Force Structure for Small Wars

[Ken White]

in all wars; true in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and Desert Storm. It should. To not do so is to fail to adapt to METT-TC.

There is absolutely no way to design a force that will fit all requirements; the structure is designed for ease of personnel use and equipping; commanders have to modify to get the job done. Not a problem.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I throw this out as grist for the mill. The original concept was to design a brigade combat team not for COIN, but for rear area operations. It morphed into a form or hybrid.

It is bound to upset about everyone. First, it creates a non-combat arms element that is a terrain manager. That alone should piss-off most of you. Second, it is based around the idea that COIN is broken into two elements. The SOF who are the terrorist hunter/killers and the stability forces that are performing what I term State Building activities. It leaves the traditional elements to fight the traditional wars without trying to force them into being the catch all for every possible mission.

Whether we can afford to create the brigades is a separate matter. It is only the concept that I was concerned with.

[Randy Brown]

I throw this out as grist for the mill. The original concept was to design a brigade combat team not for COIN, but for rear area operations. It morphed into a form or hybrid.

I very much appreciated reading your white paper exploring the possibilities inherent in a Rear Area, Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Brigade. The document addresses some of the organizational stuff that's also come up in coffee-room conversations here, as we've informally played with the blue-sky task organization and/or equipping of an IBCT to pursue a hypothetical and generic COIN mission.

Sez this armchair IBCT commander:

• I want more military police for security, and detainee ops.
• I want more engineers, both for route-clearance and infrastructure missions.

Thanks again for the document!

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thanks for the comments.

While I take full and complete credit (or blame) for the document it is really the result of ten months of conversations with members of my small group at CGSC as we discussed current issues in Iraq and how to avoid them in the future by having an immediate follow-on capability.

In addition to not discussing the SOF/COIN connection in hopes of not limiting the concept to that realm, I also did not mention that the intent would be to make many of these either multi-compo or national guard brigades since much of the capability found in this organization is just as applicable in a civil disaster CONUS as long as the security forces are used in a non-federalized status.

[Andy Pavord]

I like Curmudgeon's paper. I agree with his discussion of how this type of brigade would be used. What I am not sure about is whether the core of this type of brigade should be infantry of MP. I lean toward infantry for a couple of reasons. I envision a situation where small unit combat is still fairly common and where the brigade needs the capability to defeat up to a company minus of insurgents. MPs are really only trained to handle squad level engagements (although I know they have done far more than that in Iraq). I also think the unit needs mortars which MPs do not have. (this may be a bias from my experience in Afghanistan).

The answer may be a hybrid unit with a mix of MPs and infantry. It could be a flexible mix depending on the situation. Lord knows that every unit commander wants more MPs.

I agree completely with the description of the need for specialized experience in the headquarters staff. Integrating training, reconstruction, policing and other functions is difficult. Developing the political sensitivity in commanders takes training and expereince that is different from preparing and leading in high intensity conflict. I understand the point made by others that the military is a demanding profession and that those who take up the calling must be flexible and able to learn to execute new tasks under the most demanding situations. And there is plenty of evidence that many units have suceeded in doing this over the years in many different campaigns. My point is that learning on the fly and experimentation on the ground is not the optimal condition. We need at least a few brigade and battalion staffs that have thought this stuff through before they are in the middle of the fight. That will produce the best results.

[Andy Pavord]

I also want to second Ski's idea that unit commanders need more power to shape their own force structure. I think that we are way too biased in favor of making things easier for planners and budgeteers by enforcing a one size fits all industial era mentality. We should give unit commanders a mission and the resouces and let them experiment.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thanks for you comments. In trying to use “off-the-shelf” units as much as possible and trying not to interfere with the army’s plan to have 48 BCTs by not fighting for assets that would be necessary to fill those units.

You are absolutely right that the unit has no mortar or anti-armor capabilities. It would take a modified weapons company with three assault platoons and one “mortar platoon” made up of three standard mortar sections to build the assets required to fill the gap. One of these companies would be added to each MP BN. The question then comes up as to whether to add Q-36 or some other counter fire detection capability. I understand there is a fairly good sonic system out there somewhere that is more akin to what I may want. Again, I am out of the “off-the-shelf” capability. These modifications could be corrected during the concept validation phase.

[Ski]

If this was the case, that would be dandy.

The problem is that commanders have not be trusted to shape their organizations - they are forced to reorganize based off the DMD and DMETL.

in all wars; true in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and Desert Storm. It should. To not do so is to fail to adapt to METT-TC.

There is absolutely no way to design a force that will fit all requirements; the structure is designed for ease of personnel use and equipping; commanders have to modify to get the job done. Not a problem.