The USMC in Helmand (merged thread)

[Dayuhan]

The tragedy lies in the simple truth that the governmental horse not only refuses to learn to drink, but even milks us instead. Milk beats water, I guess.

Perhaps the tragedy lies in our belief that we could create a government that would do anything but milk us and manipulate us for the benefit of the individuals who are doing the governing. What did we expect to happen?

And, for the record, I hate the term "government in a box," which, I think, shows a profound ignorance of what government is. Government isn't some good that can be packaged and delivered.

It is a pretty appalling term, even more so because the idea is nothing new... who can forget the prelude to the Iraq war, and all the talk about "installing a democracy"?

As long as we fame our thinking with the assumption that an effective nation, a state, or government can be built, through some sort of arcane engineering method, we're going to keep running up against the same problem over and over again.

[jcustis]

Perhaps the problem is viewing the "Taliban" as something separate from "the people"? Perhaps the Taliban existed in Marjah (and everywhere else) because they are, to any degree, of the people?

Perfect point. We tend to miss little details like that all the time...

[tequila]

Nice post, Infanteer - but I'd argue that the situation you describe is not Pashtun specific but covers many insurgencies throughout history. Even the NLF in Vietnam encompassed many non-Communist elements --- the Communists provided the leadership and the organization, but most VC fighters were not Party members and did not aspire to be. Certain religious elements came into play there as well, as sects and groups (e.g. the Hoa Hao) suppressed by the Diem government went over to the NLF.

"Village" insurgencies of this type should not be regarded as really dangerous to the GIRoA, and their "accidental guerillas" are better reconciled than fought. However, I think it's a stretch to identify these groups as the same as the Taliban. They may ally with Taliban fighters to fight ANSF or NATO forces, and ambitious local commanders might transit to the full-time pros, but the vast majority will not leave their own areas and are more interested in local control and security than kicking the foreigners out, much less advancing Mullah Omar to Kabul. These fighters can be flipped or reconciled if local control can be established.

[OfTheTroops]

Today while listening to the Tipping Point by Gladwell http://books.google.com/books?id=MMl...age&q=&f=false my hope was rekindled for a second. The insurgency/ counterinsurgency seems to be related to the contagiousness of the message again. Isnt bringing "democratic human rights basd government supposed to catch like the plague and spread like the inkspot? Why is it not? Are we not finding the right "connectors" to spread the hope of our grand experiment or is it too complex to adapt and spread?

[Steve the Planner]

Are these folks Taliban taliban, or just local folks opposed to the provincial and national government they have seen to date?

You can't "flip" opponents to provincial and national ineffectiveness and corruption by given them that very same thing. You become the enforcer of that which they oppose. (Well discussed on many threads here).

Sp, how does a tailored and successful approach emerge from the post Marjah 3 that is positive and sustainable while the past two Marjah's failed?

What is it that connects, takes root, AND is consistent with our goals?

Gladwellian success processes are driven by things that catch on and add value. No?

[OfTheTroops]

I am only in the early chapters but he uses examples of hushpuppy shoes, syphillis, "white flight" and Yawning and how they infect and spread their "success"? So they did not have to be value positive. It seems a Republic/democracy should spread as easily as Communism or religious fascism. You just have to infect the right people with it. It seems this type of reasoning led to our cautious optimism for establishing beacons of Democracy.

[Bob's World]

I am only in the early chapters but he uses examples of hushpuppy shoes, syphillis, "white flight" and Yawning and how they infect and spread their "success"? So they did not have to be value positive. It seems a Republic/democracy should spread as easily as Communism or religious fascism. You just have to infect the right people with it. It seems this type of reasoning led to our cautious optimism for establishing beacons of Democracy.

but not so much for going against the flow.

Ideology is like that canoe, that enable one to go with the flow of where the populace naturally wants to go. But to attemp to employ an "ideology canoe" to go against the natural flow of the populace is not so easy.

So the insurgent (or the UW actor) can simply provide conoes. Offer an ideology that is mere promises. The government/counterinsurgent (or the FID actor) must actually perform. Promises must be matched with action.


You see the same effect in politics. (oops, insurgency IS politics) If times are good, bad leaders get re-elected. If times are bad, good leaders often get voted out in favor of a leader who may not be as good, but who offers the people what they want to hear.

[Infanteer]

"Village" insurgencies of this type should not be regarded as really dangerous to the GIRoA, and their "accidental guerillas" are better reconciled than fought. However, I think it's a stretch to identify these groups as the same as the Taliban. They may ally with Taliban fighters to fight ANSF or NATO forces, and ambitious local commanders might transit to the full-time pros, but the vast majority will not leave their own areas and are more interested in local control and security than kicking the foreigners out, much less advancing Mullah Omar to Kabul. These fighters can be flipped or reconciled if local control can be established.

Roger, but they are a concern in that as long as they exist, IEDs are emplaced, checkpoints are attacked and locals are coerced. If left unchecked, then they do turn into that force that marched on Kabul in the mid '90s.

As to whether they are Taliban or not, the best description I saw was viewing them as "Subway chains" - independently owned and operated by local entrepreneurs with resources, messaging and an image provided from corporate HQ. A pissed off guy will get his cousins together and shoot at the ANP, calling himself the "Taliban". The mid-level guy will get wind of this, go to these locals, give him some stuff and some guidance and let him run his show. So what if he isn't interested in re-establishing the Emirate right now - if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, it's probably a duck.

I try not to use the word "Taliban" too much when talking with locals. Once, when I asked, I got the young students from a Mosque brought to me. The word still carries it's legitimate religious connotations down here at times. I use the word "insurgent", "stranger", "foreigner" or "enemy" (dushman) based on who I am talking to.

Anyways, I digress - Marjah anyone?

[Firn]

Roger, but they are a concern in that as long as they exist, IEDs are emplaced, checkpoints are attacked and locals are coerced. If left unchecked, then they do turn into that force that marched on Kabul in the mid '90s.

As to whether they are Taliban or not, the best description I saw was viewing them as "Subway chains" - independently owned and operated by local entrepreneurs with resources, messaging and an image provided from corporate HQ. A pissed off guy will get his cousins together and shoot at the ANP, calling himself the "Taliban". The mid-level guy will get wind of this, go to these locals, give him some stuff and some guidance and let him run his show. So what if he isn't interested in re-establishing the Emirate right now - if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, it's probably a duck.

I try not to use the word "Taliban" too much when talking with locals. Once, when I asked, I got the young students from a Mosque brought to me. The word still carries it's legitimate religious connotations down here at times. I use the word "insurgent", "stranger", "foreigner" or "enemy" (dushman) based on who I am talking to.

Anyways, I digress - Marjah anyone?

Agreed. Sadly there are a lot of things which can and does piss many Afghans off, which the ANP ranking probably high on many lists. The article I quoted stated that many of the people in this meeting played a fair part in the insurgency. I do not know if they really think that they were acting "justly" when confessing that they attacked the ANP and that they will do so again, but chances are they feel this way.

If I would be a villager who has to plant poppy to sustain his family I would be pissed off if some corrupt cop would steal my money to enrich him and his gang of outsiders. Democracy is not very helpful when it brings people (and "foreign" Afghans) into power which do not protect me, allow those gangs to operate or even support them.

When many suffer under this corrupt regime and social, military and political support exists among the population for guys willing to bomb the ANP or shoot at the ANA or the guys supporting them, we have almost ideal conditions for an ideology and organization which, as Infanteer said before, could organize and align those forces in a way which already enabled it to control almost all Afghan territory.


Firn

[Steve the Planner]

The sad tale of the new mayor's background.

Sounds like "government out of the box"

New Afghan chief in Marjah has criminal record

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/...fqHAAD9E976HG0

[jmm99]

As I write, the current feed from the SWJ Blog is Marines Gone Rogue or Leading the Fight?, linking to a 3-page article (interesting read) at the WP, At Afghan outpost, Marines gone rogue or leading the fight against counterinsurgency?

Based on the map:

Helmand USMC.jpg

the Marines are securing the western stretch of Highway 1 in the map inset (including Marjah).

Some do not like the Marines' approach:

But the Marines' methods, and their insistence that they be given a degree of autonomy not afforded to U.S. Army units, also have riled many up the chain of command in Kabul and Washington, prompting some to refer to their area of operations in the south as "Marineistan." They regard the expansion in Delaram and beyond as contrary to the population-centric approach embraced by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, and they are seeking to impose more control over the Marines.

The U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Karl W. Eikenberry, recently noted that the international security force in Afghanistan feels as if it comprises 42 nations instead of 41 because the Marines act so independently from other U.S. forces.

"We have better operational coherence with virtually all of our NATO allies than we have with the U.S. Marine Corps," said a senior Obama administration official involved in Afghanistan policy.

All of that reminds me of ca. 45 years ago and comments re: CTZ I in general and USMC CAP in particular.

Comments by the more informed ?

Regards

Mike