AF Secretary and Chief of Staff Dismissed

[wm]

I'd like to hope that our volunteer forces will give us that year in a future major conflict. However, 2 potentially significant differences from the two wars in your list that may have been life threatening to the US as a nation (the 2 World Wars--Korea and VN were neither direct or indirect threats to the continued existence of the American way of life) make me worry.

I'd argue that none of the wars I listed including the two world wars were life threatening to the US but that's another thread.

Concur--remember my original post only said may have been life threatening to the US.

However the sheer number and dispersion of them (factories) in a nation this size makes that a somewhat daunting prospect for any potential adversary.

Not too much dispersion these days vis-a-vis critical defense industry factories--for example, Lima, Ohio is the only tank factory in the US. Two big strikes--at, for example, Galveston, TX and Linden NJ--would have significant inpact on US mid/down stream petroleum industry. Or imagine the impact of a large ADM detonation in the vicinity of Hampton or beautiful downtown Norfolk, VA.

2.) The US all volunteer force is currently the only thing protecting the nation. ... not in some low level skirmishes against poorly trained and equipped irregulars or third rate national armies. ...the difference being that we would not have another country's army to cover us while we recover from our mistakes. (Emphasis added / kw)

I think you sell this Army short. The part in bold denigrates a lot of folks who may be smarter than some seem to think. I also suggest that adequate warning of a potential major adversary, even given the sad state of the IC today, is very highly probable -- enough so that I'm comfortable with it. YMMV

Ken you quoted me out of context (are you looking for a job at the NYT? ) I was comparing the quality of our past and potential opponents, not the capabilities of our own forces. Having been part of the IC's I & W (indications and warning) world, I am not quite as comfortable as you are about IC forecasting. I am even less comfortable with the decisionmakers' ability to draw the right conclusions and act based on what the IC may tell them.

Uh, wm, you aren't going all Euro-centric and north German Plain or Fulda Gap on me are you???

Far from it. I never expected that war to occur after about 1978 anyway. I'm more worried about some mid rate power thinking it can pull off a Pearl Harbor-like event on US infrastructure in order to buy itself enough time to to do some local conquests and then be able to consolidate on its objective while the US tries to rebuild its shattered infrastructure. The attacking power would expect its consolidation would be strong enough to deter the US (and others) from interceding to restore the status quo ante. Imagine how things might have turned out in the Mid-East had Saddam tried such a tactic as or before he rolled over the border into Kuwait.

[Ken White]

...Not too much dispersion these days vis-a-vis critical defense industry factories--for example, Lima, Ohio is the only tank factory in the US. Two big strikes--at, for example, Galveston, TX and Linden NJ--would have significant inpact on US mid/down stream petroleum industry. Or imagine the impact of a large ADM detonation in the vicinity of Hampton or beautiful downtown Norfolk, VA.

Yes and no. Agree on the lack of dispersion but also suggest that the lack of stupid Congressional restraints and the elimination of a lot of the regulatory burden would enable some amazing speed in reconstruction. Not to mention that a surprising number of plants exist in 'other' industries that are capable of conversion to war production. Biggest problem would be the skills of workers and that's not insurmountable. Not trying to suggest that it would be easy, just that it can be done.

Ken you quoted me out of context (are you looking for a job at the NYT? ) I was comparing the quality of our past and potential opponents, not the capabilities of our own forces.

If I did, my apologies. Seemed to me you were saying that COIN skills (I'm really starting to dislike that phrase. It's a bad misnomer) didn't equate to major conflict skills -- which is in a limited sense true but far from being totally correct or insurmountable.

Having been part of the IC's I & W (indications and warning) world, I am not quite as comfortable as you are about IC forecasting.

I didn't mean to imply that I was comfortable with it; I think the IC has some major malfunctions right now; some self induced and some legislatively imposed by the 535 person debacle that is our Congress. Fortunately, there are enough good people about that the shortfalls can be supplemented by folks outside the IC.

I am even less comfortable with the decisionmakers' ability to draw the right conclusions and act based on what the IC may tell them.

Touché.

Far from it. I never expected that war to occur after about 1978 anyway. I'm more worried about some mid rate power thinking it can pull off a Pearl Harbor-like event on US infrastructure in order to buy itself enough time to to do some local conquests and then be able to consolidate on its objective while the US tries to rebuild its shattered infrastructure. The attacking power would expect its consolidation would be strong enough to deter the US (and others) from interceding to restore the status quo ante. Imagine how things might have turned out in the Mid-East had Saddam tried such a tactic as or before he rolled over the border into Kuwait.

All things are possible. Some are more probable than others. Some are more difficult to do than to talk about. Effects also are difficult to judge in advance.

Been my observation that many over the years have made the usually fatal mistake of misjudging what can be done to the US and / or what the US can or will do. I do not expect that to change in the near term.

[wm]

Touché.

Been my observation that many over the years have made the usually fatal mistake of misjudging what can be done to the US and / or what the US can or will do. I do not expect that to change in the near term.

I think that the first lesson that was beaten into my head about foreign (and not-so-foreign) relations, is that most actions are taken based on perceptions, rather on a good understanding, of reality. So, I agree we need to be on our guard as to the misjudgements that might dispose other national/quasi-national/nation-state-wannabe actors to do something that would probably be really stupid for a lot of folks around the globe in the long term. The more America can do to dissuade others from acting on their perceptions of reality, the better for all concerned.

Seems to me that Americans tend to be pretty stubborn when it comes to making sure that what they think is right comes to pass. The good news is, the judgement of history has shown more often than not that Americans end up being correct about what is the right end result. Too bad we have to fumble around for so long figuring out the right way to achieve it.

[Ski]

Steve's exactly right - too much crying wolf is going to get the USAF argument shot down before it gains any traction.

The Air Force has continually - since the inception as a seperate service - received more funds on an annual basis within the base budget than any other service. They have not lacked for anything. It is the Air Force's fault, and perhaps we can add some Congressional flavor into the mix, that they have continually designed and manufactured aircraft that are more expensive and complex.

The F-16 is the only aircraft in the history of the USAF to cost LESS than it's predecessor. The capability still exists to make a fine aircraft without all the bells and whistles that is cheap to design, manufacture and sustain.

As Norfolk states, the Army has undergone incremental change to the Abrams and Bradleys since they were introduced in the 1980's. They were designed that way BTW. The only really new vehicle has been the Strykers. The Marines are even worse off (and a lot of that is their own fault by putting all their eggs in the AAAV program basket) because they rely on the Army for a lot of their weaponry.

I don't disagree about the necessity of the USAF to provide air dominance. The USN and USMC help out here as well. The USAF just doesn't spend it's money wisely from what I can see. I think the C-17's are close to $150M a plane, I've seen numbers as high as $200M a plane for the F-22, and the F-35 is rising by the day (it will be closer to $100M a copy than the $35M a copy that is being claimed). Meanwhile, flight hours are down in training...why do training funds always go by the wayside when it is clear throughout history that the better trained pilot/unit will beat one that is better equipped but less trained? And if we really do get into a drag down knock out fight with the Chinese, there are far worse things to worry about than aircraft. That is really the only possible peer competitor on the horizon, and the PLAF hasn't been in combat since the late 1970's. Are we really that afraid of that potential boogeyman? Geez...

[Van]

Army has undergone incremental change to the Abrams and Bradleys since they were introduced in the 1980's. They were designed that way BTW. The only really new vehicle has been the Strykers.

To be fair, the enabling technologies of ground forces have not changed as much as the enabling technologies of air power in the same period. Comms and sensors are shifting this dynamic a bit, as new tools become availible to ground forces, but protection and lethality mechanisms have gone through any huge changes in a while.

Back on thread, Gates pick for CSAF comes out of the special ops world. This bodes well for the AF role in Small Wars (and not so well for the fighter community, and we'll just have to live with that )

[Fuchs]

Isn't it funny?

In late '99 till at least late '02, the Army feared to be(come) "irrelevant".

Now it's the AF's turn (at least in regard to Iraq and to stealth planes).

[Ski]

Van - I just don't buy it. The sensors and comms systems are parts of the integrated aircraft - they should not be the major cost drivers. If they are, that is a major problem.

I have no experience with aircraft design but my understanding is that the major cost drivers are the airframes themselves (especially with the various lightweight materials), the stealth technologies, and the engines. I stand to be corrected...

[J Wolfsberger]

Van - I just don't buy it. The sensors and comms systems are parts of the integrated aircraft - they should not be the major cost drivers. If they are, that is a major problem.

... my understanding is that the major cost drivers are the airframes themselves (especially with the various lightweight materials), the stealth technologies, and the engines. I stand to be corrected...

The avionics - radars, optics, comm, signal processing, flight management, etc. - really are a cost driver. For example, todays fighters are inherently unstable, which means they obtain stability in flight by constantly monitoring conditions and adjusting the control surfaces to achieve "stable" flight. That requires not only a lot of instrumentation, but processing power; on the F-16, three militarized computers that "vote" on the correction, at a cost in the neighborhood of $100K each. The phased array radar in the nose of the AC could easily add upwards of $2M.

I wouldn't be surprised if the avionics was 30% or more of per unit cost.

However, a lot of the avionics can be upgraded.

[Ski]

So there could be incremental upgrades to existing designs...correct?

[Van]

Ski,
I was refering to the impact of emerging comm and sensors on ground forces.

The AF was getting a handle on planes when jets showed up. Jets are under control when space technology gets busy. etc. Until the current round with the various, competing technological advances like UAVs and some of the propulsion systems on the horizon. And they've had about 3-5 years between major technology.

The Army has had much more gradual change until the emerging comm systems started getting practical for us in the past few years. I'm not convinced we're really appreciating the potential or the impact yet.

But J Wolf is right, avionics in its various forms is a serious wedge of an aircraft's cost. In the case of the initial purchase of the Coast Guard HH-65 Dolphin, a French airframe, the avionics package was extremely robust, to help ensure the "buy 51% American" requirement was met, and was something like 25% of the total price.

[Entropy]

I don't disagree about the necessity of the USAF to provide air dominance. The USN and USMC help out here as well. The USAF just doesn't spend it's money wisely from what I can see. I think the C-17's are close to $150M a plane, I've seen numbers as high as $200M a plane for the F-22, and the F-35 is rising by the day (it will be closer to $100M a copy than the $35M a copy that is being claimed). Meanwhile, flight hours are down in training...why do training funds always go by the wayside when it is clear throughout history that the better trained pilot/unit will beat one that is better equipped but less trained? And if we really do get into a drag down knock out fight with the Chinese, there are far worse things to worry about than aircraft. That is really the only possible peer competitor on the horizon, and the PLAF hasn't been in combat since the late 1970's. Are we really that afraid of that potential boogeyman? Geez...

C-17's are more like $220 million last time I checked. This may have come down. F-22 flyaway cost is variable, but the final aircraft in the 187 buy are going to cost about $135m IIRC.

Training is not down because of procurement costs. Training is down because O&M money is being spent on operations. Air-to-air is not in demand so that is where the money gets cut. The fighter guys don't like that, but no one is happy when they don't get the training they think they need.

As for the PLAAF and others, you have too look long term. The F-22 is going to be our main A2A fighter for forty years or more. The AF understands that it's going to have to live with this aircraft for a long time. Yes, it's overkill for today's threats but the gap is already closing and will be much diminished in ten years. A big reason the AF wants more than the planned 187 aircraft is because it's doesn't think that 187 airframes are gonna last that long given the inevitability of accidents and losses in future conflicts.