Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
The solution to that problem is not COIN units or an Advisory Corps -- it is simply better training for that multi purpose forces that we must field. Having done both, I'll flatly state that HIC is more difficult. Yes, the skill sets are different but the trauma of HIC, the far higher casualty rates and their effect on unit capability and the planing and logistic effort make COIN appear simple. The skill sets are different, particularly above Co/Trp level but they are not so different that the two skills are irreconcilable. Any Joe or Staff Officer who knows the basics of his job can make the switch without too much difficulty. Those that cannot should seek other employment; combat in either case is not a job for the marginally competent.All true -- and switching between the two has been done in the past and is just necessary.

Problem is total troops available and likely to be available. My belief is that the Army cannot afford that. I emphatically agree we need to retain a cadre of 'experts' and a running school for Advisors and one for COIN practice. Exercises and the MTCs should include COIN scenarios as a matter of course. I believe the units are able to cope with switch hitting at COIN or HIC with minimal adjustment time. With better training, hopefully coming and Outcome based, they'll adapt okay. I'm less sanguine about the ability of those in high places to adapt -- us old guys get set in our ways...
At the risk of resurrecting a thread... I think that there is an important element being overlooked in this discussion - the actual combat portion of the "learning curve" which we seem, in spite of so many peering into a crystal ball, to inevitably encounter.

In high intensity combat, you can screw things up sufficiently badly that you could conceivably lose an entire BCT in a matter of days or hours. COIN can be a much more forgiving in that respect. Sure mistakes in COIN cost lives, and perhaps a political setback or two (i.e., some trooper strays outside of the rules of engagement), but won't cost you a 4,000 man brigade in less than a week.

Another point is that (fumbles while opening can of worms) we can at least make wide use of contractors in a COIN environment, for security, training of local nationals, etc.. Sure, everyone loves to hate contractors, the media especially, but they can be utilitzed, in certain roles, for COIN, while we darn sure couldn't count on much contractor augmentation for a high-intensity conflict.

Why would we organize all of our HIC units into the reserves/National Guard, adding an additional 60/90/180 days required to "train up" to the 30 or so required for deployment? We may as well not have any HIC capability at all, if require the better part of a year to employ it. Besides, deployments and deployment schedules are (ultimately) determined by politicians, who often have little appreciation for capabilities. This is in a world were a crisis can pop out of the murky darkness of the future with alarming speed. So, in the event of a crisis requiring HIC units, and the active Army is only COIN units, you will have a COIN unit thrown in, whether we like it or not. "Snapping in" heavy weapons units at the last minute is a well known recipe for disaster in a HIC.

(...and how are we forgetting that we needed HIC forces to kick in the door in Iraq?)