Quote Originally Posted by AGBrina View Post
I believe that the U.S. Military had figured out very well how to balance the need for counter-insurgency specialists and conventional combat forces. By the end of the Vietnam era, the Army returned to the concept of the Ranger Battalion, to be used as a more robust supplement to Special Forces. The Special Operations Wings of the Air Force -composed of EC-130s, AC-130s, CH-53s, and a souped-up version of the "Hueys"- offered potent and flexible tactical air and airlift support. Add to these forces an airborne infantry brigade (173d); and the U.S. had a potent unconventional warfare force capable of addressing a wide array of "small war" insurgencies.
Interesting assertion. I Am interested as to when this formation was employed in conflict, and validated in counterinsurgency, and what made it superior for that kind of environment. I am unaware of the above formation ever having been employed. Further, how would this unit be able to perform counterinsurgency (by default, getting involved with the people) over such a broad area? As a counetrguerrilla force, you may have an argument, but not counterinsurgency. Two very different missions.

Such organizations would be ideally suited for Afghanistan, where there is (at least, there was) plenty of local support for a force aimed at containing and repelling the Taliban.
Basis for this statement please.

By themselves, however, counter-insurgency forces would find it impossible to prevail (in fact, unlikely to survive) in Iraq. The U.S.has undertaken to invade and conquer, and to brutally subjugate a people unwilling to accept defeat and occupation. There, a lot of boots on the ground were needed, in order to discourage the greatest percentage of the population from resisting, and to convince them that resistance to the invader was futile. The Americans didn't have the number of conventional troops to do that, in a manner similar to the Soviets in Hungary ('56) or Czeckoslavakia ('68).
Ok, now you've gone off target. First, there ARE insurgencies in Iraq. There is a struggle against a legitimate elected government under a constitution. While I agree that some groups (Such as the 1920 Brigades) are purely anti-occupation, to distill the multiple issues in Iraq to such a silly analogy as Hungary of Czech portrays a profound ignorance of what is occuring in Iraq, which differs by province, sect, and other factors.



Iraq is not counter-insurgency; it is population control!
And since when is population control not a fundamental step in COIN? I belive Galula and Trinquier make that very clear.

Let's define COIN:

JP 1-02 and FM 3-24 state:

"Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). These definitions are a good starting point, but they do not properly highlight a key paradox: though insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been called revolutionary war or internal war, they are distinctly different types of operations. In addition, insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare."


There, we are fighting disaffected segments of a population which is trying to gain independence There, we are quelling a rebellion by the people against foreign occupation, in a manner much like the Israelis are using against the Palestinians. Our success depends upon targeted assassinations, building walls to isolate populations, and pitting one ethnic grouping against another. I would not dignify such tactics by including them in the sphere of "counter-insurgency".
This is pure tripe. While there are some elements, (mentioned earlier), there is no singular "rebellion" against occupation. What you have are various groups doing different things with different aims. Polls still show the majority of Iraqis are not for an immediate withdrawal of US Forces.