Saudi Arabia: seeking security (catch all)

[bourbon]

The Saudis of course have what other builders did not, money and more money.

Which is the important point. Because Saudi defense/security procurement are enrichment mechanisms for Saudi royals, middlemen and various western lackeys – first. Actual needs of state, second.

A certain % of deals goes to commissions and kickbacks – so the incentive is to run-up the biggest bill possible. And then they cant operate, service or maintain any of the equipment – so that is a new contract, and new round of kickbacks.

Problems occur when a contract is too small for a kickback – so some particular items are not even purchased. Items like air-filters for tanks – small line item on a budget, but you cant operate tanks in the desert without them.

I have no doubt that this wall will include billions in techno-crap.

[bourbon]

SA firm Denel in Saudi drone deal - South Africa's arms manufacturer Denel appears intent on selling missile-carrying drone aircraft to Saudi Arabia, by Phillip De Wet. Mail & Guardian (South Africa), 05 Apr 2013.

According to a respected specialist newsletter, Intelligence Online, engineers from the Denel Dynamics division are working with the Saudi military to create an armed version of the Seeker 400 drone, which Denel has marketed for surveillance use. Such drones, Intelligence Online says, would be capable of carrying Denel Dynamics' Mokopa or Impi missiles.

The Mokopa is an anti-tank missile touted for its accuracy and the Impi is intended as a multipurpose missile that can carry smaller anti-personnel payloads. The latter was developed specifically for use with lightweight aircraft.

The Seeker 400 has a range of up to 250km, putting many Middle Eastern hot spots within range of units based in Saudi Arabia. But the primary target for Seeker missions is expected to be strikes on suspected terrorists similar to the US's infamous strikes in Pakistan. The craft can be operated for more than 16 hours at a time, making it capable of "loiter and strike" missions.

Related? Seems a natural compliment to a border wall; plus a possible strike capability into Yemen.

[davidbfpo]

The fence project is an interesting sign of how the relationship between Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Yemen has developed. For decades KSA has sought to maintain some control in Yemen, principally by subsides and bribes to many individuals, tribes and others. Now a fence is needed, has this influence evaporated?

I suspect that no Saudi will actually work on building the fence, although IIRC most Yemeni were expelled after the invasion of Kuwait.

[Fuchs]

Moderator's Note

Posts 22-26 were in a stand alone thread 'Saudis to build 1k border fence' until today and have been merged into this main thread (ends).


Saudi–Yemen barrier
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi%E...3Yemen_barrier


It's not so much a fence as it is a barrier against vehicles, and it's not only about immigration but also about marking the somewhat disputed border.


ICE Case Studies
Number 197, Nov., 2006
Saudi Arabia - Yemen Border Dispute
By Chris Murphy

[davidbfpo]

This thread has posts on the official Saudi programme to de-radicalise and a clearly PR article by AFP appeared today:http://english.alarabiya.net/en/pers...militants.html

Three key facts given:

Just under 3,000 [Islamist prisoners] will have to go through one of these centers before they can be released....a total of 2,336 Al-Qaeda prisoners have now been through Saudi rehabilitation schemes....The percentage of those who rejoin the deviant minority does not exceed 10%.

[davidbfpo]

A ten point article 'The Riyadh Compound Bombings: Ten Years, and Ten Lessons, Later' by Dr. Thomas Hegghammer, from CSIS, which details:

It is hard to overestimate the political impact of the Riyadh bombings. These caused a major shift in Saudi attitudes toward Islamist extremism and a complete overhaul of the Saudi internal security apparatus. The terrorism campaign—and the Saudi response to it—also did much to change Western perceptions of Saudi society, many of which, in retrospect, were biased and flawed. Finally, the campaign backfired against Al-Qaeda, leading to its demise as an organization in the kingdom. In short, the learning curve was steep for everyone involved. Specifically, the experience taught us ten important things about terrorism and Saudi Arabia.

Link:http://www.aawsat.net/2013/05/article55301428

I do wonder if the apparent success of Saudi CT plus is dependent on their wealth, few other nations could afford the options it has used.