Force Structure for Small Wars

[Ken White]

Exactly my point. Well said. Discussion is mostly academic for the next 2-3 years at least, for reasons above and several others. The recently redeployed reserve units are the best option for constituting a HIC reserve.

is unlikely; we've got aside from the obvious two theater problem a Roles and Missions review (and IMO this sub thread should be a big part of that discussion) and an upcoming QDR.

However, given the 18 month lag time in the Army's bureaucratic decision cycle (unless it's important to one of the Pachyderms), seems like the time to start discussing it is now...

My belief is that the Roles and Missions review and the QDR should provide the Army some guidance for the future and that the Army then needs to focus on, in order; the flawed personnel system, the flawed training system -- and then on the optimum, logical force structure; all the other stuff will flow from those three items.

There are those who will say I've got it backwards, the first two items I listed flow from the third. Don't think so. The current personnel system was designed to support a type Army (the pre 1940 model). It has had bandaids applied and a random tweak now and then but it is effectively totally obsolete and non responsive to the needs of the Army and the nation. It is in dire need of total redesign and that design needs to focus on providing effective personnel operations and support to what ever the Army of the day happens to look like...

Almost the same thing could be said of training; we have a pre 1940 system with grafts and patches. Most other Armies of any real use provide almost twice the training to new entrants that we do. Why is that? I have been embarrassed many times by US Officers and NCOs who didn't know as much as Brit, Canadian, German and Oz peons. Fix the training and the troops will cope with whatever force structure we throw at them.

ArNG and Reserve force structure needs less change; the Active force can endure change and fight a war at the same time. We did that in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and we're doing it today. Doesn't make life easier but it can be handled. Be even easier with a functional Personnel system and better training.

[Norfolk]

My belief is that the Roles and Missions review and the QDR should provide the Army some guidance for the future and that the Army then needs to focus on, in order; the flawed personnel system, the flawed training system -- and then on the optimum, logical force structure; all the other stuff will flow from those three items.

There are those who will say I've got it backwards, the first two items I listed flow from the third. Don't think so. The current personnel system was designed to support a type Army (the pre 1940 model). It has had bandaids applied and a random tweak now and then but it is effectively totally obsolete and non responsive to the needs of the Army and the nation. It is in dire need of total redesign and that design needs to focus on providing effective personnel operations and support to what ever the Army of the day happens to look like...

Almost the same thing could be said of training; we have a pre 1940 system with grafts and patches. Most other Armies of any real use provide almost twice the training to new entrants that we do. Why is that? I have been embarrassed many times by US Officers and NCOs who didn't know as much as Brit, Canadian, German and Oz peons. Fix the training and the troops will cope with whatever force structure we throw at them.

ArNG and Reserve force structure needs less change; the Active force can endure change and fight a war at the same time. We did that in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and we're doing it today. Doesn't make life easier but it can be handled. Be even easier with a functional Personnel system and better training.

Very much agreed on these points, and would be in no position to dispute them anyway. That said, if the HIC role was mostly transferred to the RC, just how long would it take to bring said Heavy forces up to snuff in MCO? Six months? That seems like just painting a big red bull's eye on said forces prior to dispatching them to the war zone. A year? If that were sufficient for a basic grounding in MCO, how could one ensure that the major war they were to be dispatched to would still be ongoing, or even if ongoing, still in a phase in which a major intervention would lead to victory? And, just to throw a monkey in the wrench (as this is most unlikely, but I'm drawing it to try to make a point), suppose an RC HIC force was pitted against a force of near-equal, equal, or even superior fighting quality?

The latter event, as I said, is most unlikely, but it is instructive to ponder the problems that Allied forces faced when fighting an enemy that was, for the most part, still its superior in quality, though in the midst of a precipitous decline in said quality, largely due to the sheer weight of losses suffered in operations in the East. Combined-arms MCO is the most unlikely form of warfare that will have to be faced during the foreseeable future, but it is by far the most difficult to prepare for and to master. It takes not months, not a few years, but several years at least to fully come to grips with, not just "passably", but with real proficiency. The RC manoeuvre brigades sent to ODS did not go into battle, and for good reason. Even with the six months' "grace" period that the Coalition was gifted with by the Iraqis, the RC combat brigades were not up to the job. Arguably, some of the AC units were not fully up to the job, either. Good thing the Iraqis were not up to the job at all.

I fear that there is a tendency in many quarters to overestimate the MCO proficiency of many "Top Tier" Armies, and to underestimate the difficulties of achieving real and thorough proficiency in those regards. It may be that HIC forces - especially Armoured Corps - are not required to make up as much of a proportion of the Active force structure as during the Cold War. One AC Heavy Corps may well be enough. But "Medium" Corps, composed in the main of regular (not Light) Infantry Formations may be more suitable to make up the bulk of the AC force structure, as they can perform in LIC and MIC with barely skipping a beat (if properly led and trained), won't break the procurement budget, and are best suited to most of the tasks that the Army is likely to face anyway. "Light" forces are probably best restricted to dedicated Parachute and Mountain formations, for the most part, and of course SF.

But all that force structure is predicated in the main upon holding to the highest levels of leadership and training. And not least, the substantial reduction of present overeseas committments. Three "Medium" Corps (along the lines of what Ken seems to be describing), a single Heavy Corps, and several Parachute and Mountain Formations (there seems little reason, other than training funds of course, for Parachute and Mountain units and formations to not be of the same quality as Ranger Battalions); Airmobile can be handled just fine by regular Infantry Formations, when the need to perform such operations arises.

[Ken White]

... if the HIC role was mostly transferred to the RC, just how long would it take to bring said Heavy forces up to snuff in MCO? Six months?

Many variables but basically using today's training methods, from 120 days to 180. With improved training, it could be done pretty well in 90 to 120. With improved and realistic training (not likely, due to a high a casualty rate) in 60 to 90 days.

...just to throw a monkey in the wrench (as this is most unlikely, but I'm drawing it to try to make a point), suppose an RC HIC force was pitted against a force of near-equal, equal, or even superior fighting quality?

Probably the same thing that would happen if an active HIC force ran into such an opponent -- all other things being equal they'd get whupped.

... It takes not months, not a few years, but several years at least to fully come to grips with, not just "passably", but with real proficiency.

Disagree -- it takes years in peacetime the way most of us now train, in wartime in CONUS, months. Actually in war, it takes weeks to a month or so, individual dependent (see Hoffmeister, B).

...The RC manoeuvre brigades sent to ODS did not go into battle, and for good reason. Even with the six months' "grace" period that the Coalition was gifted with by the Iraqis, the RC combat brigades were not up to the job.

Having been directly involved in that fiasco, I regret to say you're incorrect -- the decision not to send them was a dumb political decision by the then CofSA and the DCSOPS at DA -- who famously said "Not in my Army..." The 48th Mech Bde got a Go from the NTC the day before the cease fire -- DA refused to certify them for deployment (a statutory requirement to preclude your concern of unready RC units in theaters) on the basis "the war's over." They were deployment capable and would've done okay -- not great but okay. The Army simply did not want that to happen so it did not (per Ski above and peacetime money flow issues; recall that to this day, the Pentagon has not been at war since 1945).

...composed in the main of regular (not Light) Infantry Formations may be more suitable to make up the bulk of the AC force structure, as they can perform in LIC and MIC with barely skipping a beat (if properly led and trained), won't break the procurement budget, and are best suited to most of the tasks that the Army is likely to face anyway. "Light" forces are probably best restricted to dedicated Parachute and Mountain formations, for the most part, and of course SF.

Agreed

...(there seems little reason, other than training funds of course, for Parachute and Mountain units and formations to not be of the same quality as Ranger Battalions); Airmobile can be handled just fine by regular Infantry Formations, when the need to perform such operations arises.

True dat.

[Ski]

Must also pile on about the Desert Storm fiasco. The 48th Brigade was ready to go, and was held up at NTC by the HQDA leadership. Even now there is great reluctance to use ARNG BCT's as "COIN" units, and the 5 BCT's we send to OIF/OEF every year are assigned ####ty SECFOR missions that the AC does not want to get involved in...

As far as creating a RC based HIC Corps - it would take about 90-120 days (if resourced properly) to get them up to speed. Remember that the American Army's Reserve Component has far more combat experience that any other Active Army in the world - minus the UK, Canada, Australia and possibly France. You can argue about what kind of experience they've learned, but just being exposed to the elephant counts a great deal against a force that has not seen combat.

I really like the idea of creating a HIC Corps+ based around III Corps and then the 7 ARNG HBCT's. Keep them out of the misama's of Iraq and Afghanistan at all costs - start flowing the resources into the ARNG so they only take 90 days to get out the door (not hard to do, I've built models with my brethren at FORSCOM and 1st Army that shows it can be done). You now have a mailed fist capable of counterattacking any state based enemy such as Iran, NK, etc...