COIN v. Conventional Capability Debate

[Hacksaw]

Ken, wm, etal,

I suppose we are mostly talking past each other at this point… I can acknowledge/agree with most of what you say, those points that where we don't agree are issues of nuance and not worth the time to quibble over…

As I’m sure you could tell, I get a little heated when I hear 'war is war'. A broad generalization that at some levels works – e.g. reacting to an ambush is reacting to an ambush, firing an artillery mission is likewise – but the approach is unhelpful when it bumps up against reality at the Title X/Generating Base level.

You will get no argument from me wrt the fine quality of small leader and their competency that result from current operations. Additionally, leaders of that quality can and will adjust and regain a level technical and tactical competency in their MOS (Arty, AR, AD, whatever).

I suppose the question is what level of competency and whether you buy into the argument that we are in an era of persistent conflict, and that we will continue to conduct these types of operations (although admittedly to varying degrees of scope). As well as what that means wrt the aimpoint/weighting of training effort and said resources with regard to time, personnel and training resources.

It is easy to forget that we are neigh on 5 years into an era in which units, Soldiers, and leaders have formed, trained and deployed with a sole focus of COIN operations (for many outside their traditional mission) in the current operational theaters. We have a community of junior leaders (officer & NCO) who have never fired gunnery tables (FA, AR, AD, others I don’t know). The type of expertise that we have come to expect was built on these and other types of training experiences. I don't think you can get away from the fact that it is cumulative. The situation may not be critical today, but we ain’t far off.

As you surmised I think COAs 1 & 3 are more or less throw-aways but for different reasons (unacceptable/unfeasible respectively). However, I think it is unwise to assume we can continue on our current path COA 2. When viewed through a strategic lens, the US has passed its culmination point (specifically wrt to ground capability, but it appears the same is true wrt to maritme and air operations).

culminating point — The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which effectively continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which effective counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (JP 5-0)

I know plenty of bright people who think otherwise, I just can’t see it. We retain some freedom of action, but not enough to account for contingencies within the realm of the possible.

Thanks to all for their time and patience.

Live well and row