The drug problem in Afghanistan is hideously complex. I agree with Tom that optimism over wheat spontaneously replacing opium as a cash crop is misplaced. The question is whether or not NATO gets serious over eradication programs.

I believe that those who control the drug trade pose a greater long-term threat to Afghan development than the 'Taliban'. It is no longer a question of the Taliban protecting, supporting, and drawing financial resources from the drug trade - the drug traders are now subsidizing the Taliban and using them as convenient proxies to maintain the level of instability they require to conduct their business. In other words, as has happened elsewhere, the insurgent, terorist, and narcotic networks are becoming inextricably intertwined.

NATO has a choice: it can turn a blind eye to the narcotics trade in order to concentrate on rooting out the insurgents and buildling infrastructure. Unfortunately, this has an insidious affect on domestic politics - folks back home wondering why the various militaries are not fighting against the drugs trade - and on the development effort itself. Opium is a serious and growing problem in Afghanistan as it always is wherever poppies are cultivated for export. In the long run, as I have said, this will also weaken efforts to build a stronger central government.

On the other hand, taking on the drug lords in more than a cursory way will unleash a level of violence that will make the current troubles pale in comparison, and will cause the spread of violence to areas that are now considered fairly peaceful. And NATO is having enough trouble holding the coalition together now.

Clearly, the drug lords will have to be taken on at some point - either through violence or co-optation. The only question is when and how hard. And that is a genuinely difficult policy decision.