read the thread title... I immediately thought WILF will have a few pithy thoughts to share on this topic... low and behold, the most recent post was indeed from WILF... and none to my surprise reflected nearly exactly what I had presupposed...

    I suppose that makes me a SWC junkie

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    Tactics seem to be rather constant as well - the difference seems to be largely about the tools and weapons used.

    Cannae is still a valid blueprint for encirclement battles, and Epaminondas introduced the Schwerpunkt into tactics with his oblique order.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Tactics seem to be rather constant as well - the difference seems to be largely about the tools and weapons used.

    Cannae is still a valid blueprint for encirclement battles, and Epaminondas introduced the Schwerpunkt into tactics with his oblique order.
    Indeed, just like ambushes in the Battle of Lake Trasimene or Battle of the Teutoburg Forest are still valid examples of the core tactical principles of an ambush. Even the Stone/Copper Age offers us pretty good examples of raids and ambushes.

    IIRC, the "Art of War" has IMHO an apt quote:

    There are no more than five musical notes, yet the variations in the five notes cannot all be heard.

    There are no more than five basic colors, yet the variations in the five colors cannot all be seen.

    There are no more than five basic flavors, yet the variations in the five flavors cannot all be tasted. ?
    Today one might say that the political aims, strategy and METT-TC drive the tactical combination making every engagement singular.

    It is also interesting to see how the basic tactical organisation of ancient warfare into Vanguard, Rearguard, Center, Right Wing, Left Wing have been used at smaller and smaller unit scale.

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    I apologize ahead of time for two posts; I managed to exceed the maximum character count for single post.

    Quote Originally Posted by stanleywinthrop View Post
    Judging by how much clausewitz gets qouted in awe on this board, I'd have to say that more posters will agree with it than they will actually admit.
    Honestly, that is part of the reason I wanted to see people's responses to it here.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    T.E. Lawrence was as much a charlatan and fraud as Liddell-Hart, albeit a possibly brave one. Why give any credence to a discussion of men poorly informed on the subject?
    I may not post here much, but I do read quite a bit and--like another poster said--I expected you to respond. I am glad you did, and I appreciate your thoughts on the matter. However, I will take issue with your argument.

    First, you mischaracterize Lawrence and Liddell Hart. Whatever we may think about the veracity of their various claims or their theories about warfare, both men were hardly "poorly informed." Liddell Hart spent the better part of the twentieth-century writing and thinking war, so however wrong, deceitful, or whatever else he may be, he is not "poorly informed." Lawrence wrote this letter after not only his experience in the Arab Revolt but also his time as an advisor to Churchill. Again, whatever else he may be, he is not "poorly informed." Secondly, even if they are wrong about strategy or deceitful, both Lawrence and Liddell Hart warrant study, because they both continue to have significant influence on military thinking for better or ill. Ignoring them--especially in Lawrence's case, give his post-9/11 re-appearance in military rhetoric--will not make them go away.

    I understand that you do not like these two men; that is fine, but an ad hominem attack does not offer anything new to the conversation. What do you think about this idea that strategy is something eternal and tactics is something ever-changing? Agree? Disagree?

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    b.) Comparing Haig, with Belisarius is an exercise in futility and shows an very poor understanding of the considerable challenges that Haig faced.
    Third, he is not comparing the two; he is contrasting them. By writing that "[a] general can learn as much from Belisarius as from Haig," it is clear that he is stressing their differences, not their similarities.[1] It is important to note, also, that there is no evidence in the letter that the contrast reflects negatively on Haig. So far, I cannot find any other references to Haig in his letters, so I am not sure what he thought of the man. (For my thoughts on Haig, see below.)

    Lastly, you are missing what I believe to be the most interesting point of the letter: that not only can an ancient strategist be as useful as a (at least for Lawrence) contemporary one, but also that strategy as a discourse is not some march of progress in which contemporary strategists have more to offer by virtue of either the retrospection of history or the benefit of technology. Instead, tactics for Lawrence seems to depend absolutely on place, time, and technology. If anyone disagrees with this reading, I have reproduced the whole letter for context below:

    Dear L-H

    I have read this [Liddell Hart's The Ghost of Napoleon] twice, once to get its idea, and once with my pencil in hand. It has been a queer experience--like going back, in memory, to school--for by myself (though with far less knowledge, and hesitatingly) I had trodden all this road before the war. It is a very good little book: modest, witty and convincing. You realize, of course, that you are swinging the pendulum, and that by 1960 it will have swung too far!

    So far as I can see strategy is eternal, & the same and true: but tactics is the ever-changing language through which it speaks. A general can learn as much from Belisarius as from Haig--but not a soldier. Soldiers have to know their means.

    I can't write an introduction: none is necessary. Your sub-title should be 'a tract for the times.'

    Yours,

    TES[2]
    I have have highlighted to passages above, because Lawrence seems to be arguing against a general thrust of Liddell Hart's theories: that Germany lost in World War I because of "old" thinking (particularly its devotion to Clausewitz) and that "new" thinking (specifically Liddell Hart himself) would win wars. In fairness, I have not read Ghosts of Napoleon, because I cannot find a copy at the moment, but this is how others have characterized his argument.[3] I do not agree with either premise, but, as the kids say, "it is what it is." If Liddell Hart is saying that the British had been too slavishly devoted to "old" strategy, Lawrence is warning Liddell Hart that future military thinkers may ignore valuable "old" thinkers in favor of the "new" at their own peril. This is the "pendulum" that Lawrence is discussing. Instead, Lawrence seems to take the stand that there is no 'progress of ideas' when it comes to strategy, that across time and intellectual traditions there is a universal value. A "new" idea is not more valuable by virtual of its "newness." At the very least, Lawrence's suggested subtitle--"A Tract for the Times"--would seem to delimit Liddell Hart's theory to a specific point in history and to offset any sweeping generalization that 'new' will forever be better.

    This issue that "new" is not necessarily better seems obvious, but it is worth thinking about the ascendency of Revolution in Military Affairs, first in the Soviet Union and later in the United States.[4] Indeed, the date that Lawrence names, 1960, as this tipping point of the pendulum coincides roughly with RMA's emergence in the Soviet Union.[5] While it may be a stretch to link Lawrence and RMA, he most definitely predicted the perils of a time in the future when people's obsession with the new and newness would cloud military thinking.

    [Continued below...]
    Last edited by Erich G. Simmers; 02-08-2011 at 05:34 PM.
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    T.E. Lawrence was as much a charlatan and fraud as Liddell-Hart, albeit a possibly brave one.
    And, as a final aside, much of the Lawrence bashing is unfounded. Seven Pillars of Wisdom is stylized autobiography in line with what many of Lawrence's Modernist contemporaries were writing. As such, there are distortions--many of which are either openly acknowledged by Lawrence himself. However, history supports the vast majority of his role in and account of the Arab Revolt. In A Prince of Our Disorder, John E. Mack disputed many of the claims of his more critical autobiographers and found almost universal support from the men with which he served:

    The subscriber's edition of Seven Pillars, of which about two hundred copies were printed in 1929, was sent to thirty officers who served in the Revolt, including such men as Allenby, Joyce, Newcombe, Young, Peake, Stirling, and Winterton. Copies were widely circulated and read by many others who had firsthand knowledge of the events of the Revolt. […] Neither Sterling nor any other of these men every questioned the veracity of Lawrence's account. Concerning the attack and seizure of Aqaba by land, for example--the single exploit of the campaigns for which Lawrence is best known--he has been accused of undeservedly claiming credit for its strategy. Suleiman Mousa in particular states that "the plan for capturing Aqaba was devices by Faisal and Auda in Wejh." But for Colonel Edouard Bremond, the leader of the French mission (who resented Lawrence), confirms that the plan was discussed in conference before 'Awdah abu-Tayyi joined in the Revolt…[1]
    Mack similarly pokes holes in Richard Aldington's 1955 book Lawrence of Arabia: A Biographical Inquiry, which--frankly--is very lame in its criticism. Most notably, he outs Lawrence's parents who were not married when he was conceived and claims that (paraphrasing very slightly) Lawrence liked being raped in Deraa when he was in Turkish captivity. The book was almost universally panned by the men who were there with Lawrence. Many wrote responses to the book:

    When Aldington attacked Lawrence as a charlatan and a fraud he aroused most intensely the ire of Lawrence's fellow officers. The angry reaction of Captain L. H. Gilman, who commanded an armored-car battery in close association with Lawrence until near the end of the campaign, is typical… […] Gilman then proceeds to refute Aldington on specific matters of which he had firsthand knowledge, such as Lawrence's presence and courage in operations against the Hijaz railroad that Aldington had denied.[2]
    I can go on citing first-hand accounts of Lawrence in Mack's book, but I will assume that the word of the soldiers who fought with him will be good enough…

    (I would have included that in my early manifesto, but most of my books are still boxed up from a move.)

    -------

    [1]. John E. Mack, The Prince of Our Disorder (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1976), 177-178.

    [2]. Ibid, 278.
    Last edited by Erich G. Simmers; 02-10-2011 at 12:18 AM.
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    Lawrence was a strange guy. Among his contradictions was his talent for "backing into the limelight," being self-promoting and self-effacing at the same time. His fame started with the American journalist Lowell Thomas and his stage show shortly after the war. To my way of thinking Lawrence's accomplishments shouldn't be categorically dismissed but at the same time they shouldn't be taken completely at face value either.

    Whenever an outsider to the military serves in a war and later claims to have been a rare genuis casting pearls before the swine of the regular officer corps the institution usually closes ranks against him. The rumors about Lawrence's sexuality have also made him something of a hero among non-military types who for the most part have never served in uniform but still believe themselves to be intellectually superior to the dullards of the professional officer caste.

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    Default Lawrence

    Erich:

    Like Hacksaw, we were all waiting for Wilf's response, which doesn't need reprinting. His personal accomplishments may warrant the status of Hero, like with Charles Lindbergh, but I wouldn't waste much time on either's political advice.

    My problem with Lawrence and Bell is not military, but political. They were deep believers, of not primary promoters of the very poorly conceived notion of a great Arab Nation which was like jumping from crawling to Moon Landing in an afternoon.

    Remembering that, as much as these Arabists loved the notions of Arab history, the Arab culture/politics of old had been devastated by Mongols in the 1200's, followed by Ottomans who, for the most part, may have been worse as bad for Arabs as the Mongols. These folks that Lawrence and Ms. Bell were working with had a long way to go just to establish "some" countries, and certainly not their Dream Palace.

    The continuing gap between the concept of the Caliphate and its reality is, in fact, the broad diversity of the Arab and Muslim world. The breadth and acceptance of Islam by so many diverse peoples is, for political/governance types, a built-in limitation.

    No surprise about Lawrence's disdain for air power against desert peoples. Look at the Bomber Harris experiences in Northern Iraq.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Pete View Post
    Stanley, as the great Karl might have said, evasiveness is merely an extension of obfuscation by other methods.
    methods other than what?

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    I am going to defend Lawrence on a few points here, but honestly whether or not Lawrence is an admirable guy is besides the point. There are far better defenses of and attacks on Lawrence than we're writing here. What I have never heard discussed before is this discussion of strategy as eternal. Anyone disagree that strategy is in anyway eternal?

    Quote Originally Posted by Pete View Post
    Lawrence was a strange guy. Among his contradictions was his talent for "backing into the limelight," being self-promoting and self-effacing at the same time. His fame started with the American journalist Lowell Thomas and his stage show shortly after the war. To my way of thinking Lawrence's accomplishments shouldn't be categorically dismissed but at the same time they shouldn't be taken completely at face value either.
    General Allenby and another war correspondent named W. T. Massey both praised his centrality to the Arab Revolt before Lowell Thomas's stage show.[1] Also, it is worth noting that the dude wanted to enlist after the war and live out his life in obscurity. His continued celebrity was more of burden than anything else. It is evident throughout his letters.

    Whenever an outsider to the military serves in a war and later claims to have been a rare genuis casting pearls before the swine of the regular officer corps the institution usually closes ranks against him. The rumors about Lawrence's sexuality have also made him something of a hero among non-military types who for the most part have never served in uniform but still believe themselves to be intellectually superior to the dullards of the professional officer caste.
    This is unfair. I have found no evidence that Lawrence remotely viewed himself or his peers that way. As one example, Lawrence told Liddell Hart that his theory and practice of war would take no more than 10 pages to write. (I am not going to dig for the citation right now, because I feel silly footnoting these posts so much and have dissertation to get back to.) He certainly didn't think what he did was rocket science, and he gave amble credit to other highly capable advisers and trainers like Herbert Garland.

    His actual addresses to the officer corps were stuff like his 1917 "The Twenty-Seven Articles of T. E. Lawrence."[2] It was originally intended as a brief in a secret journal called The Arab Bulletin. There is a reason Kilcullen modeled his "Twenty-Eight Articles" on it; it is a solid advice to Lawrence's contemporaries as foreign military advisors. I came across a letter to one of his commanders yesterday where Lawrence wrote (paraphrasing), "Don't stick any of this report in the Bulletin--you're making too big a deal out of me." (Again, I'm not going to dig for the letter--I'll edit later if I find it in the course of my actual day job.)

    As for Seven Pillars, his rationale for writing the book was three-fold: 1. work through his own trauma and guilt over what happened during and immediately following the war; 2. vent his frustrations about the political settlement; and 3. join his high-art literary friends as a "man of letters." (Lawrence was friends with many of the major writers of the day; you folks can make what you will out of this last one.)

    Lastly, I can say from experience that Lawrence is no hero to academics--for any reason, homosexuality or otherwise. For example, read Edward Said. Kaja Silverman (who I mentioned below) is more measured, but there is definitely no love. In fact, my peers give me a hard time for showing an interest in him--much less saying anything favorable of him.

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve the Planner View Post
    Erich:

    Like Hacksaw, we were all waiting for Wilf's response, which doesn't need reprinting. His personal accomplishments may warrant the status of Hero, like with Charles Lindbergh, but I wouldn't waste much time on either's political advice.

    My problem with Lawrence and Bell is not military, but political. They were deep believers, of not primary promoters of the very poorly conceived notion of a great Arab Nation which was like jumping from crawling to Moon Landing in an afternoon.

    Remembering that, as much as these Arabists loved the notions of Arab history, the Arab culture/politics of old had been devastated by Mongols in the 1200's, followed by Ottomans who, for the most part, may have been worse as bad for Arabs as the Mongols. These folks that Lawrence and Ms. Bell were working with had a long way to go just to establish "some" countries, and certainly not their Dream Palace.

    The continuing gap between the concept of the Caliphate and its reality is, in fact, the broad diversity of the Arab and Muslim world. The breadth and acceptance of Islam by so many diverse peoples is, for political/governance types, a built-in limitation.

    No surprise about Lawrence's disdain for air power against desert peoples. Look at the Bomber Harris experiences in Northern Iraq.
    Steve:

    I agree with you on this point about Lawrence and Bell although Lawrence's actual views are probably messier than either of us would present them. At times, Lawrence seems oddly conscious of points you raise:

    A first difficulty of the Arab movement was to say who the arabs were. Being a manufactured people, their name had been changing in sense slowly year by year. Once it meant an Arabian. There was a country called Arabia; but this was nothing to the point. There was a language called Arabic; and in it lay the test. It was the current tongue of Syria and Palestine, of Mesopotamia, and of the great peninsula called Arabia on the map. Before the Moslem conquest, these areas were inhabited by diverse peoples…[2]
    This square of land, as large as India, formed the homeland of Semites, in which no foreign race had kept a permanent footing, though Egyptians, Hittites, Philistines, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Turks and Franks had variously tried.[3]
    Conversely, Lawrence did try to set up a post-war Middle East very much in his image and in the interests much as you say. A scholar named Kaja Silverman lays out the "messiness" of this construction of the Middle East pretty well.[4] As a Westerner imposing this "nation in a box" strategy, of course it is a fantasy.

    At any rate, I am not proposing we adopt his politics, thinking about war, or anything of the sort. I just didn't think some of the characterizations of him were fair. Besides, I thought the strategy vs tactics bit was fascinating. Maybe, it's just me.

    -------

    [1]. Mack, 175-176.

    [2]. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (1922 edition on my Kindle, not sure how to cite these damn things).

    [3]. Ibid.

    [4]. Kaja Silverman, "White Skin, Brown Masks: The Double Mimesis, or With Lawrence in Arabia," Differences 1, no. 3: 17-18.
    Last edited by Erich G. Simmers; 02-10-2011 at 03:33 PM.
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