Page 1 of 6 123 ... LastLast
Results 1 to 20 of 101

Thread: COIN comes home to assist policing

  1. #1
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2005
    Location
    Largo, Florida
    Posts
    3,989

    Default Iraq & the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons and Prospects

    The latest from the SWJ blog - Iraq & the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons and Prospects by Robert Bunker and John Sullivan.

    Gangs and Iraqi insurgents, militias, and other non-state groups share common origins based on tribalism, and therefore, it is expected that they will exhibit similar structures and behaviors. It is our belief that further insight into Iraq’s present situation and future prospects may be derived from a perspective utilizing 3rd generation gang (3 GEN Gangs) studies which present lessons learned from the emergence and spread of gangs within the United States, and other parts of the world, over roughly the last four decades. (1) Basically, from a 3 GEN Gangs perspective, three generations of gangs have been found to exist: turf based, drug based, and mercenary based. The first generation gangs, comprising the vast majority, focus on protecting their turf. These gangs, the least developed of the three generational forms, provide both protection and identity to their members and little more. While some drug dealing is evident, it tends with these gangs to be a sideline activity...

  2. #2
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,098

    Default

    ...an earlier thread looking at Iraq in the context of 3rd gen gangs:

    3rd Generation Gangs and the Iraqi Insurgency

  3. #3
    Registered User
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    1

    Default COIN comes home to assist policing

    Moderator's Note

    On January 18th 2012 this thread was merged with a smaller one, which started in 2010 called 'Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement' and the merged thread renamed 'COIN comes home to assist policing' (Ends).


    Counter insurgency, particularly it's emphasis on good relations with the People, seems to be affecting police training and approaches. This article
    http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/loc...,5306468.story
    about efforts to retrain the Baltimore Police Department shows a huge influence from lessons learned overseas. Even the trainers have served overseas;
    "The lecturer, Eric Greitens, was a former Navy SEAL who led missions in Fallujah, Iraq, to hunt down insurgents. The city officers copied down four phrases he wrote on a white board: No worse enemy. No better friend. No better diplomat. No better role model."
    This makes me wonder if lessons learned by the military will be reflected more police training and tactics

    EC
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-19-2013 at 08:43 AM. Reason: Mod's note added

  4. #4
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,053

    Default Cops learning from COIN soldiers?

    The quoted article is I suspect not unique - as urban police struggle to meet new demands. Using ex-military / COIN lessons is only part of the response, although using such trainers may make such intensive training more acceptable to the students and bureaucrats who make decisions behind a desk. Early days to make a judgement.

    In the UK - for very different reasons - the military has had very little impact on policing, with the exception of firearms and specialist surveillance. Mention COIN and there'll be a stampede to the exit.

    davidbfpo

  5. #5
    Council Member MattC86's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Location
    REMFing it up in DC
    Posts
    250

    Default Hey David -

    Why so, given the history with Ireland?

    You'd think there'd be more interest within the Metropolitan Police and other UK law-enforcement for non-typical policework. . .

    . . .then again, you don't have the guns and murder problems that we do (or at least I haven't seen them?)

    Regards,

    Matt
    "Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall

  6. #6
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,053

    Default UK-Ireland linkages

    Quote Originally Posted by MattC86 View Post
    Why so, given the history with Ireland?

    You'd think there'd be more interest within the Metropolitan Police and other UK law-enforcement for non-typical policework. . . then again, you don't have the guns and murder problems that we do (or at least I haven't seen them?). Regards,

    Matt
    All manner of reasons. It is a moot point that the methods used by the British Army and the police (RUC) to counter terrorism and associated criminal activity would suit the normal problems of urban mainland UK, including gun crime. Northern Ireland was a very intensive environment, notably urban West Belfast and rural South Armagh, where amidst a largely un-co-operative public PIRA operated. The latest knife murders of teenagers in London for example are quite different.

    Applying COIN, even CT methods to mainland policing and in the USA I venture to suggest are not appropriate. I have my doubts that police managers would accept, even understand, COIN.

    davidbfpo

  7. #7
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Kansas
    Posts
    1,099

    Post It's my hope

    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    All manner of reasons. It is a moot point that the methods used by the British Army and the police (RUC) to counter terrorism and associated criminal activity would suit the normal problems of urban mainland UK, including gun crime. Northern Ireland was a very intensive environment, notably urban West Belfast and rural South Armagh, where amidst a largely un-co-operative public PIRA operated. The latest knife murders of teenagers in London for example are quite different.

    Applying COIN, even CT methods to mainland policing and in the USA I venture to suggest are not appropriate. I have my doubts that police managers would accept, even understand, COIN.

    davidbfpo
    That if they just manage to catch the parts like failure to account for failure in the system and thus failure to address them makes things worse, and / or
    as long as everyone has to follow the same rules local disputes would become less frequent then I think we'll still be one step closer to where we need to be
    Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours

    Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur

  8. #8
    Council Member MattC86's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Location
    REMFing it up in DC
    Posts
    250

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    All manner of reasons. It is a moot point that the methods used by the British Army and the police (RUC) to counter terrorism and associated criminal activity would suit the normal problems of urban mainland UK, including gun crime. Northern Ireland was a very intensive environment, notably urban West Belfast and rural South Armagh, where amidst a largely un-co-operative public PIRA operated. The latest knife murders of teenagers in London for example are quite different.

    Applying COIN, even CT methods to mainland policing and in the USA I venture to suggest are not appropriate. I have my doubts that police managers would accept, even understand, COIN.

    davidbfpo
    Well, I should have been far more clear. I don't mean to suggest that COIN techniques are something that municipal police forces should take up and study. I would just assume there'd be a little more interest among police forces, given that people are always pejoratively calling COIN heavily-armed policework. . .

    To put it another way, do you think that UK police (or any police, for that matter) could gain something from the proverbial lessons learned in COIN efforts in Northern Ireland or elsewhere?

    Actually, as a follow-up, you take it, then, that the British Army took far more from its Northern Ireland experience than any police institution did?

    Regards,

    Matt
    "Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall

  9. #9
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,053

    Default Police learning from Army experience?

    Quote Originally Posted by MattC86 View Post
    Well, I should have been far more clear. I don't mean to suggest that COIN techniques are something that municipal police forces should take up and study. I would just assume there'd be a little more interest among police forces, given that people are always pejoratively calling COIN heavily-armed policework. . .

    To put it another way, do you think that UK police (or any police, for that matter) could gain something from the proverbial lessons learned in COIN efforts in Northern Ireland or elsewhere?

    Actually, as a follow-up, you take it, then, that the British Army took far more from its Northern Ireland experience than any police institution did?

    Regards,

    Matt
    Far too many issues to easily answer. COIN is not for me heavily armed policework: COIN is usually where government legitimacy is weak, with little if any popular support and the opposition comes from capable armed insurgents whose identity is largely unknown. Most Western policing operates where legitimacy is far from weak, albeit contested in some areas (inner city slums); popular support exists and the identity of the opposition is known - although not actually what they do.

    The military operate with precison regarding their opponents; the police often do not know who their opponents are.

    Yes, policing can learn from COIN, but with care. Tasking and co-ordination groups (TCG) from Ulster is one of the most visible lessons learned; alongside technical aids to surveillance, notably ANPR and CCTV. Looking for other options to arrest, charge and convict is another - notably seen in using disruption. Use of informants is another, although many are critical of those lessons (from the Army & RUC).

    What did the UK Army learn? Biggest lesson, never get involved overtly at home! That maybe reflected in seeking better policing, notably in riot control / public order (No.1 issue in the early 1980's for the UK government for the Home Office, less now). Other lesson - remember I have no miltary expereience - how effective small unit leadership was. The best example being responding directly at incidents to press enquiries with those there and not a press officer miles away.

    I am not aware if anyone from the UK Army has written publically on what lessons they learnt. I know the official reflections on UK Army deployment, called Op Banner, was posted on the web and a quick read in '07 left no lasting impression.

    I am sure we will talk about this next weekend!

    davidbfpo

  10. #10
    Council Member CPT Holzbach's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Chicago
    Posts
    74

    Default Washington D.C. becomes Sadr City.

    http://www.examiner.com/a-1423820%7E..._violence.html

    This sort of thing works, to an extent, in COIN. In America? Not a chance. And if it does lower crime in certain neighborhoods, why not do it in EVERY neighborhood? Slippery slope, there. I'm thinking the overturning of the DC gun ban (very likely to happen this month), neighborhood watches, and people who don't go along with the "stop snitchin'" mentality would work a whole lot better. This is a fine example of a COIN technique that should NOT come home.
    "The Infantry’s primary role is close combat, which may occur in any type of mission, in any theater, or environment. Characterized by extreme violence and physiological shock, close combat is callous and unforgiving. Its dimensions are measured in minutes and meters, and its consequences are final." - Paragraph 1-1, FM 3-21.8: Infantry Rifle PLT and SQD.

    - M.A. Holzbach

  11. #11
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    This is a lot of whooee about nothing. It is a short term project 10 days according to the article and they are only going to control designated areas (most likely private or government property). This is a very old Police technique nothing new here. The was one of the core techniques used in the old Federal Weed and Seed program. The Feds paid the overtime for the police to do just what is talked about in the article and provided funds for other community building projects.... hence Weed the LE part and Seed the building part. Yes it does sound similar to Clear,Hold and Build but it is a lot more focused and the time frames are a lot shorter. This is more about a police chief learning to be a politician than anything else.

  12. #12
    Council Member Tacitus's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2007
    Location
    Bristol, Tennessee
    Posts
    146

    Default D.C. cops using lessons from Iraq?

    Interesting story I heard on NPR on the drive into work today.

    D.C. Police use Radical Tactic to Combat Homicides
    http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...oryId=91379525

    They're setting up Bagdad style checkpoints (in a "failed state" type neighborhood you might say) to check IDs of people coming in to determine if they have a legitimate use to be in the neighborhood.

    Obviously, this is controversial. And residents of the neighborhood have differing opinions. The D.C. police chief seems determined, though, and thinks it is working to lower homicides.
    Last edited by Tacitus; 06-12-2008 at 12:50 PM. Reason: punctuation errors
    No signature required, my handshake is good enough.

  13. #13
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Posts
    1,111

    Default Operation Ceasefire...

    From the Economist's 'The World in 2009', Crime Interrupted by Joel Budd

    The approach that will come to prominence in 2009 is almost the exact opposite of zero tolerance. Rather than cracking down on petty offenders such as turnstile-jumpers and squeegee men, the authorities will focus on those who are most likely to kill or be killed. Some may be drug dealers recently released from prison. Others may be the associates of people recently wounded by gunfire. What makes the approach particularly novel is that it depends on local people. Rather than insisting on zero tolerance from the police, it tries to change what the residents of crime-infested areas will tolerate.
    The new method has been quietly honed for almost a decade in Chicago, where it is known as Operation Ceasefire. It has two main tools. The more conventional one is a team of outreach workers who try to mobilise communities to oppose violence, often in partnership with local clergy. Then, at night, “violence interrupters” hit the streets to sniff out trouble. Often former gang members and graduates of the prison system, the interrupters have a hard-nosed approach to law and order. They may, for example, encourage an aggrieved man to consider beating someone instead of shooting him, or try to convince rival drug-dealers that a turf war would be bad for business, as it would attract the police.
    Sapere Aude

  14. #14
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default Ceasefire webpage ...

    is here. Its results-data page is here - and its publications are here.

    NRA members might find this article of interest - knew I read of Gary Slutkin somewhere else - probably in the Rifleman.

  15. #15
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    I believe that if you all expand your view of what COIN is, you gain a clearer understanding. To my way of thinking, EVERY police officer is waging COIN every day on the job. It is only when Civil government fails in their COIN efforts that they have to bring in the military for the type of expanded COIN operations that most think of when they think of COIN.

    Viewed in this manner, the most successful COIN operation of the 60's was the passing and implementation of the Civil Rights Act by the US Government. Faced with with a rising insurgency, complete with ideology and dynamic leadership, the US could have brought in greater force to put the African American populace back into "its place," or they could change their behavior and bring a better form of governance to all Americans. Thankfully they chose the latter.

    Think of this when people talk of "Appeasing" insurgents by listenting to and addressing their concerns. When a government addresses the concerns of its own citizenry it is not appeasement, it is simply doing their job. Appeasement is when a government compromises its own populace to grant concessions to the government of an other populace. Very different things altogether.

    So yes, all COIN is local, and the best COIN is that which is done day in and day out to meet the needs of a populace long before it starts drifting into the behavior described by Mao as Phase I insurgency.

    Just something to consider.

  16. #16
    Council Member 120mm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2006
    Location
    Wonderland
    Posts
    1,284

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I believe that if you all expand your view of what COIN is, you gain a clearer understanding. To my way of thinking, EVERY police officer is waging COIN every day on the job. It is only when Civil government fails in their COIN efforts that they have to bring in the military for the type of expanded COIN operations that most think of when they think of COIN.

    Viewed in this manner, the most successful COIN operation of the 60's was the passing and implementation of the Civil Rights Act by the US Government. Faced with with a rising insurgency, complete with ideology and dynamic leadership, the US could have brought in greater force to put the African American populace back into "its place," or they could change their behavior and bring a better form of governance to all Americans. Thankfully they chose the latter.

    Think of this when people talk of "Appeasing" insurgents by listenting to and addressing their concerns. When a government addresses the concerns of its own citizenry it is not appeasement, it is simply doing their job. Appeasement is when a government compromises its own populace to grant concessions to the government of an other populace. Very different things altogether.

    So yes, all COIN is local, and the best COIN is that which is done day in and day out to meet the needs of a populace long before it starts drifting into the behavior described by Mao as Phase I insurgency.

    Just something to consider.
    Ding, ding, ding, Winnah!

    Then, at night, “violence interrupters” hit the streets to sniff out trouble. Often former gang members and graduates of the prison system, the interrupters have a hard-nosed approach to law and order. They may, for example, encourage an aggrieved man to consider beating someone instead of shooting him, or try to convince rival drug-dealers that a turf war would be bad for business, as it would attract the police.
    But the above quote is industrial strength stupid. How about we NOT look to Chicago for any answers on how to fight crime? Teaching criminals to commit crimes smarter is not the answer.... But Chicago is a fine example of a failed government. Basically the criminals are running the government.

  17. #17
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I believe that if you all expand your view of what COIN is, you gain a clearer understanding. To my way of thinking, EVERY police officer is waging COIN every day on the job. It is only when Civil government fails in their COIN efforts that they have to bring in the military for the type of expanded COIN operations that most think of when they think of COIN.
    OK, I'll just run a quick test on this.

    An insurgency is armed rebellion against the state. Yes/No?
    An insurgency is war, in that it uses violence for political gain. Yes/No?

    Is countering these activities the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?
    Is defending the state the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?

    I am not saying that some perspectives from Police Work are not incredibly valuable to Soldiers fighting against armed rebellions, but I see clear blue everything between COIN and Policing.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  18. #18
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    OK, I'll just run a quick test on this.

    An insurgency is armed rebellion against the state. Yes/No?
    An insurgency is war, in that it uses violence for political gain. Yes/No?

    Is countering these activities the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?
    Is defending the state the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?

    I am not saying that some perspectives from Police Work are not incredibly valuable to Soldiers fighting against armed rebellions, but I see clear blue everything between COIN and Policing.

    Seems to me that one can see COIN operations in two different lights: preemptive COIN and reactive COIN.

    Preemptive COIN stops an insurgency before it starts (sort of like preventive maintenance). What Bob's World described in his post wrt the Civil Rights Act would fall in this category I think.

    Reactive COIN is what happens after the insurgency has broken out and one seeks to return things to a preinsurrection status quo aka peacefulness (restorative maintenance--what your mechanic does after your car breaks down on the highway, if you wish). What Wilf is seeking to describe with his questions above falls into the second category. What the coalition is doing in IZ and AF is reactive COIN as well.

    A third consideration applies whether one is engaged in reactive or preemptive COIN. That is what we might call Limitation COIN. Limitation COIN strives to ensure that the actions taken to restore the status quo do not fan the fames and broaden the insurgency instead. It also must ensure that the efforts to forestall/preempt the insurrection do not produce new sources of dissatisfaction that foment more/different dissent in the populace. I suspect that this part of COIN is what Nagl had in mind when he called on us to produce soldier diplomats.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

  19. #19
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default COIN in a Cold "X" War

    Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare (chap. 4, pp.43-47) uses "Revolutionary" for "X" - insert whatever word suits your fancy.

    The situation is one where the insurgent's acts are generally legal and non-violent - ranging up to the situation where military forces have to take an active role because of violence that police actions cannot control.

    The counterinsurgent has 4 methods in a "cold war":

    1. Direct police and legal action vs. the insurgents (primarily directed at its infra-structure).

    2. Indirect action by alleviating the underlying conditions supporting the insurgency's cause.

    3. Infiltration of the insurgency (intelligence & derailment).

    4. Co-opt the insurgency into a mainstream political movement.

    Now, moving to Bob's World's example of the Civil Rights Movement, which addresses only one side of the coin (pun intended) - Black Voting Rights, etc. One can cite use of all four methods by local, state and Federal authorities in that era; but the Kennedy-Johnson approach was to emphasize #2 (enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts) and #4 (bringing Black voters into the Democratic Party, realizing that substantial numbers of White voters would be lost).

    The other insurgency was the anti-Civil Rights movement, which had both non-violent and violent aspects. Once the decision was made to pursue enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts, application of method #2 in favor of the "antis" was not possible - although as time went on (now 5 decades), modifications were made to satisfy some of the concerns about busing, affirmative action, etc.

    The methods used against the "antis" tending to violence were largely #1 and #3 (e.g., Mississippi Burning). That again was a long process; and there were still a large number of dissatisfied Whites without a political home. That need was met by Nixon's Southern Strategy, which changed the US political map by bringing former Democrats into the Republican Party. That message (method #4) was conveyed in a number of ways - including SCOTUS nominations of two Southern judges (Haynsworth & Carswell in 1969 & 1970), which were destined to fail from the gitgo.

    The foregoing is an explanation by hindsight - the various responses developed because of the US system of governance - not because of some magical 50-year plan.

  20. #20
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Well, yes -- and

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    ...One can cite use of all four methods by local, state and Federal authorities in that era; but the Kennedy-Johnson approach was to emphasize #2 (enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts) and #4 (bringing Black voters into the Democratic Party, realizing that substantial numbers of White voters would be lost).
    . . .
    The foregoing is an explanation by hindsight - the various responses developed because of the US system of governance - not because of some magical 50-year plan.
    there are a lot of myths about that time and effort.

    While your summation is generally correct, as one who lived in the south during most of that period, there are three things that often get discounted or ignored. First, as a result of WW II and Korea and Truman's desegregation of the Armed Forces plus a lot of returning black veterans and a lot of white guys who became aware that black was not bad, the south was in process of changing. Barriers were falling all over the place. The Kennedy developed Act that Johnson got passed just sealed the issue. Goldwater's contention that the Act was not truly necessary and could do some harmful if uintneded things was correct I believe.

    Secondly, the 'antis' were vocal but really rather few in number and the so-called Nixon southern strategy while real was successful not because of blacks becoming strong Democratic supporters or because the Democratic party had passed the CRA but because Nixon, whom no less an authority than Noam Chomsky calls the last liberal American President signed more legislation that helped the south than did his democratic predecessors. Most of the later stuff -- school and busing issues were more a result of mishandling and bad court decisions as anything else. Not to say there weren't bitter dead enders; there were -- but poor handling exacerbated things significantly.

    Lastly, the Baby Boomers had nothing to do with all that.

    Long way of getting to the point -- I don't agree that the era and the civil rights imbroglio were a COIN effort in any sense. I do understand that one could use the actions as a corollary and have no objection to that, though I wouldn't do it.

    However, if one was there at the time, it wasn't quite the way the academics like to portray it in their somewhat revisionist history and it may have been a COIN-like preemption in Stage 0 seen through that prism but on the ground at the time, Stage 0 had not yet arrove, much less Stage 1...

    Lot of shrewd, party enhancing domestic politics though, that's for sure.

Similar Threads

  1. Replies: 30
    Last Post: 04-25-2011, 09:32 PM
  2. Replies: 0
    Last Post: 04-21-2009, 03:00 PM
  3. COIN & The Media (catch all)
    By Jedburgh in forum Media, Information & Cyber Warriors
    Replies: 79
    Last Post: 02-28-2009, 11:55 AM
  4. Force Structure for Small Wars
    By SWJED in forum Military - Other
    Replies: 70
    Last Post: 10-02-2008, 08:07 PM

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •