The USMC in Helmand (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

Two rather laudatory articles as General Sir David Richards tours Afghanistan: a general report:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ve-turned.html and an article around an interview:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html

On the strategic front very different opinions see the "round up" thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9718

I note the speculation on how many Taliban commanders were thinking of reconciliation.

[jcustis]

A key challenge for the stabilisation team and Marine commanders will be transforming Zahir, who does not hail from Marjah and knows few people there, into an influential local figure. Helmand provincial governor Gulab Mangal selected him for the post largely because he is a friend, but in meetings of tribal elders before the operation, he was primarily a backbencher.

It's really this sort of stuff which, if true, really alarms me since it cuts against just about everything that I thought we we trying to understand about Afghanistan. If the Helmand governor delivers decent governance to the people of the province and its districts, and what he says matters, then all's good and well. But if the residents of Marjeh and similar locales could care less about central government because it cannot deliver on essential services and merely doles out benefits via patronage, leading folks to weather much of live alone, then we will have to do twice as much work to bring anyone under the fold.

This goes back to my head-scratching over just what we are trying to accomplish when there are pretty strong arguments against hoping to synch a centralized government structure in with pretty resilient and independent tribal structures that are already taking care of themselves in ways they know how to do best.

It also makes me wonder what the back story is on this guy, and what other reasons there are (besides the Helmand Governor connection) for him to be THAT GUY who is purportedly right for the job.

My last deploy, we had a town on the edge of the Arab belt on the fringe of the Kurdish patch in Ninevah Province. Bulayj was a relatively sleepy town by that time, with not much in the way or insurgent pockets that could really influence anything. The town had a mayor, but he lived in a town several dozen miles to the north, and he rarely visited anymore, despite his official position, due to a fear of violence. So we had a sheikh to deal with, and he was all about pointing a finger at Maj Mohammed, the police chief, who in turn would offer a slight smile and such his teeth when the topic of the sheikh came up. Meanwhile the band played on, and the shopkeepers sold their wares and the black market benzine peddlers doled out portions from rusted drums on the fringe of town.

Makes me wonder if we need less of governors and mayors in some of these corners of the world, and would do better thinking along the lines of CEOs and COOs. After all, don't we routinely complain about politicians as generally being unable to influence our personal bottom line?

[Firn]

Makes me wonder if we need less of governors and mayors in some of these corners of the world, and would do better thinking along the lines of CEOs and COOs. After all, don't we routinely complain about politicians as generally being unable to influence our personal bottom line?

More political power (autonomy) and direct democracy at a lower level for sensible political entities like villages, valleys and the like might help in specific circumstances. Afghanistan seems to be a mosaic which doesn't create a picture. Isolated villages with a history of expecting and getting very little to nothing from Kabul or the next city are hard to rule from it.

Firn

[Entropy]

It's really this sort of stuff which, if true, really alarms me since it cuts against just about everything that I thought we we trying to understand about Afghanistan.

Unfortunately it is true. The history of the governorship of Helmand province is a good example. I think the top-down appointment of provincial, district and sub-district leadership hasn't worked out too well.

[Steve the Planner]

jcustis:

I came to the conclusion about two months ago that the only viable way forward would be some form of provisional management like Brit provincial governance.

Maybe it is through UN, or NATO, but it has to be, in many areas, not local. Local may come later, but not on schedule.

That is the only effective way to stabilize and improve things consistent with US objective s and schedules.

It means US or foreigners as administrators in many of these places, and not just as advisers, and short-tour passersby. Maybe they can work themselves out of a job later, but not right away.

The rest is just window dressing--pretending that Karzai can do it, or that the US civilians have a plan.

As Rajiv's artcile said, the real power is the drug-dealer-backed police chief. He can bring ruthless justice of the same kind that led the folks to the Taliban in the first place.

It's a very sad situation.

I find it interesting that, at the same time as Afghanistan is still ship without a rudder, Iraq is just going through birth pains. Others think its bad, but, aside from the routine risks and dangers of that area, its their start.

But they were no more ready to start in 2006 than the Afghans are now. Byan Jabr running the death squads, etc...

The plan and action has to match the circumstances.

[Bob's World]

jcustis:

I came to the conclusion about two months ago that the only viable way forward would be some form of provisional management like Brit provincial governance.

Maybe it is through UN, or NATO, but it has to be, in many areas, not local. Local may come later, but not on schedule.

That is the only effective way to stabilize and improve things consistent with US objective s and schedules.

It means US or foreigners as administrators in many of these places, and not just as advisers, and short-tour passersby. Maybe they can work themselves out of a job later, but not right away.

The rest is just window dressing--pretending that Karzai can do it, or that the US civilians have a plan.

As Rajiv's artcile said, the real power is the drug-dealer-backed police chief. He can bring ruthless justice of the same kind that led the folks to the Taliban in the first place.

It's a very sad situation.

I find it interesting that, at the same time as Afghanistan is still ship without a rudder, Iraq is just going through birth pains. Others think its bad, but, aside from the routine risks and dangers of that area, its their start.

But they were no more ready to start in 2006 than the Afghans are now. Byan Jabr running the death squads, etc...

The plan and action has to match the circumstances.

Marjah doesn't need "fixed" though. We need to resist the urge make things more effective, make things more like us (ok, that's a bit of an oxymoron, but you know what I mean).

All we need to do is enable local solutions. Enable the development of governance that enjoys populace-based legitimacy. To impose "effective Westerners" would be, IMO, a disaster of the highest order. In fact, if I were a Taliban commander I would PRAY that the coalition attempted such a tact, as it would ensure I had a steady supply of rank and file fighters for my unit.

We need some things we are not too good at:
1. Patience
2. Willingness to cede control of outcomes
3. Astuteness to avoid being overly manipulated by the current government.
4. Ability to overcome our fears of what would happen if the current challengers to that government made inroads.

Even flying Karzai appointees in in USMC aircraft makes me cringe...the strategic communications of that are so hard to overcome. Far better to wait until the man could drive in in a small convoy of white hilux's with an ANA or ANP escort. Even better wait until the local siystem of Shuras could apoint their own governor.

General Nick is pushing hard to do the right things in the right ways, but we have the iniertia of good intentions that we must overcome first.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Right. There are fifty ways to do things.

I just got rung up for my volunteer shift in Haiti (through American Planning Association/UN Habitat). Does that require a westerner, or just a western assistance?

I am sure my UN ground support and framework will be from Nairobi(UN Habitat HQ, or someone (lots of locals) with a compatible face and language), and will be locally inter-connected, along with the links to all the other efforts.

But you can't ask a local administrator who has no budget, cell phone, or bicycle to make any big effects alone.

I have a pick of the Roads Shop outside Samarra from 2008. Not a truck, a backhoe or a stick of furniture left. And lots of Americans pointlessly hammering on the Salah ad Din DG Roads for why he wasn't getting the roads up and running, and making big budget execution goals happen.

So we grabbed folks with helicopters and D-9s to help him get done what he needed done. Adding fun to it, he could not be seen with US mil without getting shot, so we had to do a lot of going-between. But that's one way to solve a particular problem in a particular circumstance.

Every time I show that pic to planners. they say: So that's why everything was all screwed up!

It ain't gonna work if it just can't work. We have a very bold civilian transformation mission in Afghanistan, and a tight schedule.

Patience and duration are the real key, but that doesn't match the mission and schedule.

While Zahir is still ordering tea cups, the time will pass.

For all I know, the refugees from Marjah, some who have ben in Kabul for years, might have kids coming back from Graduate Management School in Switzerland, and are ready to re-build the place (with family opium wealth), if security returns.

So, what's a viable way through that gets somewhere to outr schedule and goals (that isn't a complete waste of effort).

[Bob's World]

Marjah is not a disaster area, it is part the most affluent region of Afghanistan. It has simply not been under GIROA governance, but has been under the Taliban.

The Coalition was, and will continue to be a great help with the security efforts; but what governing is required there does not in any way justify a preemption of legitmate local authority. Particularlly when one understands the effects such actions have in stregthening the support to the insurgency among the populace.

What we do need to keep an eye to is mititigating to the degree possible actions by the new governance to dip their own fingers into the substantial Poppy profits from the region for personal rather than collective gain; or to "resolve" land disputes by evicting current owners of premium land and replacing them via the "friends and family" program.

To install a Western governance to resolve such land disputes based on the "facts" that could be presented in a hearing would be a PR, and therefore strategic, disaster.

As Jesus said, "Give unto Ceaser, that which is Ceasar's."

To parphrase, "Leave unto the Afghans, that which is Afghan."

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

That's the rub.

First, you create security.

Then, return stability.

Which returns the population, which then has to deal with the stability system put in place and get past it to establish some level of self-rule and representation.

If what is coming in in the stability phase is to linked to too many other bad actors, or non-locals, how do the locals get rid of them later?

How does one hand the transition, fast and effective, without a provisional structure that is, on its face, temporary, and allows restoration of post-conflict local engagement that will be sustainable and improved?

If the g.o.b. gobs up the works, the result will not meet the mission objective.

Steve

[jcustis]

Which returns the population, which then has to deal with the stability system put in place and get past it to establish some level of self-rule and representation.

If what is coming in in the stability phase is to linked to too many other bad actors, or non-locals, how do the locals get rid of them later?

How does one hand the transition, fast and effective, without a provisional structure that is, on its face, temporary, and allows restoration of post-conflict local engagement that will be sustainable and improved?

And therein lies one of the reasons why I scratch my head. Once you've got stability and the population back, so long as essential services are turned back on (were they ever there at all???), does it truly require a local governance component that may turn corrupt and untidy? What if the services came, and the people continued to go on living live as they saw fit.

You see (and I'm using my oustide voice hear again), this goes precisely back to the Sanctuary Denial thread we were kicking around some while ago. Why were the Taliban in Marjeh, and why did the people allow them to dwell among them? Was it coercion/co-option, tribal, familial, or simply "I hear you my brother," support?

Has anyone seen the answer to those questions? Have those questions even been asked. We really need to peel back that layer before we assume that a government in the box is really going to resolve the pure root causes of acceptance of the Taliban. Too often in that corner of the world we continue to assume that the people comply because they are afraid...it ain't always that simple.

[Steve the Planner]

jcustis:

How do the locals see us? What-if any- problem do they have for which we bring a valuable solution?

Unfortunately, the Taliban was there because they were less ruthless that the Police Chief, and it was a prosperous little poppy-based rural economy that didn't ask for much, or get much.

We brought danger, destruction, and the possible return of the bad guys. Next, we want to bring something of value, instead.

What is it?

[Dayuhan]

A key challenge for the stabilisation team and Marine commanders will be transforming Zahir, who does not hail from Marjah and knows few people there, into an influential local figure.

That's quite a challenge... I have to wonder how exactly we expect the stabilization team and Marine commanders to "transform" an outsider into an insider. Even more, I have to wonder why we insist on handing our people that sort of challenge in the first place. Is there no way that we could have convinced the Karzai government to appoint someone local, or even to allow a local council of elders to select their own candidate? Do we not have that sort of influence, or are we not using it?

How do the locals see us? What-if any- problem do they have for which we bring a valuable solution?

They probably see us as foreign invaders, conquerors, and occupiers, because - let's not kid ourselves here - that's what we are.

It's likely that they also see our "government in a box" as a bunch of carpetbaggers imposed by Kabul, protected by an occupying army, and intent on governing for their own interests and those of their sponsors. This assessment would also be pretty reasonable under the circumstances.

Possibly I'm overly pessimistic, but I can't say it sounds like a recipe for success.

I notice that our discussions of the acceptability of governance tend to revolve around our own perceptions of what constitutes quality governance, and around the assumption that what we call "good governance" will be accepted regardless of who is doing the governing. What if acceptability is less a function of performance than of source? What if foreign or foreign-sponsored governance is seen as a priori unacceptable, regardless of performance? What is there is a fundamental suspicion of and hostility toward foreign-supported centralized government? People who have never experienced good governance are likely to see central government not as a potential benefactor but as an assumed oppressor. It seems we've decided that we have to counter that perception by imposing central government and demonstrating its benefits, which may not be a task we can actually accomplish. Might it not have been easier to adopt a less Kabul-centric system in the first place?

Again, I may be overly pessimistic, but I suspect that our decision to impose a centralized government may prove to be a major obstacle to accomplishing our objectives in Afghanistan, and that it will not be an easy decision to reverse.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayahun:

In a nutshell.

Two articles:

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/wo...a/02marja.html

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2134199c-2...49a,s01=1.html

The NYT story points out that VP Khalili, a Hazara, spoke in Dari, to an uncomfortable audience that only half understood him.

The FT article adds:

"Mr Khalili, speaking to a crowd of residents who sat on the ground in a dozen even rows, said the Afghan government would “exhaust all avenues to bring peace and security”.

“We will stay, we will fight with all our forces, we will defend you,” he said. “We will be next to you, shoulder to shoulder.”

But scepticism towards the government runs deep among many Afghans, and many see the police in particular as a corrupt and predatory organisation. Some in Marjah are also angry about the damage to homes and fields caused during the fighting."


So, that big challenge remains. Is this GoB thing going to work if the central gov is just going to send "the regular suspects," and not really get down on the ground and play.

Of course, the big paradox right now is about the poppy crop in the field, which everyone is dependent on for their livel-hood. Are we going to destroy it? If not, are we going to let them market it to the Taliban poppy trade system?

These folks aren't evil drug dealers, just farmers dependent on that crop in the field for their survival. How we deal with that will be the pivot point.

[Dayuhan]

I've seen the articles, but they don't answer two questions:

First, what kind of decision making process leads to a situation where the US has to expend lives and resources to clear Marjah so the Governor of Helmand can appoint his buddy - who isn't even from Marjah - to run the place? Possibly I'm missing something here, I certainly hope so... but isn't this the kind of crony rule that's likely to undermine everything we're trying to accomplish? Is there nothing that could have been done to at least assure that the local administrator would be from the area, ideally appointed with the approval of the local elders?

Second, would the appointment of an outsider as administrator be acceptable to the populace in any event? I ask because in the tribal society in which I live the chance of an outsider surviving as an externally imposed local administrator would be nil. Even if he had a halo floating over his head, turned water into wine and called down manna from heaven, an outsider appointed to such a position would be tossed out of the province before he got to warm his chair: the people here ask little and expect less of government, but they do insist that they be governed by their own. "Us and them" is a fairly basic human impulse, and I'm wondering to what extent that same expectation applies in a place like Marjah, and whether the appointment of a governor who owes his position to an external patron rather than to the approval of the local populace is not going to compromise the entire effort from the start.

Of course, the big paradox right now is about the poppy crop in the field, which everyone is dependent on for their livel-hood. Are we going to destroy it? If not, are we going to let them market it to the Taliban poppy trade system?

I agree that it would be silly to destroy the crop; it would make more sense to buy it, and to try to convince people to shift to other crops, though those crops would probably be have to be bought at a premium for some time to make the transition sustainable. If growing poppies is more profitable than growing grain or vegetables, people will grow poppies.

The cynic in me guesses that poppy farming will simply carry on as before, with some adjustments in the direction of the cash flow.

[Firn]

Another article from the NYTimes.

“They told us, ‘We’ve been at this eight years and we’ve heard a lot of promises,’ ” Colonel Newman said. “From a human standpoint, I can’t say I blame them. Trust is earned, not given. We’ve got to provide.”

Most of the Afghans in the meeting, he added, had been fighting the Marines in recent days.

I also feel that we promised too much and set the bar too high in relation to our efforts.

...

But the bad reputation of the Afghan police forces, in particular, along with the spotty performance of Afghan forces in Marja, suggest that the work and the spending of billions of American dollars to date had not achieved anything like the desired effects.

The Afghans in the meeting with the colonels were blunt. “They said: ‘We’re with you. We want to help you build. We will support you. But if you bring in the cops, we will fight you till death,’ ” Colonel Newman said.

The plan is to bring in the cops; already they are arriving at American-built outposts.

....

And so a complex and difficult strategy was evident on the ground.

Even while the Marines continued securing Marja and its environs, Colonel Newman was ordering a shift to engagement: paying Afghans for damage to their homes and shops; holding meetings with elders to discuss development contracts that can be started quickly; and putting Afghans to work at quick projects, including clearing brush, digging canals and providing gravel to outposts to keep down dust and mud.

Simultaneously, the Marines were signaling that the Afghan police units coming to Marja were not like the past officers, whose arrogance and corruption left behind a reservoir of animosity and disgust. The message was simple: The new police officers are different men; give them a chance to earn your respect.

I really feel for the guys in the fight. It seems that they are trying very hard to do the right things, but also have to stick out thier neck to defend the indefensible (ANP, crony outsiders or Afghan foreigners).

...

The first phase of the campaign for Marja was ending. Captain Karabin had paid aggrieved shop owners $300 to $500 each for their losses to the Afghan Army’s looting.

So began the complicated campaign of engagement. It is a race for Afghan government competence and a contest for respect and for trust, in a place where all are in short supply.

A race in which you have to promise for and rely on people which are not under your control, are also seen as foreigners and often work or better rob for their pockets.


Firn

[Entropy]

I shared all the concerns voiced by Dayuhan.

Imagine, for instance, the US federal government came in and appointed a new Mayor for Chicago - some person from Texas. What would his/her chance be of prevailing against the Chicago machine? Yet we expect this strategy to work in Marjeh?

And, for the record, I hate the term "government in a box," which, I think, shows a profound ignorance of what government is. Government isn't some good that can be packaged and delivered.

[Firn]

I shared all the concerns voiced by Dayuhan.

Imagine, for instance, the US federal government came in and appointed a new Mayor for Chicago - some person from Texas. What would his/her chance be of prevailing against the Chicago machine? Yet we expect this strategy to work in Marjeh?

And, for the record, I hate the term "government in a box," which, I think, shows a profound ignorance of what government is. Government isn't some good that can be packaged and delivered.

In short, if the governance is corrupt and crony, at least let it be a local corrupt and crony one. At least in this case the marines and the West don't have to vouch for robber barons from abroad and get afterwards blamed for doing so. I fear that the Kabul connection will rob this success and fertilize again the ground for the opponents.


Firn

[Dayuhan]

In short, if the governance is corrupt and crony, at least let it be a local corrupt and crony one.

Absolutely. A certain amount of corruption and cronyism is realistically inevitable. If tne government is local, even more if it's selected by or at least approved by a local shura or similar process, it's a lot harder to blame the outcome on oppressive foreigners from kabul or America.

I fear that the Kabul connection will rob this success and fertilize again the ground for the opponents.

One imagines a Taliban propagandist smiling in anticipation....

[jcustis]

And, for the record, I hate the term "government in a box," which, I think, shows a profound ignorance of what government is. Government isn't some good that can be packaged and delivered.

You know what? You're right, and expression or not, that is a remarkably stupid way to describe it.

[Firn]

One imagines a Taliban propagandist smiling in anticipation....

The tragedy lies in the simple truth that the governmental horse not only refuses to learn to drink, but even milks us instead. Milk beats water, I guess.


Firn