Interesting Observation

[Sargent]

Going back to my primary question, do you have any insight into advanced FID- past the basic level of drill and ceremony?

That's where you don't need any special preparation; at that point you rely on your previous experience "in the field" within your own organization. What becomes difficult is how you interact with your counterparts, how you communicate the things you want them to learn, but there's really no training manual for that -- either you've got the ability and desire or you don't. (This was my hunch, confirmed by my husband, who's a MTT CO, and who's working this very issue.)

Jill

[Eden]

My observations from Afghanistan were that SF were some of the most effective units in-country for a variety of purposes, and they were successfully integrated with both US and NATO forces on numerous occasions during individual operations.

However, in an operational sense, there was a very real wall between the SOCOM, CJTF, and ISAF staffs. Even after NATO assumed control of operations throughout the country - and maybe especially after this - the efforts of the SF and the 'regular' forces were not properly synchronized. In simpler terms, at least in my opinion, the highly capable SF units operating in Afghanistan could have (and should have) been directed to higher-payoff missions.

I'm not sure exactly why this was, as I was not privy to the limited circle of folks who were supposedly 'coordniating' activities; nor do I have a firm solution. What I do know is that the current set-up violates both unity of effort and unity of command and makes a coherent approach much more difficult to achieve.

[Ken White]

...I'm not sure exactly why this was, as I was not privy to the limited circle of folks who were supposedly 'coordniating' activities; nor do I have a firm solution. What I do know is that the current set-up violates both unity of effort and unity of command and makes a coherent approach much more difficult to achieve.

but based on recent anecdotes from some SF acquaintances and grandson-in-law plus some experience at the coordinating level more years ago than I care to recall, I suspect that the problem -- and it is a big problem -- is a combination of minor personality and mission conflicts, tactical preference differences, some turf battles and a propensity on the part of the SOCOM crowd to retreat behind the "that's classified" wall when they hear something they don't like (yep, I've done that, too... ) plus excessive concern for control (or, more correctly, responsibility if there's a screwup) by the conventional force (been there as well... ). My bet is that both sides contribute to the disconnects in pretty much equal measures. Shame.

The good news is that based on the same inputs, it appears that if the right people match up and egos are parked, some really good things are happening.

[Eden]

Ken, that's about what I expected and observed - a messy stew of multiple causes that reduces effectiveness. Golly, sounds like friction to me, just the sort of thing unity of command is designed to reduce.

My sense is that the walls between the 'conventional' and the 'special' communities need some breaking down. After all, some of what are considered traditional special operation missions can be (and are being) done by conventional forces.

An analogy could be made with what is happening between the maneuver branches. The new maneuver center at Fort Benning, though it is still taking baby steps, is supposed to reduce the cultural conflicts between infantry and armor. In terms of maintenance, gunnery training, and mounted maneuver, a mechanized infantryman has more in common with a cavalryman than he does with his light brethren.

I don't know the best ways to break down the barriers; I recognize there is a skill set, a mind set, and a culture that has to be preserved for effective special operation forces, but there has to be a way for the type of cross-fertilization the infantry enjoys. After all, Rangers can be airborne can be straight-leg can be mechanized. Maybe making SF a branch was a mistake.

[Tom Odom]

Ken, that's about what I expected and observed - a messy stew of multiple causes that reduces effectiveness. Golly, sounds like friction to me, just the sort of thing unity of command is designed to reduce.

My sense is that the walls between the 'conventional' and the 'special' communities need some breaking down. After all, some of what are considered traditional special operation missions can be (and are being) done by conventional forces.

An analogy could be made with what is happening between the maneuver branches. The new maneuver center at Fort Benning, though it is still taking baby steps, is supposed to reduce the cultural conflicts between infantry and armor. In terms of maintenance, gunnery training, and mounted maneuver, a mechanized infantryman has more in common with a cavalryman than he does with his light brethren.

I don't know the best ways to break down the barriers; I recognize there is a skill set, a mind set, and a culture that has to be preserved for effective special operation forces, but there has to be a way for the type of cross-fertilization the infantry enjoys. After all, Rangers can be airborne can be straight-leg can be mechanized. Maybe making SF a branch was a mistake.

It's something we work here with varying degrees of success. Ken, personality does indeed play a large role as you state, more than it should. Another factor is mindset--conventional guys by the time they are commanding battalions and brigades have been cast firmly in the control every thing and thereby limit uncertainty apporach to operations (and life). Unconventional guys-at least the ones that I have worked and identify with like the free flow of uncertainty. They use it rather than try and limit or control it. In my experience, I was from a different planet than then BG Jack Nix was in Goma. Stan and I worked within the chaos; Nix and the planners who thought they could engineer an immediate return of 1.5 million killers to Rwanda by stringing out feeding stations like bird or deer feeders sought to restructure chaos. In point of fact, the overal commander of Op Support Hope LTG Schroeder was given to saying that a key lesson learned was that we "had to confront chaos." That is like saying we are going to confront hurricanes, eathquakes, or the turmoil that is war. We have to work in the conditions of all of those events but we cannot "confront" or "control" them.

Bottom line: It takes a consistent and constant effort from both sides of this peculiar fence to develop smooth operations. Some get it right; many on both sides do not.

Tom