All,

I think we have all covered the philosophical aspects of this discussion in the past.

As a tip of the hat to WILF… There are obviously commonalities between COIN/LIC and Conventional/HIC. No debate there, and given the time and resources to train… I am sure that today’s crop of Soldiers and leaders could maintain competency in those aspects that are common and train to those tactics that differ… but make no mistake TTPs do differ based on the conditions/context.

Ken and wm … While the linked article highlights the larger philosophical debate regarding the Army's appropriate aim point on the spectrum of conflict. The impetus for the article was a white paper authored by three former BCT commanders that laments/warns of the crisis in the FA Branch in particular and several others in general. The gist of the white paper (sent to CSA, VCSA, and HQDA G3) was that the FA branch is broke from the perspective fire support competency. Also important to note that this was not a stone throwing event, rather that the cause of the problem is that FA units have spent so much time providing invaluable contributions to the current fight in anything but an FA role. War is NOT war in the sense that there is a very real difference in how you organize, train, and equip a force. As current events support, a good force balance for COIN does not equal a good force balance for HIC. A blinding flash of the obvious I know. I also acknowledge that the intensity of conflict at the individual/tactical level is directly proportional to your proximity to the fire fight. In that sense, war is war…. However, with respect to Title X type responsibilities – war is anything but war, and that is the level at which Gian has been beating his drum.

My lament regarding Gian is that he gets so much attention as the wild-eyed prophet screaming in the desert about a COIN-centric force, rather than his more important message… OK in some sense – certainly as it pertains to FA, the focus on COIN-specific training is very detrimental. Not so much that they are training in a COIN contect, but that they are training no traditional skills as opposed to the core competency as field artillerymen. However, the larger point that Gian raises routinely, but that I have seen no senior leader echo is that we, as a Nation, have lost complete balance between strategic objectives and resources. This is where we have become most discombobulated.

So that leaves us with three different options…

1. Curb strategic objectives (regarding democracy in ME… etc) pull back deployed forces and retool, refit, and reset conventional forces within current resources to deal with most dangerous contingencies. This has obvious implications regarding diplomatic power, encouraging extremists blah blah blah

2. Acknowledge strategic risk, remain engaged in ME and fight the war we have, and hope we’ll have the time and resources to retool, refit, and reset conventional forces before they are needed.

3. Match resources to current strategic objectives. Problem is $$$. Just not sure there is the $$$ or people available to support current strategic objectives unless we mobilize the Nation. That seems unlikely in current paradigm

No easy solutions