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Thread: Interesting Observation

  1. #1
    Council Member ODB's Avatar
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    Default Interesting Observation

    I would like to know others thoughts and insights on this. The other day I was talking with some of the ODAs that recently rotated back from Iraq. I found it interesting that a majority of the guys thought we (SF) should not be focused in Iraq any longer. They believe SF should be focused in Afghanistan more, that Afghanistan is more of a COIN situation than Iraq. Currently in their estimation Iraq is more of a policing/peacekeeping effort than COIN at this point. I personally thought this was an interesting observation and wanted to get others thoughts on this. I'll be the first to admit more soldier than scholar here, so let the thoughts fly.
    ODB

    Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:

    Why did you not clear your corner?

    Because we are on a base and it is secure.

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    Default Without regard to resource availability

    my sense is that there is still very much a SF mission in Iraq. While I was not SF myself, I was Psyop and CA and hung around with a lot of SF guys motly from 7th and 3rd SGG. John Mulholland did his MMAS for me at CGSC, Charlie Cleveland hauled me around the Chapare in Bolivia, and John Waghelstein pinned my silver oak leaves on me. I also had SF teams working for me under OPCON in Panama.

    At a minimum, I would think that the advisor/trainers the Army is turning out at Fort Riley ought to be leavened with SF guys. What the regular army advisor/trainers lack is the years of cultural awareness and language skills of the SF guys.

    When you have to prioritize, I think you will, in fact, get more bang for the buck in Afghanistan. But I would still have a residual SF force in Iraq as above.

    Cheers

    JohnT

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    I wonder if those opinions are the result of close interaction with conventional forces and having to coordinate activities with the "Operational Environment Owners." I think the impression is that the ODAs/AOBs have greater autonomy/independence in Afghanistan. I'm not sure if that perception is accurate or not.

    In discussions with junior NCOs from the other Group (not the one you are speaking of), a common opinion was that they should be used for different missions - that their jobs were too much like that of a MiTT. They wanted to be doing unilateral ops, rather than having to hit every target with an ISF force. That seemed like a sharp contrast to the purpose of SF units, but then again they were junior NCOs. I'm not sure what the older guys thought about it.

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    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    I wonder if those opinions are the result of close interaction with conventional forces and having to coordinate activities with the "Operational Environment Owners." I think the impression is that the ODAs/AOBs have greater autonomy/independence in Afghanistan. I'm not sure if that perception is accurate or not.
    This is what I thought of immediately. Big Army seems much more pervasive in Iraq and, as such, has made things more painful. That said, there is absolutely penty of work for us to do in Iraq, particularly as Big Army draws down. We are a huge force multiplier when used correctly. We provide skill sets that are simply unavailable anywhere else. The key phrase of course is "when used correctly." There has deffinitely been some friction between Big Army and SOF, particularly SF. Often Big Army commanders are unaware of what we can do. There are also commanders who don't care what we do and simply don't like SF for whatever reason. Unfortunately there is also the occasional ODA that creates a situation that reflects badly on the rest of us.


    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    In discussions with junior NCOs from the other Group (not the one you are speaking of), a common opinion was that they should be used for different missions - that their jobs were too much like that of a MiTT. They wanted to be doing unilateral ops, rather than having to hit every target with an ISF force. That seemed like a sharp contrast to the purpose of SF units, but then again they were junior NCOs. I'm not sure what the older guys thought about it.
    Bottom line, FID sucks. It sucks bad. Nobody joined the Army, much less SF, to do FID. Everybody wants to be John Wayne, cruising around slaying bad guys and looking cool doing it. Unfortunately, FID is one of our bread and butter missions. We do it very well, better than most anyone else. We were doing FID when most of Big Army thought COIN was something you dropped into a vending machine and we will be doing it when they put their COIN skill sets back on the shelf. Everybody would rather be doing unilateral rather than indig lead OPS (Lord knows I would) but that is not what we get paid for. There are units with in the SOF community whose mission is unilateral DA OPS, and they are very good at it. But that is not our job. We are SF. Working "through with and by" the indig is kind of our thing.

    SFC W

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Good post and I agree.

    I would point out, however, that this aspect:
    "...Unfortunately there is also the occasional ODA that creates a situation that reflects badly on the rest of us."
    is not restricted to just the A Teams (sorry, I'm old ) -- echelons well above that on the SF side can get in the Supreme Jerk mode occasionally. It's rare but regrettably, it's not unknown.

    With the right training and support, any good infantry unit can learn to sneak and kick in doors at oh-dark-thirty; that's been demonstrated. Maybe not as good as those that specialize but good enough for most work. SF brings another real strength to the table that the best Infantry unit cannot do well. Kicking doors is a whole lot more fun but, as you said, the real winner is the tedious, hard, dirty, bad food work with the locals and that is one thing the Army, per se, will never get good at doing. Nor, probably, should it do so...

    Back to ODB's original question; what I hear is that since Iraq has so much more 'big army' and a covey of Generals it is more tightly structured and there are more operational constraints -- and jealousies -- whereas those working in the 'Stan have a freer hand and the distribution of forces and the type and location of bad guys enhance that. That plus a lack of a pervasive host nation governmental presence sticking their nose into everything...

    I suspect the recent change of higher Hq in the 'Stan may have an adverse impact on that; we'll see.

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    Council Member ODB's Avatar
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    Bottom line, FID sucks. It sucks bad. Nobody joined the Army, much less SF, to do FID. Everybody wants to be John Wayne, cruising around slaying bad guys and looking cool doing it. Unfortunately, FID is one of our bread and butter missions. We do it very well, better than most anyone else. We were doing FID when most of Big Army thought COIN was something you dropped into a vending machine and we will be doing it when they put their COIN skill sets back on the shelf. Everybody would rather be doing unilateral rather than indig lead OPS (Lord knows I would) but that is not what we get paid for. There are units with in the SOF community whose mission is unilateral DA OPS, and they are very good at it. But that is not our job. We are SF. Working "through with and by" the indig is kind of our thing.
    100% dead on and IMO many have forgotten this and or want to stray away from it.

    With the right training and support, any good infantry unit can learn to sneak and kick in doors at oh-dark-thirty; that's been demonstrated. Maybe not as good as those that specialize but good enough for most work. SF brings another real strength to the table that the best Infantry unit cannot do well. Kicking doors is a whole lot more fun but, as you said, the real winner is the tedious, hard, dirty, bad food work with the locals and that is one thing the Army, per se, will never get good at doing. Nor, probably, should it do so...

    Back to ODB's original question; what I hear is that since Iraq has so much more 'big army' and a covey of Generals it is more tightly structured and there are more operational constraints -- and jealousies -- whereas those working in the 'Stan have a freer hand and the distribution of forces and the type and location of bad guys enhance that. That plus a lack of a pervasive host nation governmental presence sticking their nose into everything...
    Talking with them, this gets more to the heart of the problem. The restrictions being put on them. The inability to get back to "team houses" out in the towns and country. Approval for everything and anything. One word comes to mind "Micromanagement". The egos/jealousies is a big one, not as much between SOF and Conventional this go around, but amongst SOF internal, between Army and Navy, Army and Army, etc...

    I should have explained my thoughts better. Was thinking along the lines of the enemy/situational differences between Iraq and Afghanistan which one plays more into the SF fight vs the conventional fight and why? Where should SF focus be? What is to be gained/lost in each?
    ODB

    Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:

    Why did you not clear your corner?

    Because we are on a base and it is secure.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default

    Back to ODB's original question; what I hear is that since Iraq has so much more 'big army' and a covey of Generals it is more tightly structured and there are more operational constraints -- and jealousies -- whereas those working in the 'Stan have a freer hand and the distribution of forces and the type and location of bad guys enhance that. That plus a lack of a pervasive host nation governmental presence sticking their nose into everything...
    Working closely with vets from both AOs, I would say just the opposite at least at the BCT level. OEF with its NATO-ness has a much more lock step system for operations approval. The terrain and and significantly lesser troop and popualtion density in OEF offset that somewhat. But you still have a large combined and separate US C2 structure over that lesser number of troops.

    Tom

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default Concur with all

    I'm a regular army guy that has spent the last three years conducting FID/COIN. Over some beers with my SF classmates, we continually discuss this topic.

    For a broad sweep, we conclude that in Iraq, RA conducts FID/COIN while SF mostly conducts DA (remember broad sweep, not focused towards everyone). In Afghanistan, SF is still actively conducting FID/COIN. Around the world with other militaries, FID is still done well just low key.

    One of the fundamental problems everyone is having right now is that most soldiers (SF and RA) wanna be door kickers. Well, that's easy and a monkey could do it- It doesn't win these type of wars.

    It's interesting if you take a step back and consider future organizational structure. Within both RA and SF, there is an extensive combat tested FID/COIN capability with many Officers/NCO's. To maximize these skill sets would take a broad organization change in terms of defining unit makeups not by tabs and badges but by capabilities. I was considering Nagl's advisory corps concept in particular.

    In Afghanistan And the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare, LTC (R) Hy Rothstein argues that SF is no longer conducting UW.

    One last thing for the group: a discussion point came up yesterday that we found striking. All the FID material we've read only shows you how to train a new group of kids off the street into a workable fighting force. Does anyone have any info on manuals that show how to train on the more advanced levels? In Iraq now, with some units, they are proceeding very well- gathering intelligence, conducting raids, etc....It does not make sense to try and teach these seasoned leaders basic rifle markmanship.

    All broad strokes here for discussion, nothing definitive.

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default One Alibi

    Regardless, we all concluded that SF should be battlespace owners regardless of the AOR.

    That just seemed like common sense to us.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Right off the top of my head, I think that would take

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Regardless, we all concluded that SF should be battlespace owners regardless of the AOR.

    That just seemed like common sense to us.
    not only a massive cultural shift but also some statutory changes. Not saying it's a bad idea but it (a) needs some thought; and (b) would not be easy to implement for a number of reasons.

    An example of this conundrum is Tom Odom's comment above. I get the same sensing he does from the BCT returning folks I hear from; however, my earlier comment was based on the SF returnees I hear from. Rather different perspectives...

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    Regarding the issue of Big Army and the rules that come with it, my observation was that many of the rules imposed upon the ODAs originated from the Group/Bn and were created as safeguards due to the inherent danger of operating as a small unit far removed from their CF "Q"RF. However, any rules that were perceived as excessive were assumed to be the result of Big Army's meddling. As for constraints that did come from Big Army, a surprising number of those were legal issues that arose at the MNF-I/MNC-I level and were due to big picture issues often beyond their control. In other words, they were often just the messenger, and those rules were not going away if Big Army left the scene.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Good points all.

    The legal bit is scary -- but it's reality today.

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    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    I don't agree that SOF should be the battle space owners in their repspective sectors. There is an awful lot of crap going on in those sectors and SOF just isn't staffed or equipped to deal with it and trying to put Big Army units under SOF control has BAD OUTCOME written all over it. That said, I do think that SOF should have more autonomy. I have seen sectors where SOF and Big Army got along great and did great things together and I have seen where the local Big Army commander, for all intents and purposes, locked down an ODA and everything in between. Greater autonomy would still allow the ODA to do great things with the good units but would not leave them locked down by the poor ones.

    SFC W

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default Sfc B/sfc W

    Understand all,

    On another thread, I'm sure that if our government want to disrupt a rogue nation with promising nuclear capability close to Iraq, you could easily device a mission packet with a task org of only ten men....That's what y'all have been trained to do.

    I'd come along as a cheerleader.

    Going back to my primary question, do you have any insight into advanced FID- past the basic level of drill and ceremony?

    As you know, not all, but many units in Iraq are far surpassing BRM, ARM and working towards advanced COIN....How do we advice them?

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    Council Member Sargent's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Going back to my primary question, do you have any insight into advanced FID- past the basic level of drill and ceremony?
    That's where you don't need any special preparation; at that point you rely on your previous experience "in the field" within your own organization. What becomes difficult is how you interact with your counterparts, how you communicate the things you want them to learn, but there's really no training manual for that -- either you've got the ability and desire or you don't. (This was my hunch, confirmed by my husband, who's a MTT CO, and who's working this very issue.)

    Jill

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    My observations from Afghanistan were that SF were some of the most effective units in-country for a variety of purposes, and they were successfully integrated with both US and NATO forces on numerous occasions during individual operations.

    However, in an operational sense, there was a very real wall between the SOCOM, CJTF, and ISAF staffs. Even after NATO assumed control of operations throughout the country - and maybe especially after this - the efforts of the SF and the 'regular' forces were not properly synchronized. In simpler terms, at least in my opinion, the highly capable SF units operating in Afghanistan could have (and should have) been directed to higher-payoff missions.

    I'm not sure exactly why this was, as I was not privy to the limited circle of folks who were supposedly 'coordniating' activities; nor do I have a firm solution. What I do know is that the current set-up violates both unity of effort and unity of command and makes a coherent approach much more difficult to achieve.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    not only a massive cultural shift but also some statutory changes. Not saying it's a bad idea but it (a) needs some thought; and (b) would not be easy to implement for a number of reasons.

    An example of this conundrum is Tom Odom's comment above. I get the same sensing he does from the BCT returning folks I hear from; however, my earlier comment was based on the SF returnees I hear from. Rather different perspectives...
    Yep and I was thinking about it as I mowed yesterday--5 acres so that was a good bit of thinking. You are correct in that from an SF and especially an ODA perspective Iraq would be more restrictive. From the conventional BCT perspective, Afghanistan wins that cupie doll.

    Tom

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Not having been around recently, I don't know for sure

    Quote Originally Posted by Eden View Post
    ...I'm not sure exactly why this was, as I was not privy to the limited circle of folks who were supposedly 'coordniating' activities; nor do I have a firm solution. What I do know is that the current set-up violates both unity of effort and unity of command and makes a coherent approach much more difficult to achieve.
    but based on recent anecdotes from some SF acquaintances and grandson-in-law plus some experience at the coordinating level more years ago than I care to recall, I suspect that the problem -- and it is a big problem -- is a combination of minor personality and mission conflicts, tactical preference differences, some turf battles and a propensity on the part of the SOCOM crowd to retreat behind the "that's classified" wall when they hear something they don't like (yep, I've done that, too... ) plus excessive concern for control (or, more correctly, responsibility if there's a screwup) by the conventional force (been there as well... ). My bet is that both sides contribute to the disconnects in pretty much equal measures. Shame.

    The good news is that based on the same inputs, it appears that if the right people match up and egos are parked, some really good things are happening.

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    Default Something's gotta give

    Ken, that's about what I expected and observed - a messy stew of multiple causes that reduces effectiveness. Golly, sounds like friction to me, just the sort of thing unity of command is designed to reduce.

    My sense is that the walls between the 'conventional' and the 'special' communities need some breaking down. After all, some of what are considered traditional special operation missions can be (and are being) done by conventional forces.

    An analogy could be made with what is happening between the maneuver branches. The new maneuver center at Fort Benning, though it is still taking baby steps, is supposed to reduce the cultural conflicts between infantry and armor. In terms of maintenance, gunnery training, and mounted maneuver, a mechanized infantryman has more in common with a cavalryman than he does with his light brethren.

    I don't know the best ways to break down the barriers; I recognize there is a skill set, a mind set, and a culture that has to be preserved for effective special operation forces, but there has to be a way for the type of cross-fertilization the infantry enjoys. After all, Rangers can be airborne can be straight-leg can be mechanized. Maybe making SF a branch was a mistake.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Eden View Post
    Ken, that's about what I expected and observed - a messy stew of multiple causes that reduces effectiveness. Golly, sounds like friction to me, just the sort of thing unity of command is designed to reduce.

    My sense is that the walls between the 'conventional' and the 'special' communities need some breaking down. After all, some of what are considered traditional special operation missions can be (and are being) done by conventional forces.

    An analogy could be made with what is happening between the maneuver branches. The new maneuver center at Fort Benning, though it is still taking baby steps, is supposed to reduce the cultural conflicts between infantry and armor. In terms of maintenance, gunnery training, and mounted maneuver, a mechanized infantryman has more in common with a cavalryman than he does with his light brethren.

    I don't know the best ways to break down the barriers; I recognize there is a skill set, a mind set, and a culture that has to be preserved for effective special operation forces, but there has to be a way for the type of cross-fertilization the infantry enjoys. After all, Rangers can be airborne can be straight-leg can be mechanized. Maybe making SF a branch was a mistake.

    It's something we work here with varying degrees of success. Ken, personality does indeed play a large role as you state, more than it should. Another factor is mindset--conventional guys by the time they are commanding battalions and brigades have been cast firmly in the control every thing and thereby limit uncertainty apporach to operations (and life). Unconventional guys-at least the ones that I have worked and identify with like the free flow of uncertainty. They use it rather than try and limit or control it. In my experience, I was from a different planet than then BG Jack Nix was in Goma. Stan and I worked within the chaos; Nix and the planners who thought they could engineer an immediate return of 1.5 million killers to Rwanda by stringing out feeding stations like bird or deer feeders sought to restructure chaos. In point of fact, the overal commander of Op Support Hope LTG Schroeder was given to saying that a key lesson learned was that we "had to confront chaos." That is like saying we are going to confront hurricanes, eathquakes, or the turmoil that is war. We have to work in the conditions of all of those events but we cannot "confront" or "control" them.

    Bottom line: It takes a consistent and constant effort from both sides of this peculiar fence to develop smooth operations. Some get it right; many on both sides do not.

    Tom

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