This LINK sort of sums up that charge as well as the one to which it originally referred...
Most such myths merely excuse doing stupid things instead of fighting smart. Repeat them too often and they become 'the way' to fight.
This LINK sort of sums up that charge as well as the one to which it originally referred...
Most such myths merely excuse doing stupid things instead of fighting smart. Repeat them too often and they become 'the way' to fight.
I suspect that General Allenby would be far less dismissive of the value provided to him by the service of LTC Lawrence than WILF is.
After all, what LTC under his command, Regular or otherwise, created more effects for him of a strategic nature in his prosecution of the campaign that he was responsible for?
SOF exploits often make good media, so do indeed draw more than their fair share of the lime light at time. SOF operations are also ALWAYS supporting and enhancing to the larger campaign, and never the decisive component. This contradiction often tends to irk a certain component of the regular, conventional force. It has always been this way.
John S. Moseby is legend, either as a criminal or a hero, depending on one's perspective; and I am sure many a "regular" in the Confederate Army was disdainful of the operations of this SOF militiaman.
Similarly the SAS and the LRDG exploits are justifiably legendary, and they too had their fair share of opponents and naysayers in the regular conventional force.
These examples of spectacular SOF successes contributed significantly to the campaigns they were in, far beyond the rank of their leaders or the numbers of men employed. But they were shaping, supporting efforts and not the decisive component of their respective fights.
We will always need the General Bradley's who can push millions of men in a mighty frontal assault across Europe; men who can organize massive destructive powers and relieve commanders and read casualty reports without blinking. Duty, you know.
We will also need men who can operate far from traditional forms of support, often alone but for a small team of brothers within a foreign people, a strange and dangerous land, with absolutely no or little link to things like logistical resupply or medical evacuation, or fire support, or any of the other wonderful tools of warfare that comfort and support those soldiers waging the conventional fight.
A good general understands this, and orchestrates and employs all to their best effect. Allenby allowed Lawrence to do what he did in support of his larger campaign. That fact alone separates him from many of his peers as a great general.
Most would have taken one look at a rag tag reservist dressed up in Arab garb and immediately relegated to some menial clerical job more suitable for such a misfit.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
From the Mad Magazine spoof, "Flawrence Of Arabia", April 1964.
Backwards Observer,
Excellent catch and enjoyed by a non-Wilf audience. I think this is the first time SWC has cited such a laudable publication.
davidbfpo
As I did not study the campaigns of both men in detail I have to ask others. How and how much did the activities of them influence the outcome in this theater of war?
Firn
Allenby commanded the operation that forced the Turkish army out of Palestine and captured Jerusalem in 1917. Lawrence helped to organize and lead irregular Arab forces in support of Allenby's campaign. Today there is an Allenby Bridge in Jerusalem. The image from circa 1918 in the link below shows that how one sees Allenby depends on one's point of view.
http://szyk.com/pics/iLrg-hs-print-c...ee-allenby.jpg
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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