Units and METL Training

[Uboat509]

Someone asked why units are not training on their METL tasks when they are back in the states. I think that the answer is simple, really. Once every couple of months an article will appear somewhere in the MSM about how PFC Snuffy was killed in Iraq/Afghanistan and how it was because PFC Snuffy's unit was rushed into the fight had to skimp on this training or that training and that is why PFC Snuffy is dead, because he missed an NTC rotation. While there may be some truth to it, it is generally way overstated. Unfortunately, overstated or not, that is the impression that John Q Public gets and when John Q. Public gets worked up then the politicians have to appear to get worked up too and they are all looking for scapegoats, for instance a commander who decided to train METL tasks instead of just doing PMT for the next rotation. Nobody wants to be that guy. It's micromanagement from the top (civilian) level that just oozes downward and inevitably leads the resurgence of the zero defect Army of the '60s. In that kind of enviroment commanders can't afford to train for a war they are not fighting, even if it means letting METL atrophy.

SFC W

[ODB]

I had to bring METL tasks to the table so to speak. Understanding a conventional units "lifecycle".

Return from deployment (based on averages):
1 month for equipment to return and accountability.
1 month leave
2 months maintainence (getting everything operational)


Deployment outload (based on averages)
1-2 months prior to deployment date everything is starting to be packed and shipped. Additionally 1 month of leave during this time frame.

Based on these numbers a unit has 6-12 months to train between rotations. In many cases more than enough time to train METL tasks and to conduct PMT. Unfortunately (Ken will love me for this) the Army's ability to manage personnel is horrible. Many of these conventional soldiers PCS from a returning unit to a deploying unit. They are robbing Peter to pay Paul. I understand the difficulties involved in maintaining a trained and intergrated unit, but also fully believed it can be done. I am probably wrong but come from the school of thought that everyone is a trigger puller first and foremost. In discussing this with some friends I heard some promising news. Many units here are starting to get back to training these tasks prior to conducting PMTs, which is good. In the case of artillery and ADA, I still have to ask why are we not pushing gunnery skills first?

A good friend of mine recently took command of a Division Special Troops Battalion. He has been tasked to create a QRF Company and a PSD out of cooks, mechanics, MPs, etc... I have to truely question the really high decision makers. Are we so undermanned as an Army that we have resulted in misusing forces to make up for it? IMO there are many threads on here that when combined start getting to the real issues. Uboat you hit on one of the biggest ones POLITICIANS. I believe they decide when and where we fight, not how we fight.

The public, I wonder how many feel the way the news media wants you to think the public feels. Is the public majority in an outrage or are the select few getting all the attention and therefore it looks that way?

[Ken White]

and life was good...

Seriously, I am not a METL fan (heavy or otherwise...). The intent was to design a training process that was not subjective (BWahahahahahahahaaaa) and the eliminated the 'valleys' in the training cycle (equally hilarious; most of the valleys are personnel system or major training event induced). The process did eliminate some valleys -- it also eliminated most all the peaks, like any process designed to eliminate highs and lows, it simply bred mediocrity.

Having said that, I agree with both of you on the problem but do think that training distractors make it difficult and if one adds in a DMETL to the METL, it can easily get in the too hard box.

You'd think all those civilians and iron Majors developing MTOE could quickly adapt to -- and the Personnel system would support -- modifying the TOEs to provide QRFs and PSDs since everyone in both theaters has had them for what, six years now? Guess that's in the too hard box also...

My suspicion is that about a third of the public doesn't know but is pretty well convinced the Armed Forces can do nothing right; another third believe they do nothing wrong and the middle third makes up its mind slowly on what is reported in the media. Most of those media folks are totally clueless but they do eventually get a lot of it right so it generally works out okay.

Back to the METL -- consider the fact that units do not do tasks; they perform missions and those missions can require the completion of hundreds, even thousands of disparate tasks by a lot people and organic and other units. The METL process was an attempt to simplify the training effort. It overdid that simplification bit and developed a rote, by the book mentality, it dumbed us down...

It needs to go and to be replaced by outcome based training.

[Uboat509]

Can't say I disagree about outcome based training. Since I have been in SF it has been my experience that we will create some nice pretty slides about which METL tasks we are training and then go do outcome based training. Often we would skip the slides if we knew that no one would check. I am at the school house now reclassing to medic and the slide show for every class has an "action, condition and standard" at the beginning of it. Most instructors skip right over it to get to the actual training. Others may pause briefly and say something like "Here is the action, condition and standard, in case you were curious." No attempt is ever made to teach it that way. Oddly, I don't feel cheated by that.

SFC W

[Ken White]

To simplify training and make it easy on the training cadre / instructors too many 'conditions' are cookie cutter, easy approaches to the problem at hand. Problem in the real world is that conditions can vary so widely as to make much training meaningless. Clearing a roadblock at Hood and clearing one in Afghanistan will differ in multiple ways.

Simple example is climatology based. Performing a task on a pleasant and balmy June day at Bragg and the same task in January at Carson -- much less further north or up -- is a different thing entirely. A task tested at night with a full moon is likely to result differently if the same unit were tested on a night with no moon.

Another simple example is use of the Map *. Last time I looked, there were 21 map 'tasks.' Those aren't tasks, they're enabling skills and there are other skills the system doesn't recognize. There are really only two map tasks -- Using a map, (1) Plot or locate own, friendly, enemy and other locations; (2) Conduct a map reconnaissance to select masks, clearances, routes and positions. Yet, we waste time teaching some or all those 21 'tasks' over and over at every level from BCT to the OACs...

* GPS is great. Love it. Use it -- but if it goes out I won't be in trouble or lost. Not sure everyone can say that -- but they should be able to, even Joe. Especially Joe...

Training is not easy, it's difficult and it needs to be done well and it must be integrated and aimed at producing the desired performance that is most likely to offer success regardless of conditions.

[Ski]

A topic close to my heart.

Right now the Army is trying to train on everything, and manages to train on a few things. The introduction of DMETL's, DMD's and MEELS has forced units to reinvent themselves from their Core METL and MTOE, often in the middle of an ARFORGEN cycle/

It's maddening, frustrating and completely driven by theater.

Nothing is synchronized either - the personnel system is still broke (ask one of the AC guys here when they receive the last batch of replacements before deployment), the equipment pipeline is not synchronized at all (one of the few places within the military where synchronization is critical), and training falters because you don't have enough people, the mission shifts, or you are getting new equipment at the wrong time.

*sigh*