Force Structure for Small Wars

[Norfolk]

Andy Pavord wrote:

I do not adovocate transferring the COIN mission to the Guard. I suggested that the infantry brigades in the Guard should be transformed to specialize in COIN. I would also like to see a few COIN BCTs on the active force complemented by some Guard COIN BCTs. I am not sure how many. the exact number could be determined by a strategic analysis of the potential need.

My main argument is that COIN and its variants are a specialized form of warfare. The tactics and techniques required to excel in COIN can be best developed in units that specialize in COIN. I therefore believe that the Army should develop a force of COIN BCTs in both the active and the reserve components. However, because of the uncertain nature of the threats that we face I would keep this COIN force structure relatively small. It should be big enough to ensure that tactics and techniques can be developed and tested and yet not so big that it detracts from the regular BCTs. Many politicans are supporting the idea of expanding the army. I would propse that some of this expansion could be devoted to COIN BCTs.

COIN BCTs could serve as the spearhead of the initial phase of either a stabilization campaign (after the high intensity fighting has defeated enemy regular forces) or of a ounterinsurgency campaign. They could be allocated to the most critical part of the theater while regular BCTs take on the less critical areas. As the campaign continues, Guard BCTs could be deployed to replace active units.

What are termed COIN BCTS in your proposals are what are termed Gendarme units in many other countries; either paramilitary police forces (such as the MVD and the old KGB, various European Gendarmeries and Border Guard forces, et al.) who specialize in OOTW, or specialized military police forces (ie. the Carabinieri) who do likewise. In the context of the US Army, this would mean raising a force of several specialist Constabulary/MP Brigades. While there may be an operational niche for a few such formations (perhaps even on a scale of one per Army Corps), a separate and substantial force structure of several or many such BCTs would result in the corresponding loss of GPF forces for medium and HIC missions. As is, even those European powers with the longest and most comprehensive experience of OOTW (including COIN), particularly in the days of Empire, never maintained substantial specialized COIN-type formations within their military force structures. Even the separate paramilitary police forces tasked with the bulk of the day-to-day COIN-type tasks were dwarfed in size by the military establishments they cooperated with.

There seems to be a lingering myth that somehow OOTW in general and COIN in particular not only require quite different skills than MCO, but indeed are somehow more sophisticated and advanced forms of war or conflict than MCO. They are not; they are policing writ large, with a greater or lesser amount and degree of "war" intertwined. They require professional-level (not conscript-level) individual and small-unit leadership, discipline, presence of mind, and fighting skills, along with a mindset of heavily-armed policing instead of War - the majority of the time. The six-month infantry syllabus that Commonwealth Armies have adopted over the past generation is a reflection of the demands of both OOTW (including COIN, and in places as diverse as Sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East) and the demands of MCO, and again in places as divsere as Norway and Central Europe during the Cold War, to the hot wars in the Falklands and the Middle East.

I do not think that we can transfer the HIC mission to the Guard. HIC requires the ability to synchronize very complex systems under very demanding conditions. This takes an incredible amount of practice through high level collective training. Much more practice than Guard units can achieve in the time alloted during a normal drill year. Guard units can get there after mobilization, but it takes time. The nation needs HIC forces that can respond rapidly. Desert Shield is the case in point. I think that the case can be made that Guard units were ready by Feb 1991, but does anybody believe that Guard heavy units could have been deployed by Spt/Oct 1990? Guard heavy units are really part of the nation's strategic reserve. And given the unpredictable state of the world I think that we need them.

Rather agreed, although I would have to concede to Ken, Ski, and some other that MCOs performed by RC formations mobilized in 3-6 months would probably get the job done against most opponents; but not against those few opponents who might know what they're doing. As such, the minimum HIC force requirement should include a full-strength AC Heavy Corps, in addition to whatever RC Heavy Corps there may be. I don't see any realistic alternative to maintaining a large RC HIC-force; a Field Army -level force may well be necessary someday (as it was in 1991, and few expected that), and the AC is just not going to be large enough to accomodate much more than a quarter of that. MCO is the master-level of warfare; not to gall those who have to practice it, but COIN is the apprentice-level of war. By this logic, I suppose, minor conventional wars would make for the journeyman-level of war. Personally, I would be inclined to place ODS and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 into that category.

English-speaking Armies have done decently enough against opponents the likes of Argentina and Iraq in minor conventional wars, but we've had our heads handed to us on a number of occasions by those who had mastered MCO in major conventional wars, Germany in Europe and North Africa especially, though the Japanese handed us some pretty bitter defeats in Asia. To a more limited extent, China gave us a good whuppin' early on in Korea. Happily, we never actually had to take on the Russians in Europe.

As such, it could be argued that English-speaking Armies, the U.S. amongst them, are most comfortable at minor conventional wars against mediocre opponents whom we can out-manoeuvre, out-gun, out-supply, and out-tech. We run into serious trouble either when we're faced with a foe that we can't dispose of quickly - such as in COIN, where the nature of the conflict defies military resolution per se, or when we have to face opponents who have taken the pains to master major conventional warfare. The simple truth is, we're not the best, or even necessarily very good, at either. In time we become just good enough, and then forget soon after the emergency is over...

Raising specialized COIN forces would be unnecessary and counter-productive. Most COIN-related training is part and parcel of thorough initial-entry training, which in turn provides the basis upon which excellence in MCO is based upon (see Ken who's bin' der, dun dat). The remaining, more specialized training that COIN requires is largely something that must be an integral part of officer training and staff college education. Start with the basics, individual and small-unit skills, OOTW (including COIN), and work up through major-unit/formation-level OOTW and minor-unit MCO, and then finish off with major-unit and formation-level MCO training. That's how its done, and been done for over a generation in other English-speaking Armies (check with Wilf on this if you have doubts), and that's what the US has to do since the other English-speaking Armies can't do it the same anymore because of political weakness and indifference at home. No need to consider COIN to be an arcane art-form, with similarly arcane needs.

[Andy Pavord]

How about this?

1 Airborne corp for immediate response/forcible entry
1 HIC Corp with supporting RC forces as Ken Suggests
1 Corp focused on stabilization/COIN with a mixture of active and RC brigades

2 or 3 "Full Spectrum" Corps that would have broader mission lists but not be expected to respond as rapidly as the more specialized corps.

The strategic idea is that the specialized corps would be the first response to situations that fit their mission set. The "full spectrum" corps would then have some time to do more focused training and do whatever reorganization necessary before they deploy.

[Andy Pavord]

In response to Norfolk:

I think we need something heavier than Gendarme or Carbineri. I advocate a motorized infantry formation capable of defeating platoon or company (-) insurgent concentrations.

I do not agree that COIN is the "apprentice" level of war. If it were so easy why are we having so much difficulty with it? We were not able to master it in Vietnam in 64/65 or in Iraq in 03/04.

I do not know if COIN or HIC is more difficult. I do know that they are different. At the Soldier level, many of the tasks are very similar. I would also agree that an attack on a fortified position is a more difficult operation than a cordon and search. However, COIN adds the "police" element and policing is hard. It also adds information operations, political analysis, economic development, etc.

At the battalion staff level the differences are stark. The type of staff functions performed in COIN are radically different than those performed in HIC. For the S2 terain and target analysis is very different from analyzing insurgent networks. For the S3, planning a deliberate attack is very different than planning patrols and coordinating them with information operations. For the S4, supplying a battalion in contact is very different than operating log support for a FOB and supporting reconstruction efforts.

I believe that our force structure needs to recognize these differences. We need a relatively small force that can specialize in COIN in order to develop the tactics and techniques of COIN to their highest level.

[Ken White]

...
I do not agree that COIN is the "apprentice" level of war. If it were so easy why are we having so much difficulty with it? We were not able to master it in Vietnam in 64/65 or in Iraq in 03/04.

We had and are having difficulty with it because in both cases we went in wrongly trying to fight a conventional war due to total failure to understand the situation and a massive underestimation of the sophistication of the enemy. Our stupid egos got in the way. Thus, in both cases we made the situation far worse then we needed to and took too much time to adjust. I will give us an attaboy for learning faster this time than we did in Viet Nam.

The solution to that problem is not COIN units or an Advisory Corps -- it is simply better training for that multi purpose forces that we must field.

I do not know if COIN or HIC is more difficult. I do know that they are different. At the Soldier level, many of the tasks are very similar. I would also agree that an attack on a fortified position is a more difficult operation than a cordon and search. However, COIN adds the "police" element and policing is hard. It also adds information operations, political analysis, economic development, etc.

Having done both, I'll flatly state that HIC is more difficult. Yes, the skill sets are different but the trauma of HIC, the far higher casualty rates and their effect on unit capability and the planing and logistic effort make COIN appear simple. The skill sets are different, particularly above Co/Trp level but they are not so different that the two skills are irreconcilable. Any Joe or Staff Officer who knows the basics of his job can make the switch without too much difficulty. Those that cannot should seek other employment; combat in either case is not a job for the marginally competent.

At the battalion staff level the differences are stark. The type of staff functions performed in COIN are radically different than those performed in HIC. For the S2 terain and target analysis is very different from analyzing insurgent networks. For the S3, planning a deliberate attack is very different than planning patrols and coordinating them with information operations. For the S4, supplying a battalion in contact is very different than operating log support for a FOB and supporting reconstruction efforts.

All true -- and switching between the two has been done in the past and is just necessary.

I believe that our force structure needs to recognize these differences. We need a relatively small force that can specialize in COIN in order to develop the tactics and techniques of COIN to their highest level.

Define small...

Problem is total troops available and likely to be available. My belief is that the Army cannot afford that. I emphatically agree we need to retain a cadre of 'experts' and a running school for Advisors and one for COIN practice. Exercises and the MTCs should include COIN scenarios as a matter of course. I believe the units are able to cope with switch hitting at COIN or HIC with minimal adjustment time. With better training, hopefully coming and Outcome based, they'll adapt okay. I'm less sanguine about the ability of those in high places to adapt -- us old guys get set in our ways...

[ipopescu]

I think there is general agreement that we have a means/ends mismatch in our current defense strategy. But there are always two solutions to such a mismatch: increase your means or diminish your ends. That's the shape the debate is taking now.

The Stanley Foundation policy brief that Frank Hoffman and I did last year, while not as extreme as the Cato position, also argued that we need to be more circumspect in what we plan and budget for. Specifically, we took issue with the scenarios that are used to justify a force increase post-Iraq and Afghanistan such as the occupation and stabilization of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, or something similar. Frank and I were not sanguine about the threat from terrorist bases in distant lands or uncontrolled nuclear weapons. We just didn't think that long term occupation and attempted social and political re-engineering of flawed states is the most effective way to address these threats.

Basically, we could build a 5 million person force, and missions would emerge to occupy them. What we need to ask ourselves is whether, in this time of mounting economic, environmental, and social challenges, we really want to underwrite the security of other nations who spend much less than we do on their own defense (and I mean on a per capita basis, not in the aggregate).

Steve,

I remember reading last year the excellent brief you and Frank did on ground troops level where you two did some serious damage to the arguments made by Kagan&O'Hanlon in a similar Stanley Foundation paper. Your points were very well taken. It's fairly ridiculous to assume that 100k or 200k more troops would allow the US to successfully invade & perform a successful long-term nation-building mission in a place like Pakistan, Iran, or Saudi Arabia.

One point on which I have some doubts on is to what extent you can count on allied contribution to provide extra manpower for multilateral operations.
Frankly, outside the ones that were in Iraq, I don't really see any other NATO members or non-Nato allies being able to provide significant troops for any scenario that's not on their borders. It doesn't look to me like they have either the will or the capability to do so. I mean, if they can't even do more for a fairly clear cut "moral" case like in Afghanistan, I find it very unlikely to believe that they will do so in any scenario I can think of. Local allies, yes, Northern Allies proved very useful, but that situation seems rather unlikely to be easily replicable in other places; and they of course come with their share of problems such as unreliability, corruption, incompetence, etc. In short, I share your (and Frank's) skepticism regarding the suitability of dealing with failed states through regime change + nation-building, but if you do decide to do it, than I believe we shouldn't really count on much extra help by others - IMO "multilateralism" is sometimes an excuse for people who want to do those missions but don't want to pay for them.

Having said that, I nevertheless disagree rather strongly with the last point in your post regarding the disproportionate level of US investments in maintaing world peace and security. I don't actually think that's wrong, but it's just that it leads to a cure that in my opinion is worse than the disease. It's a great talking-point to argue that the US shouldn't "subsidize" other countries, but at the end of the day I don't think we are willing to, say, abandon Afghanistan just because we feel that the French or the Germans won't do their fair share. International Relations academics love to bitch about "the free rider" problem and about the US providing "public goods" when others ought to do more as well, but at the end of the day I think it's a much bigger problem if you don't take care of a security issue that affects you just because others are also reaping the benefits of your actions. Maybe I'm just having too pessimistic an opinion of Europeans, but having grew up in Europe, well, I have my reasons for it

Ionut

[William F. Owen]

the Army has fought the war on terror with conventional units adapted to counterinsurgency operations. For most units, the transition from conventional organization and tactics to the very different and challenging tasks of counterinsurgency was traumatic. The costs of poor organization for counterinsurgency, in terms of battlefield mistakes and the misallocation of resources, were substantial. To provide the optimal force for fighting insurgencies the Army should develop Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) that are specifically organized, equipped, and trained for the complex challenges of counterinsurgency operations...

Everything I can see, suggests that this is utterly correct. What is more, I see it as pretty simple to re-configure a COIN structured force to go kill armoured vehicles, either dismounted or in protected mobility, or even get them to employ stand-off fires against the appropriate target sets. This is not 1944, or even 68.

Simple as it is, (and I think it is) we will never do it.

[Eden]

I am always a little bit mystified by those who say, in effect:

Having Conventional units do COIN is a hugely difficult transition, but a unit organized, trained, and equipped for COIN should be able to pick up conventional warfighting without too much trouble...

Now that that is off my chest, I would like to hear if anybody out there thinks it would make sense, in any current or future COIN situation, to take an approach that was common among imperial forces in the last century. That is, to build an indigenous army from scratch - as we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan - with American officers and NCOs serving as commanders and small unit leaders, rather than advisers.

Most of the 'Imperial' forces that policed the various colonial empires were 'native' troops with European leaders, some of which became famous and highly effective fighting forces.

I know, I know, there are a multitude of problems with this approach...but we don't seem to be having a great deal of success with any others

[Tom Odom]

Now that that is off my chest, I would like to hear if anybody out there thinks it would make sense, in any current or future COIN situation, to take an approach that was common among imperial forces in the last century. That is, to build an indigenous army from scratch - as we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan - with American officers and NCOs serving as commanders and small unit leaders, rather than advisers.

It worked relatively well for the Brits and to a lesser degree the French and other colonial powers in a colonial setting. The Sultan of Oman used retired SAS and other Brit officers for Oman's military. That said, examples in a non-colonial setting are rare, especially today. The modern state that says it will take another countries soldiers as its military leaders is hard to find.

I still see our tendency to recreate ourselves as our biggest issue; armies develop from the unit up over time. So called "jump starts" replicating structures we have in place, especially when it comes to headquarters and training establishments are bad investments of our money, our time, and most importantly our Soldiers.

Tom

[Ski]

The myth of strategic speed has raised it's head again.

It really doesn't matter how fast you move from CONUS/Home Station to a developing theater of operations. Moving an Armored/Heavy Corps is going to take a LOT of time, and it doesn't matter if it's from the AC or the RC or a combination of both. These forces are going to have to be moved by ship because of the weight and sheer cube size of equipment in a Heavy Corps. It's going to take weeks to get the bulk of the force someplace in the globe, and while you might use APS stocks to get a BCT or two into theater, the bulk of heavy forces are still going to take time to get into theater.

That's why have Marines, the 82nd and to a lesser extent the 101st. They can get on the ground quickly and at least act as a show of force against an opposing heavy force. The Navy and Air Force really can do a lot of damage to an enemy that decides to mass his units (yes, I'm actually giving them credit).

As Cavguy stated - this is a discussion that has to take place after Iraq. The force (AC and ARNG) are being used at too high of a rate to allow the establishment of the AC/ARNG HIC Heavy Corps + for the foreseeable future.

[Ski]

As a long time 50A officer (with relevant experience in theater), it's the biggest problem we've had since the beginning of both conflicts.

The organization is the base of the pyramid - mess that up and the top of the pyramid has a lot of trouble standing on its own.

I still see our tendency to recreate ourselves as our biggest issue; armies develop from the unit up over time. So called "jump starts" replicating structures we have in place, especially when it comes to headquarters and training establishments are bad investments of our money, our time, and most importantly our Soldiers.

Tom

[ipopescu]

The non-military security studies academics has a terrible track record of their theories panning out. Wolfowitz and Feith are but two examples on the other end of the spectrum.

The fact that the whole community (who gave birth to RAND) sprung up to wargame nuclear war should add suspicion.

Of course, I'm currently enrolled in a graduate security studies program!

Yeah, the current state of that academic field is rather deplorable. That's one reason why I'm preparing to enter it: weak competition.

On a more serious note, I currently see two general ways of arguing about planning for force structure.

1. You can start from the premise that there is an ends-means mismatch, and that we need to better match our goals with our resources . And on the one side you get the people who argue that foreign policy objectives should not include regime change + nation-building operations in anything but the most extraordinary circumstances. The "Iraq is an anomaly, and a disaster, and we won't do it again" school of foreign policy. This implies that we could, and should, lower our "ends" side of the equation to match our current means. And on the other hand the ones who envision large increases in defense spending and force structure to be able to deal with failed states by occupying and nation-building them. That's my caricature of what the underlying premises are for the Conventional vs. Irregular/Coin debate people are talking about.

2. Another way of looking at it is to believe, as, IMO, Frank Hoffman, Nate Freier and others who write about hybrid challenges do, that there is something intrinsic to the nature of future warfare (because of technology, globalization, US superiority in conv. warfare, etc.) which does not so much depend on the reasons why you went to war. Both state and non-state actors will use these hybrid tactics, mixing and matching modes of warfare to cause the greatest harm in that particular situation. Thus you won't have regular vs. irregular, but ever more innovative mixes of the two. Hezbollah is a prime example of this. Hence, you need flexible forces who can switch quickly from one to the other.

I think one way to look at this, in Clausewitzian terms, is a debate between people who are focusing more on the logic of war (1) and its grammar (2)

[Eden]

2. Another way of looking at it is to believe, as, IMO, Frank Hoffman, Nate Freier and others who write about hybrid challenges do, that there is something intrinsic to the nature of future warfare (because of technology, globalization, US superiority in conv. warfare, etc.) which does not so much depend on the reasons why you went to war. Both state and non-state actors will use these hybrid tactics, mixing and matching modes of warfare to cause the greatest harm in that particular situation. Thus you won't have regular vs. irregular, but ever more innovative mixes of the two. Hezbollah is a prime example of this. Hence, you need flexible forces who can switch quickly from one to the other.

I think one way to look at this, in Clausewitzian terms, is a debate between people who are focusing more on the logic of war (1) and its grammar (2)

I would caution those who believe the above statement that chosen 'modes of warfare' can not be entirely de-linked from the desired ends. Ends, in other words, sometimes dictate the means. Moreover, there are always non-military factors (culture, politics, economics, etc) which impact on an adversary's ability to 'mix and match' modes of warfare.

And referring to Clausewitz on this forum is like jumping into the lion's den with a pork chop around your neck.

[ipopescu]

I would caution those who believe the above statement that chosen 'modes of warfare' can not be entirely de-linked from the desired ends. Ends, in other words, sometimes dictate the means. Moreover, there are always non-military factors (culture, politics, economics, etc) which impact on an adversary's ability to 'mix and match' modes of warfare.

I agree, and in fact I did not mean to imply that "modes of warfare" can be divorced from the desired ends. I actually agree with Eliot Cohen, Fred Kagan and others who argued that one of the big errors of the RMA and Network Centric Warfare discourse was precisely a separation of war from its political objectives. I'm sorry if my choice of words was inadequate.

All I meant to say was that it seems to me some people believe that the conduct of future wars will be mainly determined by the ends we seek (with the implication that if we don't get involved in wars of occupation - which we shouldn't- there is no need to improve irregular/COIN capabilities; Jeffrey Record made the argument for a Cato paper a while ago), while others, as Secy Gates said this week, think that US adversaries (state and non-state) will use attempt irregular/asymmetric and hybrid means of warfare against the United States not just in prolonged wars of occupation, but in most contingencies.

And referring to Clausewitz on this forum is like jumping into the lion's den with a pork chop around your neck.

I readily admit that my understanding of Clausewitz is limited and most certainly a work in progress, but I am hoping that trying to improve it by making such references where I think appropriate, and waiting on people smarter than me to correct me if I'm wrong, is not terribly inconvenient for the members of this forum.

[Daniel.Kushner]

I very much enjoyed the essay but I'm having difficulty envisioning the linguistic or cultural elements of these specialized COIN units. Certainly such units in Iraq would be significantly more effective if they spoke fluent (or even more) Arabic and understood the subtleties of Arab or Kurdish culture or even the intricate differences between Shi'ism and Sunnism. This education would be less useful for units sent to the Pashtun Pashto-speaking regions of Afghanistan. I suppose my question is, considering we can't be certain where we might next be involved in counterinsurgency operations, are you suggesting some sort of generalized cultural education (and what would that entail?) or a series of parallel intensive classes, where for example some soldiers could choose to specialize in various Arab cultures and the dialects of the Arabic languages, while others might choose to study in greater focus Spanish and the various Latin American cultures, or are you suggesting that we follow both veins?

[William F. Owen]

I am always a little bit mystified by those who say, in effect:

Having Conventional units do COIN is a hugely difficult transition, but a unit organized, trained, and equipped for COIN should be able to pick up conventional warfighting without too much trouble...

This all hinges on what you believe defines "COIN" and "Warfighting" in terms of the tactical and operational functions that define force structure and development. - if indeed they do!

Does a COIN Brigade need less artillery? Probably. So you have to make sure you can bolt on credible artillery when needed. Same with armour. As concerns infantry, good protected mobility and ATGWs would seem to have merit for war fighting. I suggest the training would follow suit, or at least it did in the British Army in the 1980's.

[Randy Brown]

On the M-day side, I currently work and play on an ARNG Infantry BCT staff here in the American Midwest, so Povard's arguments toward COIN-focused BCTs are of great professional interest and even potential application.

Povard suggests on page 1 of his article that:

A counterinsurgency brigade should have the capability to defeat insurgents and to conduct stability operations. A core combat force of three to five infantry battalions, equipped with armored patrol vehicles, would specialize in security and small unit combat operations. One to three heavy companies backed by an artillery battery would provide the firepower to destroy insurgent concentrations. Organic human intelligence teams, engineers, and civil affairs teams would provide the capacity to find insurgents, rebuild infrastructure, and develop political institutions. Training detachments would give the brigade the capacity to recruit, train, and equip local forces to perform security tasks. The brigade staff would be experts in counterinsurgent tasks such as human intelligence, political analysis, reconstruction, and procurement. Every member of the brigade will be proficient in counterinsurgency tactics, cultures, and languages.

Obviously, this seems to tend toward the “heavy” side of the three BCT models, and also toward a top-down, God’s-Eye-View of force structure. Admittedly, I’m coming at the topic from the opposite directions: “light” and focused at the "grassroots" brigade level.

Given that the Army’s transformation to modularity supposedly also created the ability to swap out and add organizational parts as needed, I’ve been using Povard’s article to locally instigate some water-cooler professional development, posing the following question: How would you suggest re-configuring and/or equipping a hypothetical IBCT structure to optimize COIN capabilities?

Note that:

• There are two organic infantry (light) battalions in an IBCT.
• Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) exist only in the BSTB’s military police company.
• Engineer capability in an Infantry BCT is also located in the BSTB, as one company of light engineers (Sappers).
• Recon, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA) capabilities reside in a HMMWV-based cavalry squadron. As my Cav buddies often remind me, they no longer offer on-call recon-in-force capability.

Further, note that our IBCT has recently deployed multiple rotations of Embedded Training Teams (ETT) to Afghanistan. As such, it theoretically has a cadre on which to build organic advisor-mentor capability.

So, all that said, what are your thoughts on how to theoretically re-organize and/or equip an IBCT to optimize COIN capabilities, given the missions discussed by Povard?

[Fuchs]

I'm not sure that small wars in general require a different force structure, such wars are often necessary tests for the normal forces.

Occupations otherwise require a lot of different qualifications than usual warfare and my opinion on this is that both the civil as the military services should have a reserve, to be mobilized for such duties if it's the nation's policy requirement that the national institutions should be capable to occupy foreign countries.

Such a mobilization would inadvertently create (potentially problematic) manpower shortages at home concerning policemen, economists, construction engineers, intelligence agents and diplomats.

It might be a good idea to keep such a mobilized force para-military instead of real military; the standing forces could do the combat jobs. It should be able to defend itself, though.

[Ski]

If we use Afghanistan and Iraq as examples, then Small Wars most certainly have and use unique force structure.

[Ken White]

in all wars; true in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and Desert Storm. It should. To not do so is to fail to adapt to METT-TC.

There is absolutely no way to design a force that will fit all requirements; the structure is designed for ease of personnel use and equipping; commanders have to modify to get the job done. Not a problem.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I throw this out as grist for the mill. The original concept was to design a brigade combat team not for COIN, but for rear area operations. It morphed into a form or hybrid.

It is bound to upset about everyone. First, it creates a non-combat arms element that is a terrain manager. That alone should piss-off most of you. Second, it is based around the idea that COIN is broken into two elements. The SOF who are the terrorist hunter/killers and the stability forces that are performing what I term State Building activities. It leaves the traditional elements to fight the traditional wars without trying to force them into being the catch all for every possible mission.

Whether we can afford to create the brigades is a separate matter. It is only the concept that I was concerned with.