The USMC in Helmand (merged thread)

[Tukhachevskii]

Been offline for a few days and puzzled slightly at the two AFP photos on this BBC report:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8527266.stm

The armour look like German-made Leopards, which to my knowledge are deployed by only two ISAF nations in Afghanistan: the Canadians (in Kandahar) and the Danes (in Helmand).

Can anyone confirm what they are? I'm not familiar with the Stryker profile.

Apparently the French are also sending their Caesar wheeled 155mm howitzers http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/hta.../20090712.aspx


... whilst the Dutch are deploying their "panzer howitzers" (actually German made PzH2000) http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullSto...4C8D701CF85%7D

[Steve the Planner]

From the articles I have read, the Battle seems to have secured major population centers, but much of this place remains out of our reach.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran's coverage of the arrival of the town's newly appointed Mayor---the government in a box---sound like the box has yet to be filled or sealed:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...022201660.html

He arrived in Marja aboard a Marine MV-22B Osprey helicopter with a contingent of Marine officers and a small retinue of tribal elders who have been living in other parts of Helmand province. He was on the ground for about two hours, not venturing more than 100 yards from where his aircraft landed. He did not travel to the site of the new municipal center the Marines plan to construct, less than a half-mile away.

But, behind that is his more telling story about the Mayor behind the Mayor---Karzai's "chosen man" for the area:

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/90785856-1...0779e2340.html

A key challenge for the stabilisation team and Marine commanders will be transforming Zahir, who does not hail from Marjah and knows few people there, into an influential local figure. Helmand provincial governor Gulab Mangal selected him for the post largely because he is a friend, but in meetings of tribal elders before the operation, he was primarily a backbencher.

The man with the most sway in Marjah is Abdul Rahman Jan, the former police chief in Helmand. His officers in Marjah were so corrupt and ruthless – their trademark was summary executions – that many residents welcomed the Taliban as a more humane alternative.

Although Jan, who has extensive ties to narcotics traffickers, was removed from his post in 2005 after pressure from the British government, which was then about to send forces to Helmand, he remains close to Karzai.

Jan injected himself into discussions with tribal leaders in the run-up to the current operation. US and British diplomats say they think he will seek to influence the shape of the future Marja government and police force, in an effort to protect his interests in the area.

“Karzai wants A.R.J. to be the guy calling the shots in Marjah, not Haji Zahir,” said a western diplomat familiar with the issue. “That makes building an effective, stable government there a very challenging proposition.”

So much for the "government in a box."

Did somebody say that the reason the military is involved in this stuff only because no one else is? Ditto

[davidbfpo]

Two rather laudatory articles as General Sir David Richards tours Afghanistan: a general report:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ve-turned.html and an article around an interview:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html

On the strategic front very different opinions see the "round up" thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9718

I note the speculation on how many Taliban commanders were thinking of reconciliation.

[jcustis]

A key challenge for the stabilisation team and Marine commanders will be transforming Zahir, who does not hail from Marjah and knows few people there, into an influential local figure. Helmand provincial governor Gulab Mangal selected him for the post largely because he is a friend, but in meetings of tribal elders before the operation, he was primarily a backbencher.

It's really this sort of stuff which, if true, really alarms me since it cuts against just about everything that I thought we we trying to understand about Afghanistan. If the Helmand governor delivers decent governance to the people of the province and its districts, and what he says matters, then all's good and well. But if the residents of Marjeh and similar locales could care less about central government because it cannot deliver on essential services and merely doles out benefits via patronage, leading folks to weather much of live alone, then we will have to do twice as much work to bring anyone under the fold.

This goes back to my head-scratching over just what we are trying to accomplish when there are pretty strong arguments against hoping to synch a centralized government structure in with pretty resilient and independent tribal structures that are already taking care of themselves in ways they know how to do best.

It also makes me wonder what the back story is on this guy, and what other reasons there are (besides the Helmand Governor connection) for him to be THAT GUY who is purportedly right for the job.

My last deploy, we had a town on the edge of the Arab belt on the fringe of the Kurdish patch in Ninevah Province. Bulayj was a relatively sleepy town by that time, with not much in the way or insurgent pockets that could really influence anything. The town had a mayor, but he lived in a town several dozen miles to the north, and he rarely visited anymore, despite his official position, due to a fear of violence. So we had a sheikh to deal with, and he was all about pointing a finger at Maj Mohammed, the police chief, who in turn would offer a slight smile and such his teeth when the topic of the sheikh came up. Meanwhile the band played on, and the shopkeepers sold their wares and the black market benzine peddlers doled out portions from rusted drums on the fringe of town.

Makes me wonder if we need less of governors and mayors in some of these corners of the world, and would do better thinking along the lines of CEOs and COOs. After all, don't we routinely complain about politicians as generally being unable to influence our personal bottom line?

[Firn]

Makes me wonder if we need less of governors and mayors in some of these corners of the world, and would do better thinking along the lines of CEOs and COOs. After all, don't we routinely complain about politicians as generally being unable to influence our personal bottom line?

More political power (autonomy) and direct democracy at a lower level for sensible political entities like villages, valleys and the like might help in specific circumstances. Afghanistan seems to be a mosaic which doesn't create a picture. Isolated villages with a history of expecting and getting very little to nothing from Kabul or the next city are hard to rule from it.

Firn

[Entropy]

It's really this sort of stuff which, if true, really alarms me since it cuts against just about everything that I thought we we trying to understand about Afghanistan.

Unfortunately it is true. The history of the governorship of Helmand province is a good example. I think the top-down appointment of provincial, district and sub-district leadership hasn't worked out too well.

[Steve the Planner]

jcustis:

I came to the conclusion about two months ago that the only viable way forward would be some form of provisional management like Brit provincial governance.

Maybe it is through UN, or NATO, but it has to be, in many areas, not local. Local may come later, but not on schedule.

That is the only effective way to stabilize and improve things consistent with US objective s and schedules.

It means US or foreigners as administrators in many of these places, and not just as advisers, and short-tour passersby. Maybe they can work themselves out of a job later, but not right away.

The rest is just window dressing--pretending that Karzai can do it, or that the US civilians have a plan.

As Rajiv's artcile said, the real power is the drug-dealer-backed police chief. He can bring ruthless justice of the same kind that led the folks to the Taliban in the first place.

It's a very sad situation.

I find it interesting that, at the same time as Afghanistan is still ship without a rudder, Iraq is just going through birth pains. Others think its bad, but, aside from the routine risks and dangers of that area, its their start.

But they were no more ready to start in 2006 than the Afghans are now. Byan Jabr running the death squads, etc...

The plan and action has to match the circumstances.

[Bob's World]

jcustis:

I came to the conclusion about two months ago that the only viable way forward would be some form of provisional management like Brit provincial governance.

Maybe it is through UN, or NATO, but it has to be, in many areas, not local. Local may come later, but not on schedule.

That is the only effective way to stabilize and improve things consistent with US objective s and schedules.

It means US or foreigners as administrators in many of these places, and not just as advisers, and short-tour passersby. Maybe they can work themselves out of a job later, but not right away.

The rest is just window dressing--pretending that Karzai can do it, or that the US civilians have a plan.

As Rajiv's artcile said, the real power is the drug-dealer-backed police chief. He can bring ruthless justice of the same kind that led the folks to the Taliban in the first place.

It's a very sad situation.

I find it interesting that, at the same time as Afghanistan is still ship without a rudder, Iraq is just going through birth pains. Others think its bad, but, aside from the routine risks and dangers of that area, its their start.

But they were no more ready to start in 2006 than the Afghans are now. Byan Jabr running the death squads, etc...

The plan and action has to match the circumstances.

Marjah doesn't need "fixed" though. We need to resist the urge make things more effective, make things more like us (ok, that's a bit of an oxymoron, but you know what I mean).

All we need to do is enable local solutions. Enable the development of governance that enjoys populace-based legitimacy. To impose "effective Westerners" would be, IMO, a disaster of the highest order. In fact, if I were a Taliban commander I would PRAY that the coalition attempted such a tact, as it would ensure I had a steady supply of rank and file fighters for my unit.

We need some things we are not too good at:
1. Patience
2. Willingness to cede control of outcomes
3. Astuteness to avoid being overly manipulated by the current government.
4. Ability to overcome our fears of what would happen if the current challengers to that government made inroads.

Even flying Karzai appointees in in USMC aircraft makes me cringe...the strategic communications of that are so hard to overcome. Far better to wait until the man could drive in in a small convoy of white hilux's with an ANA or ANP escort. Even better wait until the local siystem of Shuras could apoint their own governor.

General Nick is pushing hard to do the right things in the right ways, but we have the iniertia of good intentions that we must overcome first.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Right. There are fifty ways to do things.

I just got rung up for my volunteer shift in Haiti (through American Planning Association/UN Habitat). Does that require a westerner, or just a western assistance?

I am sure my UN ground support and framework will be from Nairobi(UN Habitat HQ, or someone (lots of locals) with a compatible face and language), and will be locally inter-connected, along with the links to all the other efforts.

But you can't ask a local administrator who has no budget, cell phone, or bicycle to make any big effects alone.

I have a pick of the Roads Shop outside Samarra from 2008. Not a truck, a backhoe or a stick of furniture left. And lots of Americans pointlessly hammering on the Salah ad Din DG Roads for why he wasn't getting the roads up and running, and making big budget execution goals happen.

So we grabbed folks with helicopters and D-9s to help him get done what he needed done. Adding fun to it, he could not be seen with US mil without getting shot, so we had to do a lot of going-between. But that's one way to solve a particular problem in a particular circumstance.

Every time I show that pic to planners. they say: So that's why everything was all screwed up!

It ain't gonna work if it just can't work. We have a very bold civilian transformation mission in Afghanistan, and a tight schedule.

Patience and duration are the real key, but that doesn't match the mission and schedule.

While Zahir is still ordering tea cups, the time will pass.

For all I know, the refugees from Marjah, some who have ben in Kabul for years, might have kids coming back from Graduate Management School in Switzerland, and are ready to re-build the place (with family opium wealth), if security returns.

So, what's a viable way through that gets somewhere to outr schedule and goals (that isn't a complete waste of effort).