AF Secretary and Chief of Staff Dismissed

[Stevely]

Concur. I heartily recommend a read of the Rommel Papers--Rommel's comments about Allied air superiority at Alamein and the subsequent Axis retreat across Libya as well during actions in Tunisia and the Normandy landings is very instructive. Other anecdotal German commentary about fighting in the West and having to deal with the "damned Jabos" (the German name for Allied fighter-bomber CAS aircraft) is further support for Cliff's point.

I think these fears are starting to get out of hand. Air Force proponents aren't doing the cause any service when they start suggesting they are on the brink of losing any control of the air whatsoever, and US forces in the next war will face what the Germans faced in WW2. I think this is pretty damn far from what the enemy is capable of achieving, regardless of which potential enemy we're talking about. Let's keep it real, ok?

OTOH, if the challenge to American air supremacy is as strong as some would have us believe, the bad guys seem to be doing it for a lot, lot cheaper than the USAF and its contractors are charging the taxpayer to keep its edge. The Air Force is running the red queen's race. Maybe we ought to start buying from their vendors instead of Boeing/ LockMart?

[Ken White]

Agree on all counts. We are nowhere near a crisis and to make it seem so is likely to be seen as caterwauling "canis lupus."

Best I can do with impenetrable terminology this time of day...

[Sargent]

I am talking about the fact that we were not ready overall when hostilities kicked off... agree that in WWII we were attempting to get there, but bottom line we started with a sub-standard Army and AAF, and probably Navy as well. Doesn't really matter in what respect you're unprepared - you're unprepared.

Yes, you are unprepared. However, you are also not beholden to an extant structure of personnel, weapons, tactics, and doctrines -- in sum, you don't try to make the war fit what you have to iffy results, but you build what you need to the exact specifications required. I would much rather start off unprepared but able to build to suit rather than the other way around. It is what makes me take the maverick position of thinking that the American penchant for massive post-war demobilization is not the bad thing people assume it to be -- of thinking that it's actually a rather good thing.

I know, miliary heresy, but as a civilian that's my perogative.

Cheers,
Jill

[Ken White]

heretical, possibly -- but that's not a bad thing. Not at all.

[Cliff]

I think these fears are starting to get out of hand. Air Force proponents aren't doing the cause any service when they start suggesting they are on the brink of losing any control of the air whatsoever, and US forces in the next war will face what the Germans faced in WW2. I think this is pretty damn far from what the enemy is capable of achieving, regardless of which potential enemy we're talking about. Let's keep it real, ok?

OTOH, if the challenge to American air supremacy is as strong as some would have us believe, the bad guys seem to be doing it for a lot, lot cheaper than the USAF and its contractors are charging the taxpayer to keep its edge. The Air Force is running the red queen's race. Maybe we ought to start buying from their vendors instead of Boeing/ LockMart?

The problem isn't right now neccessarily... but the medium-term (10-15 years) future. Once you close down the F-22 line, you can't just restart it on a whim... it is not like a sheet metal WW-II fighter where a car factory can quickly turn from cars to planes. The technology to produce it is different.

I'm not saying the sky is falling now, I am saying we are on a slippery slope in that direction. And the enemy isn't neccessarily going for air supremacy... just a localized version of it. If we had the SAMs the enemy has, we could do what they may do - and just deny everyone the ability to fly on a general basis, only using our own air locally. My point is that the entire US military depends on Air Superiority throughout the AOR. Take away air superiority/freedom of action in the air and OEF and OIF go way differently - that is my point.

In short, not saying we're hurting now, but we need to invest - things like the F-15C breaking in half are going to start happening a lot more based on the age of our jets.

V/R,

Cliff

[Norfolk]

The problem isn't right now neccessarily... but the medium-term (10-15 years) future. Once you close down the F-22 line, you can't just restart it on a whim... it is not like a sheet metal WW-II fighter where a car factory can quickly turn from cars to planes. The technology to produce it is different.

I'm not saying the sky is falling now, I am saying we are on a slippery slope in that direction. And the enemy isn't neccessarily going for air supremacy... just a localized version of it. If we had the SAMs the enemy has, we could do what they may do - and just deny everyone the ability to fly on a general basis, only using our own air locally. My point is that the entire US military depends on Air Superiority throughout the AOR. Take away air superiority/freedom of action in the air and OEF and OIF go way differently - that is my point.

In short, not saying we're hurting now, but we need to invest - things like the F-15C breaking in half are going to start happening a lot more based on the age of our jets.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff's very right on this point, and although it might seem unlikely that the US would allow its fighter production capability to go cold, stranger things have happened. It took a year and a half to build an F-15 from start to finish, long-lead items and all, at a peacetime production rate. Even if that could have been reduced by 2/3 rds in wartime, that's still six months waiting for a new aircraft. It seems unlikely that an F-22 or even an F-35 could be built much quicker, let alone at a rate that would suffice to replace losses in a major shooting war. True, there may be no "peer competitor" at the moment, but the AF's fleet is elderly, and will no longer be with us for much longer in many cases. Personally, I have growing misgivings about the F-35, and the high-lo mix concept that began with the F-15/F-16 pairing back in the 70's in order to reduce costs may offer rather less benefit given issues surrounding the F-35's anticipated capabilities (or rather, indications that such capabilities as are to be afforded by the F-35 may turn out to be substantially less than expected). And I will echo wm's warning about the potential consequences of losing control of the air; an obvious point perhaps, but given that U.S. Forces (and National Policy) are thoroughly accustomed to the possession of Air Superiority, and thus are in some ways under-prepared for the converse, even flirting with the potential of substantially weakening it is probably imprudent.

But the Air Force also needs to bear in mind that not a single new MBT has been manufactured for either the Army or the Marines since 1992, and the Navy is increasingly struggling with aging ships and boats, as well as aging aircraft of its own - not to mention that its mine warfare fleet is being reduced to a pittance, and this in a Navy that is supposed to be focussing on Littoral Warfare. And it has no fixed-wing ASW capability on board its carriers. What resources that are available really are going to have to be shared in order to avoid being caught flat-footed in some critical area in the future. Of course, this is not the way things are done...

[Sargent]

Once you close down the F-22 line, you can't just restart it on a whim... it is not like a sheet metal WW-II fighter where a car factory can quickly turn from cars to planes. The technology to produce it is different.

Why assume that in the event of a war we would go back to the F-22? I don't argue with your point that restarting that production line would be difficult and time consuming -- rather, I doubt we'd bother to go back to it all.

The problem with building weapons systems in peace time is that they must take into account many contingencies and have a multitude of capabilities. However, once a war has emerged, the need to have is defined and the required capabilities are narrowed. Thus, I would argue that the aircraft that would be built would be far simpler than what we are building now. I agree that they would not be as simple as WWII aircraft, but likely as relatively simple, given the advancements in production capabilities.

There is a logic to my heresy.

Cheers,
Jill

[Ken White]

10 to 20 year procurement cycle is a permanent fixture. It is not. That length of time results from Congressional ambivalence and on again-off again funding, new administrations with different priorities, low volume peacetime production runs and several other impactors. Given a significant threat, that'll go. The F35, for instance, will almost certainly be produced in two variants, a US only and an all others. I'd bet big money that the 'all others' variant can be rapidly ramped up and produced in plants aside from Fort Worth. It might take a year to hit full volume but I suspect multiples per day would be rolling off the line.

Bombardier could make some...

Huh? How do you get that year? Why, from today's all volunteer force -- just like we did in 1917, 1942, 1950, 1965 and will again. That's why that force exists, to buy that year. We all stuck up our hands and agreed to do that...

[wm]

Huh? How do you get that year? Why, from today's all volunteer force -- just like we did in 1917, 1942, 1950, 1965 and will again. That's why that force exists, to buy that year. We all stuck up our hands and agreed to do that...

Ken,
I'd like to hope that our volunteer forces will give us that year in a future major conflict. However, 2 potentially significant differences from the two wars in your list that may have been life threatening to the US as a nation (the 2 World Wars--Korea and VN were neither direct or indirect threats to the continued existence of the American way of life) make me worry.

1.) Today's technology no longer allows the US to rely on the defenses to its national industrial base provided by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. US industrial infrastructure could be immediately at risk for attack in a future major conflict. Rebuilding destroyed factories is quite a bit harder than retooling them I believe.
2.) The US all volunteer force is currently the only thing protecting the nation. In both of those earlier "big" wars, the US had at least one ally who was already fully mobilized to stand as a shield while the US took the necessary time to bring its military up to speed. In the case of WWI, those allies were the folks who provided the final training that enabled US forces to succeed on a modern battlefield, not in some low level skirmishes against poorly trained and equipped irregulars or third rate national armies. Today, we would most likely need our combat veterans to do the fighting and would not have an adequate battle-experienced cadre available to train up the additional forces being mobilized. Our newly raised forces would probably have to learn most of their lessons the hard way, as we did in North Africa (at Kassserine Pass among others), Buna, and Guadalcanal--the difference being that we would not have another country's army to cover us while we recover from our mistakes.

[J Wolfsberger]

Why assume that in the event of a war we would go back to the F-22? I don't argue with your point that restarting that production line would be difficult and time consuming -- rather, I doubt we'd bother to go back to it all.

The problem with building weapons systems in peace time is that they must take into account many contingencies and have a multitude of capabilities. However, once a war has emerged, the need to have is defined and the required capabilities are narrowed. Thus, I would argue that the aircraft that would be built would be far simpler than what we are building now. I agree that they would not be as simple as WWII aircraft, but likely as relatively simple, given the advancements in production capabilities.

There is a logic to my heresy.

Cheers,
Jill

I think you're overlooking the time to design. That involves years of system analysis, design and terst. The worst aspect of the problem is staffing up to do the work. Engineers who have spent a career in the civilian sector often have difficulty addressing the completely different set of needs and considerations for defense systems. Engineers who have "escaped" the defense sector usually refuse to return. The conflict would likely be over by the time the new aircraft emerged.

On the other hand, if we'd started in 2001 on an aircraft to support COIN ... we'd have found a way to put the A-10 back in production.

[Tom Odom]

On the other hand, if we'd started in 2001 on an aircraft to support COIN ... we'd have found a way to put the A-10 back in production.

But it would be made of composites and would cost 10X as much...kind of a reverse multiplication table engineering...

I caught a bit of a military channel program on P47s last night--the true macho fighter of WWII. Just an incredible A/C, heavy, durable, powerful, and at wars end long range. Just not as sexy as a Mustang...

I wonder who would have won then had we followed today's practices...

[Ken White]

Ken,
I'd like to hope that our volunteer forces will give us that year in a future major conflict. However, 2 potentially significant differences from the two wars in your list that may have been life threatening to the US as a nation (the 2 World Wars--Korea and VN were neither direct or indirect threats to the continued existence of the American way of life) make me worry.

I'd argue that none of the wars I listed including the two world wars were life threatening to the US but that's another thread.

1.) Today's technology no longer allows the US to rely on the defenses to its national industrial base provided by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. US industrial infrastructure could be immediately at risk for attack in a future major conflict. Rebuilding destroyed factories is quite a bit harder than retooling them I believe.

It is, of course. However the sheer number and dispersion of them (factories) in a nation this size makes that a somewhat daunting prospect for any potential adversary.

2.) The US all volunteer force is currently the only thing protecting the nation. ... not in some low level skirmishes against poorly trained and equipped irregulars or third rate national armies. ...the difference being that we would not have another country's army to cover us while we recover from our mistakes. (Emphasis added / kw)

I think you sell this Army short. The part in bold denigrates a lot of folks who may be smarter than some seem to think. I also suggest that adequate warning of a potential major adversary, even given the sad state of the IC today, is very highly probable -- enough so that I'm comfortable with it. YMMV

Uh, wm, you aren't going all Euro-centric and north German Plain or Fulda Gap on me are you???

[J Wolfsberger]

But it would be made of composites and would cost 10X as much...kind of a reverse multiplication table engineering...

I caught a bit of a military channel program on P47s last night--the true macho fighter of WWII. Just an incredible A/C, heavy, durable, powerful, and at wars end long range. Just not as sexy as a Mustang...

I wonder who would have won then had we followed today's practices...

With modern design tools, techniques and technologies, we can design aircraft with capabilities that were impossible in the WW II era. As an example, the big trade off for fighters is manueverability vs. stability. Todays fighters are inherently unstable, but have maneuverability unheard in the past.

With respect to the Mustang, "The prototype NA-73X [which became the P-51] was rolled out just 117 days after the order was placed, and first flew on 26 October 1940, just 178 days after the order had been placed..." The A10 was 5 years from RFP to production.

Still, I understand the point, and I agree we could probably shorten the design cycle. I wonder how quickly we could do it if our backs were to the wall.

[wm]

I'd like to hope that our volunteer forces will give us that year in a future major conflict. However, 2 potentially significant differences from the two wars in your list that may have been life threatening to the US as a nation (the 2 World Wars--Korea and VN were neither direct or indirect threats to the continued existence of the American way of life) make me worry.

I'd argue that none of the wars I listed including the two world wars were life threatening to the US but that's another thread.

Concur--remember my original post only said may have been life threatening to the US.

However the sheer number and dispersion of them (factories) in a nation this size makes that a somewhat daunting prospect for any potential adversary.

Not too much dispersion these days vis-a-vis critical defense industry factories--for example, Lima, Ohio is the only tank factory in the US. Two big strikes--at, for example, Galveston, TX and Linden NJ--would have significant inpact on US mid/down stream petroleum industry. Or imagine the impact of a large ADM detonation in the vicinity of Hampton or beautiful downtown Norfolk, VA.

2.) The US all volunteer force is currently the only thing protecting the nation. ... not in some low level skirmishes against poorly trained and equipped irregulars or third rate national armies. ...the difference being that we would not have another country's army to cover us while we recover from our mistakes. (Emphasis added / kw)

I think you sell this Army short. The part in bold denigrates a lot of folks who may be smarter than some seem to think. I also suggest that adequate warning of a potential major adversary, even given the sad state of the IC today, is very highly probable -- enough so that I'm comfortable with it. YMMV

Ken you quoted me out of context (are you looking for a job at the NYT? ) I was comparing the quality of our past and potential opponents, not the capabilities of our own forces. Having been part of the IC's I & W (indications and warning) world, I am not quite as comfortable as you are about IC forecasting. I am even less comfortable with the decisionmakers' ability to draw the right conclusions and act based on what the IC may tell them.

Uh, wm, you aren't going all Euro-centric and north German Plain or Fulda Gap on me are you???

Far from it. I never expected that war to occur after about 1978 anyway. I'm more worried about some mid rate power thinking it can pull off a Pearl Harbor-like event on US infrastructure in order to buy itself enough time to to do some local conquests and then be able to consolidate on its objective while the US tries to rebuild its shattered infrastructure. The attacking power would expect its consolidation would be strong enough to deter the US (and others) from interceding to restore the status quo ante. Imagine how things might have turned out in the Mid-East had Saddam tried such a tactic as or before he rolled over the border into Kuwait.

[Ken White]

...Not too much dispersion these days vis-a-vis critical defense industry factories--for example, Lima, Ohio is the only tank factory in the US. Two big strikes--at, for example, Galveston, TX and Linden NJ--would have significant inpact on US mid/down stream petroleum industry. Or imagine the impact of a large ADM detonation in the vicinity of Hampton or beautiful downtown Norfolk, VA.

Yes and no. Agree on the lack of dispersion but also suggest that the lack of stupid Congressional restraints and the elimination of a lot of the regulatory burden would enable some amazing speed in reconstruction. Not to mention that a surprising number of plants exist in 'other' industries that are capable of conversion to war production. Biggest problem would be the skills of workers and that's not insurmountable. Not trying to suggest that it would be easy, just that it can be done.

Ken you quoted me out of context (are you looking for a job at the NYT? ) I was comparing the quality of our past and potential opponents, not the capabilities of our own forces.

If I did, my apologies. Seemed to me you were saying that COIN skills (I'm really starting to dislike that phrase. It's a bad misnomer) didn't equate to major conflict skills -- which is in a limited sense true but far from being totally correct or insurmountable.

Having been part of the IC's I & W (indications and warning) world, I am not quite as comfortable as you are about IC forecasting.

I didn't mean to imply that I was comfortable with it; I think the IC has some major malfunctions right now; some self induced and some legislatively imposed by the 535 person debacle that is our Congress. Fortunately, there are enough good people about that the shortfalls can be supplemented by folks outside the IC.

I am even less comfortable with the decisionmakers' ability to draw the right conclusions and act based on what the IC may tell them.

Touché.

Far from it. I never expected that war to occur after about 1978 anyway. I'm more worried about some mid rate power thinking it can pull off a Pearl Harbor-like event on US infrastructure in order to buy itself enough time to to do some local conquests and then be able to consolidate on its objective while the US tries to rebuild its shattered infrastructure. The attacking power would expect its consolidation would be strong enough to deter the US (and others) from interceding to restore the status quo ante. Imagine how things might have turned out in the Mid-East had Saddam tried such a tactic as or before he rolled over the border into Kuwait.

All things are possible. Some are more probable than others. Some are more difficult to do than to talk about. Effects also are difficult to judge in advance.

Been my observation that many over the years have made the usually fatal mistake of misjudging what can be done to the US and / or what the US can or will do. I do not expect that to change in the near term.

[wm]

Touché.

Been my observation that many over the years have made the usually fatal mistake of misjudging what can be done to the US and / or what the US can or will do. I do not expect that to change in the near term.

I think that the first lesson that was beaten into my head about foreign (and not-so-foreign) relations, is that most actions are taken based on perceptions, rather on a good understanding, of reality. So, I agree we need to be on our guard as to the misjudgements that might dispose other national/quasi-national/nation-state-wannabe actors to do something that would probably be really stupid for a lot of folks around the globe in the long term. The more America can do to dissuade others from acting on their perceptions of reality, the better for all concerned.

Seems to me that Americans tend to be pretty stubborn when it comes to making sure that what they think is right comes to pass. The good news is, the judgement of history has shown more often than not that Americans end up being correct about what is the right end result. Too bad we have to fumble around for so long figuring out the right way to achieve it.

[Ski]

Steve's exactly right - too much crying wolf is going to get the USAF argument shot down before it gains any traction.

The Air Force has continually - since the inception as a seperate service - received more funds on an annual basis within the base budget than any other service. They have not lacked for anything. It is the Air Force's fault, and perhaps we can add some Congressional flavor into the mix, that they have continually designed and manufactured aircraft that are more expensive and complex.

The F-16 is the only aircraft in the history of the USAF to cost LESS than it's predecessor. The capability still exists to make a fine aircraft without all the bells and whistles that is cheap to design, manufacture and sustain.

As Norfolk states, the Army has undergone incremental change to the Abrams and Bradleys since they were introduced in the 1980's. They were designed that way BTW. The only really new vehicle has been the Strykers. The Marines are even worse off (and a lot of that is their own fault by putting all their eggs in the AAAV program basket) because they rely on the Army for a lot of their weaponry.

I don't disagree about the necessity of the USAF to provide air dominance. The USN and USMC help out here as well. The USAF just doesn't spend it's money wisely from what I can see. I think the C-17's are close to $150M a plane, I've seen numbers as high as $200M a plane for the F-22, and the F-35 is rising by the day (it will be closer to $100M a copy than the $35M a copy that is being claimed). Meanwhile, flight hours are down in training...why do training funds always go by the wayside when it is clear throughout history that the better trained pilot/unit will beat one that is better equipped but less trained? And if we really do get into a drag down knock out fight with the Chinese, there are far worse things to worry about than aircraft. That is really the only possible peer competitor on the horizon, and the PLAF hasn't been in combat since the late 1970's. Are we really that afraid of that potential boogeyman? Geez...

[Van]

Army has undergone incremental change to the Abrams and Bradleys since they were introduced in the 1980's. They were designed that way BTW. The only really new vehicle has been the Strykers.

To be fair, the enabling technologies of ground forces have not changed as much as the enabling technologies of air power in the same period. Comms and sensors are shifting this dynamic a bit, as new tools become availible to ground forces, but protection and lethality mechanisms have gone through any huge changes in a while.

Back on thread, Gates pick for CSAF comes out of the special ops world. This bodes well for the AF role in Small Wars (and not so well for the fighter community, and we'll just have to live with that )

[Fuchs]

Isn't it funny?

In late '99 till at least late '02, the Army feared to be(come) "irrelevant".

Now it's the AF's turn (at least in regard to Iraq and to stealth planes).

[Ski]

Van - I just don't buy it. The sensors and comms systems are parts of the integrated aircraft - they should not be the major cost drivers. If they are, that is a major problem.

I have no experience with aircraft design but my understanding is that the major cost drivers are the airframes themselves (especially with the various lightweight materials), the stealth technologies, and the engines. I stand to be corrected...