The USMC in Helmand (merged thread)

[Infanteer]

Why were the Taliban in Marjeh, and why did the people allow them to dwell among them? Was it coercion/co-option, tribal, familial, or simply "I hear you my brother," support?

Perhaps the problem is viewing the "Taliban" as something separate from "the people"? Perhaps the Taliban existed in Marjah (and everywhere else) because they are, to any degree, of the people?

Bob's World spoke of two insurgencies - a revolutionary one (Quetta Shura) that views itself as a legitimate replacement for Karzai's government, and a reactionary one which is localized resistance to both foreign forces (to a larger degree) and northern suzerainty (to a lesser degree). Every village has its own "insurgency" for its own reason - police robbed them, ISAF destroyed their fields, mullah preaches a good line about the duties of expelling infidels, airstrike killed some villagers, it's the Pashtun thing to do, etc, etc. In essence, there are hundreds of small, reactionary insurgencies going on at the same time. The overarching revolutionary insurgency is the glue that binds these together. It takes all these grievances and turns them into "The Taliban" and can supply them with some extra horsepower. The best term for this I've seen is a "Pashtun Intifada".

Apply that to Marjah (or Panjwayi, or Arghandab, or Kunar) and you'll probably get your answer of why the Taliban were allowed to exist in the area.

My 2 cents.

[Steve the Planner]

I could pur salt in the wounds with this latest AP missive on the driug finds, and what to do with them,

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/...MifEwD9E713G00

But the point is the "Government in a Box" crap, when applied, looks like a profound Achilles Heel. Is it going to be Clear, Hold, Build, or just the regular grass mowing, and come back in two years?

I'm still stuck with this notion that something "provisional" has to be worked out to make the "hold, build" part work to, first, establish effective control, and second, create stabilization, and third, incorporate and transition to local control---rapidly, effectively, and over and over.

Haven't seen that yet.

A Relief news report indicated there were some 4,000 families recorded as refugees from the fighting, waiting to come home---those are the "people" of Marjah. That's maybe 25,000 people. So how do we deal with them?

[Dayuhan]

The tragedy lies in the simple truth that the governmental horse not only refuses to learn to drink, but even milks us instead. Milk beats water, I guess.

Perhaps the tragedy lies in our belief that we could create a government that would do anything but milk us and manipulate us for the benefit of the individuals who are doing the governing. What did we expect to happen?

And, for the record, I hate the term "government in a box," which, I think, shows a profound ignorance of what government is. Government isn't some good that can be packaged and delivered.

It is a pretty appalling term, even more so because the idea is nothing new... who can forget the prelude to the Iraq war, and all the talk about "installing a democracy"?

As long as we fame our thinking with the assumption that an effective nation, a state, or government can be built, through some sort of arcane engineering method, we're going to keep running up against the same problem over and over again.

[jcustis]

Perhaps the problem is viewing the "Taliban" as something separate from "the people"? Perhaps the Taliban existed in Marjah (and everywhere else) because they are, to any degree, of the people?

Perfect point. We tend to miss little details like that all the time...

[tequila]

Nice post, Infanteer - but I'd argue that the situation you describe is not Pashtun specific but covers many insurgencies throughout history. Even the NLF in Vietnam encompassed many non-Communist elements --- the Communists provided the leadership and the organization, but most VC fighters were not Party members and did not aspire to be. Certain religious elements came into play there as well, as sects and groups (e.g. the Hoa Hao) suppressed by the Diem government went over to the NLF.

"Village" insurgencies of this type should not be regarded as really dangerous to the GIRoA, and their "accidental guerillas" are better reconciled than fought. However, I think it's a stretch to identify these groups as the same as the Taliban. They may ally with Taliban fighters to fight ANSF or NATO forces, and ambitious local commanders might transit to the full-time pros, but the vast majority will not leave their own areas and are more interested in local control and security than kicking the foreigners out, much less advancing Mullah Omar to Kabul. These fighters can be flipped or reconciled if local control can be established.

[OfTheTroops]

Today while listening to the Tipping Point by Gladwell http://books.google.com/books?id=MMl...age&q=&f=false my hope was rekindled for a second. The insurgency/ counterinsurgency seems to be related to the contagiousness of the message again. Isnt bringing "democratic human rights basd government supposed to catch like the plague and spread like the inkspot? Why is it not? Are we not finding the right "connectors" to spread the hope of our grand experiment or is it too complex to adapt and spread?

[Steve the Planner]

Are these folks Taliban taliban, or just local folks opposed to the provincial and national government they have seen to date?

You can't "flip" opponents to provincial and national ineffectiveness and corruption by given them that very same thing. You become the enforcer of that which they oppose. (Well discussed on many threads here).

Sp, how does a tailored and successful approach emerge from the post Marjah 3 that is positive and sustainable while the past two Marjah's failed?

What is it that connects, takes root, AND is consistent with our goals?

Gladwellian success processes are driven by things that catch on and add value. No?

[OfTheTroops]

I am only in the early chapters but he uses examples of hushpuppy shoes, syphillis, "white flight" and Yawning and how they infect and spread their "success"? So they did not have to be value positive. It seems a Republic/democracy should spread as easily as Communism or religious fascism. You just have to infect the right people with it. It seems this type of reasoning led to our cautious optimism for establishing beacons of Democracy.

[Bob's World]

I am only in the early chapters but he uses examples of hushpuppy shoes, syphillis, "white flight" and Yawning and how they infect and spread their "success"? So they did not have to be value positive. It seems a Republic/democracy should spread as easily as Communism or religious fascism. You just have to infect the right people with it. It seems this type of reasoning led to our cautious optimism for establishing beacons of Democracy.

but not so much for going against the flow.

Ideology is like that canoe, that enable one to go with the flow of where the populace naturally wants to go. But to attemp to employ an "ideology canoe" to go against the natural flow of the populace is not so easy.

So the insurgent (or the UW actor) can simply provide conoes. Offer an ideology that is mere promises. The government/counterinsurgent (or the FID actor) must actually perform. Promises must be matched with action.


You see the same effect in politics. (oops, insurgency IS politics) If times are good, bad leaders get re-elected. If times are bad, good leaders often get voted out in favor of a leader who may not be as good, but who offers the people what they want to hear.

[Infanteer]

"Village" insurgencies of this type should not be regarded as really dangerous to the GIRoA, and their "accidental guerillas" are better reconciled than fought. However, I think it's a stretch to identify these groups as the same as the Taliban. They may ally with Taliban fighters to fight ANSF or NATO forces, and ambitious local commanders might transit to the full-time pros, but the vast majority will not leave their own areas and are more interested in local control and security than kicking the foreigners out, much less advancing Mullah Omar to Kabul. These fighters can be flipped or reconciled if local control can be established.

Roger, but they are a concern in that as long as they exist, IEDs are emplaced, checkpoints are attacked and locals are coerced. If left unchecked, then they do turn into that force that marched on Kabul in the mid '90s.

As to whether they are Taliban or not, the best description I saw was viewing them as "Subway chains" - independently owned and operated by local entrepreneurs with resources, messaging and an image provided from corporate HQ. A pissed off guy will get his cousins together and shoot at the ANP, calling himself the "Taliban". The mid-level guy will get wind of this, go to these locals, give him some stuff and some guidance and let him run his show. So what if he isn't interested in re-establishing the Emirate right now - if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, it's probably a duck.

I try not to use the word "Taliban" too much when talking with locals. Once, when I asked, I got the young students from a Mosque brought to me. The word still carries it's legitimate religious connotations down here at times. I use the word "insurgent", "stranger", "foreigner" or "enemy" (dushman) based on who I am talking to.

Anyways, I digress - Marjah anyone?

[Firn]

Roger, but they are a concern in that as long as they exist, IEDs are emplaced, checkpoints are attacked and locals are coerced. If left unchecked, then they do turn into that force that marched on Kabul in the mid '90s.

As to whether they are Taliban or not, the best description I saw was viewing them as "Subway chains" - independently owned and operated by local entrepreneurs with resources, messaging and an image provided from corporate HQ. A pissed off guy will get his cousins together and shoot at the ANP, calling himself the "Taliban". The mid-level guy will get wind of this, go to these locals, give him some stuff and some guidance and let him run his show. So what if he isn't interested in re-establishing the Emirate right now - if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, it's probably a duck.

I try not to use the word "Taliban" too much when talking with locals. Once, when I asked, I got the young students from a Mosque brought to me. The word still carries it's legitimate religious connotations down here at times. I use the word "insurgent", "stranger", "foreigner" or "enemy" (dushman) based on who I am talking to.

Anyways, I digress - Marjah anyone?

Agreed. Sadly there are a lot of things which can and does piss many Afghans off, which the ANP ranking probably high on many lists. The article I quoted stated that many of the people in this meeting played a fair part in the insurgency. I do not know if they really think that they were acting "justly" when confessing that they attacked the ANP and that they will do so again, but chances are they feel this way.

If I would be a villager who has to plant poppy to sustain his family I would be pissed off if some corrupt cop would steal my money to enrich him and his gang of outsiders. Democracy is not very helpful when it brings people (and "foreign" Afghans) into power which do not protect me, allow those gangs to operate or even support them.

When many suffer under this corrupt regime and social, military and political support exists among the population for guys willing to bomb the ANP or shoot at the ANA or the guys supporting them, we have almost ideal conditions for an ideology and organization which, as Infanteer said before, could organize and align those forces in a way which already enabled it to control almost all Afghan territory.


Firn

[Steve the Planner]

The sad tale of the new mayor's background.

Sounds like "government out of the box"

New Afghan chief in Marjah has criminal record

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/...fqHAAD9E976HG0

[jmm99]

As I write, the current feed from the SWJ Blog is Marines Gone Rogue or Leading the Fight?, linking to a 3-page article (interesting read) at the WP, At Afghan outpost, Marines gone rogue or leading the fight against counterinsurgency?

Based on the map:

Helmand USMC.jpg

the Marines are securing the western stretch of Highway 1 in the map inset (including Marjah).

Some do not like the Marines' approach:

But the Marines' methods, and their insistence that they be given a degree of autonomy not afforded to U.S. Army units, also have riled many up the chain of command in Kabul and Washington, prompting some to refer to their area of operations in the south as "Marineistan." They regard the expansion in Delaram and beyond as contrary to the population-centric approach embraced by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, and they are seeking to impose more control over the Marines.

The U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Karl W. Eikenberry, recently noted that the international security force in Afghanistan feels as if it comprises 42 nations instead of 41 because the Marines act so independently from other U.S. forces.

"We have better operational coherence with virtually all of our NATO allies than we have with the U.S. Marine Corps," said a senior Obama administration official involved in Afghanistan policy.

All of that reminds me of ca. 45 years ago and comments re: CTZ I in general and USMC CAP in particular.

Comments by the more informed ?

Regards

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

I believe we are back to the strategies vs. tactics issues for the 41 (or 42) different international parties, each with their own fleeting AO and mission.

If I was told to be west of Kandahar (but not Kandahar), how would I view what is important, where to be, and what to do?

Those no man's lands around delaram/nimruz have importance to the west of Kandahar area as the backstop in the whackamole game about to start with the Kandahar operation.

Somewhere west of Helmand is the limit of Pashtunistan, and the start of Iranistan. So is that a good place to set the western marker?

The Marines know damned well that this is Marjah 3, and know that if they just do what the others have done (go into Helmand until relieved), the results will be the same.

Assuming there is a big picture, how does what they are doing fit into it?

I didn't read anything in that WP article that explained why they are doing what they are doing, or how what they are doing is inconsistent with the mission they were assigned.

It was all just about Kandahar (somebody else's very tough next mission).

The corollary WP article on the increased problems in Kandahar could have been combined to ask whether there was something in what the Marines are doing that could inform and support the build up to Kandahar.

Another article last week criticized the US recent abandonment of Zabul (last year's place of the week). It might have been interesting to compare the Marines' serious commitment not to do that to the west, and for the often "lost-and-found" Helmand province.

These reporters are certainly better at analysis than others, but the scarcity of them, and the limited US press coverage in general, sure leaves a lot to be desired in terms of understanding the strategy.

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

From a 1/15/2010 post in "Fixing Intel..." re: Delaram:

"I have a composite map of provinces and districts in Afghanistan and Pakistan which I use to follow events in all these places. The one I use shows the district of Delaram in Farah,with an asterisk that Afghanistan does not formally accept the transfer of Delaram from Nimruz to Farah.

Despite the asterisk, the Census Bureau clearly shows the transfer of the 20,000 residents from Nimruz to Farah four years ago, so somebody accepts it.

Anyway, I wiki-ed the two provinces. For Nimruz, the wiki provincial boundary map includes Delaram in Nimruz, but doesn't list Delaram as one of its districts, nor its component population.

For Farah, it does not show Delaram as one of oits districts or the population of Delaram in its component counts.

Both wiki cites claim to use the 2005 Census, but, probably because the changed circumstance didn't conform with their data transfer, Delaram just disappeared.

Farah/Nimruz, like Uruzgan/Daykundi is one of those places of recent changes. 1970's era maps for Nimruz show it extending up to include Lash-e Juwayn (adjacent to Iran and now a part of Farah), so both provincial boundaries have changed by one hundred miles or more.

When there is not much development/administration going on, these "minor" changes and discrepancies don't seem to matter, but become very important if you want to do something like plan and extend government services.

Particularly, if a place like Delaram, adjacent to Washer and Nad Ali districts in Helmand, is only a short hop (so to speak) from places like Now Zad. Great to have a "hole in the wall" or nonexistent district nearby if you are traveling off-the-record."

So much for wiki-knowledge.

Steve

[Firn]

It is difficult to comment this without having been there, but...

'Mullahpalooza tour'

The result has been a degree of experimentation and innovation unseen in most other parts of the country. Although they account for half of the Afghan population, women had been avoided by military forces, particularly in the conservative south, because it is regarded as taboo for women to interact with males with whom they are not related. In an effort to reach out to them, the Marines have established "female engagement teams."

Made up principally of female Marines who came to Afghanistan to work in support jobs, the teams accompany combat patrols and seek to sit down with women in villages. Working with female translators, team members answer questions, dispense medical assistance and identify reconstruction needs.

Master Sgt. Julia Watson said the effort has had one major unexpected consequence. "Men have really opened up after they see us helping their wives and sisters," she said.

This seems to be sensible and puts very likely the women in the corps to better use. It is not a new idea, but sometimes just looking around helps and trying hard to do the good stuff helps. I'm pretty sure that it wasn't easy to get this plan going.

The Marines have sought to jump into another void by establishing their own police academy at Camp Leatherneck in Helmand instead of waiting for the U.S. military's national training program to provide recruits. The Marines also are seeking to do something that the military has not been able to do on a national scale: reduce police corruption by accepting only recruits vouched for by tribal elders.

"This is a shame culture," said Terry Walker, a retired Marine drill instructor who helps run the academy. "If they know they are accountable to their elders, they will be less likely to misbehave."

This is an approach with both risks and rewards. In our current situation the potential rewards seem well worth the risks.


Firn

[Sylvan]

Every 6 months you will see the next great offensive to win in Afghanistan.
In a complete coincidence, every 6 months a new marine force rolls in with a new commander convinced his regiment is going to have the battle that joins ranks with Iwo Jima and Guadacanal.
I remember the battle of Garmshir.
Then the Battle of Nad Ali.
And now the battle of Marjah.
Lots of press, lots of prep, more reporters than taliban. A few casualties and 6 dead Taliban.
6 months later we will have the next great battle.
Yawn.
Regimental offensives are a waste of resources and time
But platoon level patrols and the daily shura with the babas doesn't make for headlines, and certainly doesn't make marine colonels into generals.
Call me jaded.

[Jedburgh]

ICOS, 3 May 10: Operation Moshtarak: Lessons Learned

NATO‟s Operation Moshtarak, launched in February 2010 in Helmand province, was the first deployment after the beginning of the much-debated surge of 30,000 additional US troops. It was billed as the largest military operation since the invasion of 2001. The planning for the operation emphasised the needs of the Afghan people, and the importance of winning hearts and minds as part of a classic counterinsurgency operation. However, the reality on the ground did not match the rhetoric. Welcome improvements in the size and conduct of military operations were undermined by a lack of sufficient corresponding measures in the political and humanitarian campaigns.

This report reviews the local perceptions of the operation from more than 400 Afghan men from Marjah, Lashkar Gah and Kandahar, interviewed by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) in March 2010.

[Steve the Planner]

Jed:

Regrettably, that has been my understanding all along.

If "hearts and minds" is the target in the now-third military effort in Marjah, the proof of concept is not in the 2-3000 stragglers who braved the onslaught to protect their homes or other interests (good or bad), but in the stabilization and sustainability of a secure and functioning Marjah for all of its 28,000 residents, most of whom wisely fled from the predictable dangers.

That is the materially different measure for a successful military tactic or mission, and a viable process that can produce success in the war, as presently defined.

My version remains that some form of effective provisional occupation government (Afghan, UN, ISAF, NATO, US, EU, Swazi, Uighar?) must first be established, with full protection and stabilization as the first goal. Local transfer is secondary, but only after stabilization under provisional occupation.

Obviously, this dumb idea is not on anybody's agenda. So.....

Steve

[Bob's World]

There are some "armchair snipers" coming out of the woodwork to take shots at operations in Marjah these days. Many of those who are the most quick to criticize are also those who have the least to offer in terms of understanding the nature of insurgency, the nature of the threat in Aghanistan, and the nature of the operational design being implemented by GIROA and the Coalition.

It was well understood going into Marjah that initial operations to create access for GIROA to extend governance to the newly formed District of Marjah would be challenged in many and evolving, ways throughout the summer, particularly as the Poppy harvest concludes and and migrant farm workers are present and available to take on Taliban funded cash work as well. Such is the nature of resistance insurgency and Southern Afghanistan.

Meanwhile the expansion of security and provision of good governance continues to grow very much on schedule with what was expected going in. Bottom line, operations in Marjah are on track and on schedule, and I challenge anyone who thinks otherwise to bring their credentials with them to the table if they feel compelled to take a postion counter to that. They are intitled to their opinions, but opinions are relative.

Meanwhile, focus is shifting to a much more complex problem and environment in Kandahar and the surrounding rural areas. This does not mean that Marjah is over by any means, only that there is much more work to do and as the surge grows the Coalition, the Coalition and Giroa are expanding the areas they are working to influence this summer.