The USMC in Helmand (merged thread)

[Entropy]

BW is completely correct. If you go to google maps and search "marjeh Afghanistan" and zoom in to the big green area in the desert you'll get an idea of the region and terrain.

[jcustis]

It's notable that LtCol Brian Christmas, CO of 3d Bn 6th Marines, is the son of LtGen George Christmas, company commander in 2/5 during the fight to regain Hue in '68.

I can only imagine the stories the younger Christmas will have to recount to his father when he gets home.

[jcustis]

Moderator's Note copied here from another thread

If history is any guide, Taliban fighters typically withdraw, leaving a host of hastily constructed IEDs behind that have become more powerful over the years. Large-scale withdrawal is usually followed by pockets of fierce resistance from limited groupings of fighters while small IED emplacement teams and teams of fighters harass perimeter forces with small arms fire and RPGs.40

The quote above is from the backgrounder article posted to the SWJ Blog post about Marjah.

Has anyone seen a breakout of unit organization that the various Taliban forces have employed, and the command and control methods employed (besides the obvious reliance on FRS type radios).

We saw them employ 30 5-man teams against one of the COPs (can't remember if it was Wanat or Keating)), but how does that shake out against their normal command structure and fighting organization? Do they just mob about aboard motorcycles and small pickups, or is there some semblance of team and squad organization for the fighters.

[jcustis]

Moderator's Note copied here from another thread

I'm hearing rumblings of heliborne assaults being used to support shaping operations for the attack to clear mission of Marjah.

Those would have good utility for avoiding IED-sewn areas on the way to key terrain objectives, and there's good reason to trust the inserted force can sustain itself relative to the threat until a more deliberate clearance mission can be executed to get to the maneuver elements. They'd seal off ratlines by establishing a traffic control/vehicle checkpoint, or total barrier plan.

[Firn]

Moderator's Note copied here from another thread

I'm hearing rumblings of heliborne assaults being used to support shaping operations for the attack to clear mission of Marjah.

Those would have good utility for avoiding IED-sewn areas on the way to key terrain objectives, and there's good reason to trust the inserted force can sustain itself relative to the threat until a more deliberate clearance mission can be executed to get to the maneuver elements. They'd seal off ratlines by establishing a traffic control/vehicle checkpoint, or total barrier plan.

The coalition should have been able to mass enough ressources to implement this approach and to make it hopefully work. As we already discussed in this thread, great parts of the territory should facilitate the use of inserted elements, be it observation or fighting/blocking forces.

We will see how this works out well.


Firn

[jcustis]

Moderator's Note copied here from another thread

The coalition should have been able to mass enough ressources to implement this approach and to make it hopefully work. As we already discussed in this thread, great parts of the territory should facilitate the use of inserted elements, be it observation or fighting/blocking forces.

We will see how this works out well.


Firn

One likelihood is that even though several aircraft were massed, many of them were reserved for mass casualty CASEVAC. They would be tagged for missions in the shaping phases, but reserved once things kicked off.

There are still operations occurring in other parts of the area of operations, so the number of MEDEVAC aircraft remains a finite entity. Assets might merely be located further forward, but the number available remain the same.

[davidbfpo]

From my "armchair" a good article by Tim of FRI, maybe very tactical, but has some snippets of note.

The only thing the local people of southern Helmand are concerned about, when it comes to Marines, is that they are going to leave soon. They would much rather see them stay - This is is told to me everywhere I go, and I go just about everywhere in this Province.

Earlier on:

An ANP commander pointed out a village where his men have hit 3 IEDs in as many weeks and each time the villagers poured out with AK’s to start a firefight. So, a few nights later the Marines blow a controlled det on the road to simulate an IED hit and when the villains rushed out with their flame sticks they met what we lovingly call the ‘L shaped ambush’.

Anyway the link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=4352#comments

Thread title changed 2nd October 2011 to reflect next post.

[davidbfpo]

A long BBC report after three weeks being with the USMC, which opens with:

After 10 years in Afghanistan, foreign troops can claim successes in the notorious province of Helmand - but a vicious guerrilla war still rages in the Upper Gereshk valley, which US marines are in the process of handing back to British forces.

Captain Andrew Terrell deployed here with the Royal Marines 40 Commando in 2007 and:

not a lot has changed. The situation is no better. The people here are not fed up with the fighting, they've not reached the limit of what they're willing to accept from the Taliban. It's easier for them to move out of the area and hope it settles down, but they don't look much further than tomorrow.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-14897977

From the tone I'd expect a film report to appear, but nothing is shown on the link.

[davidbfpo]

A short NYT article on the declining USMC presence and their replacement by:

the Afghan National Army has grown, to almost four brigades with more than 16,000 soldiers...

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/wo...pagewanted=all

As a DoS veteran of Afghanistan remarked this week:

Helmand Province only has 3% of the population, why the UK & USA made such a large commitment there is not easy to understand.

[former_0302]

A short NYT article on the declining USMC presence and their replacement by:

As a DoS veteran of Afghanistan remarked this week:

As a matter of pure conjecture, I'd guess it was because the Marine Corps wanted into Afghan, and the Army said something along the lines of "Great--we already own all this battlespace, and we're not giving it up, and we don't really want you around us, so where can we send you? Hey, the British could use some help in Helmand!" Or something to that effect.

[Bill Moore]

There was another post on the blog a few months ago that explained our leadership wanted the Marines to secure the population in Kandahar, but the Marines chose not to follow this order/advice(?) and struck out on their own into Helmand. One can speculate all day on why they did this. Did their leadership want a mission that had a higher probability of success, so they could support the never squeaking Marine propaganda wheel (look at our success)? Did they believe they could better secure Kandahar by securing the routes into Kandahar? Who knows, but it seems incredible if true they decided to follow their own strategy. We keep talking about the value of whole of government, coalition operations, but we need to get our joint operations straight first.

Seems every nation, every service, SOF, and each government agency is to a large degree pursuing their own strategy. While this won't generate synergy, it may quite by accident overwhelm the Taliban by confusing the hell of them.