OODA Rethought

[ericmwalters]

To recap:

MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."

What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).

Challenge: If the OODA Loop concept was originally designed to explain how the F-86 could generate a higher and better tempo in “fast transients” against a MiG-15 in a Korean War era dogfight, is it still relevant/valid in understanding missile versus aircraft engagements?

Response: I would argue it certainly is. This is very clear if we look back to Vietnam War surface-to-air missile engagements—Randy “Duke” Cunningham knew exactly when to put his F4 into a steep dive when one of those “flying telephone poles” would come up to greet him. Timing was everything; the advantage the pilot had was he knew how the missile would react—after all, missiles had no brain. So if the pilot understood the guidance system, the pilot knew the missile G-loading characteristics (which were usually more than what humans could tolerate), the pilot knew the characteristics of his own aircraft, he could devise a response based on what he knew the missile was capable of.

Certainly as guidance systems and missile performance has improved, this has gotten harder and harder to do. Certainly the OODA Loop as ONE of a number of analytical lenses would help to paint the problem. Still, aircraft countermeasures against missiles (whether inherent to the aircraft or from other aircraft executing SAM suppression missions) are aimed at lengthening the missile engagement OODA Loop to the point where the pilot can effectively react and negate the threat. If we need to get into specifics here, we can, certainly…even if we are talking about theoretical scenarios.

But just an example, Missile Warning gear is intended to alert the pilot that a missile is in the air, giving him the option to divert or abort (or press on). In other words, it provides an “earlier” observation than he might otherwise get, leaving him more time for “orientation” and “decision” and “action.” “Wild Weasel” missions flying support for strike packages have a number of options that can be described in OODA terms. Is this the ONLY way to express what is going on? Certainly not. There are a number of other tools that are necessary to understand what is happening, what can be done, etc. Especially for the air defender, there’s a lot of game theory/queuing theory going on before the engagement so that decisions can be made in split seconds. Is that an application of the OODA Loop concept? One can argue it either way. On the one hand, some will say that “orientation” and “decision” times must be cut to an absolute minimum, so automated/algorithmic solutions are sought. On the other hand, some might argue that the OODA loop as the maneuver warfare advocates portray it is pretty much useless in such scenarios. Okay. This is a technical argument—I think the OODA concept applies, but I’d readily concede you won’t find any discussion of “reconnaissance pull,” “commander’s intent,” and “mission tactics” in this. Roger. But given what we have talked about regarding maneuver warfare, this would be seen as a relatively arcane discussion compared to the “larger” issues regarding command and control of larger units on the ground. That’s where most the arguments come in.

[ericmwalters]

Challenge: What makes us think the OODA Loop concept—if we believe it works to explain single entity versus single entity conflict—can apply to understanding aggregates of entities fighting aggregate of entities?

Response: This is perhaps the most important question regarding the applicability of the OODA Loop. Certainly a number of thread posters have expressed doubt about this. So this deserves a lengthier response.

We’ve already talked about the wrestler analogy—this is perhaps most akin to air combat maneuvering. A single decisionmaker pitted against another single decisionmaker. I need to elaborate a bit here, because Wilf and others have brought up chess players as an analogy—where does application of the OODA Loop work for chess?

I’d ague it doesn’t. For the simple reason that chess play is regulated by turns. Each side will ALWAYS get to react to the move of the opponent’s last move. There are no possibilities to get in two moves instead of just one. I get a move, you get a move. So the pace/tempo of the game is regulated by the rules.

Now, it’s been brought up that, given timed moves, a player that exhibits superior OODA capabilities should be able to apply this to win. True, but irrelevant to OODA loop implications that I’ll get into in a bit. Sure, expert players can “orient” and “decide” better and faster. But the issue is ultimately about quality of the moves. The players (or the tournament) decide ahead of time how long the chess clock limits are. Those limits never change. And the question comes down to quality of decisions made in that never-changing time limit. I just don’t think this equates to war very well.

Now, for those familiar with Ed Glabus and Aegis Corporation’s old InfoChess game, elements of the OODA are introduced. It’s a double-blind game with the ability to buy Information Operations capabilities. It’s very possible in that game that the opponent won’t get to execute his move when it’s his turn, particularly if he’s the victim of a successful Electronic Attack (EA) mounted by his opponent. But this is relatively rare—most of the issues in InfoChess involve quality of the moves. Players are bent on deception and operations security versus intelligence and counterintelligence most commonly. Even in InfoChess, there is still that pacing function. Sure, you have a better shot at getting into two moves to the opponent’s one given a successful EA operation, but this is an example of lengthening the enemy’s OODA Loop and not tightening your own and dealing with the consequences of that.

Maneuverists do talk a good bit about chess masters. But mostly it’s about expertise—and how that expertise means that true experts take much less time to orient and decide. That’s why MW is so difficult. You need experts—and you need to develop them. The maneuverists argue that the results are worth the cost. If you disagree with that—that the U.S. military cannot grow that many experts—then the argument is pretty much over. You and the “German School” maneuverists have different assumptions and value systems; you aren’t going to be able to agree on anything. However, you may have something in common with the Soviet school, more on that later.

Anyway, back to the issue at hand--

An understanding of OODA Loop theory, developed from F-86 versus MiG-15 dogfights, explains much regarding why some ACM matchups in Vietnam worked the way they did. And Boyd certainly applied this understanding to E-M theory, which revolutionized how we design and evaluate fighter aircraft. Okay. If somebody wants to attack that idea, I’d welcome it. But let’s assume for a minute that this is true. What makes Boyd make the leap into other realms of war, particularly those involving larger formations?

Most of the maneuverists will point to how basketball players play basketball. Or soccer players play soccer. Or hockey players play hockey. Or so on. Sure, offensive/scoring ability counts, defensive skills count, but being able to manipulate the tempo of the game is something each team strives to achieve. In “blowout” games, usually it’s pretty clear the winning team completely dominated the opposition, being able to pre-empt, dislocate, and disorient the other team. Those maneuverists, such as John Schmitt, will explain this effect in OODA Loop terms. IN such instances, Schmitt points to the lateral communication between the team members—the coach is unable to influence much of the play from the sidelines compared to other games such as American football or baseball. The game is in the hands of the players. These kinds of games show recon-pull in action. When gaps or holes in the defense are found, players naturally gravitate to it/exploit it without waiting for someone (like the coach or the team captain) to tell them.

The question is whether you can believe that this analogy will hold for larger aggregates of units in violent competitions where there are higher levels of uncertainty.

Both the German and Soviet school advocates will concede that this holds—the OODA Loop is applicable in such instances. The difference between them is with regard to where the experts are. For example, to use the basketball analogy—do I have a team that’s played several seasons together? If I do, the players are able to decentralize command and control and implement “recon pull” to immediately exploit discovered gaps. The commander doesn’t have to explicitly direct such exploitation. Soviet school pretty much assumes you have a “pick up”/”back lot” basketball team—team members don’t know each other, implicit communication is at a minimum, and so on. So there’s much more emphasis put on preparation—speed and focus is achieved through better planning BEFORE the operation, as opposed to German school which depends on speed and focus occurring DURING the operation.

So the basic question that differentiates the two schools boils down to this: do you have people that can make independent decisions? If you believe that can’t happen at lower levels—such independence is reserved for senior levels—then you are a Soviet school advocate. If you think you can grow that kind of effective independence at low levels, then you’ll lean to the German school.

Commercial wargaming provide some potential insights. My favorite system to explore this is the MMP/The Gamers Tactical Combat System. In this game, players have to write operations orders with sketches in order for units to conduct operations. You must designate objectives, provide control measures (where to move, what unit boundaries are, etc), and so on. The interesting thing about the game system is that units don’t obey orders as soon as they get them. A number of variables come into play. The first (and some say the most important) variable is how quickly the inherent command and control system accepts new instructions. There are other variables, such as whether the formation is currently in contact or is out of contact (better). And so on. Every turn that an new order is levied against a formation, a die is rolled. The player cannot possibly be sure WHEN a formation will accept and then execute a given order. Playing the numerous games in this series leads players to prefer the sides that have the lowest implementation values. In other words, players want to play the side that accepts and executes orders faster. While they can’t predict when orders will be accepted and executed, there is the possibility that one side will accept and execute orders faster than the other side. While there are exceptions on a case by case basis (i.e., occasionally luck will cause the slower unit to execute orders faster than the faster unit), overall the faster implementing side will get the majority of “jumps” on the opponent in conducting operations. This is a huge insight and leads to a depth of understanding regarding how the OODA Loop works in practice.

But this won’t be convincing to a number of people who will want to judge how well this works given historical examples. Maneuverists will point to a number of well-worn examples where shorter OODA cycles (for the German School, this typically involves recon-pull examples) contribute to situations where the enemy’s actions are rendered “too little, too late.”

[ericmwalters]

Challenge: If one admits that the OODA Loop concept does apply to aggregates of entities fighting aggregates of entities (i.e., it is indeed valid), how can one know that one is being effectively faster in such a context? By the time you detect/see the results of your speed, isn’t it too late to effectively exploit it?

Response: This is another extremely serious question. The kind of answer you get depends on which MW school you belong to—German school or Soviet school.

First of all, Boyd wasn’t the only one who believed the OODA Loop concept applied to aggregates. The Soviets believed much the same thing as articulated in their “Troop Control” algorithms. Their basic equation for Troop Control ran like this: Tcon (Time needed for effective Troop Control) was equal to T1 (time for effective reports to HQ) + T2 (Headquarters functioning, to include direction from higher headquarters) +T3 (time for orders and signals for the headquarters to reach the unit of action. According to the Soviets, C2 was operative if “Tcon (T1 + T2+ T3) + Top (the time it took for the receiving unit to execute) < Tcrit…with Tcrit being the “critical time” or the time within which the operation must be executed to have the intended effect. A great deal of foundation work in this regard was laid out by Altukhov in “Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control” in 1984. It’s difficult to say whether Altukhov was influenced by Boyd or not. We just don’t know.

So, given the Soviet algorithm. T1 = Observation. T2 had elements of Orientation and decision contained within. T3 and Top were the “action” elements of the OODA. It is very clear they understood that you had to tighten the Tcon loop to beat the Tcrit parameter.

Here is where the German school diverges from the Soviet school. To the Soviet school, the problem of detecting change in time to effectively take advantage of it is huge. Basically, they admit that it can’t be reliably done—and “reliably” is the operative term. So the focus is on preparation before the operation. Likely outcomes are calculated ahead of time and when conditions roughly approximate the preconditions for one of the options, then that option is chosen and pushed through. Here the idea is that the high command will be ready for certain sets of conditions with a “branch plan” or “sequel” ready for execution. If something unexpected comes up, it isn’t seized upon, even if it appears to be advantageous. That’s just how it is. So if you believe that a command and control system cannot possibly take advantage of the unforeseen in a reliable way, you tend to subscribe to Soviet school MW. The way to deal with uncertainty is to prepare like nobody’s business and execute violently but according to the plan (with all its branches and sequels).

On the other hand, German school embraces uncertainty and expects to “recon-pull” its way through the problem. So the German school adherents also admit that higher headquarters can’t judge the outcomes of actions in enough time to take advantage of them. So what the German school adherents advocate is decentralization—units see local conditions and act immediately, consistent with the higher commander’s intent. Decentralization buys the required speed—the cost is possibly the unity of effort. Commander’s intent is supposed to provide that unity of effort. Sometimes that occurs, sometimes it doesn’t. The criticism against German school MW is basically that you may not be able to rely on commander’s intent to govern initiative. If you don’t have cohesion, if you don’t have practiced experts, then I’d agree that they are right.

Of course, the requirements for expertise and cohesion throughout the system to accomplish this are much higher than it is for the Soviet school. It’s a lot less efficient but judged to be more effective. Like the basketball team, the players move the ball down the court and make the shots—there’s not much the coach can do on game day. His role was getting the team ready to play.

The German school advocates have a number of illustrations to show what they mean—and let’s admit it, these examples are pretty much a “best case” solution set. My favorite is SSgt Ruhbarth on the Meuse in 1940, pretty much pulling Guderian’s river crossing behind him (you can read all about that in Robert Doughty’s excellent book, The Breaking Point). And there are other equally compelling examples. But what is lacking are case studies that show breakdowns in this kind of command and control system. We have no shortage of cases showing the failures of Soviet School Maneuver Warfare (and I can provide those if anyone is interested). But we lack a comprehensive body of cases that show the risks in German school MW. Robert Leonhard tried to suggest one—Guderian’s conduct of the Battle of Yelnia in 1941—but I’d argue it’s not a good case (and I can provide my rationale why to anyone who asks—just send me a Private Message and I’ll send you a paper on it). Yet, I bet there are others. That said, I sense that these cases are illustrating poor applications of the theory rather than flaws in the theory itself. Of course, one might say the same thing about the Soviet school failures.

There are a number of cases that suggest the disadvantages of the German school approach that I will get into later. As far as the Soviet school failures, I would hope these are relatively self evident, but they may not be to some reading this thread. All I will say is that--despite these failures--they were good enough against the Germans and Japanese at the operational level of war to achieve success. This why Soviet School MW (and their understanding of the OODA Loop) is alive and well, even to this day.

There was no way the Soviets could attempt a German school solution. They had too many languages, conscription (even for NCOs) meant only a two to three year obligation, professionals were only to be found in the officer class—and of these, only at the field grade level (if at that) and above. The operative Soviet school problem was the risk that the situation would outrun the plan. They solved that through the echelon concept—basically, units would only be asked to do one thing and one thing only. Once they were done with that one thing, other units would follow them and carry on the fight. Therefore there was a huge emphasis on reconnaissance so units could prepare and plan to do that “one thing” and nothing more. Once units completed their mission, they were “expended.” Nothing further was asked of them. Other units continued the operation.

I’d hope this illuminates the effective challenges to this very key “MW Essential Premise.” Much depends on your particular experiences, studies, biases, and preferences as to whether you buy into Soviet or German school interpretations of the OODA Loop and how to implement it, or reject it altogether.

[Teufel]

So how do you know you are "inside the enemies OODA Loop"? Because you are just doing something faster? That may only become apparent when you actually see the result of your actions, - which rarely if ever happens.

I was in a squad on squad ambush in Afghanisan once where we suppressed the enemy and manuevered out of the kill zone so quickly that the enemy still believed we were in the kill zone and continued to engage the area they thought we were in while we manuevered on their flanks. They were never able to recover from this mistake and could never really reorient on our forces and figure out where we were and what we were up to until it was too late.

I would say that we were inside their OODA loop because our quick decision making and appropriate actions meant that the enemy was deciding and acting an orientation that was based on observations that were no longer accurate.

[stanleywinthrop]

The OODA Loop is a map, not the territory.

Worth quoting.

[Hacksaw]

I think that is a perfect example of OODA loop and also a great example of in which context (tactical decision making that leads to positional advantage) OODA loop makes sense as a tool, but then again I doubt you and your squad weren't thinking about OODA loop in the midst of the action...

I can also recall a (then 3-star later 4-star) general thinking he was inside the enemy's OODA loop (used the term during BUBs) in the midst of a UFL exercise...

Maneuver forces were racing northward, failing to clear UGFs and HARTs/secure LOCs against the best advice of his subordinate commanders, and the Blue Force got its lunch ate (BADDD with three Ds). Having recently returned from Korea and in which my last task was to work with the OPFOR CDR, it was painfully obvious how the situation would unfold. I thought it would be a great lesson learned for a senior leader that speed does not equal operational tempo.

Hence, I was greatly saddened when the same individual made the same error the next year and horrified when they were subsequently named to command that theater

IMHO, OODA is best left as a tactical level mental construct...

Live well and row

[William F. Owen]

I would say that we were inside their OODA loop because our quick decision making and appropriate actions meant that the enemy was deciding and acting an orientation that was based on observations that were no longer accurate.

So, you did something for which the enemy was unprepared, and even if they had been prepared, they failed to recognise the change in conditions. That IS the definition of "Surprise." Do we need the OODA to describe the utility of Surprise?

OK, let's assume we do. How would you apply that to trying create Surprise, as part of a Combat Estimate? I can't see a way it can be done, but my life would be a lot easier if someone could show me how!

IMHO, OODA is best left as a tactical level mental construct...

OK, so how do I then I apply it in a practical way?

[Bob's World]

OODA also reinforces a very narrow, fighter pilots metric of success, of being able to deliver ordanance on the enemy while denying him the opportunity to do the same to you; all with little consideration for how your actions to create such a situation may be impacting the larger environment in which you are operating and contributing to the overall desire/motivation of otherwise passive bystanders into being active participants in your ultimate demise.

Such a perspective could lead an out-going President to boldly proclaim as a defining measure of his term of office that the nation had not been attacked.

True enough, though it overlooks completely the fact that a free willed enemy may have been quite happy with the continuing success from the first attack and had no intent to launch another; or

The impact of the family of "attacking and avoiding attack" engagement might be having accross the environment to create new opponents and to raise the motivation of others to join in ones ultimate demise.

This type of fighter pilot singular focus of purpose is dangerous when applied in a much more complex environment than just two planes rolling through the air shooting at each other. Not saying its a bad concept, just that it has dangerous limitations and does not add very much to the intelectual process of solving complex problems.


Be wary of the ideas of those who have achieved cult status (CVC, Boyd, Kilcullen, etc); that you don't inadvertantly defeat a very good concept by ascribing too much meaning to the same.

[Steve Blair]

Be wary of the ideas of those who have achieved cult status (CVC, Boyd, Kilcullen, etc); that you don't inadvertantly defeat a very good concept by ascribing too much meaning to the same.

I'm not so much wary of the ideas, but the followers and creators of the cult you mention. Boyd's ideas, like CvC and others, are pretty much neutral and may have merit if placed in the proper context. Where they become dangerous is when a group of articulate (or simply loud) followers latch onto them and try to give them context and content that might not have been intended (or simply lacking) in the original idea. It's always worth remembering that the original OODA idea came from gun combat involving fighter aircraft. Boyd himself, from what I've seen of his presentations and unfinished ideas, later tried to stretch it into places that it really didn't fit, and his fellow travelers and later converts were even worse in extending the concept's "reach" into places it really didn't belong.

[Bob's World]

I'm not so much wary of the ideas, but the followers and creators of the cult you mention. Boyd's ideas, like CvC and others, are pretty much neutral and may have merit if placed in the proper context. Where they become dangerous is when a group of articulate (or simply loud) followers latch onto them and try to give them context and content that might not have been intended (or simply lacking) in the original idea. It's always worth remembering that the original OODA idea came from gun combat involving fighter aircraft. Boyd himself, from what I've seen of his presentations and unfinished ideas, later tried to stretch it into places that it really didn't fit, and his fellow travelers and later converts were even worse in extending the concept's "reach" into places it really didn't belong.

As I read through this thread I got flashbacks to my high school lit class where we had to read and discuss Moby Dick; forced to sit and ascribe all kinds of unintended meanings to the characters and scenes in the book.

(Don't tell Mrs. Taylor, but I never did read over half of that book)

Although, if the white whale is really a symbol for bin Laden, and Rumsfeld is Ahab... nahhh

[Hacksaw]

I thought I was pretty clear when I noted to Truefel that I doubted anyone in their squad was thinking about OODA as it maneuvered out of the kill zone and destroyed the enemy...

I do, however, see merit in junior leaders learning through STIX and other decision making drills/exercises to rapidly observe, orient, decide and assess - repeat... I'm not advocating, nor did I imply that the squad leader should have consciously went through a mental checklist to ensure he "checked" all the blocks...

mental construct does not nor was it intended to equal TTP/practical application.

Live well and row

[Teufel]

I think that is a perfect example of OODA loop and also a great example of in which context (tactical decision making that leads to positional advantage) OODA loop makes sense as a tool, but then again I doubt you and your squad weren't thinking about OODA loop in the midst of the action...

I'll grant you that, but many things become intuitive after extensive training. I don't know how or if you can train someone to be a better decision maker with the OODA loop but I really think that the OODA loop is a valuable tool that can be used to describe how some successful tacticians make rapid tactical decisions. It really illustrates to a Marine or Soldier in very basic terms how important it is to weigh information vs time. The longer you take to orient and decide, the more information you will have but it is more likely that the enemy will make a decision before you do and force you to react to their action. Rush through observe and orient and risk making a rushed and disasterous decision because you don't have enough information.

I do, however, see merit in junior leaders learning through STIX and other decision making drills/exercises to rapidly observe, orient, decide and assess - repeat...

I liken this to the five paragraph order. We do it so much in training that we don't have to think about it when giving frag orders in the field; we have been trained to articulate our thoughts in such a way to follow the five paragraph format.

So, you did something for which the enemy was unprepared, and even if they had been prepared, they failed to recognise the change in conditions. That IS the definition of "Surprise." Do we need the OODA to describe the utility of Surprise?

I think it goes beyond surprise. In my opinion, the enemy was not surprised, but confused. They were able to locate our patrol but only after we had closed a significant amount of distance and gained a tremendous amount of momentum. If we applied this to the OODA loop, the enemy failed to reorient themselves to the changing conditions on the battlefield and became overfocused on a decision they made on old information. The surprise came later when they saw us manuvering on their flanks. I have seen this happen in several engagements. Sound tactical decisions made quickly inflict confusion and chaos upon the enemy which in turn generates momentum as the enemy attempts to react and counter these decisions.

[William F. Owen]

I think it goes beyond surprise.

Well beyond surprise is Shock.

Sound tactical decisions made quickly inflict confusion and chaos upon the enemy...

...and that is shock. The wounding of the mind. An inability to make effective decisions leading to effective action. Sever shock is no decision = freezing.

I have always been an OODA sceptic. It does have some merit as a learning process, but I can't see it's application in combat. You (Teufel) are most likely a skilled tactical practitioner and would be without the OODA loop. Speed is only operationally and tactically relevant in relation to surprise.

[Teufel]

Well beyond surprise is Shock.


...and that is shock. The wounding of the mind. An inability to make effective decisions leading to effective action. Sever shock is no decision = freezing.

I have always been an OODA sceptic. It does have some merit as a learning process, but I can't see it's application in combat.

I can agree with that. I think this really applies well to the current enemy as I have found that they really don't recover well if they are surprised. I don't know if you can train someone to incorporate the OODA to make quick decisions or if that just comes naturally with experience. I certainly wasn't thinking about Boyd when we were slugging it out, nor have I actively sought to train my mind to adopt his methods.

[Bob's World]

I can agree with that. I think this really applies well to the current enemy as I have found that they really don't recover well if they are surprised. I don't know if you can train someone to incorporate the OODA to make quick decisions or if that just comes naturally with experience. I certainly wasn't thinking about Boyd when we were slugging it out, nor have I actively sought to train my mind to adopt his methods.

...was describe in a snappy way something that all humans are naturally coded to do from untold generations of evolution and survival. He didn't offer something new, he just offered a new description of something very old.

Kind of like discovering gravity. Important, but it was there all along.

[Entropy]

I'm no expert on OODA, but it seems to me a simple way to think of it as a construct about gaining and maintaining the initiative.

[Cavguy]

I'm not so much wary of the ideas, but the followers and creators of the cult you mention. Boyd's ideas, like CvC and others, are pretty much neutral and may have merit if placed in the proper context. Where they become dangerous is when a group of articulate (or simply loud) followers latch onto them and try to give them context and content that might not have been intended (or simply lacking) in the original idea.

This is why I am not a fan of the whole 4GW/Maneuver Warfare/Boyd Rulez clique.

There are valuable things within each context, but the some of the DNI crowd just is creepy to me, and their Boyd evangelism comes across as cult-worship.

[Steve Blair]

This is why I am not a fan of the whole 4GW/Maneuver Warfare/Boyd Rulez clique.

There are valuable things within each context, but the some of the DNI crowd just is creepy to me, and their Boyd evangelism comes across as cult-worship.

Quite so. There are aspects of MW that I like, but on the whole I tend to find 4GW to be more of a marketing ploy than an actual theory. Boyd's historical analysis is also sketchy, and I've never been convinced that his theories really hold up outside of the context in which he originally conceived them (gun-based air to air combat). That doesn't mean that there isn't value in the stuff, but you need to be willing to accept what works and reject what doesn't without drinking a full glass of the Kool-Aid.

[William F. Owen]

Boyd's historical analysis is also sketchy, and I've never been convinced that his theories really hold up outside of the context in which he originally conceived them (gun-based air to air combat).

Boyd's use of military history is THE main problem with his work and insights, all of which makes sense if you have HIS view of military history and human behaviour.

OODA is at best an idealised process to describe what learning should/could be. I am not convinced that this is what Boyd intended it to describe.

[TSgalpin]

OODA is at best an idealised process to describe what learning should/could be. I am not convinced that this is what Boyd intended it to describe.

Very astute. Based on my own research, I can tell you that Boyd's work is not well understood or well used in defense circles. It actually is typically better understood (if less often referenced) in business.

To understand Boyd and the OODA loop, you need to be familiar with Boyd's body of work. OODA is not like METT-TC or C4ISR as a methodical doctrine acronym to be memorized.

30 second Boyd was a legendary cold war era fighter pilot. After that he was the scientific developer of energy maneuverability theory - what is now the guiding aeronautical engineering equation of tactical fighter design.

After becoming s scientist in his own right responsible for fundamentally changing aeronautical engineering; then he started to come up with stuff like the OODA loop.

OODA is not a doctrine for how you should think.

OODA is a psychological model (represented by a rather nice process flow diagram on wikipedia) that shows an opponents decision making process in a manner that you can exploit it. It is an equation for manipulating a situation no different than game theory manipulates economics or engineers use physics to alter machine performance.

OODA is a way to exploit and manipulate your opponents mind. What he thinks, and how long he needs to think.

Example - Poker. By exhibiting certain behaviors, I can influence other players at the table to make assumptions about my hand. A Bluff in poker is the classic example of using an opponent's observation to manipulate his decision making.

Now many examples have been shown where speed of maneuver does not necessarily create an advantage. Making one's own OODA loop faster is the lowest common denominator of applying an OODA loop. It is popular because it's easy. Not because it's the best application of OODA.

Now By the way - Chess has little to do with OODA. In a friendly match between amateur players it's possible to use OODA just like you would in a Poker game, commercial negotiation, or establishing enfilade. But Chess has a very limited number of moves, a small enough number of tactics and scenarios that a chess master has them all memorized. Chess matches are decided by who has the best memory, and in timed matches who has the fastest pattern recognition. That subject has been highly researched by psychology and neurology. Trying to manipulate the OODA cycle of a chess master is about as easy as manipulating your opponents OODA cycle in tic tac toe. I'm sure it's possible, but against a good player, it's exceedingly difficult and probably involves distraction off the game board. (Seriously, when was the last time you won a game of tic tac toe? Can you trick the other player into losing?)

OODA is just a psychological model that theoretically explains and predicts the effect of properly executed surprise, bluff, and misdirection.

Have you ever gotten information overload that caused you to panic because you couldn't keep up? It happens to quarterbacks in the NFL, and CEO's in board meetings. The OODA loop is a way of modeling the psychology that allows you it intentionally induce panic in your target, rather than waiting for luck to favor you. Shock and Awe is an application of OODA psychology to induce paralyzing emotions in an opponent.

But like any equation used in science or engineering, it's only useful if you understand how to apply the equation/theory and have enough tactical/technical ability to execute the application.

Which is why guys that do math for a living tend to make great utility of OODA methodology, and shooters don't get it. It's abstract theory, not a instructional acronym. The military is not known for it's ability to indoctrinate creative implementation of graduate level theory at a broad tactical level.

But You don't need F=MA to understand that steel on target kills. You don't need E=MC^2 to understand that a small nuclear device can destroy a city. And you don't need to know OODA process theory to appreciate that a good bluff, feint, or misdirection can be used to trick your enemy into doing what you want them to do. Good training doctrine can and should teach the craft without confusing riflemen with sophisticated theory. If this exposition made sense to you; please find away to pass on the technology of psychological manipulation of the enemy without misrepresenting it with four easily mistaken words to a culture obsessed with acronyms.

When John Boyd said "get inside an enemy's decisions cycle" he meant to change the amount of time it takes your enemy to react, to decide what to do. Boyd would feed his opponents information at a rate that would dictate how long it would take his opponent to react. And give the enemy information that would make him react predictably. Just like Musashi suggesting to appear slow, weak and tired; than attacking fast and hard. It's about manipulating your opponent's mind and response.

Read Boyd's personal history. His political strategies for promoting EM theory and the light weight fighter program. Boyd constantly manipulated his political opponents to achieve his goals. And succeed as a colonel advancing his agendas in the Pentagon by out maneuvering dozens of generals. Boyd's genius in OODA was to codify formal psychological theory into a form that is relevant to general strategic and tactical application.

So you guys are good - tell me what I missed, tell me what I got wrong.

Thanks for the forum.