Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
I suspect that part of the problem has to do with how NATO is reconstructing itself. I remember chatting with a senior German policy advisor about Germany's role in Afghanistan, and he pointed out the somewhat ironic position where for years Germany was told they were "bad" for being militaristic and were now being told they were "bad" for not being militaristic enough .
Interesting.....

Saw something earlier this year talking about the German approach:

We're back to the delicate situation at the very beginning of operations in Afghanistan, when U.S.-led forces started "Operation Enduring Freedom" to rid Afghanistan of its Taliban rulers, who had hosted Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorists. Their mission, with full support of the UN Security Council and all members of the Alliance, continues. But the Alliance as such has been excluded from the very beginning, although NATO had invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. At the time, many allies, including Germany, expressed disappointment over this course of action. It was only a year later that NATO was given a role, that of command of the ISAF forces, which have a mission based in peacekeeping and stabilization: to provide security, at first, in Kabul, later in the north and the west, and now, since October 5, in all of Afghanistan. So, the distinction between the two missions is the distinction between a peacekeeping and reconstruction force on the one hand, and a fighting force on the other. Germany has made clear that its aircraft will not be part of the fighting force.
...a little more

On the one hand, German participation in Afghanistan may have been considered more self-evident in the United States, than was actually the case in Germany. Stated differently, Americans may have tended to underestimate the political hurdles which German national leaders had to overcome in order to develop a consensus for the German military role in ISAF. Therefore, it was perhaps inevitable that the Bundeswehr's engagement would be prescribed in a priori, legalistic terms containing operational caveats designed to reinforce a clear separation in the mission elements between ISAF and OEF. This approach was necessary within the German domestic political context both to develop, and then to sustain, sufficient political support for the German ISAF role. The downside of this approach was the impression it could create among other allies, notably the U.S. and the United Kingdom, that the Germans were not fully sharing the same risks and burdens they themselves were confronting in the more dangerous southern portion of Afghanistan.