TE Lawrence: a merged thread

[William F. Owen]

Allenby's successful operations in Palestine during the Great War are said to have delayed the demise of the horse cavalry for about 20 years after that war.

Who ever said that would be wrong. There was very good reason to retain Horse Cavalry/Mounted Infantry, well into the 1920's - certainly till 1932. The reason the British "Cavalry" were slow to change was mostly lack of money.

The real idiocy to come out of mounted operations in Palestine was the Australians, who tried to change mounted infantry into cavalry - buy giving them swords and cavalry training.

[William F. Owen]

An e-mail from another Lawrence sceptic reminded me of Lt Col Leachman
who sadly died before he could be compared to Lawrence or others could point out that men of this calibre, were comparatively common in the British Army of the day.

.... and amongst the regular army, "getting your name in the papers" was considered "bad form." Sadly, not so today.

[Pete]

Wait a minute Wilf, the Aussies remember the charge at Beersheba in October 1917 the way Americans remember the 101st Airborne at Bastogne.

The 4th and 12th Australian Light Horse Regiments drew up behind a ridge. From the crest, Beersheba was in full view. The course lay down a long, slight slope which was bare of cover. Between them and the town lay the enemy defences. The 4th was on the right; the 12th was on the left. They rode with bayonets in hand. Each drew up on a squadron frontage. Every man knew that only a wild, desperate charge could seize Beerhseba before dark. They moved off at the trot, deploying at once into artillery formation, with 5 metres between horsemen. Almost at once the pace quickened to a gallop. Once direction was given, the lead squadrons pressed forward. The 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment and the Yeomanry followed at the trot in reserve. The Turks opened fire with shrapnel. Machine guns fired against the lead squadrons. The Royal Horse Artillery got their range and soon had them out of action. The Turkish riflemen fired, horses were hit, but the charge was not checked.

For the entire story:

http://www.lighthorse.org.au/histbatt/beersheba.htm

[Ken White]

This LINK sort of sums up that charge as well as the one to which it originally referred...

Most such myths merely excuse doing stupid things instead of fighting smart. Repeat them too often and they become 'the way' to fight.

[Bob's World]

I suspect that General Allenby would be far less dismissive of the value provided to him by the service of LTC Lawrence than WILF is.

After all, what LTC under his command, Regular or otherwise, created more effects for him of a strategic nature in his prosecution of the campaign that he was responsible for?

SOF exploits often make good media, so do indeed draw more than their fair share of the lime light at time. SOF operations are also ALWAYS supporting and enhancing to the larger campaign, and never the decisive component. This contradiction often tends to irk a certain component of the regular, conventional force. It has always been this way.

John S. Moseby is legend, either as a criminal or a hero, depending on one's perspective; and I am sure many a "regular" in the Confederate Army was disdainful of the operations of this SOF militiaman.

Similarly the SAS and the LRDG exploits are justifiably legendary, and they too had their fair share of opponents and naysayers in the regular conventional force.

These examples of spectacular SOF successes contributed significantly to the campaigns they were in, far beyond the rank of their leaders or the numbers of men employed. But they were shaping, supporting efforts and not the decisive component of their respective fights.

We will always need the General Bradley's who can push millions of men in a mighty frontal assault across Europe; men who can organize massive destructive powers and relieve commanders and read casualty reports without blinking. Duty, you know.

We will also need men who can operate far from traditional forms of support, often alone but for a small team of brothers within a foreign people, a strange and dangerous land, with absolutely no or little link to things like logistical resupply or medical evacuation, or fire support, or any of the other wonderful tools of warfare that comfort and support those soldiers waging the conventional fight.

A good general understands this, and orchestrates and employs all to their best effect. Allenby allowed Lawrence to do what he did in support of his larger campaign. That fact alone separates him from many of his peers as a great general.

Most would have taken one look at a rag tag reservist dressed up in Arab garb and immediately relegated to some menial clerical job more suitable for such a misfit.

[William F. Owen]

A good general understands this, and orchestrates and employs all to their best effect. Allenby allowed Lawrence to do what he did in support of his larger campaign. That fact alone separates him from many of his peers as a great general.

I agree, so why the many biographies of Lawrence and very few of Allenby?
Objective military history should concentrate far more on Allenby and the role of the Arab Section of the British Intelligence than Lawrence.

[Backwards Observer]

From the Mad Magazine spoof, "Flawrence Of Arabia", April 1964.

[William F. Owen]

Wait a minute Wilf, the Aussies remember the charge at Beersheba in October 1917 the way Americans remember the 101st Airborne at Bastogne.

Between them and the town lay the enemy defences. The 4th was on the right; the 12th was on the left. They rode with bayonets in hand.

...nuff said....