Defense Link posting of Secretary Gates' announcement supports this point rather clearly.Originally Posted by Entropy
The more important point is who will be the new CSAF and SAF. I've heard that Gen Schwartz, the TRANSCOM Cdr, may have an inside track as CSAF. Anyone have any insight as to who is the likely new SAF?
Last edited by wm; 06-06-2008 at 11:58 AM.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
On the first point true--but it did happen against a larger setting. When I first started looking for information I googled SecDef Fires AF Secretary and Chief of Staff. Pages came up on the earlier events--including the nukes as I stated when I started this thread--and Gates' frustration with the AF over war support and rigidity in its approach to life.I would say this was a very large proverbial straw that broke the SecDef's patience.
On the second point that is a very large question. Gates is trying to affect AF culture. Nominating a airlift guy would be a very large signal. It is one way that Gates could significantly limit the AF senior leaders abilities to "wait him out" as others have correctly suggested.
Tom
A Transporter CSAF??!!!!!
Wow, we can only hope... I suppose the equivalent would be a placing a QM or Corps of Engineer as the CSA. If it comes to pass, it will be real interesting to see how the rank and file react. I suppose the chances are that it would be very professional etc etc. But the possibility remains for near open mutiny (at least behind closed doors).
Hell, if Chenney named Gates as either his running mate or presumptive Sec Def it might swing my vote.
There is definitely a bad moon arising in the USAF... about time
Hacksaw
Say hello to my 2 x 4
Schwartz is not just a transporter. He also has Special Ops and NORAD experience. Here's the link to his official bio.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
even better
Great personal friend of mine is an AF SOF one or two star
The guy I've heard that is the likely pick is the current ACC commander, Gen. Corely, another fighter guy.
I also agree to an extent with Tom about the "larger setting." I think they would have been fired regardless, but all the other stuff just made it that much easier.
I hope not. I'll keep my ear to the ground here. Honestly the last thing they need is another fighter pilot running the show. Schwartz's bio does look good...a nice balance of things and hopefully some new perspectives.
Last edited by Steve Blair; 06-06-2008 at 02:06 PM.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I understand the ACC CDR is the choice of AF leadership while the TRANSCOM CDRr is the choice of many of the non-AF denizens of the 5 sided building. Seein's how the SecAF is also gone (and there is no incumbent Under Secretary either IIRC), I'm not sure who does the nominating of the CSAF's replacement. Given the "larger setting" situation, I also wonder how much weight the remaining AF leadership's druthers has when it comes to nominating a successor.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Ah, what a difference a new CSAF makes! The new CSAF, Gen. Schwartz, addressed the Air Force Association last night. There was a LOT of meat in the speech and I'm very happy with his vision for fixing problems in the service.
The entire transcript can be found here in a very annoying bullet-point format. WTF? The content is golden though.
I will comment more later and provide some links when I get a bit of time.
It's quite clear to me from that transcript that Gates is going after some baseline AF cultural issues. If you look at some of the things that have been going on in the AF in a number of areas (not just the nuclear programs), the drift has been noticeable for years. There was also a great deal of internal downplaying of the Minot incident, and the Taiwan shipment didn't make much of a ripple that we could see down here. Once you combine all that with Mosley's ties to the Thunderbirds fiasco and a recent letter in either AF Times or AF Magazine (don't remember which) that basically suggested that generals were above the law, I'm not surprised in the least that Gates acted. Wynn and Mosley were products of a particular culture...one that does not take criticism well and really isn't wired to look at itself in a critical way. That's been shown throughout the years. Hopefully the AF as a corporate whole will learn something from this other than "they're all out to get us."
That said, I know there's been a positive reaction in our little group regarding this removal. Not sure how it's playing out elsewhere, though.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
AF Culture
Agree.
I have heard that the Thunderbirds deal was a bigger part of this than many have implied.
I can't speak for what you think the culture of the AF is, and I have no idea where you are getting your information. I can tell you that at the basic frontline trigger-puller level (albeit a sample made solely of the 6 bases I interact with regularly) the feeling is not "they are all out to get us." The feeling is "they are all risking us losing a lot of people in any near to medium-term conflict by ignoring the reality of modern air combat". This is not something the generals have told us - this is what we learn each day trying to train against an increasingly robust threat. In spite of that, every guy I know is still raring to go out there and get the job done - even though we know that we are losing our edge day by day and there's not much we can do about it. The hope is simply that we don't let a lot of Army, Navy, or Marine folks get killed because we can't get the job done anymore. Every time enemies have approached technical parity with the USAF it has been training that has made the difference... only now the training part is slipping even as the tech part continues to slide.
You can argue how likely it is that we will face this type of conflict. But if you look solely at only one adversary you are missing the boat - focusing only on one country or one scenario can lead to making poor choices. Better to look at how to deal with a range of scenarios and be prepared to deal with them. How many folks thought we would end up fighting Iraq in 1990? How many folks thought we'd end up at war with Afghanistan? We have an extremely poor history of predicting the next fight, and so I believe it makes pretty good sense to have at least a small hedge against the worst. OBTW, it doesn't take a peer competitor to combine tactical SSMs with WMD, mix in some 4th gen fighters and EA, and then add a liberal dose of double digit SAM IADs... you do that, as many folks are attempting to do, and you have a potentially catastrophic threat without requiring a peer-level competitor. Airpower has been one of the largest factors in our contuining ability to overmatch conventional opponents. I would argue that no one in the US military has a serious understanding of the effects the loss of control of the air would have on every service... the worst effects would not be on the USAF. The support the USAF and USN provide from the air is often overlooked, but is critical to every service's operations.
I completely disagree with the not looking at yourself in a critical way. Just because a lot of the "looking" occurs on a classified and therefore not public level doesn't mean it isn't occuring... anyone who thinks otherwise is naive at best. You could make comparisons about many Army generals not looking at their early OIF performance critically vs. what the lower level folks were doing... does the fact that the senior leaders porked it mean that the culture of the rank and file is messed up? Is the culture of a military service defined solely by the top couple leaders? I would argue that it is not, at least in the Air Force. Clearly some issues have not been addressed... but I don't think that's due to AF wide culture. Perhaps the one cultural element that may be affected by this is the willingness to fire people... that seems to be a problem throughout DoD. Most folks I have talked to understand and agree with what has happened - the commanders are responsible for their own as well as their people's actions.
There's been a lot of problems that need solving but it is tough to be all things to all people when you can't fly very much, your aircraft are falling apart (literally!), and all of your support folks have been cut in the name of reducing the budget. No excuses - the nuclear mission needs to be done right, as do all the missions. But it is hard to expect the same level of intensity as when Secretary Gates was in SAC when those same forces are expected to make their own TDY orders, be their own base personnel center, be their own finance office, do every conventional mission known to man, and still spend the same amount of time on the nukes, all with jets that have some of the highest MX time per flying hour in the history of the AF...
If you don't agree with funding the F-22, fine. Then at least fund the flying hours and upgrades to the jets we do keep to give guys a fighting chance, at least until those jets fall apart. Or admit that you don't care if we lose control of the air and accept that we will assume a level of risk comparable to that we assumed at the start of WWII. You can't have your cake (not fund AF recapitalization like F-22 and C-17) and then complain when your BCT gets SSMed or bombed by Flankers, you have no CAS 'cause the A-10s got shot by SAMS, and you can't get resupplied because there's not enough airlift and the boats were sunk by ASMs.
Again, I am not trying to make excuses. There are serious problems that need solving. These problems cannot be solved without good leadership, good followership, and more money. The first two hopefully we will get, the third isn't going to happen based on the amount being spent in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the end the result is good people trying to do the best they can. Let's hope it doesn't come back to bite us and get a lot of good people killed.
Sorry for the long post. I'd like to hear what anyone else who has regular contact with AF combat units thinks about the current culture in the AF.
V/R,
Cliff
Cliff,
The main context here (and I have this based on both historical experience and contact with a number of active duty AF folks) is NOT at the trigger-puller level. It's what goes on at higher levels (mainly headquarters level). That is where the culture is cultivated and preserved. If you track back through, you'll notice that I have no quarrel with the front line AF...it's when you hit the cultural level (say senior O-6 and up) where the major policy decisions are made that the disconnect begins. And that is where the long term management culture is created and preserved. To borrow your term...to believe anything else is naive.
It's interesting to me how this always spins back onto "you're attacking the AF" as a whole as opposed to an examination of what the miscues and malfunctions might have been that led to this removal. Going back as far as the B-36 (and farther in some respects), senior AF leadership has often been resistant to critical thinking and examination. Does this mean that the entire AF is? No. But when you consider that the majority of major policy decisions are made by a fairly limited group of people that culture has a great impact on the service and how it's perceived. And they have also done a masterful job of creating a circle the wagons and shoot the messenger defense system.
In short, if you think I'm attacking the rank and file AF, you're dead wrong. Hopefully the younger generation of officers will stick with it long enough to fix the problems.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I guess in my mind the culture isn't from the higher ups... most of the operational AF deals mostly with folks at the local level... HHQ is mostly transparent to us. Day to day ops in peacetime are not centrally controlled... and even in combat, your interaction with the CAOC is somewhat remote. It is the LtCol level Commanders and DOs, and perhaps O-6 Ops Group commanders that set the culture... the HQ is not as relevant in my opinion, because they aren't involved in the actual execution of warfare on a day to day basis. The independent spirit of the airman is still around. Again, just my opinion...
I agree that the AF in the times of SAC was very hide-bound. The shakeup post Desert-Storm is a good example of the fact that the AF does adapt. Not saying it's perfect, but I guess I think there is more debrief-style critical thinking going on that is visible. That's the whole beauty of the USAF Weapons School idea - a cadre of folks who are young tactical leaders. These folks can (and are supposed to) tell the commanders what tactically/operationally is wrong and how to fix it. Even the generals listen to these folks - and major recent changes have been due to the weapons officers standing up and saying "this needs to change". Not a perfect system, but I think it gets less credit than it should.
I don't think you're attacking anyone. I am just offering my perspective (albeit from the tactical/operational level) on the culture of the warfighters in the AF. I think it differs from what you're seeing - hopefully a good thing!
V/R,
Cliff
It would be like every war in history in which dominance had to be established on the field of battle rather than in garrison training. In most recent memory, it would be like WWII, where air superiority did not exist for the Allies, at least not in the beginning of the war.I would argue that no one in the US military has a serious understanding of the effects the loss of control of the air would have on every service...
The notion that superiority in one aspect of combat can exist and can be perpetuated ad infinitum is what is new. With respect to air power, it can likely be traced to the fact that since WWII the US has not had to face an opponent that had a creditable air capability.
On the other hand, one could look at the post-VN Army situation in Europe as an example of having to prepare for war as the inferior force. Ask any BNCO assigned to EUCOM in the 80s what it was like to wargame the Fulda Gap, and they'll tell you of the dismal prospects they faced in the event of a war there. Or ask an arty guy how he feels about the prospect of war against North Korea.
As we face a world where a) resources applied to the military are going to be increasingly restrained, and b) the picture of future war is increasingly murky, the Air Force argument that it must always maintain superiority through the application of unconstrained resources just can't work. To the extent that the firings of CSAF and SAF were related to an unchanged/ing attitude (as expressed by the request for more money for F-22s) as regards the USAF role in war reflects this fact.
There is going to have to be cultural adaptation in USAF to the fact that they will have to make more out of less, and that any future war will be a fight.
Regards,
Jill
From AF Times regarding Wynn's successor:
Full article here.Gates is likely to recommend Michael B. Donley, the Pentagon’s director of administration and management to succeed Wynne, a senior defense official said Friday.
Donley was acting secretary of the Air Force for seven months in 1993 and served as the service’s top financial officer from 1989 to 1993.
Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Duncan McNabb will likely become acting chief of staff.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
My point isn't that we neccessarily have to have Air Superiority.... it's that the entire US Military has come to depend on it. From JIT supply by air, to the lack of a robust anti-air breathing ADA, to the Navy's reduced focus on air to air and reliance on Aegis for fleet air defence... even the decision to switch to the EMEDs concept of air-evacing casualties vs. large theater hospitals... the whole US military has adapted to operating in an environment of air superiority. The substitution of air for artillery in many cases is another example.
The arguement for F-22s isn't for unconstrained resources, but for the resources to execute the National Security and National Military Strategy with an acceptable (read medium) level of risk. It's the CSAF and SECAF's job to state these requirements. If they're told to shut up and color, they either need to salute smartly or resign. If you believe the F-22 issue is one of the root causes, then it seems like the resignations are the right thing to do.
The USAF is definitely already doing more with less... but that doesn't mean you shouldn't state the risks of executing the strategy with the current force structure. As I've said before, doing more with less equipment is one thing, doing more with less equipment WITHOUT enough training doesn't work. I think the lack of adequate training ability is more of a problem than the lack of F-22s...
Finally, with the USMC and USA focusing on OIF and OEF, it makes sense for the USN and USAF to focus on the higher end of conflict. We have done a crummy job of prediciting what future conflict will look like... so we need to preserve our capabilities at all levels, instead of focusing solely on the current threat and ignoring the medium and long term ones. Otherwise we end up in the same situation we were in at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam... do we have the strategic depth, time, and ability to absorb the losses that would result? Curious to hear what folks here think.
V/R,
Cliff
Last edited by Cliff; 06-08-2008 at 03:30 AM.
Well, I'm on record as a supporter
of the F-22 (more than DoD says but less than the AF wants) and the F35 -- as well as more C17s and C27Js. So I can dispense with going into all that but with regard to these items...In reverse order, not so. Not at all -- some in the system have most always predicted what would come and pretty accurately. The problem is and has been that the system is too bureaucratic to respond to the input and that senior people do not want to hear the world may be different than their preferences. That, regrettably, seems to still be the case. As to AF and Navy focus, I though that's what they were doing to the extent possible...Agree....so we need to preserve our capabilities at all levels, instead of focusing solely on the current threat and ignoring the medium and long term ones...Three very different situations and not at all comparable to today. ForWW II, we had started building up in November, 1940, as rapidly as Roosevelt could convince Congress to act. Major aircraft, ship and army equipment programs were just starting to produce millions of tons and the services were slimming down and getting ready. At the time of Korea, we were sound asleep, period. For Viet Nam, most of the stateside Army was prepped, ready and trained for COIN -- problem was the Generals were not. None of those relate to today... Otherwise we end up in the same situation we were in at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam...Can't answer that because you didn't tell me what it is that will cause those losses?... do we have the strategic depth, time, and ability to absorb the losses that would result? Curious to hear what folks here think.
If, just guessing, your concern is the potential loss of air dominance, I'd like to know why you think that may be a problem; I know what you said above and I agree that training has been allowed to slide but I doubt it's gone down that much. The F22 and F35 are in the pipeline so the issue is not no new and capable aircraft, it is simply that they are so expensive that in a time of peace (which is what everyone outside of some service guys in Afghanistan and Iraq and a few other places is experiencing now) we can't buy as many as some would like. Given a threat, the money tap gets turned on and production ramps up.
So I'm uncertain what causes your doomsday scenario...
You really have a good understanding and knowledge beyond my own, which I find educating and refreshing. The AF itself is guilty of chewing up its ranks at the cost of careers and loss of talent. Inside, it has been for a very long time, exactly what you state, "they're all out to get us", but coming from the lower and mid ranks of the USAF itself as that statement relates to the higher ranks filled with shameful opportunists for a lack of better description. Again, I'm not bashing the USAF. There are a great deal of good people in the USAF. But The Force is brutal on its own people with the power of pen and paper alone. And like you intimated, I hope this is an eye opener for the corporate model types controlling thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination of those that do the work with enthusiasm and sacrifice in the face of internal asperity. I see administrative action at the top levels as a moral booster within the USAF and a long time in coming about. The mantra at the higher levels is as if the War Department still exists where careers were either made or broken. The War Department ended the same year the USAF was created.
Last edited by Culpeper; 06-09-2008 at 03:17 AM.
"But suppose everybody on our side felt that way?"
"Then I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way. Wouldn't I?"
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