Hoffman vs. Sageman: Myth of Grassroots Terrorism

[J Wolfsberger]

may be this:

“The danger of this ‘either-or’ argument could lead us to the mistakes of the past,” said Baltasar Garzón, Spain’s leading antiterror investigatory magistrate. “In the ’90s, we saw atomized cells as everything, and then Al Qaeda came along. And now we look at Al Qaeda and say it’s no longer the threat. We’re making the same mistake again.”

(From the same article.)

[selil]

Sageman v. Hoffman. I think they are arguing over nuts and berries while the forrest burns down around them. I've read two of Sagemans books, seen his lecture on "Leaderless Jihad", and I've read Hoffmans book too. It is a perspective and point of view difference. Quite silly the vitrol that has been tossed around but not unusual in academia. Neither author is really providing actionable base theory. If I could get a select dozen of the SWC around a table for a day we could exit with actionable plans to wipe AQ off the face of the earth. Problems v. Solutions.

ETA: Yes I know that sounds grandiose, but ... After reading several dozen books on terrorism I was struck by the epiphany that.... They all discuss the problems and not even ONE discusses the solutions. Now I'm grumbling.

[Tom Odom]

Sageman v. Hoffman. I think they are arguing over nuts and berries while the forrest burns down around them. I've read two of Sagemans books, seen his lecture on "Leaderless Jihad", and I've read Hoffmans book too. It is a perspective and point of view difference. Quite silly the vitrol that has been tossed around but not unusual in academia. Neither author is really providing actionable base theory. If I could get a select dozen of the SWC around a table for a day we could exit with actionable plans to wipe AQ off the face of the earth. Problems v. Solutions.

ETA: Yes I know that sounds grandiose, but ... After reading several dozen books on terrorism I was struck by the epiphany that.... They all discuss the problems and not even ONE discusses the solutions. Now I'm grumbling.

Sam

I worked aniti-terror in the early 90s and soon discovered that it was a cottage industry on the cusp of going global, meaning that we did not do solutions. We did threats. Threats by definition had to grow and they always had to be a surprise. Therefore we could only speculate about those threats and how they were growing around us.

This is very remmiscent of that experience. It is intellectual "rice bowl" stuff.

Tom

[marct]

Hi Tom,

I worked aniti-terror in the early 90s and soon discovered that it was a cottage industry on the cusp of going global, meaning that we did not do solutions. We did threats. Threats by definition had to grow and they always had to be a surprise. Therefore we could only speculate about those threats and how they were growing around us.

A number of years ago, I looked at the welfare system in Ontario and realized that it was set up to keep people on welfare in part as a way of increasing the demand for social workers (and growing government departments budgets). This has a very familiar ring to it .

[SteveMetz]

Hi Tom,



A number of years ago, I looked at the welfare system in Ontario and realized that it was set up to keep people on welfare in part as a way of increasing the demand for social workers (and growing government departments budgets). This has a very familiar ring to it .

It's hard for any organization (or parent for that matter) to define their own irrelevance as their strategic objective. Imagine if the mission statement of the U.S. military was to create a world where it was no longer needed!

[marct]

It's hard for any organization (or parent for that matter) to define their own irrelevance as their strategic objective. Imagine if the mission statement of the U.S. military was to create a world where it was no longer needed!

Have you been reading my mind, Steve ?!?!?

Oh, I do agree with you; it's almost impossible for any organization, at least if it uses the rational-legal bureaucratic framework as its organizational genotype, to define its mission as eliminating the need for it.

[slapout9]

Last Sunday the military ch. had a program about Private Armies and of course the PMC Exective Outcomes came up and how good-fast-and cheap they were. Which is the very reason they became such a threat to conventional country based militaries. During the interview of their former CEO about every other word was "we were unconventional in our approach to the problem." Don't know how true everything he said was but I think there are some lessons to be learned

[slapout9]

If I could get a select dozen of the SWC around a table for a day we could exit with actionable plans to wipe AQ off the face of the earth. Problems v. Solutions.

Not to far off Sam, like I said on another thread a million bucks and the all the brains here and we could pretty much take out any country we wanted. Someplace that has beaches,beer and bikinis.

Tom you are so right, no money in solutions just make the problem bigger and require more college degrees and you have life time employment.

[SteveMetz]

Not to far off Sam, like I said on another thread a million bucks and the all the brains here and we could pretty much take out any country we wanted. Someplace that has beaches,beer and bikinis.

Tom you are so right, no money in solutions just make the problem bigger and require more college degrees and you have life time employment.

My understanding was that the Small Wars Council spends more time UNDER the table than AROUND it.

But (semi) seriously, this reminds me of an idea that I've tried with no success to sell my boss on. With a change of administrations coming up, we ought to build a collaborative SWC National Security Strategy using a wiki method.