COIN comes home to assist policing

[SWJED]

The latest from the SWJ blog - Iraq & the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons and Prospects by Robert Bunker and John Sullivan.

Gangs and Iraqi insurgents, militias, and other non-state groups share common origins based on tribalism, and therefore, it is expected that they will exhibit similar structures and behaviors. It is our belief that further insight into Iraq’s present situation and future prospects may be derived from a perspective utilizing 3rd generation gang (3 GEN Gangs) studies which present lessons learned from the emergence and spread of gangs within the United States, and other parts of the world, over roughly the last four decades. (1) Basically, from a 3 GEN Gangs perspective, three generations of gangs have been found to exist: turf based, drug based, and mercenary based. The first generation gangs, comprising the vast majority, focus on protecting their turf. These gangs, the least developed of the three generational forms, provide both protection and identity to their members and little more. While some drug dealing is evident, it tends with these gangs to be a sideline activity...

[Jedburgh]

...an earlier thread looking at Iraq in the context of 3rd gen gangs:

3rd Generation Gangs and the Iraqi Insurgency

[Eric Churchg]

Moderator's Note

On January 18th 2012 this thread was merged with a smaller one, which started in 2010 called 'Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement' and the merged thread renamed 'COIN comes home to assist policing' (Ends).


Counter insurgency, particularly it's emphasis on good relations with the People, seems to be affecting police training and approaches. This article
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/loc...,5306468.story
about efforts to retrain the Baltimore Police Department shows a huge influence from lessons learned overseas. Even the trainers have served overseas;
"The lecturer, Eric Greitens, was a former Navy SEAL who led missions in Fallujah, Iraq, to hunt down insurgents. The city officers copied down four phrases he wrote on a white board: No worse enemy. No better friend. No better diplomat. No better role model."
This makes me wonder if lessons learned by the military will be reflected more police training and tactics

EC

[davidbfpo]

The quoted article is I suspect not unique - as urban police struggle to meet new demands. Using ex-military / COIN lessons is only part of the response, although using such trainers may make such intensive training more acceptable to the students and bureaucrats who make decisions behind a desk. Early days to make a judgement.

In the UK - for very different reasons - the military has had very little impact on policing, with the exception of firearms and specialist surveillance. Mention COIN and there'll be a stampede to the exit.

davidbfpo

[MattC86]

Why so, given the history with Ireland?

You'd think there'd be more interest within the Metropolitan Police and other UK law-enforcement for non-typical policework. . .

. . .then again, you don't have the guns and murder problems that we do (or at least I haven't seen them?)

Regards,

Matt

[davidbfpo]

Why so, given the history with Ireland?

You'd think there'd be more interest within the Metropolitan Police and other UK law-enforcement for non-typical policework. . . then again, you don't have the guns and murder problems that we do (or at least I haven't seen them?). Regards,

Matt

All manner of reasons. It is a moot point that the methods used by the British Army and the police (RUC) to counter terrorism and associated criminal activity would suit the normal problems of urban mainland UK, including gun crime. Northern Ireland was a very intensive environment, notably urban West Belfast and rural South Armagh, where amidst a largely un-co-operative public PIRA operated. The latest knife murders of teenagers in London for example are quite different.

Applying COIN, even CT methods to mainland policing and in the USA I venture to suggest are not appropriate. I have my doubts that police managers would accept, even understand, COIN.

davidbfpo

[Ron Humphrey]

All manner of reasons. It is a moot point that the methods used by the British Army and the police (RUC) to counter terrorism and associated criminal activity would suit the normal problems of urban mainland UK, including gun crime. Northern Ireland was a very intensive environment, notably urban West Belfast and rural South Armagh, where amidst a largely un-co-operative public PIRA operated. The latest knife murders of teenagers in London for example are quite different.

Applying COIN, even CT methods to mainland policing and in the USA I venture to suggest are not appropriate. I have my doubts that police managers would accept, even understand, COIN.

davidbfpo

That if they just manage to catch the parts like failure to account for failure in the system and thus failure to address them makes things worse, and / or
as long as everyone has to follow the same rules local disputes would become less frequent then I think we'll still be one step closer to where we need to be

[MattC86]

All manner of reasons. It is a moot point that the methods used by the British Army and the police (RUC) to counter terrorism and associated criminal activity would suit the normal problems of urban mainland UK, including gun crime. Northern Ireland was a very intensive environment, notably urban West Belfast and rural South Armagh, where amidst a largely un-co-operative public PIRA operated. The latest knife murders of teenagers in London for example are quite different.

Applying COIN, even CT methods to mainland policing and in the USA I venture to suggest are not appropriate. I have my doubts that police managers would accept, even understand, COIN.

davidbfpo

Well, I should have been far more clear. I don't mean to suggest that COIN techniques are something that municipal police forces should take up and study. I would just assume there'd be a little more interest among police forces, given that people are always pejoratively calling COIN heavily-armed policework. . .

To put it another way, do you think that UK police (or any police, for that matter) could gain something from the proverbial lessons learned in COIN efforts in Northern Ireland or elsewhere?

Actually, as a follow-up, you take it, then, that the British Army took far more from its Northern Ireland experience than any police institution did?

Regards,

Matt

[Tacitus]

Interesting story I heard on NPR on the drive into work today.

D.C. Police use Radical Tactic to Combat Homicides
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...oryId=91379525

They're setting up Bagdad style checkpoints (in a "failed state" type neighborhood you might say) to check IDs of people coming in to determine if they have a legitimate use to be in the neighborhood.

Obviously, this is controversial. And residents of the neighborhood have differing opinions. The D.C. police chief seems determined, though, and thinks it is working to lower homicides.

[Surferbeetle]

From the Economist's 'The World in 2009', Crime Interrupted by Joel Budd

The approach that will come to prominence in 2009 is almost the exact opposite of zero tolerance. Rather than cracking down on petty offenders such as turnstile-jumpers and squeegee men, the authorities will focus on those who are most likely to kill or be killed. Some may be drug dealers recently released from prison. Others may be the associates of people recently wounded by gunfire. What makes the approach particularly novel is that it depends on local people. Rather than insisting on zero tolerance from the police, it tries to change what the residents of crime-infested areas will tolerate.

The new method has been quietly honed for almost a decade in Chicago, where it is known as Operation Ceasefire. It has two main tools. The more conventional one is a team of outreach workers who try to mobilise communities to oppose violence, often in partnership with local clergy. Then, at night, “violence interrupters” hit the streets to sniff out trouble. Often former gang members and graduates of the prison system, the interrupters have a hard-nosed approach to law and order. They may, for example, encourage an aggrieved man to consider beating someone instead of shooting him, or try to convince rival drug-dealers that a turf war would be bad for business, as it would attract the police.

[jmm99]

is here. Its results-data page is here - and its publications are here.

NRA members might find this article of interest - knew I read of Gary Slutkin somewhere else - probably in the Rifleman.

[Bob's World]

I believe that if you all expand your view of what COIN is, you gain a clearer understanding. To my way of thinking, EVERY police officer is waging COIN every day on the job. It is only when Civil government fails in their COIN efforts that they have to bring in the military for the type of expanded COIN operations that most think of when they think of COIN.

Viewed in this manner, the most successful COIN operation of the 60's was the passing and implementation of the Civil Rights Act by the US Government. Faced with with a rising insurgency, complete with ideology and dynamic leadership, the US could have brought in greater force to put the African American populace back into "its place," or they could change their behavior and bring a better form of governance to all Americans. Thankfully they chose the latter.

Think of this when people talk of "Appeasing" insurgents by listenting to and addressing their concerns. When a government addresses the concerns of its own citizenry it is not appeasement, it is simply doing their job. Appeasement is when a government compromises its own populace to grant concessions to the government of an other populace. Very different things altogether.

So yes, all COIN is local, and the best COIN is that which is done day in and day out to meet the needs of a populace long before it starts drifting into the behavior described by Mao as Phase I insurgency.

Just something to consider.

[Jedburgh]

JSOU, Jul 10: Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement

....The requirements to obtain warrants prior to execution of raids for high-value targets, collect and preserve evidence for criminal prosecution, and on occasion present testimony in courts of law are new missions for SOF. They are not relatively simple changes in the rules of engagement or comparable techniques. As far as can be determined, previously no U.S. military combat arms unit has ever been tasked with such a mission during combat operations. The thesis is straightforward; if such missions are to continue, then consideration must be given to adequate training for them.

In addition, the dangers faced by civilian LEAs in the U.S. have been constantly escalating. Many criminals are equipped with fully automatic weapons and in some areas conducting small-unit operations. The response to these threats requires additional SOF-like civilian units within LEAs. As such, SOF and LEAs will be competing for personnel from a limited subset of the American population.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the elements precipitating this convergence, provide SOF with a better understanding of changing domestic threats and operational capabilities of LEAs, and draw insights from the similarities and challenges imposed by transnational gangs and terrorists both domestically and abroad. The monograph will argue that SOF need new skills and training to assume the law-enforcement-like missions they are being assigned. In addition, it will provide leaders of major LEAs a better understanding of special operations and potentially facilitate a basis for future cooperation and mutual support. The monograph is written as a forward-looking document and a harbinger of emerging trends; some are quite clear, and others more subtle, but all worth contemplating, especially by those engaged in planning for the future of SOF. It is also argued that the public attitude toward conflict is changing and perhaps the legal underpinnings on use of force as well....

[slapout9]

Jed,thanks for posting this. This concept should have been implemented a long time ago IMO.

[OfTheTroops]

gain legitimacy through transparency. Darn Posse Comitatus degrades our skill set.

[jmm99]

The monograph is certainly on point in suggesting that a closer educational relationship should exist between SOFs and LEAs. I'd say that, where the outcome hinges on the quality of local governance, seeking guidance from those in the civil and criminal justice system is simply logical.

Where the author (a non-lawyer) jumps the track (to some extent) is in the section "Criminalization of Terrorism" (pp. 72-75), particularly in citing LTC Mike Hoffman's 2005 article, Rescuing the Law of War: A Way Forward in an Era of Global Terrorism; and then not following up on how LTC Hoffman's 2005 recommendations were treated in terms of what US courts have held since then.

Thus, the author says:

The issue of how to deal with terrorism is not new, nor is the debate concerning whether terrorist acts constitute war or a crime.[192] The lines are certainly blurred when terrorist actions are embedded in a war zone and constitute a basic tactic employed by the adversary. Since 9/11 and the inception of the GWOT, the debate has intensified with serious concerns about how to deal with perpetrators. A review of terrorists’ prosecutions by Michael Hoffman in Parameters noted, “Terrorists are gaining an astonishing legal edge over the U.S.” The rights and privileges they are now afforded exceed those of enemy soldiers or even insurgents in civil conflicts.[193] The implications for SOF are significant as they, like law enforcement officers, are often the people who are executing operations that bring them into direct contact with the terrorists and must then meet legal challenges. Hoffman indicated that this trend would increase.

No doubt that Hoffman wrote what was quoted; but Hoffman (vice the Rule of Law trend he saw in 2005) recommended instead a Laws of War approach (snip from his 2005 Parameters article):

A Way Forward

The judicial branch of government is the one least qualified to apply the laws of war and determine national security policy, but these issues are undeniably generating crucial legal questions, and the courts consider it their duty to move with rapidity when urgent issues come before them. Though an incremental approach to these issues by the executive and legislative branches reflects their appreciation of the complexities involved, this leaves a gap that the courts are quickly filling.

32/33

When applied against post-9/11 challenges, earlier American state practice arguably can be used to support either a pragmatic law-of-war approach or an utterly impractical law-enforcement approach. In the absence of a firm law-of-war framework, the courts are furnishing their own answers. There is simply no time to spare if the executive and legislative branches want to weigh in with alternative answers. The following two principles offer a way forward.

• Terrorist warfare represents a form of unlawful belligerency that sovereign states can meet by adapting customary rules of war.

Not all warfare is necessarily covered by the Geneva Conventions, and where it isn’t, the customary law of war should apply. The 9/11 Commission observed that such rules can form the basis for an operational response to terrorism.[24] The executive branch needs to establish clear, firm guidelines for the application of the customary rules of war in operations against unlawful belligerents. Legal issues will arise that haven’t been foreseen, but that’s inherent to all military operations and they will have to be addressed as they arise. There is little time, however, to build a complete customary law-of-war framework ad hoc, and relying upon the judicial branch to sort out uncertainties in the rules of war is not an option.

• The customary laws of war, when adapted for conflict with unlawful belligerents, must always incorporate rules of humanitarian restraint.

Any set of customary rules of war adapted for this purpose will have to include rules for humanitarian protection of civilians and military captives. There simply is no getting around this. While certain rules found in the Geneva Conventions may not be appropriate or obligatory when dealing with terrorist organizations (e.g., the rule limiting the scope of questions that prisoners of war are obligated to answer[25]) there are still lines that can’t be crossed.

The US courts involved in the Gitmo cases (SCOTUS, DC Circuit and DC District) have applied the Laws of War - primarily developing Common Article 3 - since 2005. Those courts generally have followed Hoffman's advice.

So, if an SOF trooper is proceeding against terrorists under US law, he is not subject to LE rules - unless (1) the ROE/RUF have been tightened to incorporate LE rules (e.g., if EU-NATO rules are being used in an ISAF context); or (2) if a SOFA (or other HN agreement) requires the local Rule of Law to apply (as in Iraq, and in Astan under some circumstances).

The exceptions to the application of the Laws of War are not something imposed by US courts. They have been imposed by political, diplomatic and military considerations (e.g., "best practices COIN"). That conglomeration of the Rule of Law and Laws of War has led to a much stickier quagmire than COL Alexander describes in his monograph.

More directly to the use of police (including paramilitary police) in "COIN" is this JSOU monograph by Joseph D. Celeski, Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN — the Thick Blue Line (2009).

A snip indicating his perspective agrees with mine:

7. Conclusions

The primary frontline COIN force is often the police, not the military. The primary COIN objective is to enable local institutions. Therefore, supporting the police is essential.

The ability to prevent an outbreak of insurgent activities rests on the perceived legitimacy of the government to provide its citizens security, rule of law, and a better way of life within some type of moral framework acceptable to the culture. When effective, police and law enforcement institutions can control just about any level of criminality and violence to a level acceptable to the populace. If the violence emanates from the armed actions of insurgents, police and law enforcement retain the capabilities to manage the situation at an acceptable level—that is, if the government correctly identifies the origins of the violence as insurgent in nature. If policing efforts cannot contain the insurgent threat, then they must either be reinforced or the government must choose to inject military might to defeat the insurgency.

Whether the government chooses a course of action to reinforce policing measures or deploy its military, maintaining the rule of law will remain paramount throughout the crisis to buttress legitimacy. In order to prevent a protracted conflict, which is a central component of insurgent strategy, combined military and paramilitary policing efforts, while simultaneously continuing community policing, are often the best method to defeat the enemy and return society to a level of law enforcement reasonable to control societal violence.

The police and law enforcement sectors are key enablers for the COIN practitioner. The police and law enforcement organizations often outnumber the personnel in the military, are closest to the problem, and are normally the first responders to insurgent violence. Conversely, a low level of perceived legitimacy on the part of the populace towards its law enforcement institutions, often due to corruption and ineptness within the police, can almost guarantee that the COIN effort will become more difficult in achieving its objectives.

COL Celeski's article seems more practical (IMO).

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Early in January 2012 this SWJ article was published 'Counterinsurgency and Community Policing in Afghanistan':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cou...in-afghanistan

The relevance here is in the comment, with links, by a Massachusetts State Police & SOF veteran Michael Cutone aka ODA944, which opens with:

Massachusetts State Police initiated a pilot program during the fall of 2009 at the north end of Springfield Massachusetts. A high crime area of gangs, violence and drugs. Below is the project we initiated. Utilizing the eight COIN principles to combat gangs and drug dealers.

Lessons From the Battlefield: Counter-Insurgency for Domestic Law Enforcement

Springfield, Massachusetts, was ranked the 12th most dangerous city in America and had a rampant gang problem. A rise in crime and gang violence was exacerbated by budgetary restraints on the police force. Massachusetts State Trooper Michael Cutone had recently returned from a tour of duty in Iraq where he and Trooper Thomas Sarrouf had played essential roles in a Special Operations mission in the Avghani region of Iraq...

Mike Few, who whilst at NPS looked at the problems faced the city of Salinas in California, added a SWJ article in October 2011 'Gangs and Guerrillas'; which looks at the work NPS did, a very short taster:

The goal of this project is to share the ideas developed to fight insurgents and terrorists and
see if they can be adapted or modified to help the people of Salinas think about their city’s problem with gangs in an innovative way.

Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/gangs-and-guerrillas

I know awhile back MikeF also posted on his experiences in Salinas, but there are too many hits on the city name.

Important enough to add this post, perhaps others will ask how community policing can be married to COIN in the USA or other developed, liberal democracies.

[SWJ Blog]

Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs

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[SWJ Blog]

Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs

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[SWJ Blog]

Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace

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