The USMC in Helmand (merged thread)

**davidbfpo** · 01-15-2012

When I read this passage I stopped and AFAIK this has not been in the public domain before:

The result was a thankful population and, because “for the Taleban, losing people is not an issue but losing face is very important”, 400 Taleban defectors.

There are other comments on this operation, mainly background on the commanders influence approach:http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/mini...eral_1_2057051 and http://www.scotsman.com/news/kenny_f...arts_1_1362194

**Bill Moore** · 01-15-2012

Tequila, thanks for the link. Found pages 9 and 13 of particular interest, but in the end I think this quote sums it up.

It is best, in Helmand, to look at the situation in terms of normal human motivation, rather than as a clash of ideology, religion, or ethnicity.

However, this may not impact the overall situation in the country. The presence of foreign forces has skewed the debate; in Washington or London, much more attention is given to “strategic interests” and “global terrorism” than to local grievances and concerns.

**davidbfpo** · 01-18-2012

I'll echo Bill's comment and thanks to Tequila. I'd missed the NAF report on Helmand and wonder if anything has changed since September 2010, in Helmand for the locals.

Citing Bill now and if we had concentrated on:

local grievances and concerns

and the principle of reducing harm to the locals, would we have achieved our objectives in Helmand and Afghanistan?

I know we have attempted to look back at Iraq in the past, then looked around at other conflicts, both active and potential. If we adapted the principles of local issues first and reducing harm to the local populace would that satisfy our strategic objectives?

Or returning to the Imperial practice in the ungoverned spaces of punitive action and leaving promptly having delivered a message.