Interesting Observation

[Schmedlap]

Regarding the issue of Big Army and the rules that come with it, my observation was that many of the rules imposed upon the ODAs originated from the Group/Bn and were created as safeguards due to the inherent danger of operating as a small unit far removed from their CF "Q"RF. However, any rules that were perceived as excessive were assumed to be the result of Big Army's meddling. As for constraints that did come from Big Army, a surprising number of those were legal issues that arose at the MNF-I/MNC-I level and were due to big picture issues often beyond their control. In other words, they were often just the messenger, and those rules were not going away if Big Army left the scene.

[Ken White]

The legal bit is scary -- but it's reality today.

[Uboat509]

I don't agree that SOF should be the battle space owners in their repspective sectors. There is an awful lot of crap going on in those sectors and SOF just isn't staffed or equipped to deal with it and trying to put Big Army units under SOF control has BAD OUTCOME written all over it. That said, I do think that SOF should have more autonomy. I have seen sectors where SOF and Big Army got along great and did great things together and I have seen where the local Big Army commander, for all intents and purposes, locked down an ODA and everything in between. Greater autonomy would still allow the ODA to do great things with the good units but would not leave them locked down by the poor ones.

SFC W

[MikeF]

Understand all,

On another thread, I'm sure that if our government want to disrupt a rogue nation with promising nuclear capability close to Iraq, you could easily device a mission packet with a task org of only ten men....That's what y'all have been trained to do.

I'd come along as a cheerleader.

Going back to my primary question, do you have any insight into advanced FID- past the basic level of drill and ceremony?

As you know, not all, but many units in Iraq are far surpassing BRM, ARM and working towards advanced COIN....How do we advice them?

[Sargent]

Going back to my primary question, do you have any insight into advanced FID- past the basic level of drill and ceremony?

That's where you don't need any special preparation; at that point you rely on your previous experience "in the field" within your own organization. What becomes difficult is how you interact with your counterparts, how you communicate the things you want them to learn, but there's really no training manual for that -- either you've got the ability and desire or you don't. (This was my hunch, confirmed by my husband, who's a MTT CO, and who's working this very issue.)

Jill

[Eden]

My observations from Afghanistan were that SF were some of the most effective units in-country for a variety of purposes, and they were successfully integrated with both US and NATO forces on numerous occasions during individual operations.

However, in an operational sense, there was a very real wall between the SOCOM, CJTF, and ISAF staffs. Even after NATO assumed control of operations throughout the country - and maybe especially after this - the efforts of the SF and the 'regular' forces were not properly synchronized. In simpler terms, at least in my opinion, the highly capable SF units operating in Afghanistan could have (and should have) been directed to higher-payoff missions.

I'm not sure exactly why this was, as I was not privy to the limited circle of folks who were supposedly 'coordniating' activities; nor do I have a firm solution. What I do know is that the current set-up violates both unity of effort and unity of command and makes a coherent approach much more difficult to achieve.

[Ken White]

...I'm not sure exactly why this was, as I was not privy to the limited circle of folks who were supposedly 'coordniating' activities; nor do I have a firm solution. What I do know is that the current set-up violates both unity of effort and unity of command and makes a coherent approach much more difficult to achieve.

but based on recent anecdotes from some SF acquaintances and grandson-in-law plus some experience at the coordinating level more years ago than I care to recall, I suspect that the problem -- and it is a big problem -- is a combination of minor personality and mission conflicts, tactical preference differences, some turf battles and a propensity on the part of the SOCOM crowd to retreat behind the "that's classified" wall when they hear something they don't like (yep, I've done that, too... ) plus excessive concern for control (or, more correctly, responsibility if there's a screwup) by the conventional force (been there as well... ). My bet is that both sides contribute to the disconnects in pretty much equal measures. Shame.

The good news is that based on the same inputs, it appears that if the right people match up and egos are parked, some really good things are happening.

[Cavguy]

Understand all,

On another thread, I'm sure that if our government want to disrupt a rogue nation with promising nuclear capability close to Iraq, you could easily device a mission packet with a task org of only ten men....That's what y'all have been trained to do.

I'd come along as a cheerleader.

Going back to my primary question, do you have any insight into advanced FID- past the basic level of drill and ceremony?

As you know, not all, but many units in Iraq are far surpassing BRM, ARM and working towards advanced COIN....How do we advice them?

Depends exactly on what you are looking for. I assume you've read the FM?

If you're looking for TT advice, send me a PM, there's a TT Leader Handbook and a multi-service TTP in the works.