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Thread: AF Secretary and Chief of Staff Dismissed

  1. #101
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    The reason that quote isn't as important to me is that I don't agree with it or the premises behind it. The last sentence in the portion you quoted is particularly enlightening in that regard.

  2. #102
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Given much the same data, reasonable people can

    arrive at differing conclusions. We can agreeably disagree on that, particularly on the enlightenment offered by that sentence which, to this observer, is regrettably correct in some respects if not all.

    Interestingly, I agree with the accuracy of your quote -- but suggest that if mine were not partially correct, then yours wouldn't exist...

  3. #103
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    Default Please allow me to explain further...

    First, I completely agree that reasonable people can come to different conclusions based on the same data. As a member of the so-called "intelligence" profession, differing conclusions come with the territory.

    That said, here's my take on that paragraph:

    Perhaps the greatest defect of Air Force leaders in recent times has been their failure to adapt to the changing demands of a transformed global security environment.
    Where is the evidence? And what's "recent" - especially since the example given is Vietnam. As I've mentioned elsewhere, the AF reorganized in 1992 and got rid of Strategic Air Command which was the AF's most important arm during the cold war. Given the decline in nuclear security and accountability that led to these firings (which I think were necessary, btw), one might argue that the AF changed too much in that case. I personally think the AF has been more adaptable in recent times than the other services - or at least the Navy, which is where I have direct experience. When I first joined the AF after the Navy, it was frankly refreshing to be in a service relatively free of cultural baggage and what some of us Navy guys jokingly called "tradition before innovation."

    Regardless, my sense is that the entire nation is still grappling with the "transformed global security environment" and what that means with respect to US interests and military doctrine and capabilities. The author doesn't give us her definition, so it's impossible to ultimately tell if her criticism is valid in a specific context.

    However, U.S. defeat in Vietnam signaled that the source of danger was shifting to elusive, unconventional aggressors, and the Air Force failed to change as fast as the threat did.
    I would agree with you that the sentence is basically correct, but it is deceptive by what it leaves out. Why not replace Air Force in that sentence with any of the other services or the DoD as whole? It hardly seems fair to lay blame for failure to adapt to threats posed by "elusive, unconventional aggressors" when those threats are largely ground-based and the Army didn't seem too interested in addressing them either until OEF/OIF. The AF has been pretty consistent in adapting to threats in its domain, IMO.

    Finally, while it's probably beyond the scope of the article, there's no suggestion as to what the AF should have done better, much less whether it would have been possible to convince OSD and Congress to sign on to changes the AF should have taken. Nor is it clear if the AF is currently on the right track, though the author's use of the past tense might indicate that it is.

    The bit about the location of the Air Force Academy and service school is particularly obtuse - one wonders if she makes the same argument with regard to Leavenworth?

    I do agree with this paragraph, however, which is a very close second to the one I identified above:

    One symptom of this cultural insularity is a widespread political obtuseness within the Air Force that leads it to misjudge what power brokers outside the service want or will support. For example, during the Bush years the service has expended considerable political capital in resisting the efforts of civilian leaders to buy more B-2 bombers, increase spending on space systems, and accelerate the development of unmanned surveillance aircraft. If it had simply said "yes" in each case and conserved its capital for the really hard fights like keeping the F-22 fighter in production, the Air Force today would have a bigger budget, better capabilities, and more goodwill among senior policymakers. By refusing to deal with the political system on its own terms, the Air Force has handed other services with superior political skills control of the entire joint command structure.

  4. #104
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Where is the evidence?
    Here's one (LINK)I can find more pertaining to everything from the YC14 and 15 to Bombers. Point is the senior leadership of the USAF has been excessively air to air fighter centric since Viet Nam.
    And what's "recent" - especially since the example given is Vietnam.
    Since 1975; since 1989 when the USSR dribbled into a puddle, since 1991 when the future of air to air for some time was illustrated plainly; since 2001? Take your pick. As you may recall, I've defended the AF in several of these threads. I will on this one as well; I just found it interesting that seemingly, the PR aspect -- which I admit is important -- took precedence over the practical, do the job aspect -- which would seem to me to be more important.
    As I've mentioned elsewhere, the AF reorganized in 1992 and got rid of Strategic Air Command which was the AF's most important arm during the cold war. Given the decline in nuclear security and accountability that led to these firings (which I think were necessary, btw), one might argue that the AF changed too much in that case.
    I would agree. SAC worked and should not have been trifled with, I suggest that what occurred was an effort to appear in tune with the times that was ill thought out.
    I personally think the AF has been more adaptable in recent times than the other services
    I'd say it's been about on par with the others -- none of whom, not even the rather flexible USMC have exactly covered themselves with glory in that respect. All the services practice "tradition before innovation."
    Regardless, my sense is that the entire nation is still grappling with the "transformed global security environment" and what that means with respect to US interests and military doctrine and capabilities.
    True.
    The AF has been pretty consistent in adapting to threats in its domain, IMO.
    I agree but offer the caveat; with quite selective priorities which have not done them any favors. That, I think is the rub.

    In any event, wasn't picking on you or the USAF; just thought the selection of a "money quote" was interesting, not wrong.

  5. #105
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Here's one (LINK)I can find more pertaining to everything from the YC14 and 15 to Bombers.
    Shortly after this the A-10C precision engagement program upgrade was funded by the USAF.... I haven't seen the memo in question, so I can't comment on that, but I am pretty sure the A-10 wasn't ever in much danger.

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Point is the senior leadership of the USAF has been excessively air to air fighter centric since Viet Nam.Since 1975;
    So we should have ignored the less than 2-1 kill ratio in Vietnam? Ignore the threat of SAMs to bombers?

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    since 1989 when the USSR dribbled into a puddle, since 1991 when the future of air to air for some time was illustrated plainly; since 2001?
    The future of air to air was illustrated since 2001? How? Who did we fight since 2001 that had advanced jammers and 4th gen fighters with active missiles? What about the future of Surface to Air Missiles? This wasn't illustrated in any of the above because none of the adversaries had the SAMs other folks have now... The F-22 is a response to SAMs almost more than it is to Flankers. If we were only talking about the Air to Air threat, we would be able to upgrade F-15Cs and at least have parity with the Su-30...

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Take your pick. As you may recall, I've defended the AF in several of these threads. I will on this one as well; I just found it interesting that seemingly, the PR aspect -- which I admit is important -- took precedence over the practical, do the job aspect -- which would seem to me to be more important.I would agree. SAC worked and should not have been trifled with, I suggest that what occurred was an effort to appear in tune with the times that was ill thought out.I'd say it's been about on par with the others -- none of whom, not even the rather flexible USMC have exactly covered themselves with glory in that respect. All the services practice "tradition before innovation."True.I agree but offer the caveat; with quite selective priorities which have not done them any favors. That, I think is the rub.
    The ditching of SAC was, in fact, a significant innovation. It is interesting that you argue against the USAF due to the focus on air to air but like the fact that we shackled our entire bomber force to a single nuclear mission.... While perhaps SAC should have been retained, having all the USAF's bombers focus solely on the SIOP and not train to conventional missions is exactly the lack of innovation you are unhappy with. The idea of getting rid of SAC was that we should focus on the effects weapons create rather than the command that owns them or the type of aircraft in question.

    This is the same reason the USAF has a requirement for a certain number of Raptors... we need to preserve a broad spectrum of capabilities to be able to deal with a range of future threats, rather than focusing solely on one narrow scenario.

    I agree that the USAF could show more flexibility, and hasn't always done the best PR. I fail to see how the PR aspect took precedence over doing the job... that isn't happening at the warfighter level. From my perspective (and that of many USAF folks) we know we're sacrficing training hours, maintenance, and equipment (as well as a lot of folks) to support our brothers and sisters from all services in the AOR... and most folks aren't thrilled, but they understand why things are this way.

  6. #106
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I said you said that I said that you said..

    Quote Originally Posted by Cliff View Post
    Shortly after this the A-10C precision engagement program upgrade was funded by the USAF.... I haven't seen the memo in question, so I can't comment on that, but I am pretty sure the A-10 wasn't ever in much danger.
    Only because Dave Deptula didn't get his way. The upgrades to the A-10 were partly reaction as a result of the outcry over the article I linked. The point is that many in the USAF would like to get rid of the CAS mission -- but not at the expense of the Army getting it.

    I'm not going to quibble about the SAM vs air to air issues; you have valid points and we'd degenerate even further we have into semantic nit noiding.
    The ditching of SAC was, in fact, a significant innovation. ... The idea of getting rid of SAC was that we should focus on the effects weapons create rather than the command that owns them or the type of aircraft in question.
    Ah, effects based... yes. Shock and awe.

    SAC worked; missions can be changed; the fact that the USAF did NOT change SAC's mission in the 70s is due to the fighter and bomber mafias staying out of each others sandbox -- until it was forced on 'em. My point was simply an aside that you took a fairly well functioning command and tossed it instead of just changing it's mission. No big thing, really
    This is the same reason the USAF has a requirement for a certain number of Raptors... we need to preserve a broad spectrum of capabilities to be able to deal with a range of future threats, rather than focusing solely on one narrow scenario.
    Let me remind you -- again -- that I'm an F-22 and F-35 supporter; so you don't need to sell the bird; as for numbers, that need changes on an almost daily basis; unfortunately, the budgeting and production processes aren't that flexible and a decision on a number that is a meld of available dollars and mission needs will be reached. That's life.
    ...and most folks aren't thrilled, but they understand why things are this way.
    Nor, I suspect are most of the folks in the AORs all that thrilled...

    This too will pass...

    And we better quit before we both get silly. I've defended the USAF here and elsewhere for a long time. I've benefited from the air superiority that the USAF and the Navy and Marines have provided for me. I see the need for new airframes. I've said all that. I also see you guys in blue are hyper defensive and don't take even constructive criticism well

    We're all on the same side. Honest

  7. #107
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    Ken, will you please quit bashing the Air Force?!! Some of us are sick and tired of it!

  8. #108
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I also want more C-17s and a new CSAR bird

    and do not care which one gets the nod as long as it works.

    Plus I want the Illinois, Kansas and Washington Congressional delegations plus that twit Murtha to shut up on the Tanker deal.

    Oh. AFSOC needs C-27s, too -- and AC-27s.

    In return for that, I respectfully request the right to make mildly smart ass comments about the ABU.

  9. #109
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    In return for that, I respectfully request the right to make mildly smart ass comments about the ABU.
    Don't get me started on that! I'm still wearing good old BDU's but they are wearing out fast. Oh, and they're changing our class A's...again.

  10. #110
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    In return for that, I respectfully request the right to make mildly smart ass comments about the ABU.
    You have to lay off the ABUs. It's par for the course. Just like the F-22, it's the newest technology, it's more expensive, and many think we don't need it.
    -john bellflower

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    "You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)

  11. #111
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    Ah, what a difference a new CSAF makes! The new CSAF, Gen. Schwartz, addressed the Air Force Association last night. There was a LOT of meat in the speech and I'm very happy with his vision for fixing problems in the service.

    The entire transcript can be found here in a very annoying bullet-point format. WTF? The content is golden though.

    I will comment more later and provide some links when I get a bit of time.

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