OODA Rethought

[snapperhead]

You are batting down strawmen Wilf.

but why use OODA?

Strawman. You don't "use" OODA in the manner you are talking about. As zenpundit has already point out it is part of a knowledge gathering, thinking, and doing process. You are already doing it right now.

What does it tell us that normal observation and use of empirical evidence does not?

Equivocation fallacy. Boyd modelled the loop originally on the scientific process. So it is empirical. You are equivocating.

If is a good analytical tool?

Strawman. Analysis is inherent to thinking and part of a person's orientation process. It isn't an analytical tool. Analysis is inherent to the person doing the thinking. It says nothing about the OODA loop.

More to the point, and IMO, the idea that you can be "inside the other guys OODA loop" is neither useful or correct. It implies that speed is an end in itself and this is wholly false.

From what premises are you drawing that conclusion? How do you go from:

(p1) A person is operating inside another person's OODA loop.
(c1) Therefore speed is an end in itself.

I'm missing the extra premise you left out. Perhaps you can illuminate the unstated premise.

Speed only serves your purpose in that it creates surprise. Speed of process is merely that. Speed of bad process creates defeat. If you learn and adapt faster, then great, but you must not die while doing it.

I have no idea what you are on about here. Definitely a strawman though as the OODA process is exactly that. If you get it wrong you are stuffed. That is one of the main points behind it. To try mess with the opponent's OODA loop.

If you are telling me that the OODA loop is just one of many loops used to describe various processes then OK, but it is not the Core Functions, which is how people want to try and use it, and no where near as inherent to true military doctrine.

Strawman and No True Scotsman fallacy.

Try again.

[Ski]

"Orient-Observe-Reorient-catalog-Decide-Act"

As soon as you reorient, you've started the cycle over again. The one issue I have with the OODA Loop - and I talked with Lind about this, because I thought it nullified the OODA Loop - was what happens when things happen so slowly that you are spinning around in your own OODA Loop that you become disoriented. I think that's a real problem, as Eden stated - these kinds of wars move glacially.

If we can't orient properly, the OODA Loop is useless.

[Fuchs]

"Orient-Observe-Reorient-catalog-Decide-Act"

As soon as you reorient, you've started the cycle over again. The one issue I have with the OODA Loop - and I talked with Lind about this, because I thought it nullified the OODA Loop - was what happens when things happen so slowly that you are spinning around in your own OODA Loop that you become disoriented. I think that's a real problem, as Eden stated - these kinds of wars move glacially.

If we can't orient properly, the OODA Loop is useless.

What you call "spinning around" should be nothing else but keep watching the situation instead of to lean back or go on vacation.
You don't need to change your actions if nothing has changed and if you still think that your action is appropriate.

OODA is really more about being better by higher tempo and reaction than it is an interesting theory.

We could as well discuss about the importance of unit speed for pursuit operations to be able to get ahead of the enemy and block his withdrawal.
If properly discussed, we'd find as much applicability of the idea to other situations as for OODA.

[Ski]

It's not just about speed. That's the biggest fallacy of the OODA Loop.

You have to orient correctly and observe correctly before you can decide and then act. If you don't have perfect observation - and this is why I think the OODA Loop is not very relevant in 4GW/COIN - it doesn't work.

[Fuchs]

It's not just about speed. That's the biggest fallacy of the OODA Loop.

You have to orient correctly and observe correctly before you can decide and then act. If you don't have perfect observation - and this is why I think the OODA Loop is not very relevant in 4GW/COIN - it doesn't work.

OODA is primarily about war, and war knows no perfect observation.

[William F. Owen]

(p1) A person is operating inside another person's OODA loop.
(c1) Therefore speed is an end in itself.

I'm missing the extra premise you left out. Perhaps you can illuminate the unstated premise.

So how do you know you are "inside the enemies OODA Loop"? Because you are just doing something faster? That may only become apparent when you actually see the result of your actions, - which rarely if ever happens.

Speed is only relevant in performing actions the enemy is seeking to interdict or over match. How does performing operations faster than an enemy you are unable to detect gain you benefit?

A successful operation may take ours of slow stealthy movement and deception activity, to generated the required level of surprise. In that time you may be totally reactive to enemy action, but still be able to operate, as his many quickly generated operations are not effective - for a vast number of reasons! - none of which are to do with the OODA loop.

It's not just about speed. That's the biggest fallacy of the OODA Loop.

You have to orient correctly and observe correctly before you can decide and then act. If you don't have perfect observation - and this is why I think the OODA Loop is not very relevant in 4GW/COIN - it doesn't work.

I concur, except I'd extrapolate that to all forms of conflict. As Clausewitz so well explains, it's about operating in the utter absence of perfect observation!

[snapperhead]

You are equivocating the mental "speed" of the OODA loop with temporal real-world "speed." One can observe the world, think about it, and react faster than the enemy without necessarily being fast in a physical sense. Especially if the enemy is carrying out their "quickly generated operations" under false observations and false mental images of the world created by the friendly side.

[wm]

You are equivocating the mental "speed" of the OODA loop with temporal real-world "speed." One can observe the world, think about it, and react faster than the enemy without necessarily being fast in a physical sense. Especially if the enemy is carrying out their "quickly generated operations" under false observations and false mental images of the world created by the friendly side.

Your command of the world of informal fallacies, as demonstrated here, here, and here is pretty impressive. Why not go here and tell us more about yourself?

[Ski]

Fuchs - you are correct, but Boyd also talks about friction, and how it affects the OODA Loop. The more successful side is able to reduce friction to get a clearer observation, while the losing side is usually unable to reduce friction and becomes confused and cannot observe well.

[William F. Owen]

You are equivocating the mental "speed" of the OODA loop with temporal real-world "speed." One can observe the world, think about it, and react faster than the enemy without necessarily being fast in a physical sense. Especially if the enemy is carrying out their "quickly generated operations" under false observations and false mental images of the world created by the friendly side.

I assume this refers to my "equivocating" so I'll jump in.

I am in no way confusing the issue of mental (cognitive) - and I'll spare you the Wiki LINK- speed with "real world" EG: procedural or physical.

If the enemy you are observing are not doing anything, then why is there an imperative to conduct any of your activity faster?

How did the British Army get inside the IRA's OODA loop or even the Argentine Armies?

I have watched a Command Staff produce a set of detailed orders that were rendered utterly irrelevant, but OP reports 20 mins later - by an enemy who totally unaware they were under observation!

If you want to talk about the OODA loop in terms of chess, then OK. If you want to try an apply it to a Theatre or Formation Level operation in a complex and restricted environment with multiple actors it falls apart pretty quickly.

[Fuchs]

Wilf, it's a common problem that we lack modern examples of competent forces fighting each other with most factors balanced.
That's when many concepts could make a difference although they were irrelevant in many known examples.

Imagine the Argentinians had had a battalion with MT-LBs and PT-76's. The could have attacked from one direction - British foot-mobile army might have adapted. Before they adapted, the Argentinians could have mounted, withdrawn and attacked somewhere else again. Again, again, again. They'd never have encountered reserves, but would have had local superiority again and again.

The Argentinians were neither capable enough nor had they the necessary vehicles on the island.
We are simply lacking good examples.

[William F. Owen]

Imagine the Argentinians had had a battalion with MT-LBs and PT-76's. The could have attacked from one direction - British foot-mobile army might have adapted. Before they adapted, the Argentinians could have mounted, withdrawn and attacked somewhere else again. Again, again, again. They'd never have encountered reserves, but would have had local superiority again and again.

Not sure about the detail, but I see where you are going and you are exactly right. What you are talking about demonstrates the to the core functions in a very clear way. Thank you.

[snapperhead]

I assume this refers to my "equivocating" so I'll jump in.

I am in no way confusing the issue of mental (cognitive) - and I'll spare you the Wiki LINK- speed with "real world" EG: procedural or physical.

If the enemy you are observing are not doing anything, then why is there an imperative to conduct any of your activity faster?

How did the British Army get inside the IRA's OODA loop or even the Argentine Armies?

I have watched a Command Staff produce a set of detailed orders that were rendered utterly irrelevant, but OP reports 20 mins later - by an enemy who totally unaware they were under observation!

If you want to talk about the OODA loop in terms of chess, then OK. If you want to try an apply it to a Theatre or Formation Level operation in a complex and restricted environment with multiple actors it falls apart pretty quickly.

Once again, it is a strawman that the OODA is some normative top-down model that prescribes that a group of people should act in a certain way (as in act faster, or apply it as an operational art). Do some people in the military do this? Yes you are quite right, they do. But they have drawn the same caricature of the model. Once again, it is a model, an inference to best explanation, that purports to describe an individual and opponent's process of information gathering and thinking. From that model you can then draw your own normative conclusions, which Boyd and others have done. The OODA isn't some hive-mind, queen-bee, decision making process. Certain parts of the OODA -- cultural aspects, ops orders, and commanders intent -- have "hive mind" like aspects, nevertheless it isn't a process you can apply top-down like some templated IPB. Once again, Zenpundit's comments is the best explanation of what it is.

[Fuchs]

I recommend Chet Richards if anybody wants to discuss OODA in a very theoretical and comprehensive way.

I myself consider it as a tiny mosaic piece in military art, not worth much attention.
I've always had the feeling that a significant part of its prominence stems from the desire of Americans to have had a great military art theoretician as well.

[William F. Owen]

it is a model, an inference to best explanation, that purports to describe an individual and opponent's process of information gathering and thinking. From that model you can then draw your own normative conclusions, which Boyd and others have done.

I agree. This is correct, but this is not how 99% of people use and attempt to apply it - which is exactly my point.

Bill Lind's Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook explicitly states OODA as being part of MW Doctrine. - in that you have to understand it to be a practitioner.

IIRC, Naveh also makes a big deal of the OODA loop, in that he also believes it useful in the same way Lind does. As I said elsewhere I am away from my Library, so I can't check.

[selil]

I recommend Chet Richards if anybody wants to discuss OODA in a very theoretical and comprehensive way.

I myself consider it as a tiny mosaic piece in military art, not worth much attention.
I've always had the feeling that a significant part of its prominence stems from the desire of Americans to have had a great military art theoretician as well.

That just reads pretty nasty no matter how I look at it. Fuchs you can't even give Americans the credit that they have ONE great military theoretician?

[William F. Owen]

That just reads pretty nasty no matter how I look at it. Fuchs you can't even give Americans the credit that they have ONE great military theoretician?

America has Robert Leonhard, who is about the finest military theorist alive today and also the least recognised. IIRC, Colin Gray is also a US Citizen.

I profoundly disagree with Bill Lind, but he is prolific and vastly influential, though not really a military thinker or theorist, in a way I understand.

In sharp contrast Boyd is likewise vastly influential, and I can never work out why.

[ericmwalters]

I think I've captured all the relevant complaints about the OODA Loop concept and hope to publish a series of postings here and in the other OODA Loop thread (they'll be mirroring each other for starters) to hopefully lend some clarity to the issue, at least WRT how we in the Marine Corps intended to deal with it. That said, the concept is grossly misunderstood, mistaught, misapplied, and misused...and weeding through all that is going to be difficult. But separating all that chaff to get the germ of the wheat should be productive, if nothing else but to cast some light on what the issues behind the OODA Loop concept really are. Like any other concept, OODA has uses in situations best suited for it--and it is irrelevant in others or just plain dangerous in the hands of the unskilled. It's very difficult to make generalities regarding the concept outside of situations/scenarios. But I'll make that attempt. You'll find, however, that in a philosophical/conceptual disagreement I'll quickly "go to ground" in specific scenarios and situations, both to illustrate what I think your qualms are and what I think the proper understanding and utility of the concept is.

As an intelligence officer, I have a particular interest in the concept/model from a practical standpoint in designing intelligence architectures, systems, techniques and procedures, and in training Marines. How the OODA Loop concept helps me do this is something I probably won't get to for some time, because I've got to lay a helluva lot of conceptual foundation/groundwork to establish before I get there.

The complaints I see in the threads revolve around two areas:

The validity of the OODA Loop Concept
The utility of the OODA Loop Concept.

If you don't buy the validity of the concept, you generally don't think much of its utility. Even if you buy the validity of the concept, you may still think it's not terribly useful from a practical standpoint.

My Particular Bents and Biases on the Subject:

First, I am a "German School" Maneuver Warfare advocate for reasons established in other threads that I won't repeat here. I was also an armor officer with a light armored vehicle battalion commander in my tank battalion at one time (he retired a three-star general)--he was pretty big on deliberately designing shorter decision cycles with no compromises made on quality of judgments, even though mistakes were generally tolerated. But more to the point, I also learned "Soviet School" MW when in grad school--I got fairly engrossed in Soviet tactical cybernetic theory (what they termed "Troop Control" theory) which had very much of a mirror concept to the OODA Loop. Interestingly, the Soviets spent a huge amount of effort on the "Orientation" piece, trying to simultaneously shorten the time required to achieve it and increase the quality of the understanding to be achieved in that phase. Most of my judgments on the utility of OODA Loop theory is going to be founded on Soviet School MW practice, although there is quite a bit of German School MW utility as well. I'll cover both, but the German School applications appear relatively squishy in comparison.

Secondly, I was and still am a big fan of MW influences in commercial hobby historical wargame design and development. There have been a number of efforts to model OODA loop processes for various historical periods, but the "German School" MW applications of C2--decentralized command to facilitate tighter OODA cycle time--has been the most problematic to model. So far the most successful effort I have seen (but still not the most perfect) is the Tactical Combat Series (TCS) games published by The Gamers and Multi-Man Publishing. Repeated play of these games--which are overwhelmingly focused on WWII, naturally--provides some compelling insights into what is theoretically (and practically) possible with the concept in ground warfare at the tactical level. There are other titles and game design systems that also do a good job, but a little more abstractly which makes them harder to visualize what is happening and accept some of the game outcomes. I'll get into that as well much, much later--probably at the end of my discussion.

Lastly, there are limitations and issues regarding the OODA Loop concept, and my interest here is to increase the understanding of what those truly are as opposed to what many perceive them to be. I may not be convincing enough as much depends on your particular background and desires. But it's worth a shot. If anything, if you fail to agree with how I lay this out, at least you understand why I'm thinking in the way that I do...and if we agree to disagree, it's because we're coming at the idea with widely differing assumptions borne from widely different experiences.

[ericmwalters]

If you are familiar with my posts in discussion threads elsewhere, you can perhaps better appreciate why I used the terms I did in the title.

Instead of plunging into Osinga's description of Boyd's concepts of the OODA Loop and "fast transients," I thought I'd start with the foundational MW theory as Marines understand it and work backwards. That way I can uncover the issues regarding validity and utility one onion layer at a time so we maintain some coherence in approach and cohesiveness in discussions. We'll eventually cover everything mentioned so far (and I expect a good deal more besides), but it's a very large subject and it must be tackled in layers. Each layer is going to build on the other layers.

Like theology, we've got to start with some foundational beliefs. There's a lot of reason and logical edifices that are erected, but none of that means much if you don't buy into the basics.

MW Essential Premise #1: Speed and Focus are two characteristics of successful operations in an environment of uncertainty.

What does this mean? While these are not the only two characteristics needed for success, these are the two characteristics that discriminate the MW style from other styles. Additionally, there is a belief that these characteristics are necessary (but not sufficient) for success in an uncertain environment. If the environment is relatively static and certain, then these characterstics may not play such a significant role. Siege operations (whether on a tactical, operational, or possibly even a strategic scale) would seem to put much less emphasis on achieving relative speed advantages and on focusing on a particular thing at the same time--at least until the "assault upon the works!" Ideally, a successful siege never gets that far--the place surrenders/succumbs before then.

MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."

What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).

MW Essential Premise #3: Weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operation, and training to accomplish these must be oriented towards achieving higher quality "fast transient" actions when confronted with such situations.

What does this mean? If additional hitting power (strike) or force sustainment/survival (protect) cabilities are purchased at the price of speed and focus to gain leverage/advantage (maneuver), then the force is potentially off-balance vis-a-vis an opponent who enjoys better speed and focus and can leverage these to advantage. MW interpretations of history (and possibly narrow selection of examples--we can talk about those) are that, given the dilemmas regarding balancing strike/protect/maneuver capabilities, one is better off putting more initial emphasis on maneuver over strike and protect, given an uncertain situation.

MW Essential Premise #4: Where agility and action quality in executing "fast transients" have been historically seen as important and improvements made in weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operations, and training to accomplish these have been made, the explicit intent to design all aspects of military command and control around this idea is a relatively recent occurrence.

What does this mean? Command and control--in all its components and aspects--is to be explicitly designed to execute fast transients. What differentiates German School and Soviet School MW is how command and control is designed to achieve it; each reflects differing requirements, restraints, constraints, and compromises made between tempo and quality. German School MW uses Boyd's decision cycle as its means of explanation/analysis, whereas Soviet School uses a similar conceptual device but with different emphases in the subcomponents.

My next post will catalogue and investigate the challenges to these premises before we move on. Once that is done, we'll delve into the Bill Lind and the USMC interpretions of the OODA loop and the various challenges to the validity and utility of the concept.

[ericmwalters]

To recap:

MW Essential Premise #1: Speed and Focus are two characteristics of successful operations in an environment of uncertainty.

What does this mean? While these are not the only two characteristics needed for success, these are the two characteristics that discriminate the MW style from other styles. Additionally, there is a belief that these characteristics are necessary (but not sufficient) for success in an uncertain environment. If the environment is relatively static and certain, then these characteristics may not play such a significant role. Siege operations (whether on a tactical, operational, or possibly even a strategic scale) would seem to put much less emphasis on achieving relative speed advantages and on focusing on a particular thing at the same time--at least until the "assault upon the works!" Ideally, a successful siege never gets that far--the place surrenders/succumbs before then.

So here are the quibbles/challenges to this idea and the USMC Maneuver Warfare doctrinal responses:

Challenge: Speed alone is not enough. Even speed with focus means little if the focus is misdirected and/or speed only is in a single spurt and cannot be sustained.

Response. MW/OODA Loop theory has no argument with this particular challenge, but nevertheless maintains that an uncertain environment puts a premium on capabilities to enjoy greater speed of action/response than one’s opponent and the ability to focus that action effectively. The theory does not encourage reckless speed in a number of instances:

MCDP 1 Warfighting says (pages 62-64):

In a military sense, there is more to speed than simply going fast, and there is a vital difference between acting rapidly and acting recklessly. With time we must consider the closely related factor of timing….Making maximum use of every hour and every minute is as important to speed in combat as simply going fast when we are moving….A good tactician has a constant sense of urgency. We feel guilty if we are idle. We never waste time, and we are never content with the pace which events are happening….We employ speed and use time to create tempo. Tempo is not merely a matter of acting fastest or at the earliest opportunity. It is also a matter of timing—acting at the right time.

Additionally, MCDP 1 argues (pages 65-66

As with all things in war, speed is relative. Speed is meaningful militarily onlyl if we are acting faster than the enemy. We can do that either by slowing the enemy or by increasing our own speed.

To be consistent, superiority in relative speed must continue over time. It is not enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then because when we are not moving faster, the advantage, the initiative, passes to him. Most forces can manage an intermittent burst of speed but must then halt for a considerable period to recover between bursts. During that halt, they are likely to lose their advantage. We realize that we cannot operate at full speed indefinitely, and the challenge is to be consistently faster than the enemy.

I’d like interject here that most of the complaints I’ve read in the threads are about acting so fast that no good judgments are possible. Nobody is talking about the other half of the way to win the OODA Loop contest, which is by slowing the enemy down. If you think your force is going too fast to effectively understand what it’s doing before it does it, then there’s the other option of getting the enemy to slow down to the point where this is less of a risk to your force.


Challenge: An overemphasis on speed/tempo in this sense means there is little provision for times when it is best to wait for the situation to develop out of uncertainty.

Response: The MW/OODA Loop is designed to help us concentrate on building capacity for speed/tempo and focus in execution of operations. There is a difference between the German and Soviet schools on how this works in planning, which we’ll have to cover in the future. But USMC MW theory admits that knowing when to act—and when not to—is part of the speed/focus emphasis. Again, from MDCP 1 Warfighting (pages 64-66):

Timing means knowing when to act, and equally important, when NOT to act [Emphasis in the original—EMW]…If our concept of operations involves a diversion, we need to allow time for the diversion to take effect. If we have laid an ambush for the enemy, we need to give the enemy time to fall fully into the trap. If a situation is still forming, we may want to develop it further before we commit to a course of action….Decisive action is our goal, and it must be timed to occur at the proper moment. There are times to act, and there are other times to set the stage and wait.

As has been said, simply using speed and focus is no panacea for effective thinking. Discrimination in application matters--and practice/experience in doing so is essential.