Afghan National Army (ANA) thread

[davidbfpo]

An interesting article on the ANA, with some historical points only a historian or an expert would know: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...tml#entry-more

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Posted on another OEF thread: A variety of links and some will be cross-posted on other threads i.e. ANA & ANP. Not in order of priority.

1) Britain calls for mini-surge in Afghanistan to help train army. Of note is the claim the UK can deploy only 3k of the 9k troops in Helmand and that the ANA now have 8k deployed in Helmand (which I simply find incredible) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6851607.ece

2) http://www.captainsjournal.com/ has some amazing reports on the ANA and ANP. This is the longest, citing many sources (many on SWC I'm sure) and covers both the ANA and ANP: http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...national-army/

3) A Canadian OMLT veteran (from Kandahar Province) on the ANA, including literacy, training and more: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/

davidbfpo

[Lomed]

We so often hear American politicians call for expanding the ANA.

Ok, great, but how?

I read this the other day and wanted to gauge people's thoughts: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/457/

I was particularly struck by the following:

We have been struggling in Afghanistan primarily because of weak Afghan leadership, in the ANA and even more so in the ANP. Although there are many competent commanders in the ANA, more are needed, especially in the event of rapid growth. As a recently published CSTC-A report has stated, “The most significant challenge to rapidly expanding the Afghan National Security Forces is a lack of competent and professional leadership at all levels, and the inability to generate it rapidly.”

Growing the ANA too fast will result in poorly trained, less effective units on the battlefield. Lacking adequate leadership, ANA soldiers are much more likely to engage in criminal activity. Corruption and AWOLs will increase, and the reputation of the ANA will decline, as more allegations of abuse against the Afghan people surface. With poorly led, quickly manufactured units, the chances increase of ANA units breaking and running on the battlefield—it has happened before with a few brave advisors preventing disaster. Collaboration with the enemy could also increase. Worst-case scenario - entire formations could switch sides, as ANA units have occasionally done throughout Afghanistan’s history, a point ANA officers shared with the author in confidence. These problems are, indeed, a recurrent theme in the history of counterinsurgency. As Moyar noted in his recent New York Times article, “Past counterinsurgents who tried to expand under similar conditions, like the British in Malaya (1948 to 1960) and the Salvadorans (1980 to 1992), discovered that too many inexperienced officers took command and the experienced officers were spread too thinly. In addition to fighting poorly, badly led troops usually alienate the population by misbehaving and they often desert or defect.”

Agree? Disagree? Is there a better plan out there?

[Fuchs]

The German army rebuilt since 1955, had access to many war-experienced officers and still had serious leadership shortcomings till the early 1960's.

The German level of expectation was certainly much higher, but it's plausible that quick expansion on a mildly competent & small basis is 'difficult'.

It helps to adapt expectations, doctrine and employment.
The ANA can easily be more competent than the Taliban which have no superior training opportunities and a higher enemy-caused attrition rate.


I have doubts about the utility of an expansion and its probability of success, of course. On the other hand; I think the whole AFG adventure has left the track of reason in 2002.

[davidbfpo]

I have merged several old, small threads into this main thread and added the question posed today. Looked through the OEF-Afghanistan list to do this and it is likley that within other threads the ANA do appear.

[Old Eagle]

As several of you know, I was part of the initial defense reform in Afgh. I guess my first question now is why are we re-learning or re-documenting issues that were identified from the get-go?

Expansion of the ANA hinges on two major issues:

Faster is not necessarily better. The initial bureaucratic solution to the "faster" issue is usually to cut training time -- Reduce basic training to 4 weeks instead of six or whatever. As others have already pointed out, more untrained soldiers don't contribute to the long-term solution. Similarly, investments in leadership training, to include literacy classes, although costly in terms of train-up time, ultimately pay huge dividends.

No Afghan force on the drawing boards now is sustainable financially without outside assistance. In fact, that's kind of a way of life in Afghanistan. When I explained to one of our Afghan interlocutors that the force we developed had to be sustainable after we left. His question was who would pay for the Army once the Americans left. The truth of the matter is that the Afghan military has been dependent on external support for decades, and that has now become the new normal. It is unlikely that this will change.

For the past 7 years, we have approached the good-fast-cheap conundrum by opting for fast and cheap, then wondering why things aren't good.

[Fuchs]

This is where economy comes into play.
Let's forget monetary budgets for a while and think of a country like Afghanistan instead.

Let's think of Pharaoh-time Egypt.

How were they able to complete huge construction projects and why were others not able to do so?

The answer is agricultural productivity/efficiency. Only relatively small share of the population had to work as farmers. The combination of Nile water, fertile Nile mu and intense sun made the Nile valley very fertile.
More accurately in the special case of Egypt: A quite low percentage of national working hours had to be devoted to farming in order to sustain (feed) the population.

This freed man-hours for other activities, such as producing goods for export (to get import wares like wood), pay servants of the king/state (administration), feed craftsmen, work on huge construction projects - and waging war.

The key variable is the % of available working hours that need to be devoted to sustenance and the % of available working hours lost due to poor weather (Nile floods, Afghan winter).

100% minus these two percentages yields the % of other activities (crafting, trading, guarding/fighting, administering) and inactivity (unemployment, underemployment, 'wasted' time).


I'm quite sure that the economy of Afghanistan could sustain the necessary army strength (let's say 200,000-500,000 competent warriors), and even much more during the winter.

The state is not able to harness the power reserves of the country, to free enough % of national working hours for itself. That's the problem.


Just look at the unemployment rate - all those unemployed men could just as well stand guard with a uniform and an AK instead. They get fed either way, after all - or else they would quickly disappear from the statistic estimate.

[jcustis]

We so often hear American politicians call for expanding the ANA.

Ok, great, but how?

I read this the other day and wanted to gauge people's thoughts: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/457/

I was particularly struck by the following:

Agree? Disagree? Is there a better plan out there?

I have no first-hand experience with Afghan Security Forces, but when I think of expansion in the Iraqi context, it makes me think of the need to build enough capacity to sustain a force afield in the face of so many soldiers away on leave.

Leave was always an incredibly important aspect of an advisory effort, because the troops simply had no way to get money home to family. If you had a largely-Shiite formation built out of family men from Najaf and points east, but you were posted to the Syrian-Jordan border area, you were faced with tremendous challenges. That was always the hidden facet of the stats on how many security force elements we had grown. That, and their state of readiness always seemed to be in contention.

I have seen first-hand what it looks like when a training/advisory effort is cobbled together with too few resources, and little thought applied to the small details. For example, during my second deployment to OIF, after the invasion, I had to contend with Shewani Specialized Special Forces at Camp Korean Village who had no documents on them beyond a over-sized postage stamp of an ID, had not been paid in months, and no one from higher HQ knew how many I had in my AO...because they had no accurate idea how many had been sent to me! Add to that the fact that many of these overweight, lazy fellows were from Basra and would justas soon shoot an Arab teenager forrock-throwing, and it was a mess.

Fast forward to Sahl Sinjar Airfield just south of Thari al-Ghara in northwestern Iraq, during my last deploy, and the formations of predominantly Kurdish (formerly Peshmerga) forces we interacted with, and you can see a remarkably capable military force with a decent blend of discipline, equipment standards, and tactical prowess. IIRC, there were still Arabs within some of the ranks of those mostly Kurdish units, as well as pure Peshmerga forces that had come down from Kurdistan. Security in those areas frequented by the Kurds was very good. In the areas frequented by the mixed units, the security was not comparable.

For the most part, formations built around regional realities are probably the best way to go, instead of trying to fight against the dynamic of leave issues, and the ethnic and sectarian tensions in an area of operations where troops born and raised elsewhere operate.

The notable units are always going to be the ones with the strong-willed, competent leaders. We have got to perfect the business of assisting the HN in screening these men for that capacity, or do it for them outright, I think. Having been a colonel "before the war" has garnered many of these charlatans a meal ticket, but a pain in the ass for the coalition. There is a danger, of course, from the 2nd and 3d order of effects if the wrong guy is selected and he just plain out doesn't mesh with the local political/social/religious landscape, but from about everything I have seen concerning ANA/ANP performance, we have got to keep the corruption down first and foremost. Accomplishing that while simultaneously reducing the number of leaders who have their own agenda to line a pocket or two is very difficult, but not impossible.

I agree with Bob's World whole-heartedly on the matter of not trying to build too much in our image, and I do believe that working along the militia system has merits, but they still have to have competent leaders who can work and manage COIN (true COIN since it is their backyard) and get it done.

Getting it all started is easy, but keeping it on course, through troop rotations, component command strategy shifts, resource allocation issues, etc., is the hardest part. I have slowly warmed up to the idea that perhaps we (in the big Army-Marine Corps sense) shouldn't be involved at the tip of that spear any longer. Perhaps this is one effort where we could afford to contract it out (say perhaps to a reputable company that can pull the right resumes, like MPRI), establish longer periods of performance than what any one MiTT could ever offer, and hold the winning vendor to delivering on time and to standard. This model is used for security assistance training in other areas of the world, and old-school mercenaries have built successful formations in the past with a few suitcases full of cash, so perhaps it stands to work in Afghanistan.

Most important, we need to start to plan for the next 5-10 years, not just around the corner, and come to grips with what Old Eagle highlighted...we will have to subsidize this effort for a long time to come because the government cannot.

We need someone (or a team of similar dudes) like this guy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedri...lm_von_Steuben

I've got quite a few more thoughts on this subject, but I need to read up a little further on some of the studies out there from RAND and CSIS.

[davidbfpo]

Lomed,

A good catch this:

I read this the other day and wanted to gauge people's thoughts: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/457/

An excellent article, with the good and the bad, from the "cutting edge" to the logistical "tail" with a series of recommendations. Curious that the locals will prefer a poor ANA unit to a professional ISAF unit.

The external key factor is Afghan political will and I suspect many here think that is elusive. We can hardly improve the ANA without that will; unless we revert to renting "warlords".

Would the Afghan state and ANA accept expatriate officers and NCOs in command? Whether from ISAF members or contractors. A modern equivalent, modified from historical examples across the Durand Line i.e. the para-military Frontier Corps.

That practice might create time for some of the Defpro recommendations.

[jmm99]

The ANA is not my field - I was more interested in the linked article, Reforming the ANP (which to swipe from Dr Zhivago: "It certainly needed reforming.").

Other than my snarky thought (8 years; and we now realize the need for reform ?), I do have a serious question for you Soldiers and Marines out there.

Why does the ANA need Brigades and Corps ?

I count roughly 35 provinces - a 1K Bn per province = ~ 35K effectives (if, a big if, all are present). If concentration of mass is needed, form regimental combat teams for a specific purpose.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

indirectly from a SF LTC, and this article, Corrupt, untrained, underpaid, illiterate: the forces waiting to take over:

From The Sunday Times
December 6, 2009
Marie Colvin in Kabul
.....
Lieutenant-Colonel Todd Goehler is the head of a 12-man training team that since July has been mentoring Charlie kandak — Afghan for battalion — in Kabul’s capital division.

Goehler, a 24-year veteran of the special forces, described a disastrous situation that differed dramatically from the official projections. “They have been putting Band-Aids on this for a while,” he said.

On paper, Charlie kandak is one of six battalions in the brigade covering the 14 districts of Kabul and outlying areas. In reality, he revealed, only one other exists. Two kandaks are only at 30% capacity and are consequently not deployable. The final two are still “in the training pipeline”.

Decrepit Russian barracks at Kabul international airport have been earmarked for their arrival. The buildings lack running water and all the electrical fittings have been stripped. At any given moment, 20% to 30% of the 600 soldiers on Charlie kandak’s roster are absent without leave. In the Afghan army, a soldier can be missing for up to 60 days before any action — other than the suspension of his pay — is taken.

Illiteracy is high: 70% of inventory receipts are signed with a thumbprint. This engenders corruption because a soldier who cannot read has no idea what he has just confirmed receipt of.

So, in Kabul province, there are 2 Bns at roughly 450 effectives each (quite a bit less than the 1K/Bn that I posited). Add 2 Bns at 30% capacity (slightly under 150 effectives each); and 2 Bns at 0% capacity (in "training"), and we have a Brigade - perhaps, we might call that the Capital "Brigade". Any resemblence to the ROK Capital Division would be purely fictional.

But, the Brigades and Corps probably present a nice-looking PowerPoint slide.

-------------------------
That snark having been said of the ANA Kabul defenders, the ANP are far worse - from the same article:

While offering the prospect of hope, this was an isolated example: the army remains in poor shape. However, it is a well-oiled machine compared with what could be seen of the Afghan police force last week. Station three [in Kabul - JMM] should have had some of the best policemen in the city. The neighbourhood is home to more than 30 foreign companies, a university and two ministries.

Habibzani, the deputy, spelt out the problems. He had graduated from the Kabul police academy, but he could barely support his family of five on an officer’s salary of $200 (£120) a month.

The $120 paid to the lowest ranks meant the force attracted those who had no other possibilities — and needed the three meals a day that come with the job — but also meant they felt no guilt about demanding bribes.

A key aspect of the US strategy is to make working for the state more attractive than taking the Taliban’s shilling. Yet there was no sign of the wage increase to $165 that the government had announced. Meanwhile, the Taliban pay $220 a month.

Habibzani said 90% of the police could not read or write. Abdullah Fattah, a police trainer standing with him in the gloom of the hallway as black cables dangled uselessly from the ceiling, said police received five months’ training. “They start from such a low level. I need five years,” he said. “With all the attention of the international community, maybe three years minimum.”

No wonder that Sen. Levin's mantra of a primary focus on ANA and ANP training seems to have had little purchase at the WH. Doubling -X gives you -2X. Note that the present Kabul police situation is after Karzai stripped up to 700 police from several provinces (Kunduz article at this post).

Interesting article.

Mike

[Bob's World]

One of the largest problems hindering the development of an effective ANA is extreme fear of "militias" by US policy types.

So instead of building a military security force that is recruited, trained, and employed in their own local areas (perhaps even in a mobilized status with the clear recognition that they revert to a drilling, reserve status once the crisis is contained); we instead recruit from one side of the country with the intent to ship the newly minted national soldiers to another side to operate. To put it mildly, this is problematic and completely out of touch with the cultural realities of these people.

So, my one recommendation for getting the ANA up and moving: Drop the "mini-me" national army approach, and go with something much more like the National Guard. Militia is not a dirty word.

[Jedburgh]

NPC, 22 Jan 10: Build-up of Afghan security forces ill advised

A well-functioning government is a prerequisite for any successful counter-insurgency strategy and good governance is unlikely to be established in Afghanistan any time soon. As a consequence, the plans for the build-up of the ANSF must be adjusted. This build-up is not only an exit strategy; it is a cover for a “graceful exit”, serving a perceptual function in western publics. But in counter-insurgency theory a disconnect between governance and security is anathema. The end-state projection of 400,000 soldiers and police is unsustainable and ill-adapted to Afghanistan’s socio-economic and political foundations. Furthermore, the continued growth of centralized and corrupt security forces could very well lead to increased resistance. The ANSF – like any armed force – is in dire need of a credible and motivating cause, simply to avoid disintegration.....

[davidbfpo]

Sorry, I could not leave the previous headline alone after this headline 'Afghan army to accept former Islamic militants Islamic militants are being brought into the Afghan National Army through a back door recruitment scheme'.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...militants.html

Reconciliation and integration. Watch & wait.

[davidbfpo]

The think tank ICG will be issuing a report on the ANA in the next two weeks. Placed here as a reminder.

[Sylvan]

The ANA is a tajik dominated organization built around the bones of the Northern Alliance.
We are trying to win a Pashtoon population with an Army built of tajik leadership and a disporportionate Hazara enlisted force.
1. The ANA does not fight and will not fight. They do Battalion level operations planned and advertised weeks in advance. Guaranteeing no results but minimum casualties.
2. The ANA are there to collect money. No matter what we supply them with, they will never be ready. No trucks? Give them trucks. No UAHs? Give them UAHs. No NATO weapons? give them NATO Weapons. Next they will ask for MRAPs. Then they will ask for 2000 Helos. This attitude is from the MoD down. Lets face it, the minute the ANA admit to being up to the task, we pull out with our money. They know this. They will ALWAYS have an excuse not to fight. The ANA outnumbers the Taliban 3-1 and is better trained, equipped and resourced. Yet McCrystal's assessment still excuses their complete lack of bravery due to, "A poverty of resources" Bull####.
3. ANP is 1/3rd the size but takes 3 times the casualties. Also killing 10X the Taliban. Much less mentorship, much less resources, but are actually pashtoon. ANA and MoD keep telling us we can't trust them but that is so all money gets pumped to the MoD side. Proof is in the pudding. ANA doesn't do ####.

Cut the ANA in half, and use those forces to create a viable ABP, which is critical and ignored both in the IGoA and in McCrystal's assessment.

[Sylvan]

Moderator's Note: Copied from the ANP thread as the article linked covers ANA too.

Here is an article by Sean Naylor, also from this past summer.http://www.afji.com/2009/07/4231017/

90% of local complaints about police in my AO turned out to be false. Amazing how an Afghan will walk up and make a claim, and Westerners instantly assume its the god's honest truth.

[Rex Brynen]

CSIS

Reforming ANSF Metrics
By Adam Mausner

June 10, 2010

The CM system does not provide an accurate picture of ANA capabilities. At best, it provides a snapshot of the resources that have gone into a unit's manning, equipping, and training. Moreover, the overly-quantitative CM system provides little information about how a unit will actually perform in the field. MNSTC-I ran into similar problems with its ORA system for the Iraqi Army. While many within the US military feel that the CM system needs to be reformed or replaced, there is little consensus as to what its replacement should look like. This memo lays out the framework for a more accurate system.

[Fuchs]

Some flavours of self-defeating behaviour are kind of funny.

http://defensetech.org/2010/06/18/bi...ecurity-firms/

Private security companies working under Defense Department contracts in Afghanistan are siphoning off some of the best and brightest from that country’s security and police forces, Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee says.
...

[davidbfpo]

This link appeared elsewhere and only noted the content - USMC in Helmand on their erstwhile ANA comrades: http://marinecorpstimes.com/news/201...e_ana_062110w/

There's also points in this UK paper: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets..._Moshtarak.pdf