OODA Rethought

[ericmwalters]

To recap:

MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."

What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).

Challenge: If the OODA Loop concept was originally designed to explain how the F-86 could generate a higher and better tempo in “fast transients” against a MiG-15 in a Korean War era dogfight, is it still relevant/valid in understanding missile versus aircraft engagements?

Response: I would argue it certainly is. This is very clear if we look back to Vietnam War surface-to-air missile engagements—Randy “Duke” Cunningham knew exactly when to put his F4 into a steep dive when one of those “flying telephone poles” would come up to greet him. Timing was everything; the advantage the pilot had was he knew how the missile would react—after all, missiles had no brain. So if the pilot understood the guidance system, the pilot knew the missile G-loading characteristics (which were usually more than what humans could tolerate), the pilot knew the characteristics of his own aircraft, he could devise a response based on what he knew the missile was capable of.

Certainly as guidance systems and missile performance has improved, this has gotten harder and harder to do. Certainly the OODA Loop as ONE of a number of analytical lenses would help to paint the problem. Still, aircraft countermeasures against missiles (whether inherent to the aircraft or from other aircraft executing SAM suppression missions) are aimed at lengthening the missile engagement OODA Loop to the point where the pilot can effectively react and negate the threat. If we need to get into specifics here, we can, certainly…even if we are talking about theoretical scenarios.

But just an example, Missile Warning gear is intended to alert the pilot that a missile is in the air, giving him the option to divert or abort (or press on). In other words, it provides an “earlier” observation than he might otherwise get, leaving him more time for “orientation” and “decision” and “action.” “Wild Weasel” missions flying support for strike packages have a number of options that can be described in OODA terms. Is this the ONLY way to express what is going on? Certainly not. There are a number of other tools that are necessary to understand what is happening, what can be done, etc. Especially for the air defender, there’s a lot of game theory/queuing theory going on before the engagement so that decisions can be made in split seconds. Is that an application of the OODA Loop concept? One can argue it either way. On the one hand, some will say that “orientation” and “decision” times must be cut to an absolute minimum, so automated/algorithmic solutions are sought. On the other hand, some might argue that the OODA loop as the maneuver warfare advocates portray it is pretty much useless in such scenarios. Okay. This is a technical argument—I think the OODA concept applies, but I’d readily concede you won’t find any discussion of “reconnaissance pull,” “commander’s intent,” and “mission tactics” in this. Roger. But given what we have talked about regarding maneuver warfare, this would be seen as a relatively arcane discussion compared to the “larger” issues regarding command and control of larger units on the ground. That’s where most the arguments come in.