Interesting Observation

[ODB]

I would like to know others thoughts and insights on this. The other day I was talking with some of the ODAs that recently rotated back from Iraq. I found it interesting that a majority of the guys thought we (SF) should not be focused in Iraq any longer. They believe SF should be focused in Afghanistan more, that Afghanistan is more of a COIN situation than Iraq. Currently in their estimation Iraq is more of a policing/peacekeeping effort than COIN at this point. I personally thought this was an interesting observation and wanted to get others thoughts on this. I'll be the first to admit more soldier than scholar here, so let the thoughts fly.

[John T. Fishel]

my sense is that there is still very much a SF mission in Iraq. While I was not SF myself, I was Psyop and CA and hung around with a lot of SF guys motly from 7th and 3rd SGG. John Mulholland did his MMAS for me at CGSC, Charlie Cleveland hauled me around the Chapare in Bolivia, and John Waghelstein pinned my silver oak leaves on me. I also had SF teams working for me under OPCON in Panama.

At a minimum, I would think that the advisor/trainers the Army is turning out at Fort Riley ought to be leavened with SF guys. What the regular army advisor/trainers lack is the years of cultural awareness and language skills of the SF guys.

When you have to prioritize, I think you will, in fact, get more bang for the buck in Afghanistan. But I would still have a residual SF force in Iraq as above.

Cheers

JohnT

[Schmedlap]

I wonder if those opinions are the result of close interaction with conventional forces and having to coordinate activities with the "Operational Environment Owners." I think the impression is that the ODAs/AOBs have greater autonomy/independence in Afghanistan. I'm not sure if that perception is accurate or not.

In discussions with junior NCOs from the other Group (not the one you are speaking of), a common opinion was that they should be used for different missions - that their jobs were too much like that of a MiTT. They wanted to be doing unilateral ops, rather than having to hit every target with an ISF force. That seemed like a sharp contrast to the purpose of SF units, but then again they were junior NCOs. I'm not sure what the older guys thought about it.

[Uboat509]

I wonder if those opinions are the result of close interaction with conventional forces and having to coordinate activities with the "Operational Environment Owners." I think the impression is that the ODAs/AOBs have greater autonomy/independence in Afghanistan. I'm not sure if that perception is accurate or not.

This is what I thought of immediately. Big Army seems much more pervasive in Iraq and, as such, has made things more painful. That said, there is absolutely penty of work for us to do in Iraq, particularly as Big Army draws down. We are a huge force multiplier when used correctly. We provide skill sets that are simply unavailable anywhere else. The key phrase of course is "when used correctly." There has deffinitely been some friction between Big Army and SOF, particularly SF. Often Big Army commanders are unaware of what we can do. There are also commanders who don't care what we do and simply don't like SF for whatever reason. Unfortunately there is also the occasional ODA that creates a situation that reflects badly on the rest of us.

In discussions with junior NCOs from the other Group (not the one you are speaking of), a common opinion was that they should be used for different missions - that their jobs were too much like that of a MiTT. They wanted to be doing unilateral ops, rather than having to hit every target with an ISF force. That seemed like a sharp contrast to the purpose of SF units, but then again they were junior NCOs. I'm not sure what the older guys thought about it.

Bottom line, FID sucks. It sucks bad. Nobody joined the Army, much less SF, to do FID. Everybody wants to be John Wayne, cruising around slaying bad guys and looking cool doing it. Unfortunately, FID is one of our bread and butter missions. We do it very well, better than most anyone else. We were doing FID when most of Big Army thought COIN was something you dropped into a vending machine and we will be doing it when they put their COIN skill sets back on the shelf. Everybody would rather be doing unilateral rather than indig lead OPS (Lord knows I would) but that is not what we get paid for. There are units with in the SOF community whose mission is unilateral DA OPS, and they are very good at it. But that is not our job. We are SF. Working "through with and by" the indig is kind of our thing.

SFC W

[Ken White]

I would point out, however, that this aspect:

"...Unfortunately there is also the occasional ODA that creates a situation that reflects badly on the rest of us."

is not restricted to just the A Teams (sorry, I'm old ) -- echelons well above that on the SF side can get in the Supreme Jerk mode occasionally. It's rare but regrettably, it's not unknown.

With the right training and support, any good infantry unit can learn to sneak and kick in doors at oh-dark-thirty; that's been demonstrated. Maybe not as good as those that specialize but good enough for most work. SF brings another real strength to the table that the best Infantry unit cannot do well. Kicking doors is a whole lot more fun but, as you said, the real winner is the tedious, hard, dirty, bad food work with the locals and that is one thing the Army, per se, will never get good at doing. Nor, probably, should it do so...

Back to ODB's original question; what I hear is that since Iraq has so much more 'big army' and a covey of Generals it is more tightly structured and there are more operational constraints -- and jealousies -- whereas those working in the 'Stan have a freer hand and the distribution of forces and the type and location of bad guys enhance that. That plus a lack of a pervasive host nation governmental presence sticking their nose into everything...

I suspect the recent change of higher Hq in the 'Stan may have an adverse impact on that; we'll see.

[ODB]

Bottom line, FID sucks. It sucks bad. Nobody joined the Army, much less SF, to do FID. Everybody wants to be John Wayne, cruising around slaying bad guys and looking cool doing it. Unfortunately, FID is one of our bread and butter missions. We do it very well, better than most anyone else. We were doing FID when most of Big Army thought COIN was something you dropped into a vending machine and we will be doing it when they put their COIN skill sets back on the shelf. Everybody would rather be doing unilateral rather than indig lead OPS (Lord knows I would) but that is not what we get paid for. There are units with in the SOF community whose mission is unilateral DA OPS, and they are very good at it. But that is not our job. We are SF. Working "through with and by" the indig is kind of our thing.

100% dead on and IMO many have forgotten this and or want to stray away from it.

With the right training and support, any good infantry unit can learn to sneak and kick in doors at oh-dark-thirty; that's been demonstrated. Maybe not as good as those that specialize but good enough for most work. SF brings another real strength to the table that the best Infantry unit cannot do well. Kicking doors is a whole lot more fun but, as you said, the real winner is the tedious, hard, dirty, bad food work with the locals and that is one thing the Army, per se, will never get good at doing. Nor, probably, should it do so...

Back to ODB's original question; what I hear is that since Iraq has so much more 'big army' and a covey of Generals it is more tightly structured and there are more operational constraints -- and jealousies -- whereas those working in the 'Stan have a freer hand and the distribution of forces and the type and location of bad guys enhance that. That plus a lack of a pervasive host nation governmental presence sticking their nose into everything...

Talking with them, this gets more to the heart of the problem. The restrictions being put on them. The inability to get back to "team houses" out in the towns and country. Approval for everything and anything. One word comes to mind "Micromanagement". The egos/jealousies is a big one, not as much between SOF and Conventional this go around, but amongst SOF internal, between Army and Navy, Army and Army, etc...

I should have explained my thoughts better. Was thinking along the lines of the enemy/situational differences between Iraq and Afghanistan which one plays more into the SF fight vs the conventional fight and why? Where should SF focus be? What is to be gained/lost in each?

[Schmedlap]

Regarding the issue of Big Army and the rules that come with it, my observation was that many of the rules imposed upon the ODAs originated from the Group/Bn and were created as safeguards due to the inherent danger of operating as a small unit far removed from their CF "Q"RF. However, any rules that were perceived as excessive were assumed to be the result of Big Army's meddling. As for constraints that did come from Big Army, a surprising number of those were legal issues that arose at the MNF-I/MNC-I level and were due to big picture issues often beyond their control. In other words, they were often just the messenger, and those rules were not going away if Big Army left the scene.

[Ken White]

The legal bit is scary -- but it's reality today.