TE Lawrence: a merged thread

[William F. Owen]

Pete has inspired me to pull out my copy of "With Allenby in Palestine". This should make for a good read on another trans-Atlantic flight.

Reading anything on Allenby is time well spent, especially the book on him by Wavell. Allenby was a total professional in sharp contrast to the total-amateur of Lawrence.

I'd also strongly suggest reading Yigal Sheffy. British military intelligence in the Palestine campaign, 1914-1918

It's an excellent corrective to the Lawrence view and basically shows how cool headed and methodical the British were, and what Lawrence actually did versus what he and others claim.

[Bob's World]

Ahh, but American culture is distinct from British culture (perhaps due largely to the nature of that separation). It is one that values the successful military amateur over that of the successful military professional. At least it used to.

For the past 60 years or so, that we fell into a very colonial sustaining/ containment role we drifted, like our Euro parent, to being more focused on the professionals required to perform those peacetime tasks and are coming to see that as the gold standard.

I think America was a better country, with a better perspective, when it valued the amateur over the professional. We've slid down that slippery slope. Crafty old amateurs, such as George Washington, would shake his head in wonder at the America of today for this change of perspective and approach to the world.

[Infanteer]

I'm sorry Bob's World, but I can't agree with that lamentation.

Considering most, if not all, Western armies didn't have an Army "profession" (as defined by Huntington) in the 18th century and that much of the officer corps consisted of aristocrats, Washington could hardly be considered an amateur when held up to them. He definately was a "seasoned" amateur.

Canada used to be dominated by the "militia myth", believing that the militia was enough and that when threatened, the patrotic citizen mustering to the defence of the realm was more effective than a standing army. A poor reading of history commonly accompanied the "militia myth". That myth has since been demolished and it is a common understanding that despite a history of successful amateurs like Currie and Hoffmeister, neglect of the profession means that amateurs generally learn their professional shortcomings with the blood of their soldiers.

[Bob's World]

Oh, we created the military academies to ensure we had that core of professionalism; but it was the "myth of militias" that fought and won the American Civil War; Spanish-American War; World War I and World War II to name but 4.

Count the regulars on the battlefield, and they are few and far between. Count the senior commanders with military academy heritage, and they dominate the field. Today's problem is made worse in that we have gotten into messy peacetime engagements that we have labeled as "wars" and that we are employing our modern militia far to heavily overseas to wage peace. Militias should only be called upon in time of war, and our nation is not at war.

A small regular force can't be employed by the government to cause too much trouble in the world during times of peace. It is a valuable check on the abuse of power. This is but one more example of where America has taken off former self-constraints on actions overseas. Our current willingness to quickly move to militarily delivered deadly violence in the sovereign space of others is another example of such relaxing of self constraint. For my money, there is few more effective applications of power than constraint. Constraint coupled with the absolute certainty that when a certain line is crossed that it will come down with a frightening degree of certainty and effect. Used to often, and one loses much of that effectiveness and gains a reputation as a bully or a loose cannon. This is where we find ourselves today.

We have gotten all mixed up in our approaches and priorities.

[William F. Owen]

Ahh, but American culture is distinct from British culture (perhaps due largely to the nature of that separation). It is one that values the successful military amateur over that of the successful military professional. At least it used to.

I don't know where the distinction of Amateur and Professional occurs. Amateur (Gentleman) has always been a term of derision to me. As far as I am concerned, the preference is always for Professionals, as a description of men who study what they do and take it seriously.

[Bob's World]

In my experience, many of our "Armatures" are more versed in the profession of arms than our "Professionals" are. It is a distinction of what one does as their primary means of income, not a distinction of one's competence in a particular subject.

In fact, many a disaster has occured by placing too much trust in one who wears the badges and titles of a "professional," but lacks any real talent or expertise in their chosen profession.

[William F. Owen]

In fact, many a disaster has occured by placing too much trust in one who wears the badges and titles of a "professional," but lacks any real talent or expertise in their chosen profession.

I agree, thus I draw the distinction between men who take their profession seriously and seek to improve theirs and others conduct of it, and those that do not. Soldiering is a profession, (or should be) . Not a past time or hobby.

[Bob's World]

Sometimes the "hobbiest" sees what the professional cannot. Such as the small distinction that not all violence for political purposes is warfare!

(Ok, you know I had to bring that back around. Good discussion; I don't expect to convert you anytime soon, but think about it. The best answer likely lies somewhere in the no-man's land between our two positions. I believe us professionals need to put a finer point on some of these topics in order to help avoid some of the sticker messes we've been getting ourselves into with overly broad, and I believe, dated perspectives. It will likely be some old wolf like Ken White, or young buck like Infanteer who leads a patrol out there to bring that answer back.)

[Ken White]

...It is one that values the successful military amateur over that of the successful military professional. At least it used to.

US ArNG like to foster that idea...

For the past 60 years or so, that we fell into a very colonial sustaining/ containment role we drifted, like our Euro parent, to being more focused on the professionals required to perform those peacetime tasks and are coming to see that as the gold standard.

True, though I disagree with the drifting or the 'Euro parent' ideas. We didn't drift, we were propelled by FDR et.al. ...

I think America was a better country, with a better perspective, when it valued the amateur over the professional

Having been around before you arrove, I missed that. However, that's neither here nor there. We are where we are and dreams of returning to a kinder, gentler time are just that -- dreams. Nothing wrong with dreams but one must account for reality and not sugar coat the memories in order to convert the dream into meaningful progress.

A small regular force can't be employed by the government to cause too much trouble in the world during times of peace. It is a valuable check on the abuse of power. This is but one more example of where America has taken off former self-constraints on actions overseas.

More dreaming. In 1939, prior to the onset of WW II, the US Army and ArNG numbered about 400K -- about .3% of the then population. Smedley Butler would disagree with your "self constraints."

Today we have about 1M in the Army and ArNG -- about .3% of today's population. The more things change, the more they remain the same. Oh -- and Smedley would still disagree with you.

Infanteer also had this right: ""That myth has since been demolished and it is a common understanding that despite a history of successful amateurs like Currie and Hoffmeister, neglect of the profession means that amateurs generally learn their professional shortcomings with the blood of their soldiers."" The US has failed to fully comprehend that significant problem even though in the all the big wars you named, Civil War forward, there was ample evidence of its truth...

We have gotten all mixed up in our approaches and priorities.

That may be true but it is the policies that must be changed and I still await your proposal on how to get both the Politicians and the great unwashed to subscribe to your approach...

In my experience, many of our "Armatures" are more versed in the profession of arms than our "Professionals" are. It is a distinction of what one does as their primary means of income, not a distinction of one's competence in a particular subject.

I agree with the latter sentence, my experience with the former is that the statement is partly true but for few as opposed to many.

In fact, many a disaster has occured by placing too much trust in one who wears the badges and titles of a "professional," but lacks any real talent or expertise in their chosen profession.

That is totally correct. It is unfortunately exemplified by current US personnel policies which opt for 'fairness' (or the politically correct version thereof... ) over competence. The system produces far too many who are adequate or less so as opposed to the number who are good or better.

That is an exceedingly long way of getting to my points.

- Wilf and Infanteer are right, a good pro can whip a great amateur most always.. .

- We can agree on flawed policies. We might not totally agree on which are flawed but that's broadly immaterial as we do agree on many. The question neither of us can answer is how does one turn the Elephant herd that is the US political milieu and its accompanying defense bureaucracy. Wishing will not get that done...

[Bob's World]

Perhaps. Of course my point of order with Wilf was that he uses "Armature" when he means "Incompetent." Such bias-driven loose applications of meaning are how bar fights get started.

As to the 30s vs. now; As I recall the US did not have compete dominance of Air, Space, Land and Sea then as it does now...and a small percentage of a small nation creates small problems, such as the banana wars that Smedley rightfully found distasteful after the fact. Today, a small percentage of a large nation with such dominating enablers is able to get out there and create trouble on a much larger scale, and need not stop by the Congress to ask for permission on the way out the door...

And all things being equal, a good professional is indeed better than a gifted armature. But go to a surgeon and he will recommend surgery. Go to a Priest and he will recommend prayer. Go to a General and he will recommend war.

Which brings me to my second point with Wilf; not all violence for political purpose is war; nor should it be. Waging it as such can lead to far greater problems than the events that set things in motion to begin with.

[Ken White]

Perhaps. Of course my point of order with Wilf was that he uses "Armature" when he means "Incompetent."

Though my observation is that he's pretty careful with words, says what he means and has never denied that there are incompetent professionals -- indeed, he takes pleasure in naming them. As do I...

As to the 30s vs. now; As I recall the US did not have compete dominance of Air, Space, Land and Sea then as it does now...

Nor did anyone else at the time. Nor does the US really have that dominance today. If we did we wouldn't be doing many of the things we are doing or buying many of the things we are buying.

...and a small percentage of a small nation creates small problems, such as the banana wars that Smedley rightfully found distasteful after the fact.

That's Smedley. I don't find them distasteful, not at all -- though they were rather shortsighted. The fact remains that in the 30s, the harbingers of US cultural hegemony were all in place around the world to include the ME.

Today, a small percentage of a large nation with such dominating enablers is able to get out there and create trouble on a much larger scale, and need not stop by the Congress to ask for permission on the way out the door...

In order; not all that dominating or we wouldn't be doing what we're doing (or at least we'd be doing it far more efficiently and effectively...); This next is important: creating trouble or responding poorly to it? Two very different parameters requiring differing fixes. Really.

Ah, yes. Congress. What is your solution to them? As well as to the Executive Branch of the US government? According to you, both are behaving badly. I'm unsure how your plans and ideas can be implemented in view of that.

And all things being equal, a good professional is indeed better than a gifted armature. But go to a surgeon and he will recommend surgery. Go to a Priest and he will recommend prayer. Go to a General and he will recommend war.

Not to be snarky, but well, doh...

However, I've known a number of Generals who OPPOSED war (and specific, recent wars); more than have advocated for one.

That's not the issue, though. the Generals, whether they recommend war or not, do NOT make the decisions to go or not go. The issue with Generals is how they perform once that decision is made by their civilian bosses. Currently, the consensus is 'not too well' but that judgment is significantly affected by the political milieu. There's your real problem, nominal professionals and some AGR amateurs (many better than their active counterparts) being OVERdirected by both amateurs and professionals from another line of work. IOW, to use your similes, the Political High Priests (and a few Acolytes and even the occasional lay Brother plus a Nun or two, all, of course, from the 'correct' denomination or order -- none selected for their competence, either...) are directing the war or simulation thereof...

Which brings me to my second point with Wilf; not all violence for political purpose is war; nor should it be. Waging it as such can lead to far greater problems than the events that set things in motion to begin with.

That we can agree on -- and I don't think Wilf would disagree. Nor would Carl...

Though Lawrence -- either a gifted amateur or a superb self promoter; perhaps a bit of both -- might disagree.

[Steve the Planner]

Amateur/Professional/Whatever?

Starbuck: Burke's Lawrence piece was very good.

I particularly liked:

While experts in the ivory tower of academia may debate whether or not the military is best suited to restore civil and social services to a city after capture, the argument is moot. In many instances, such as Damascus the military may be the only organization around with the manpower and equipment to restore civic order.

There was a very unique group of Brits "walking around" the Middle East in the mid-1910's. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell are the two known in our histories.

They were studying societies, histories, architecture, structure of organizations...

I was amazed in the Burke article to not see any reference to Bell, who shared many a camel ride with Lawrence throughout that period. The two, as I understood it, were two branches of the same tree, and were constantly cross-fertilizing the Arab Nationalist Ideal, one coming from Egypt to Damascus, and the other coming through Basra and Mosul to the same spot.

As far as I know, the corresponding westerners that were "walking around" the Middle East (at different, but recent times) were Ryan Crocker and Rory Stewart. Neither was really successful in the military, but, like Lawrence as a practical matter, were really external influencers of the military.

I take a little discomfort with the military analyst's idea of correlating Lawrence/Bell with Petreaus/Nagl for a lot of reasons, but particularly because what Lawrence and Bell knew was social/cultural/organizational, which was adapted to military, while Petreaus/Nagl were military who, at most, learned enough social/cultural/organizational insights to play them for military purposes (often short-term ones).

The gap is most evident in the failings in Iraq to understand how to manage the civilian structure and systems, and in Afghanistan to grasp the anti-foreign aspect that is deep rooted and confounds our efforts.

Lawrence was a welcome chameleon in the Arab insurgency against the beastly and inept Turks, but was adamant and protective of their aspirations for self-rule.

I find that authors like William Dalrymple, who are Lawrence-like in their immersion in Northern Indian post-colonial society provide a very important set of insights into much of what Lawrence and Bell were studying and using.

Eating soup with a knife is a great symbol, in my mind, of the continuing failed effort to learn just enough to coopt a few people to temporarily join OUR side, but with little real comprehension of where enduring success lies.

The above quote is right on that a military can and should be capable of effective public administration when needed. We have not yet demonstrated that capacity.

Heck, even Lawrence could have just paid out some graft (Clear-Hold-Bribe) along the way and have travelled far but accomplished nothing.

Even with that, he and Bell's fixation with Arab Nationalism proved to be, in the best light, a premature aspiration, and in the worst light, the seeds of much of what led to future problems.

Maybe they just didn't build enough "capacity" before they left?

Clearly, aiming the right folks to the right challenges is the path to success (at the risk of being too much of a Toynbeeist).

[Steve the Planner]

Found this in "Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908" By Gökhan Çetinsaya:

“In your humble servant’s opinion, no idea has ever circulated in central government, other than the forcible repression and devastation of the Arabs. And they (the Arabs) have never been viewed as potential friends…The Arabs are not savage, but they fear and hate us.
Abdullatif Suphi Pasa to Sultan Abdulaziz, 1864”

Cetinsaya's Introduction uses this 1864 report as a frontispiece to explain the internal politics of the Ottoman Empire to its Arab territories, as they struggled to reform the struggling empire.

This stuff that Lawrence was feeding on was the air that Arabs breathed for generations: Hatred of the Turks.

How does this parallel our efforts in Kabul? Substituting Pashtuns for Arabs?

Which side are we on?

Is Lawrence's approach more useful to us or to Mullah Omar?

[William F. Owen]

While experts in the ivory tower of academia may debate whether or not the military is best suited to restore civil and social services to a city after capture, the argument is moot. In many instances, such as Damascus the military may be the only organization around with the manpower and equipment to restore civic order.

This is not the debate. Those of us focussed on informing practice are well aware that Military Power can and should be used to restore order. That is restore and maintain it, so as a political entity can exploit it.
Martial Law works. Ask Allenby! - not Lawrence!

There was a very unique group of Brits "walking around" the Middle East in the mid-1910's. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell are the two known in our histories.

They were not unique. There were hundereds (possibly 1000+) of British Civil Servant and Army officers in the Mid-East who spoke Arabic and in many cases much better than Lawrence.

Lawrence was a welcome chameleon in the Arab insurgency against the beastly and inept Turks, but was adamant and protective of their aspirations for self-rule.

Lawrence was a Britisher Officer tasked with getting the Arabs to defeat the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the British. When he started to speak for the Arabs, he was basically guilty if a mis-conduct and should have been charged and dismissed. Only his self started publicity machine prevented that happening.

What most people don't get is that the old-school British Army is not proud of Lawrence. What you see today is the flow down of 1960's Liberal hero-worship. He contributed very little of use and probably did more damage with his dreaming that good. Of course what sells books is saying "Hero." Last time I counted there were 11 Lawrence Biographies.