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  1. #1
    Council Member kehenry1's Avatar
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    Default Extra Oil Ordered

    Well, I think it's interesting considering I just read that the navy had ordered up four fuel tankers for December as opposed to their usual two/mo. Which was presupposed by the writer to be in relationship to a potential offensive or some operation in the Gulf to intimidate the Iranians.

    However, I wonder if they are simply preparing for a potential shortage based on such intelligence?

    This was open sourced news report. I'll try to find the link.
    Kat-Missouri

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    Quote Originally Posted by kehenry1 View Post
    Well, I think it's interesting considering I just read that the navy had ordered up four fuel tankers for December as opposed to their usual two/mo. Which was presupposed by the writer to be in relationship to a potential offensive or some operation in the Gulf to intimidate the Iranians.

    However, I wonder if they are simply preparing for a potential shortage based on such intelligence?

    This was open sourced news report. I'll try to find the link.
    It was posted and reposted in newsmedia and not a few blogs. Here's one link:

    US Navy steps up fuel deliveries to Gulf forces, Reuters 23 Nov 07
    ....One of the largest commercial tanker hires is on a time-charter basis, the length of time a ship is sought, stipulating a period of 90 days to carry a range of fuels between locations in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

    The time charter, which begins in early December and allows for multiple journeys in Gulf waters, is to carry a minimum of 310,000 barrels of jet and marine fuel, some of it JP5.

    “What’s most interesting is the time-charter in the Gulf. It’s a big ship and here we have a commitment for a lot of movement of fuels, backwards and forwards down to the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman,” the Gulf source said.

    “This confirms there is going to be a lot of activity, possibly a serious demonstration to Iran that the military means to protect the Hormuz Strait,” he said.

    He pointed out that Saudi Arabia had already promised US forces long-term fuel supplies this year, known as term tenders.

    In February, oil industry sources told Reuters Riyadh had raised the amount of jet fuel earmarked for the military from 1.5 million barrels last year to close to eight million in 2007.....

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    The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 24 Jan 08:

    Jailing Jihadis: Saudi Arabia’s Special Terrorist Prisons
    Saudi Arabia is nearing completion of new purpose-built prison facilities for its program of rehabilitation and counseling for Islamist militants. Under this program five new specialized prisons have been built in Riyadh, Qassim, Abha, Dammam, and Jiddah over the span of approximately nine months. These new facilities have been designed to facilitate the dialogue process while at the same time housing individuals assessed to be significant security risks. These five new prisons are each designed to hold up to 1,200 prisoners.

    The decision to build specially-dedicated facilities in which to focus on the counseling program was based upon a number of considerations. First and foremost was the fact that the existing prison facilities were not designed to promote dialogue and it was determined that successful advancement of the rehabilitation program could best be done through new specially-designed facilities. Furthermore, these new facilities would make the classification and segregation of detainees easier. The classification of detainees into those more predisposed to dialogue, and then separation of them from other more militant prisoners, would encourage and facilitate the work of the Advisory Committee, the Ministry of the Interior body that runs the rehabilitation program.....

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    TWQ, Spring 08: Al Qaeda's Third Front: Saudi Arabia
    The war in Saudi Arabia is being waged over the biggest stakes of all: control over Islam's holy cities and oil wealth. Yet, having withdrawn most of its forces from Saudi Arabia in August 2003 after al Qaeda began its war, the United States remains on the margins. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia is waging an aggressive counterattack. How has bin Laden implemented his vision thus far, and how effective has Saudi Arabia's counterterrorist campaign been in stopping him? Has the U.S. military withdrawal from Saudi Arabia had any effect on bin Laden's plan for Saudi Arabia and the wider Middle East? What effect has the war had on Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, especially toward its U.S. alliance?

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Saudi Prisons again

    Try: Saudi Arabia showcases its controversial programme to rehabilitate convicted jihadis through art; on this link http://www.frontlineclub.com/club_articles.php?id=319

    davidbfpo

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    International Affairs, Jul 08: Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia
    ....In this article I posit that Saudi Islamism is a heterogeneous phenomenon which needs to be broken down into smaller components, each to be analysed separately. One recent study identified three distinct Islamist currents in the Kingdom: rejectionism (or extreme pietism), represented by Juhayman al-Utaybi and the 1979 Mecca incident; reformism, which produced the so-called Sahwa movement of the early 1990s; and jihadism, associated with the Saudi fighters in foreign conflict zones. In the following, I will apply the social movement theory perspective specifically to the Saudi jihadist movement. I will trace the evolution of Saudi jihadism since the 1980s and try to explain why it ‘came home’ in 2003 and not before. The findings derive from analysis of a large collection of jihadist texts and videos, as well as extensive fieldwork conducted in Saudi Arabia between 2004 and 2007. After outlining the origin and characteristics of the Saudi jihadist movement, I will look at Al-Qaeda’s foothold in, and strategy towards, Saudi Arabia between 1996 and 2001. Finally I will explain why the QAP campaign was launched and why it eventually failed.....

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