US Military Information Operations FM

[invictus0972]

I have been reading FM 3-13 trying to get a better idea of the role the G-7 has in IE. As I look at Figure 6-1, I come away thinking of the G-7 as a conductor directing an orchestra of five core competencies of IE (PA, PO, Combat Camera, STRATCOM, Public Diplomacy), Par 6-2. I understand that this is done in working groups; however, I am trying to figure out who has ultimate responsibility for IE. At the end of the mission, is the commander going to look at the G-7 for the successes and failures of IE, or will he look to the PAO, PO, etc.?

In Paragraph 6-36, it states, "PSYOP planning is conducted within the G-7/S-7section and synchronized within the IEWG."

Am I understanding this correctly to say that the PSYOP officer works for the G-7?

I definitely see the need for these working groups to be functional so as to ensure the command achieves a "coherent operational approach." Given the many overlapping responsibilities of the various competencies, I can see where there would be a real challenge in this regard.

[ilots]

Am I understanding this correctly to say that the PSYOP officer works for the G-7?

Not sure what IO might want to say about it, but generally speaking, PSYOP is placed under the combatant command / geo-CDR. The supported force operations officer S/G/J/C3 will excersise staff supervision of the POO (hehe, can't resist.... PSYOP Officer) & PSYOP Forces. HOWEVER, things will appear less clear with POTF/JPOTF/CJPOTF operations (which is the more common way for PSYOP forces to deply in support of big-Army operations) where the PSYOP CDR may be a functional component CDR subordinate to a TF/CJTF. Likewise, things can appear down right muddy with regard to PSYOP iso inter-agency, non-DOD assets, & fer'n military.

Did that clear it up?
And don't talk about product approval, assigned v/s attached, tacon v/s opcon, special considerations, or dealing with large dogs that have orange eyebrows - if you figure all that out, please publish copies.

[Rockbridge]

I don't think I've ever seen anybody called on the carpet for violations of doctrine, but I can't say the same for Regs. Regs dictate what you SHALL do, whereas doctrine dictates what your SHOULD do.

Of course there's also the theory that Regs and Doctrine are both "rules for fools, but guidelines for commanders." It all comes down to what your paycheck can handle.

[invictus0972]

Thanks for the reply. I have read at least one article in which there seems to be a little angst between PSYOP and IO officers:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...ngJanFeb08.pdf

The basic principle of the author, who was PSYOP, was that there was no need for the FA 30 officer because it caused redundancy and confusion. I am new to the field, but I find the debate interesting. As it has for more than 200 years, I am confident doctrine will evolve to the point that most of these questions will be answered. This article is new and may have been already discussed on SWJ, but it is new to me!

[Eric Henderson]

Reading through the posts on this topic, a couple of points come to mind.

First, I think it is important to separate skill sets, training and education, career field, and an officer's actual position or role on a staff or in a unit. For example, the PSYOP officer in a Division staff does, in fact and by MTOE and doctrine, work for the G-7. That is a very different thing from saying that PSYOP organizations attached/TACONed/OPCONed to that division - and by extension their commanders - also work "for" the G-7. Chains of command and the G-3 tasking authority haven't changed. The same thing holds true for a large variety of odd cats who start out or end up assigned as special staff officers to the G-7 who is himself a coordinating (i.e. "primary") staff officer.

Still, at the end of the day, the commander has to have someone to whom he can turn in re the mission area of information engagement, that is for the coherent and coordinated use of words and images delivered through a wide variety of mediums in support of an operation or campaign. The draft FM 3-13 (ID) posits that the coordinating staff officer to whom the rose has been stuck for this is the G-7. This requires the G/S-7 to serve as the functional integrator of the work of everybody whose stock-in-trade is words and images - the PAO and any attached PA units, the POTF if one is assigned, potentially non-DoD folks (as in a PRT in Afghanistan), et al.

To help him with this, the G-7 has a section comprised of FA30s, PSYOPers, and PA personnel, among others. These folks provide the requisite SME in much the same way that a G-4 has transporters, supply specialists, property management types, etc. and yet serves as the single go to guy for the overall sustainment effort. The relationship envisioned in the manual between the G-7 and, say, the POTF is not itself dissimilar to the relationship between the old MI BN Cdr commander and the G-2. It's also worth noting that the role of the command's Public Affairs Officer as a personal staff officer does not change under this scheme.

At the end of the day, there are a variety of organizational solutions that have and could work as long as they result in a coherent story that resonates with relevant publics and actors, adjusts as required, and does not result in either lowest common denominator communications, or a cacophany of official voices all purporting to speak for the command.

[invictus0972]

Sir,

Thanks for that very cogent response; it was extremely helpful. I was talking just today with the PAO officer on the 1st ID staff, and he suggested that the G-7 was pretty much a "planner" for all the IO tasks. I am starting to get an understanding of the concept. I just have a little confusion when I consider the point you made in your post, which is also made in FM 3-13:

It's also worth noting that the role of the command's Public Affairs Officer as a personal staff officer does not change under this scheme.

Using your example of the G-4, he does not have another person on his staff who is considered a "personal staff officer." I can see scenarios in which the G-7 and PAO are at odds, and the PAO would use his position as a "personal staff officer" to push his own agenda. At the division and higher level, I suppose it is a trivial point; but if the egos of the parties were big enough, it could hamper the planning process.

Again, thanks for the response. You have cleared a few things up for me.

[Eric Henderson]

Invictus,

Happy to help. Re: the PAO and G-7; frankly I don't think the issue has settled out one way or the other in people's minds. I think everyone sees some degree of at least latent tension, both in the current de facto setups being used in theater and in this proposal. A variety of really sharp people with the best interests of the Army and the nation have different takes on how this ought to play out.

Bottom line: The Army is in a period of turbulence and change on this. Part of the reason we have thrown the initial draft to as wide an audience as we have is to try to get the maximum number of informed and thoughtful perspectives.

Regards,
H

[Charles Martel]

The S/G/J-3's coordinate Eng, Arty, Avn, AD, etc, but we take what is their most important tool in COIN and place it in a parallel staff section -- the 7. If we really believe that information ops is operations, it should be in the domain of the combined arms integrator, the '3. Our enemies support info ops with kinetic ops, so have clearly figured out that they are one in the same.

I know, the DCO/CoS can be the integrator, but isn't he running the rest of the staff? Who's coordinating logistics support with operations? Seems like we've taken the burden off of the warfighter to really understand IO by taking it away from him.

The successful Brigades I saw had commanders who were the IO officers. MNF-I is consolidating the IO folks into the 3 for better coordination. Afgh does the same (although they have different names, Strat Effects, etc.).

Seems like the battlefield is telling us loudly that IO is ops, so why don't we write our doctrine that way?

[Hacksaw]

Charles...

I think you are speaking past each other... that's the problem with trying to communicate in bullets...

This new version of 3-13, for whatever else you might take issue, you cannot debate whether this version is commander centric...

The actual text of the version in staffing right now, takes an approach of integrating info tasks into the extant staff processes...

Many thus far have taken exception with this version because they think it doesn't vest the G7 with enough authority/responsibility for info execution as opposed to the other way around.

Live well and row

[invictus0972]

Charles Martel,

Awesome namesake!

Anyway, I have been discussing this on the CAC blog, too. According to a string I read there, AR 600-3 is being changed to identify Information Operations Officers as Information Engagement Officers. This is in line with your notion that there is only one operation. As it really defines and clarifies the role of the G-7, I think I like this change. Of course the G-7 should have oversight of the other Information tasks, but I do not think it advisable that the G-7 should take full responsibility of C2W, OPSEC, IP, and MILDEC. There is a lot of variance in the types of skills that these competencies require. That being said, I keep coming back to the same question in my mind. If IE is the primary mission of the G-7 staff, why do we have a PSYOP career path? Aren't we doing the same thing? I keep thinking that the G-7 is kind of like a political officer whose job it is to make sure that the actions of the PSYOP (enemy focused) and PAO (friendly focused) officer are not too divergent from the over all strategic message. As FM 3-13(DRAFT) states, "The same combination of acts, words, and images that influence a particular group of people in one instance inevitably influence other groups of people in the same area of operations, adjoining geographic areas, and in locations on the other side of the globe." Because of the information revolution, these two skill sets cannot operate in a vacuum thereby necessitating the need for a G-7 staff.

I don't know. Still trying to work it out; it is fun, though!

[Cavguy]

The S/G/J-3's coordinate Eng, Arty, Avn, AD, etc, but we take what is their most important tool in COIN and place it in a parallel staff section -- the 7. If we really believe that information ops is operations, it should be in the domain of the combined arms integrator, the '3. Our enemies support info ops with kinetic ops, so have clearly figured out that they are one in the same.

I know, the DCO/CoS can be the integrator, but isn't he running the rest of the staff? Who's coordinating logistics support with operations? Seems like we've taken the burden off of the warfighter to really understand IO by taking it away from him.

The successful Brigades I saw had commanders who were the IO officers. MNF-I is consolidating the IO folks into the 3 for better coordination. Afgh does the same (although they have different names, Strat Effects, etc.).

Seems like the battlefield is telling us loudly that IO is ops, so why don't we write our doctrine that way?

I fully agree Charles - every successful unit I have seen with IO has treated it as a commander's program that drives operations, not an additional staff section. I am with you, the 3 should be the integrating officer, rather than a parallel staff head.

As long as IO is just an annex to an OPORD, we will fail at it.

[ilots]

I keep thinking that the G-7 is kind of like a political officer whose job it is to make sure that the actions of the PSYOP (enemy focused) and PAO (friendly focused) officer are not too divergent from the over all strategic message.

I would caution against the using the comparison you used for PSYOP v/s PAO - PSYOP is not "enemy focused" information. PSYOP is OBJECTIVE driven; designed to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to US objectives. It is not Command Information. It is objective focused, not information focused. It seeks to affect behavorial change.

Also, regarding the G-7 acting as a Political Officer to keep PSYOP in-line with Strat Objectives.. often PSYOP Objectives are approved at a level of higher authority (sometime even approved at EAG). In the past, this sometimes would lead to conflict with IO & Targeting Cells, as PSYOP Objectives can be directed & separate - obviously, this could be used in an exploitive manner.

Also, again - while a PSYOP Officer or element/cell may work for/with the G7 to coordinate/liaise - PSYOP Units, Dets, Teams are a BOS (non-lethal fire support tasked to seize & retain the most important key terrain in COIN ) and work for the 3.

[zzman]

For those that haven't heard. It is not currently believed that this draft will go forward. There is still quite a bit of controversy within the field now. I just finished the 12 week FA30 Qualification Course and there was still no answer on the future of IO by the end. I would venture that IE (Information Engagement) will remain an important task headed up by the G7, but I don't expect it to be the end all, be all of an entire primary Staff member.

For the time being, the G7 or S7 realistically will define their own role on the staff based upon how they can add value to the Commander.

Doctine? We don't need no stinkin' doctrine!