Force Structure for Small Wars

[Cavguy]

I began reading this 2001 book on defense budgets and force structure, Holding the Line, edited by Cindy Williams (currently at MIT, formerly in a high-level position at the Congressional Budget Office.) It is a compilation of the conventional wisdom regarding defense planning for the 2000-2010 period as it was viewed at that time.

She also wrote a series of op-eds in the 2000-2001 period that argued the military was overpaid in benefits.

The non-military security studies academics has a terrible track record of their theories panning out. Wolfowitz and Feith are but two examples on the other end of the spectrum.

The fact that the whole community (who gave birth to RAND) sprung up to wargame nuclear war should add suspicion.

Of course, I'm currently enrolled in a graduate security studies program!

[ipopescu]

The non-military security studies academics has a terrible track record of their theories panning out. Wolfowitz and Feith are but two examples on the other end of the spectrum.

The fact that the whole community (who gave birth to RAND) sprung up to wargame nuclear war should add suspicion.

Of course, I'm currently enrolled in a graduate security studies program!

Yeah, the current state of that academic field is rather deplorable. That's one reason why I'm preparing to enter it: weak competition.

On a more serious note, I currently see two general ways of arguing about planning for force structure.

1. You can start from the premise that there is an ends-means mismatch, and that we need to better match our goals with our resources . And on the one side you get the people who argue that foreign policy objectives should not include regime change + nation-building operations in anything but the most extraordinary circumstances. The "Iraq is an anomaly, and a disaster, and we won't do it again" school of foreign policy. This implies that we could, and should, lower our "ends" side of the equation to match our current means. And on the other hand the ones who envision large increases in defense spending and force structure to be able to deal with failed states by occupying and nation-building them. That's my caricature of what the underlying premises are for the Conventional vs. Irregular/Coin debate people are talking about.

2. Another way of looking at it is to believe, as, IMO, Frank Hoffman, Nate Freier and others who write about hybrid challenges do, that there is something intrinsic to the nature of future warfare (because of technology, globalization, US superiority in conv. warfare, etc.) which does not so much depend on the reasons why you went to war. Both state and non-state actors will use these hybrid tactics, mixing and matching modes of warfare to cause the greatest harm in that particular situation. Thus you won't have regular vs. irregular, but ever more innovative mixes of the two. Hezbollah is a prime example of this. Hence, you need flexible forces who can switch quickly from one to the other.

I think one way to look at this, in Clausewitzian terms, is a debate between people who are focusing more on the logic of war (1) and its grammar (2)

[Eden]

2. Another way of looking at it is to believe, as, IMO, Frank Hoffman, Nate Freier and others who write about hybrid challenges do, that there is something intrinsic to the nature of future warfare (because of technology, globalization, US superiority in conv. warfare, etc.) which does not so much depend on the reasons why you went to war. Both state and non-state actors will use these hybrid tactics, mixing and matching modes of warfare to cause the greatest harm in that particular situation. Thus you won't have regular vs. irregular, but ever more innovative mixes of the two. Hezbollah is a prime example of this. Hence, you need flexible forces who can switch quickly from one to the other.

I think one way to look at this, in Clausewitzian terms, is a debate between people who are focusing more on the logic of war (1) and its grammar (2)

I would caution those who believe the above statement that chosen 'modes of warfare' can not be entirely de-linked from the desired ends. Ends, in other words, sometimes dictate the means. Moreover, there are always non-military factors (culture, politics, economics, etc) which impact on an adversary's ability to 'mix and match' modes of warfare.

And referring to Clausewitz on this forum is like jumping into the lion's den with a pork chop around your neck.

[ipopescu]

I would caution those who believe the above statement that chosen 'modes of warfare' can not be entirely de-linked from the desired ends. Ends, in other words, sometimes dictate the means. Moreover, there are always non-military factors (culture, politics, economics, etc) which impact on an adversary's ability to 'mix and match' modes of warfare.

I agree, and in fact I did not mean to imply that "modes of warfare" can be divorced from the desired ends. I actually agree with Eliot Cohen, Fred Kagan and others who argued that one of the big errors of the RMA and Network Centric Warfare discourse was precisely a separation of war from its political objectives. I'm sorry if my choice of words was inadequate.

All I meant to say was that it seems to me some people believe that the conduct of future wars will be mainly determined by the ends we seek (with the implication that if we don't get involved in wars of occupation - which we shouldn't- there is no need to improve irregular/COIN capabilities; Jeffrey Record made the argument for a Cato paper a while ago), while others, as Secy Gates said this week, think that US adversaries (state and non-state) will use attempt irregular/asymmetric and hybrid means of warfare against the United States not just in prolonged wars of occupation, but in most contingencies.

And referring to Clausewitz on this forum is like jumping into the lion's den with a pork chop around your neck.

I readily admit that my understanding of Clausewitz is limited and most certainly a work in progress, but I am hoping that trying to improve it by making such references where I think appropriate, and waiting on people smarter than me to correct me if I'm wrong, is not terribly inconvenient for the members of this forum.