Force Structure for Small Wars

[Ski]

If this was the case, that would be dandy.

The problem is that commanders have not be trusted to shape their organizations - they are forced to reorganize based off the DMD and DMETL.

in all wars; true in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and Desert Storm. It should. To not do so is to fail to adapt to METT-TC.

There is absolutely no way to design a force that will fit all requirements; the structure is designed for ease of personnel use and equipping; commanders have to modify to get the job done. Not a problem.

[Randy Brown]

I throw this out as grist for the mill. The original concept was to design a brigade combat team not for COIN, but for rear area operations. It morphed into a form or hybrid.

I very much appreciated reading your white paper exploring the possibilities inherent in a Rear Area, Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Brigade. The document addresses some of the organizational stuff that's also come up in coffee-room conversations here, as we've informally played with the blue-sky task organization and/or equipping of an IBCT to pursue a hypothetical and generic COIN mission.

Sez this armchair IBCT commander:

• I want more military police for security, and detainee ops.
• I want more engineers, both for route-clearance and infrastructure missions.

Thanks again for the document!

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thanks for the comments.

While I take full and complete credit (or blame) for the document it is really the result of ten months of conversations with members of my small group at CGSC as we discussed current issues in Iraq and how to avoid them in the future by having an immediate follow-on capability.

In addition to not discussing the SOF/COIN connection in hopes of not limiting the concept to that realm, I also did not mention that the intent would be to make many of these either multi-compo or national guard brigades since much of the capability found in this organization is just as applicable in a civil disaster CONUS as long as the security forces are used in a non-federalized status.

[Andy Pavord]

I like Curmudgeon's paper. I agree with his discussion of how this type of brigade would be used. What I am not sure about is whether the core of this type of brigade should be infantry of MP. I lean toward infantry for a couple of reasons. I envision a situation where small unit combat is still fairly common and where the brigade needs the capability to defeat up to a company minus of insurgents. MPs are really only trained to handle squad level engagements (although I know they have done far more than that in Iraq). I also think the unit needs mortars which MPs do not have. (this may be a bias from my experience in Afghanistan).

The answer may be a hybrid unit with a mix of MPs and infantry. It could be a flexible mix depending on the situation. Lord knows that every unit commander wants more MPs.

I agree completely with the description of the need for specialized experience in the headquarters staff. Integrating training, reconstruction, policing and other functions is difficult. Developing the political sensitivity in commanders takes training and expereince that is different from preparing and leading in high intensity conflict. I understand the point made by others that the military is a demanding profession and that those who take up the calling must be flexible and able to learn to execute new tasks under the most demanding situations. And there is plenty of evidence that many units have suceeded in doing this over the years in many different campaigns. My point is that learning on the fly and experimentation on the ground is not the optimal condition. We need at least a few brigade and battalion staffs that have thought this stuff through before they are in the middle of the fight. That will produce the best results.

[Andy Pavord]

I also want to second Ski's idea that unit commanders need more power to shape their own force structure. I think that we are way too biased in favor of making things easier for planners and budgeteers by enforcing a one size fits all industial era mentality. We should give unit commanders a mission and the resouces and let them experiment.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thanks for you comments. In trying to use “off-the-shelf” units as much as possible and trying not to interfere with the army’s plan to have 48 BCTs by not fighting for assets that would be necessary to fill those units.

You are absolutely right that the unit has no mortar or anti-armor capabilities. It would take a modified weapons company with three assault platoons and one “mortar platoon” made up of three standard mortar sections to build the assets required to fill the gap. One of these companies would be added to each MP BN. The question then comes up as to whether to add Q-36 or some other counter fire detection capability. I understand there is a fairly good sonic system out there somewhere that is more akin to what I may want. Again, I am out of the “off-the-shelf” capability. These modifications could be corrected during the concept validation phase.

[Sabre]

The solution to that problem is not COIN units or an Advisory Corps -- it is simply better training for that multi purpose forces that we must field. Having done both, I'll flatly state that HIC is more difficult. Yes, the skill sets are different but the trauma of HIC, the far higher casualty rates and their effect on unit capability and the planing and logistic effort make COIN appear simple. The skill sets are different, particularly above Co/Trp level but they are not so different that the two skills are irreconcilable. Any Joe or Staff Officer who knows the basics of his job can make the switch without too much difficulty. Those that cannot should seek other employment; combat in either case is not a job for the marginally competent.All true -- and switching between the two has been done in the past and is just necessary.

Problem is total troops available and likely to be available. My belief is that the Army cannot afford that. I emphatically agree we need to retain a cadre of 'experts' and a running school for Advisors and one for COIN practice. Exercises and the MTCs should include COIN scenarios as a matter of course. I believe the units are able to cope with switch hitting at COIN or HIC with minimal adjustment time. With better training, hopefully coming and Outcome based, they'll adapt okay. I'm less sanguine about the ability of those in high places to adapt -- us old guys get set in our ways...

At the risk of resurrecting a thread... I think that there is an important element being overlooked in this discussion - the actual combat portion of the "learning curve" which we seem, in spite of so many peering into a crystal ball, to inevitably encounter.

In high intensity combat, you can screw things up sufficiently badly that you could conceivably lose an entire BCT in a matter of days or hours. COIN can be a much more forgiving in that respect. Sure mistakes in COIN cost lives, and perhaps a political setback or two (i.e., some trooper strays outside of the rules of engagement), but won't cost you a 4,000 man brigade in less than a week.

Another point is that (fumbles while opening can of worms) we can at least make wide use of contractors in a COIN environment, for security, training of local nationals, etc.. Sure, everyone loves to hate contractors, the media especially, but they can be utilitzed, in certain roles, for COIN, while we darn sure couldn't count on much contractor augmentation for a high-intensity conflict.

Why would we organize all of our HIC units into the reserves/National Guard, adding an additional 60/90/180 days required to "train up" to the 30 or so required for deployment? We may as well not have any HIC capability at all, if require the better part of a year to employ it. Besides, deployments and deployment schedules are (ultimately) determined by politicians, who often have little appreciation for capabilities. This is in a world were a crisis can pop out of the murky darkness of the future with alarming speed. So, in the event of a crisis requiring HIC units, and the active Army is only COIN units, you will have a COIN unit thrown in, whether we like it or not. "Snapping in" heavy weapons units at the last minute is a well known recipe for disaster in a HIC.

(...and how are we forgetting that we needed HIC forces to kick in the door in Iraq?)

[Ken White]

...
Why would we organize all of our HIC units into the reserves/National Guard...

Who suggested that? I did not -- though I do think a slight majority of the overall number of heavy BCTs should be in the RC.

adding an additional 60/90/180 days required to "train up" to the 30 or so required for deployment?

Sixty plus the 30; 90 days total should be more than adequate. The problem heretofore has not been lack of capability but the reluctance of the active Army to certify ARNG combat units for deployment for a variety of reasons.

...and the active Army is only COIN units, you will have a COIN unit thrown in, whether we like it or not. "Snapping in" heavy weapons units at the last minute is a well known recipe for disaster in a HIC.

(...and how are we forgetting that we needed HIC forces to kick in the door in Iraq?)

Agree -- and again, not at all what I suggested.

[reed11b]

Who suggested that? I did not -- though I do think a slight majority of the overall number of heavy BCTs should be in the RC.Sixty plus the 30; 90 days total should be more than adequate. The problem heretofore has not been lack of capability but the reluctance of the active Army to certify ARNG combat units for deployment for a variety of reasons.Agree -- and again, not at all what I suggested.

Amen to the recognition of the political aspect of the NG certifications on OIF-I. I disagree w/ the HBT's in the NG however. The upkeep cost difference between an active HBT and NG HBT is not particularly great. There is also limited large training areas available in many states. IBT's make a better cost saving and dual-role option for the NG.

[Ken White]

I disagree w/ the HBT's in the NG however. The upkeep cost difference between an active HBT and NG HBT is not particularly great.

Cost is not the issue, manning strengths are the problem.

There is also limited large training areas available in many states.

True but there are other States, mostly out west, that have plenty of room. There are a lot of politics in what type of Guard units are where and that can be rectified (Heh; Congress willing, of course...).

IBT's make a better cost saving and dual-role option for the NG.

True for the Guard; my question is which is best for the nation.

[Entropy]

Just wanted to inject that the Air Guard has undergone a lot of significant changes as part of brac in the last few years. One of the biggest changes was a significant loss of ANG "HIC" capability through the loss of combat aircraft. To me this makes sense - an F-16 wing, for example, is of limited use to a governor. A big focus for the ANG now is DGS - the ground station exploitation from UAV's, U-2 and other aircraft.

On the reserve side, the trend is toward "associate" units where reserve units are colocated and partially integrated with active duty units. The reserve is now, for all intents and purposes, an operational and not a strategic reserve.

[Ken White]

~90% funded by the USG only to serve the States?

Just wanted to inject that the Air Guard has undergone a lot of significant changes as part of brac in the last few years. One of the biggest changes was a significant loss of ANG "HIC" capability through the loss of combat aircraft. To me this makes sense - an F-16 wing, for example, is of limited use to a governor.

I suggest the the sheer cost of todays fighters to replace those F-16s (And F-15s) plays a part. Pointing out that F-16s are of little use to a Governor is just sugar coating reality.

A big focus for the ANG now is DGS - the ground station exploitation from UAV's, U-2 and other aircraft.

I suspect that will accelerate. It should. Hopefully, they'll get a handle on the stress factor.

On the reserve side, the trend is toward "associate" units where reserve units are colocated and partially integrated with active duty units. The reserve is now, for all intents and purposes, an operational and not a strategic reserve.

As, IMO, the Army Reserve should be while the ARNG remains a strategic reserve. The mid-80s movement of all Cbt units away from the USAR was a bad deal for the nation.

[reed11b]

but a great deal for the NG. I certainly would have never "gone guard" w/o there being actual deployable combat units w/ first rate equipment in it. What do you think the advantage of having BCTs in the reserve over the NG would be BTW?
Reed

[selil]

Just want to point out that the Army and Air National Guard units are the only force that has all of the law enforcement and military powers in one entity available for use up to and trumping the FBI for international conflict to fight cyber warfare. Whew...

When you look at all of the entities that want to do it, they all have legal restrictions, that make them nearing on almost impossible to act in the capacity of offensive cyber warfare.

Now capability. That may be something else. And, there are a few sticky issues involving international law and treaties. SO, force structure for small wars follows patterns far beyond trigger pullers.

[reed11b]

but I retract my earlier statements. I re-read the whole thread from the beginning, and in the context of who should be involved in long-term fights and who should be involved in the "kick-off", I must say that a RC HBTs do make a great deal of sense. This would also allow for increased focus on training for both the AC and RC since the majority of the downtime upkeep would be taken over by technicians and contractors. grrr not only do I never get away w/ sloppy posts around Ken, sometimes I even have to admit I was wrong. Thanks a heap.
Reed

[Entropy]

~90% funded by the USG only to serve the States? I suggest the the sheer cost of todays fighters to replace those F-16s (And F-15s) plays a part. Pointing out that F-16s are of little use to a Governor is just sugar coating reality.

Never said they were only to serve the states but regardless it doesn't make much sense to me to have too many combat aircraft like F-16's in the guard. If there's an argument for keeping fighters in the Guard I'd love to hear it.

I don't see aircraft cost being a primary factor since the fighter fleet is only expected to decline by around 15% over the next 15 years which should be offset easily by UAS'. The primary factor, IMO, are O&M costs and the continuing trend in both the Navy and Air Force to consolidate airframes to a few bases as a cost saving measure. This is also the logic behind the reserve associate units.

I suspect that will accelerate. It should. Hopefully, they'll get a handle on the stress factor.

Yeah, these units will be 24/7/365 operations once they all get up and running which will be nice for Guard bums but could take some adjustment from the traditionals. The advantage, of course, is there are no operational deployments.

Anyway, I don't want to hijack the thread further, but it's interesting to compare how the different services are making changes to the Guard/Reserve.

[Ken White]

Never said they were only to serve the states but regardless it doesn't make much sense to me to have too many combat aircraft like F-16's in the guard. If there's an argument for keeping fighters in the Guard I'd love to hear it.

Given the number of combat aircraft available and the even smaller number likely to be available, it doesn't make much sense -- if we had the big numbers we had in the 1945-95 period it would.

I don't see aircraft cost being a primary factor since the fighter fleet is only expected to decline by around 15% over the next 15 years

That doesn't track. As of Sep 07, the figures were:
730 F-15
1,245 F-16 (incl 270 F-16 ADF for AirNG fighter interceptor mission)
378 A10 (last number I heard)
______
2,353

vs.

183 F22 (last number I heard)
1,763 F35 (last number I heard)
_____
1,946

That's a 17% drop if all goes well -- but that's really academic and it is around 15%. My point would be that even that 2007 number is vastly different than the 1987 figures...

which should be offset easily by UAS'.

True.

Anyway, I don't want to hijack the thread further, but it's interesting to compare how the different services are making changes to the Guard/Reserve.

the services all have vastly different roles and missions so there should be a difference -- a big difference...

[Ski]

The National Guard has combat force structure because it is considered the militia of the nation - expanded to the ANG once flight became possible. It's Constitutional Law and that alone means the Guard is going to have the bulk of Reserve Component combat force structure.

I can get into some of the force structure, training and readiness changes of the Army Guard later today or this week, depending on available time. Christ knows I've spent the last five years of my life getting the ARNG working through Modularity, ARFORGEN and earlier this year, the new Pre-Mob Training cycle. Also have worked on the "Comprehensive Review" that was just signed by the FORSCOM Commander which really is the nuts and bolts of getting a much better trained, manned, and ready ARNG integrated into the Operational Reserve.

Gots to get to CGSC now...

[Ken White]

The National Guard has combat force structure because it is considered the militia of the nation - expanded to the ANG once flight became possible. It's Constitutional Law and that alone means the Guard is going to have the bulk of Reserve Component combat force structure.

'considered.' That word raises the question "by whom?"

Your statement is correct by Statute, not by the Constitution; what Congress renders, it can unrender. NGB slickly got all that myth bought by a succession of Administrations and Congresses over the last 100 years or so. I spent a lot of my 18 years of DAC time working some of the issues and with the Guard, plus I've been there, KY Gd at 16 and SC Gd later. Nothing I've written is a knock on the Guard, it is what it is and it's okay as it is -- and will get better...

In any event, it is simply my opinion that transfer of all combat units in the RC to the Guard was a mistake -- whether it was an error or not, it's unlikely to be changed. Certainly nothing I write will bring that about...

[selil]

'
Your statement is correct by Statute, not by the Constitution; what Congress renders, it can unrender. NGB slickly got all that myth bought by a succession of Administrations and Congresses over the last 100 years or so. I spent a lot of my 18 years of DAC time working some of the issues and with the Guard, plus I've been there, KY Gd at 16 and SC Gd later. Nothing I've written is a knock on the Guard, it is what it is and it's okay as it is -- and will get better...

I think Ken you may be partially right which suggests... I can't pull it off the top of my head but I believe from the Korean War, there may be a few Supreme Court decisions, as to the Constitutional nature of the guard. I believe, though don't know what to search for, that there was a SCOTUS decision in the Kennedy era too. There has been a lawsuit also brought by a couple of governors in the last few years.

Sorry I'm being vague but this is far afield of my area of expertise but becoming of increased interest as to the realities, legal, and political implications of increased use of the Guard for non-traditional missions.