Armies decline after winning a war?

[davidbfpo]

I concur. I am even moved to say that the best modern Army that ever existed, was the British Army of 1918-28. It could war fight and do pretty good COIN as well.

Wilf makes a good point and made into new thread? So I have moved it from the thread Rifle Squad Composition.

I have read about The Hundred Days campaign in 1918, by the Allied armies on the Western Front (including Australia, British, Canadian, French, Belgian and American). Plus a few wars afterwards, not always succesful e.g. Russain Civil War intervention and not to overlook a war with Afghanistan (The Third Afghan War).

What is interesting is why this prowess disappears. Personnel changes I'd expect to be the key and declining political understanding of waging war second. Logistically, war stocks will have run down and new supplies are required.

I also recall a few comments on how the USMC went to war in Korea, the Pusan landing in particular and OIF.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

Wilf makes a good point

Had to happen sooner or later!

What is interesting is why this prowess disappears.

I don't think it does disappear. I think it mutates into the something less useful for reasons few are prepared to admit.

The great question of military thought is:"why do we not do, what we know works?"

[Ken White]

...I don't think it does disappear. I think it mutates into the something less useful for reasons few are prepared to admit.

The great question of military thought is:"why do we not do, what we know works?"

True on both counts, I think.

Among the reasons for the first count in most Armies are sloth (particularly intellectual laziness), dislike of change, dreams of past glories and domestic politics. There are many other factors but I believe those are the biggest impactors.

On the second issue, too true -- and other than the contributors I cited above (which I do not think adequately explain that second phenomenon) plus massive egos ("I can solve any problem, no help required...") I have been at a loss to fully understand that failure for many years. I do know it is an extremely dangerous effect that causes unnecessary deaths in every new war...

[Rifleman]

Among the reasons for the first count in most Armies are sloth (particularly intellectual laziness), dislike of change, dreams of past glories and domestic politics. There are many other factors but I believe those are the biggest impactors.

One example: we garrison as divisions of small brigades and those divisions are of a "type;" yet, we depoly and fight as big brigade combat teams under a division level HQ that might operationally control three or four different types of brigades.

[Gian P Gentile]

Agree with Wilf's and Davidbpfo's point about the British Army. I would add that an inter-war focus on constabulary missions (partly due to the trauma of the country from World War I and not wanting to even think of having to do that one over again) hurt the British Army on the eve of its involvement in World War II; Dunkirk immediately comes to mind.

If any are interested in this problem of Armies and their possible breaking, I am pasting here ("Breaking the American Army" by Gian P Gentile) a link to a short oped I had run in a number of newspapers around the country last week. It might be worth reading especially in light of the O'Hanlon piece that Dave D posted in today's oped roundup where O'Hanlon essentially argues that today the overall condition of the American Army is OK; I disagree. I think O'hanlon sugar-coats some real and high risk problems that the American Army today faces after years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[marct]

We've talked a lot about various and sundry personelle issues, along with equipment issues, etc. What struck me about both of these pieces is the lack of a formal analytic system with meaningful metrics.

If we look at the O'Hanlon piece, there are some metrics, but are they meaningful? Consider the following two "metrics" offered on the recruitment issue:

That said, while figures for the other services have remained good, the Army has had some worsening problems of late, with the high-school graduation figure for 2007 declining to just over 70 percent of new recruits — comparable to the norm of the 1970s. That suggests a trendline that needs to be arrested and reversed, even if overall statistics on the quality of new recruits are reasonably solid.

High School diplomas?!? There are so many naive assumptions here that I am almost unsure where to start! First, the actual "value" in terms of skills and knowledge represented by a High School diploma has certainly changed since the 1970's. Second, using a HS diploma as a proxy for "stick-to-it"ivness, which is one of the main reasons most HR people use it (there are others, but let's just stick with that one), is equally naive since it assumes that high schools as organizations have not changed during the 30+ years under consideration. Anyone who looks at the educational systems in North America, unless they are a hopeless idiot, will see that the organization of both the schools and the programs has changed significantly. For one thing, back in the 1970's in most of the public school systems, it was still possible to fail (i.e. get an F) while it is almost impossible to do so nowadays.

So what is a High School diploma a proxy for? Well, I suppose that you could argue, with some validity, that it is a good proxy for being able to put up with a psychotic organization for four years - and that may well be viewed as a useful skill for someone in the military to have (). It certainly does not guarantee that the person can read, write, do basic arithmetic or find the #ss with both hands and a manual. I find it absolutely fascinating that O'Hanlon states that

That suggests a trendline that needs to be arrested and reversed, even if overall statistics on the quality of new recruits are reasonably solid.

So, let me see if I understand his problem - the actually measured skills, the "quality", is roughly the same, but there is a drop in the number holding the socially approved credential? Wow, he's right - that is scary! People shouldn't be allowed to do something they don't have the socially approved credentials for - like read . (okay, I'll get off my sarcastic soapbox now...)

Let's look at his next metric:

Moral waivers for new recruits for their criminal histories have increased substantially in recent years. A total of 860 soldiers and Marines required waivers from convictions for felony crimes in 2007, up by 400 from 2006.

While most of the convictions were for juvenile theft, and the aggregate total is modest compared with the size of the force, only by arresting such trends will the quality of the force be ensured. Again, the current situation is not that dire, but the trendlines are worrisome and must be watched.

I have many of the same problems with this supposed metric as I do with the use of High School diplomas; the sum total of felonies in 1970 is different from 2008. Furthermore, and I think Ken will back me up on this, didn't there used to be a moderately common habit of judges in offering people a choice between the pen and the army?

So, again, "convictions" are being used as a proxy for something - but what? Well, people who haven't been convicted either never committed a felony, never had one pinned on them or never were found out. So, it is obviously being used as a proxy for either not bucking the system or for beating it.

Most of O'Hanlon's metrics are of the same (lack of) quality. Nowhere does he define what is the breaking point, and Gian's article suffers from the same problem. A statement such as

If the Army is not broken, it is getting very close to that point.

constitutes only a statement; not a proof. Where Gian's article is better than O'Hanlon's is the act that he doesn't list any BS metrics - kudos for that Gian ! I also think that Gian is quite right to concentrate on the personelle system as the key one to examine, although I do think he is being even more of a hopeless romantic that I usually am when he says

The American army will not mutiny like some French army units did in 1917.

Got any proof of that, Gian? Don't bother, because it can't be proven it can only be either asserted or stated as a probability function. I can think of at least three or four scenarios that would lead to a mutiny inside US Army units (low probability, but not a 0% probability). (Sorry, but bald assertions that something will "never" happen is another hobby horse of mine).

Okay, so let's look at how to actually construct some metrics that might be useful. First, and foremost, any metrics have to be based on reality (as much as possible) and not on inadequate proxies. Okay, with that in mind, I would suggest that there are three major system areas to consider when building metrics:

• political
• personelle
• equipment

The political system concerns mission parameters - things like the COIN vs Conventional debate. Partially, this system is beyond the control of the military. For the sake of argument, I would suggest that we assume that the army must be able to do both at sufficient levels of force to actually accomplish any given mission. Given current and likely future commitments, this implies that

1. the army will have to be significantly expanded;
2. there will have to be significant leveraging of US forces with allies; and
3. there will have to be a serious commitment to developing interoperability with these allies.

The personelle system concerns getting the right number of the right people with the right training delivered at the right time and place (we'll get into equipment in a minute).

If we treat the army as a basic demographic problem, then we look at the proxies for birth rate (entry into the system) and death rate (exit from the system). So, what metrics would work for this? Well, one is just basic numbers of bodies - it's simplistic, but it's a start. Are enough people being recruited to meet projected requirement targets? The exit rate is somewhat trickier since it includes multiple exit strategies: death, physical disability, psychological disability (i.e. PTSD, etc.), free choice to leave, etc. None of these, by themselves, is enough to "break" the army, although any one of them might. The important figure is the cumulative exit rate segmented by a variety of different factors (e.g. time in, grade, MOS, etc.). Defining where the break point in the system comes requires that you compare system strain (exits and segmentation) against the projected political objectives. When the system cannot meet a projected political objective, then you can say that it is "broken".

I'm not going to going to too much detail on the equipment system, but it is similar to the personelle system and has exactly the same definition for being "broken", i.e. when it cannot meet the projected political objectives.

So, how about shifting the parameters of the debate to something that can actually be tracked and checked?

[William F. Owen]

Agree with Wilf's and Davidbpfo's point about the British Army. I would add that an inter-war focus on constabulary missions (partly due to the trauma of the country from World War I and not wanting to even think of having to do that one over again) hurt the British Army on the eve of its involvement in World War II; Dunkirk immediately comes to mind.

The inter war focus on COIN/Constabulary was not a choice. It was something the UK was forced to do because Johnny Native fancied at having a go. The Irish got it right, and almost everyone else (including the Afghans and Iraqis) got it wrong!

The intellectual and equipment focus of the British Army was still very focussed on "Big Wars."

Liddell-Hart, Fuller, Lawrence and some of the other not very helpful people were entirely focussed on "how to fight the next big war," and I think there is an argument to be made that they may have caused the Army to be less well prepared for WW2 than they might have been.

...and before everyone gets too excited, if you can show me any writing that Fuller produced, post 1919 that contributed to a doctrine for armoured vehicle design, I'd be very grateful.

[Steve Blair]

To tag back into the "moral waiver" thing for a moment...has anyone considered that the need for these might be higher due to things like mandatory sentencing and the general press to "get tough on crime"? Personally I've seen offenses (MIP being the biggest one) that would have earned a caution (translation...."kid, don't be an ass") fifteen years ago change to a ticket and court appearance. That's gonna boost the need for waivers.

The personnel system has been broken for YEARS. The army (and other services) have been in command denial about this since the 1960s. What we're seeing now is that haphazard careerist system straining under pressure. Has it happened before? Sure. Look at Vietnam. The catch is Vietnam had a steady stream of draftees to hide the careerism that took place in the Regular ranks. Now we don't have that shield for the system to hide behind. I'd also argue that the Army was FAR more "broken" from about 1969 through 1974 or so than it is now. Is there enough strain for rumor-mongers and self-promoters to paint it as a break? Sure. Does this mean things that aren't working shouldn't be fixed? No. The personnel system needs a total overhaul. It was designed to work with a "spare parts" draftee force and not a volunteer organization. It's bloated and inefficient and encourages behavior that goes against the core values that most services push.

That said, I don't think we're seeing a breakdown in discipline that even comes close to what we saw in 1969 and 1970. If anything it's closer to what units in Europe saw in late 1945 and 1946. Troubling, but not "breaking." I don't minimize the problem, but I also don't think it's a dire as some might believe.

[Ken White]

Gian said:

"Agree with Wilf's and Davidbpfo's point about the British Army. I would add that an inter-war focus on constabulary missions (partly due to the trauma of the country from World War I and not wanting to even think of having to do that one over again) hurt the British Army on the eve of its involvement in World War II; Dunkirk immediately comes to mind."

Given the fact that the German Army contributed to the 'Phoney War' every bit as much as did the British and French and that Dunkirk was a practical British success that the Germans could and should have prevented, it seems to me that Germans -- who emphatically did not do any between the wars constabulary missions -- don't have that excuse for their shortcomings...

I'd also suggest that a counterpoint to your contention is that the US Army's foolishness in deliberately avoiding anything to do with 'constabulary missions' or COIN for almost 30 years lead directly to the ongoing problems in Iraq -- events more harmful that Dunkirk even approached.

MarcT said:

"So what is a High School diploma a proxy for? Well, I suppose that you could argue, with some validity, that it is a good proxy for being able to put up with a psychotic organization for four years - and that may well be viewed as a useful skill for someone in the military to have ( )."

Heh, I think you've got that one nailed...

Wilf said:

"The inter war focus on COIN/Constabulary was not a choice. It was something the UK was forced to do because Johnny Native fancied at having a go. The Irish got it right, and almost everyone else (including the Afghans and Iraqis) got it wrong!

The intellectual and equipment focus of the British Army was still very focussed on "Big Wars."'

True and we, the US Army, are in the same shape; we're doing what we have to do -- yet the intellectual and equipment focus of most, not all, of the US Army is still too much focused on the "Big War."

Steve Blair said:

"To tag back into the "moral waiver" thing for a moment...has anyone considered that the need for these might be higher due to things like mandatory sentencing and the general press to "get tough on crime"? Personally I've seen offenses (MIP being the biggest one) that would have earned a caution (translation...."kid, don't be an ass") fifteen years ago change to a ticket and court appearance. That's gonna boost the need for waivers."

True -- and the rest of your comment is totally accurate. The 1970-75 time frame saw far more trauma than we're likely to see even as the troops realize they're going to do year on - year off rotations for a while.

[Gian P Gentile]

Ken said:

I'd also suggest that a counterpoint to your contention is that the US Army's foolishness in deliberately avoiding anything to do with 'constabulary missions' or COIN for almost 30 years lead directly to the ongoing problems in Iraq -- events more harmful that Dunkirk even approached.

On this one Ken, I have to tell you respectfully that I believe you are wrong. I think the notion that the US Army fumbled at Coin from 2003 to 2006 until rescued by the Surge is chimera. I have reviewed all of the editions of Military Review which is the Army's journal that carries on the ground experience from solidiers and the striking conclusion is that as far back as mid 2004 the articles in it by paractioners of coin in Iraq were very positive about their experience and the fact that they had learned and adapted to the requirements of coin. And I am not talking about the fair-haired few of the 101, 3rdACR, and 1/1AD but other combat outfits from 1AD in 04, 1st Cav in 04/05 to name just a few. Does this mean that there were combat units that did fumble at coin from 03-06; of course. Does this mean that there are combat units today as part of the Surge fumbling now? yes that is the case and i have annecodotal reports to prove this.

The bigger point here is that even good combat outfits practicing good coin methods can not make up for a failed strategy. The bigger point that I tried to make in my little oped on breaking the army is that the nation needs to reconcile strategic aims with strategic means; or to be more blunt the fact that we are breaking the American Army over Iraq. No this breaking will not look like the American Army circa 1970-1974. But it is already showing its deep fissures. Consider the report that the three colonels sent to army Chief Gen Casey where they refered to the Army's field artillery branch as a "dead branch walking."

What we have come to with the Surge Matrix is a fulcrum point where the past is viewed with a certain prism that shows failure and "not getting it" until the Surge begins, and then at that fulcrum point pivoting to a better present and new future. Problem is that the present in Iraq might be a bit better but for reasons primarily other than the Surge, and more troubling is that the vector to the future is filled with an over-emphasis on coin and irregular war to the detriment of our conventional capabilities which places us in my mind in strategic peril.

gian

[MattC86]

Liddell-Hart, Fuller, Lawrence and some of the other not very helpful people were entirely focussed on "how to fight the next big war," and I think there is an argument to be made that they may have caused the Army to be less well prepared for WW2 than they might have been.

Having just read Fuller and LH - along with Mearsheimer's scathing attack "Liddell Hart and the Weight of History" - I would be interested to know how you think the 1920s works of Fuller and LH on armored warfare and "deep strategic penetration" were detrimental to the British Army's preparations for WWII. I grant that LH went off on a different track in the 30s; emphasizing defense over mechanization and predicting the return of trench warfare, but I find it difficult to understand that the work of Fuller and (1920s version) LH hurt the British Army's preparation for WWII.

In my mind, this would be a case where Lt.Col. Gentile's concerns about COIN or imperial policing proved to be valid - the British government debated for years whether or not to maintain the Continental commitment, and for most of the period kept the Army as was necessary for imperial duties.

Finally, re: David's mention of the Marines in Korea and at Pusan - is that an example of a force in decline after a victory (i.e., WWII)? I'm not sure of the reference. . .

Regards,

Matt

[Steve Blair]

Finally, re: David's mention of the Marines in Korea and at Pusan - is that an example of a force in decline after a victory (i.e., WWII)? I'm not sure of the reference. . .

Regards,

Matt

I'd actually say this is a case of a premature "peace dividend," or shortsightedness on the part of planners who didn't understand how much the world had changed since the end of World War II. Granted, their shortsightedness is understandable when one considers the popular isolationist trend that was still a part of everyday life in the United States (and had been since the end of World War I.

I guess the somewhat quick answer (though not necessarily the complete or 'right' one) is that military forces in victory are often forced to decline by their political masters (or can suffer from doctrinal stagnation, as was the case with the Prussian Army left by Frederick...).

[MattC86]

I'd actually say this is a case of a premature "peace dividend," or shortsightedness on the part of planners who didn't understand how much the world had changed since the end of World War II. Granted, their shortsightedness is understandable when one considers the popular isolationist trend that was still a part of everyday life in the United States (and had been since the end of World War I.

I guess the somewhat quick answer (though not necessarily the complete or 'right' one) is that military forces in victory are often forced to decline by their political masters (or can suffer from doctrinal stagnation, as was the case with the Prussian Army left by Frederick...).

Well, I meant more specifically the Marines as David mentioned - they were able to stabilize the Pusan Perimeter acting as Walker's "Fire Brigade" and then land at successfully Inchon and fight through the streets of Seoul. I understand, certainly, the peace-dividend as it applied to the military forces as a whole - hell, MacArthur sent teams to salvage equipment from Pacific islands and have the Japanese refurbish it - as well as an unclear vision about the future in Washington and among the services.

Plus there's that whole little issue your sig-line gets into of the new kid on the service block. . .

. . . I was nitpicking the tree instead of dealing with the forest.

Regards,

Matt

[William F. Owen]

Having just read Fuller and LH - along with Mearsheimer's scathing attack "Liddell Hart and the Weight of History" - I would be interested to know how you think the 1920s works of Fuller and LH on armored warfare and "deep strategic penetration" were detrimental to the British Army's preparations for WWII.

Phew, How long have you got? First thing to remember was that the Tank Corps were full of Fuller supporters, and Swinton, Martel and Hobart were all in full swing. Read JP Harris "Men, Ideas and Tanks," for a pretty sound account of what actually happened.

Basically, I think they lost the plot. I think "Tanks" blinded them to some of the realities and "deep strategic penetration" was only ever going to be a pipe dream. Fuller and LH all drank their own bathwater. VI Germains pointed out that "mechanisation" was nothing new and it had to be rationally applied, and not over sold. - in contrast the Germans had no avant garde and came up with generally sound methods, based on experience and experimentation.

- plus, point to note, the UK probably had the greatest proportion of Tank advocates anywhere in any army - yet we failed to produce any useable doctrine or even a good tank!

Unlike the German army, we did get rid of our horses.

[MattC86]

Phew, How long have you got?

I was thinking we could get a debate of epic proportions going here, with expert witnesses and a few mud-flinging doctoral theses written. . .

First thing to remember was that the Tank Corps were full of Fuller supporters, and Swinton, Martel and Hobart were all in full swing. Read JP Harris "Men, Ideas and Tanks," for a pretty sound account of what actually happened.

Basically, I think they lost the plot. I think "Tanks" blinded them to some of the realities and "deep strategic penetration" was only ever going to be a pipe dream. Fuller and LH all drank their own bathwater. VI Germains pointed out that "mechanisation" was nothing new and it had to be rationally applied, and not over sold. - in contrast the Germans had no avant garde and came up with generally sound methods, based on experience and experimentation.

I wouldn't argue any of this - but wouldn't it be a rare moment indeed when an Army becomes unprepared for the next war because it went too far in developing new theory, equipment and methods? (At least within the realm of conventional warfare - US or IDF issues with tensions between maneuver warfare and COIN not included) I feel the Army in Decline concept is strongly linked with the "fighting the last war" theory, and all the tank advocates you describe were pushing strongly for major changes from the Great War. While they're predictions and prognostications may not have been entirely accurate, I still am not sure that pushing for mechanisation and promoting the tank - however "avant garde" their proposals may have been - had a major role in the May 1940 defeat.

- plus, point to note, the UK probably had the greatest proportion of Tank advocates anywhere in any army - yet we failed to produce any useable doctrine or even a good tank!

Indeed, yet despite all those advocates, the British Army still swung the gate into Belgium in 1940 to solidify the Franco-British line and return largely to Great War static conflict. I still equate this with blaming the revolutionaries for the problems of the masses.

Regards,

Matt

[William F. Owen]

In my mind, this would be a case where Lt.Col. Gentile's concerns about COIN or imperial policing proved to be valid - the British government debated for years whether or not to maintain the Continental commitment, and for most of the period kept the Army as was necessary for imperial duties.

Sorry, missed this. Remember Fuller went around saying how much manpower tanks would save, and also advocated air power in the same vein.

The Continental commitment meant an Army based in the UK doing nothing, when the UK was very strapped for cash. I don't think the UK ever gave up wanting to be prepared for the next big bash, they just had no money to pursue it, especially as all the options the "avant garde" were kicking about were all pretty expensive.