Interesting Observation

[Eden]

Ken, that's about what I expected and observed - a messy stew of multiple causes that reduces effectiveness. Golly, sounds like friction to me, just the sort of thing unity of command is designed to reduce.

My sense is that the walls between the 'conventional' and the 'special' communities need some breaking down. After all, some of what are considered traditional special operation missions can be (and are being) done by conventional forces.

An analogy could be made with what is happening between the maneuver branches. The new maneuver center at Fort Benning, though it is still taking baby steps, is supposed to reduce the cultural conflicts between infantry and armor. In terms of maintenance, gunnery training, and mounted maneuver, a mechanized infantryman has more in common with a cavalryman than he does with his light brethren.

I don't know the best ways to break down the barriers; I recognize there is a skill set, a mind set, and a culture that has to be preserved for effective special operation forces, but there has to be a way for the type of cross-fertilization the infantry enjoys. After all, Rangers can be airborne can be straight-leg can be mechanized. Maybe making SF a branch was a mistake.

[Tom Odom]

Ken, that's about what I expected and observed - a messy stew of multiple causes that reduces effectiveness. Golly, sounds like friction to me, just the sort of thing unity of command is designed to reduce.

My sense is that the walls between the 'conventional' and the 'special' communities need some breaking down. After all, some of what are considered traditional special operation missions can be (and are being) done by conventional forces.

An analogy could be made with what is happening between the maneuver branches. The new maneuver center at Fort Benning, though it is still taking baby steps, is supposed to reduce the cultural conflicts between infantry and armor. In terms of maintenance, gunnery training, and mounted maneuver, a mechanized infantryman has more in common with a cavalryman than he does with his light brethren.

I don't know the best ways to break down the barriers; I recognize there is a skill set, a mind set, and a culture that has to be preserved for effective special operation forces, but there has to be a way for the type of cross-fertilization the infantry enjoys. After all, Rangers can be airborne can be straight-leg can be mechanized. Maybe making SF a branch was a mistake.

It's something we work here with varying degrees of success. Ken, personality does indeed play a large role as you state, more than it should. Another factor is mindset--conventional guys by the time they are commanding battalions and brigades have been cast firmly in the control every thing and thereby limit uncertainty apporach to operations (and life). Unconventional guys-at least the ones that I have worked and identify with like the free flow of uncertainty. They use it rather than try and limit or control it. In my experience, I was from a different planet than then BG Jack Nix was in Goma. Stan and I worked within the chaos; Nix and the planners who thought they could engineer an immediate return of 1.5 million killers to Rwanda by stringing out feeding stations like bird or deer feeders sought to restructure chaos. In point of fact, the overal commander of Op Support Hope LTG Schroeder was given to saying that a key lesson learned was that we "had to confront chaos." That is like saying we are going to confront hurricanes, eathquakes, or the turmoil that is war. We have to work in the conditions of all of those events but we cannot "confront" or "control" them.

Bottom line: It takes a consistent and constant effort from both sides of this peculiar fence to develop smooth operations. Some get it right; many on both sides do not.

Tom