TE Lawrence: a merged thread

[William F. Owen]

So...do you think a movement should be to name Patreaus the next Allenby?

The COIN club are trying to do that!
I don't know Patreaus at all, or much of him. By all accounts a good commander, but based on purely on historical achievement, or even successful operations, I cannot see how he makes a list with Sherman, Jackson, Abrams, Patton and Puller on it.

Culturally biased, I'll admit, with the exception of Sherman, I'm more drawn to Monash, Slim and Allenby as teachers, with a very grudging respect for Montgomery.

"for every Napoleon. Alexander, and Jesus Christ that made roles of [sic] history, there were several born. Only the lucky ones made it to the summit."

speaks to Allenby's very self-effacing manner. He really is worthy of study by the modern US and UK Army's. He just knew how to fight. It didn't matter if it was regulars or irregulars - they all fall the same way!

[Hacksaw]

I did serve with Gen Petraeus on two different occassions... The first during OIF I... the second while as CAC Cdr...

I don't know whether he belongs with Sherman, Abrahms... etc... then again in the midst of their heyday, I'd hazard a guess they had as many detractors... far easier to see a great commander in hindsite than it is in plain view...

This is what I can state authoritatively about Petraeus as a wartime commander...
Lazer-like focus on mission command and communicating intent...
Power down authority...
both physical and moral courage in abundance...
Absolute comfort with decision making...
Rightfully tough on staff to get it right (sometimes leading to the reality or perception of mistrust)...
radiates confidence
Green Tab, Green Tab, Green Tab...

As Commander of CAC...
Intellectually rigorous...
tireless....
flat organization (probably too flat for even himself)...
radiates confidence...

All of which I think bodes well for how HISTORY will regard him... as is predictable, one of his greatest strengths is perhaps his blind spot - radiates confidence would probably also be fairly applied to your entire list...

We shall see, as a disclaimer, my service with the man was from a staff perspective (with lots of access)... I can't say I always liked the man, but that has no bearing... always respected though...

My two cents

Live well and row

[Pete]

Allenby's successful operations in Palestine during the Great War are said to have delayed the demise of the horse cavalry for about 20 years after that war.

[William F. Owen]

Allenby's successful operations in Palestine during the Great War are said to have delayed the demise of the horse cavalry for about 20 years after that war.

Who ever said that would be wrong. There was very good reason to retain Horse Cavalry/Mounted Infantry, well into the 1920's - certainly till 1932. The reason the British "Cavalry" were slow to change was mostly lack of money.

The real idiocy to come out of mounted operations in Palestine was the Australians, who tried to change mounted infantry into cavalry - buy giving them swords and cavalry training.

[William F. Owen]

An e-mail from another Lawrence sceptic reminded me of Lt Col Leachman
who sadly died before he could be compared to Lawrence or others could point out that men of this calibre, were comparatively common in the British Army of the day.

.... and amongst the regular army, "getting your name in the papers" was considered "bad form." Sadly, not so today.

[Pete]

Wait a minute Wilf, the Aussies remember the charge at Beersheba in October 1917 the way Americans remember the 101st Airborne at Bastogne.

The 4th and 12th Australian Light Horse Regiments drew up behind a ridge. From the crest, Beersheba was in full view. The course lay down a long, slight slope which was bare of cover. Between them and the town lay the enemy defences. The 4th was on the right; the 12th was on the left. They rode with bayonets in hand. Each drew up on a squadron frontage. Every man knew that only a wild, desperate charge could seize Beerhseba before dark. They moved off at the trot, deploying at once into artillery formation, with 5 metres between horsemen. Almost at once the pace quickened to a gallop. Once direction was given, the lead squadrons pressed forward. The 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment and the Yeomanry followed at the trot in reserve. The Turks opened fire with shrapnel. Machine guns fired against the lead squadrons. The Royal Horse Artillery got their range and soon had them out of action. The Turkish riflemen fired, horses were hit, but the charge was not checked.

For the entire story:

http://www.lighthorse.org.au/histbatt/beersheba.htm

[Ken White]

This LINK sort of sums up that charge as well as the one to which it originally referred...

Most such myths merely excuse doing stupid things instead of fighting smart. Repeat them too often and they become 'the way' to fight.

[William F. Owen]

Wait a minute Wilf, the Aussies remember the charge at Beersheba in October 1917 the way Americans remember the 101st Airborne at Bastogne.

Between them and the town lay the enemy defences. The 4th was on the right; the 12th was on the left. They rode with bayonets in hand.

...nuff said....

[William F. Owen]

...

All of which I think bodes well for how HISTORY will regard him... as is predictable, one of his greatest strengths is perhaps his blind spot - radiates confidence would probably also be fairly applied to your entire list...

Hack, all sounds good. What I think is utterly irrelevant, compared to opinions within the US Army - my real point is that the nature of operations in Iraq is not going to show up great general ship. It will however do the opposite!

As Lewis Sorely said of Abrams, "He deserved a better war."

I think Wavell was a great general, but extremely unlucky to bump up against the Africa Korps and the greatly over-rated Rommel!