AF Secretary and Chief of Staff Dismissed

[J Wolfsberger]

Van - I just don't buy it. The sensors and comms systems are parts of the integrated aircraft - they should not be the major cost drivers. If they are, that is a major problem.

... my understanding is that the major cost drivers are the airframes themselves (especially with the various lightweight materials), the stealth technologies, and the engines. I stand to be corrected...

The avionics - radars, optics, comm, signal processing, flight management, etc. - really are a cost driver. For example, todays fighters are inherently unstable, which means they obtain stability in flight by constantly monitoring conditions and adjusting the control surfaces to achieve "stable" flight. That requires not only a lot of instrumentation, but processing power; on the F-16, three militarized computers that "vote" on the correction, at a cost in the neighborhood of $100K each. The phased array radar in the nose of the AC could easily add upwards of $2M.

I wouldn't be surprised if the avionics was 30% or more of per unit cost.

However, a lot of the avionics can be upgraded.

[Ski]

So there could be incremental upgrades to existing designs...correct?

[Van]

Ski,
I was refering to the impact of emerging comm and sensors on ground forces.

The AF was getting a handle on planes when jets showed up. Jets are under control when space technology gets busy. etc. Until the current round with the various, competing technological advances like UAVs and some of the propulsion systems on the horizon. And they've had about 3-5 years between major technology.

The Army has had much more gradual change until the emerging comm systems started getting practical for us in the past few years. I'm not convinced we're really appreciating the potential or the impact yet.

But J Wolf is right, avionics in its various forms is a serious wedge of an aircraft's cost. In the case of the initial purchase of the Coast Guard HH-65 Dolphin, a French airframe, the avionics package was extremely robust, to help ensure the "buy 51% American" requirement was met, and was something like 25% of the total price.

[Ski]

Ok- yeah, you are correct. The sensor and digital revolution has made quite a difference. Agree 100%

Thanks for the update on the avionics piece. Something just seems a little out of whack when the CPU's for actually flying the aircraft cost so much...

[Entropy]

There was also a great deal of internal downplaying of the Minot incident, and the Taiwan shipment didn't make much of a ripple that we could see down here. Once you combine all that with Mosley's ties to the Thunderbirds fiasco and a recent letter in either AF Times or AF Magazine (don't remember which) that basically suggested that generals were above the law, I'm not surprised in the least that Gates acted. Wynn and Mosley were products of a particular culture...one that does not take criticism well and really isn't wired to look at itself in a critical way. That's been shown throughout the years. Hopefully the AF as a corporate whole will learn something from this other than "they're all out to get us."

While I agree that Gates is partially going after cultural issues with these latest leadership changes, these issues exist in all the services. Furthermore, I might suggest that none of the services take criticism particularly well. Rather than singling out the Air Force, I think an argument can be made that the entirety of DoD isn't "wired to look at itself in a critical way." It may be true the AF is worse in this regard, but I would like to see some evidence the AF is worse than any other service.

And, like it or not, there is a basis for the Air Force believing that "they're all out to get us." There are the many articles and commentaries that have made the rounds for decades that advocate the disbanding of the Air Force or at least consider it a serious option to consider. One can hardly visit anyplace that discusses AF issues without this desire being raised by someone. The comments in an AM post from today is but one example of thousands.

Then there are Gate's comments which are almost always mis-reported and interpreted as being critical of the AF and not the other services. Probably the worst was Gate's comments about a month ago in Colorado Springs which are discussed in another AM thread (see the comments). When Gate's says something about the services not doing enough for the current war, it's the F-22 that is inevitably highlighted as "proof" of the AF's malfeasance, yet the billions spent by the other services (including the Army) on capabilities with no utility in Iraq and Afghanistan go completely unmentioned. By the same token the need for an air superiority fighter is endlessly questioned while other capabilities that are arguably less important go unmentioned. If you want to see defensiveness, try suggesting to the Marines that amphibious warfare is perhaps not as important as they might think.

Add in the fact that many making these arguments are clearly advocates for the Army and their arguments are parochial in intent and I think the AF has some justification for being defensive.

All this isn't to excuse the AF in any way. I've said many times before in this forum and others that the AF has serious problems that need addressing, but its extremely frustrating when so much criticism directed against the AF is just plain wrong and based on what appears to be parochial hatred of the service. These invalid criticisms do not go unheard by AF leadership and they certainly do affect how the leadership acts and reacts.

In closing and rereading this post, I want to make clear this post is venting a general frustration and is not directed at you in particular. Your post just happened to be the springboard.

[Entropy]

The F35, for instance, will almost certainly be produced in two variants, a US only and an all others. I'd bet big money that the 'all others' variant can be rapidly ramped up and produced in plants aside from Fort Worth. It might take a year to hit full volume but I suspect multiples per day would be rolling off the line.

Bombardier could make some...

Actually, there are a lot of variants. It's a USAF, USN, USMC and coalition aircraft that is designed to be modular enough to satisfy all those requirements.

Regardless, if we are still fighting an air war a year after the initiation of hostilities then we've probably already lost. Air supremacy will be decided relatively quickly.

[George Raihala]

Software takes a looong time to code, test, fix, and retest.

Take, for example, something relatively simple like putting Link-16 into the B-1 (something I have direct experience with). The software effort alone for that will take the better part of 3 years, long after the hardware is ready. And that's for one application. Aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 are completely software-driven aircraft, from the radar to the displays to the flight control system. We are talking millions of lines of code for a new aircraft. That all takes time. If you are designing a new airframe, you are then talking about new flight control laws, envelope expansion, etc, etc...that can take years to test. The notion that we can afford to wait until we are in a shooting war to develop new aircraft is simply not practical in any sense.

I would also disagree with some on this board that have suggested we go with simpler aircraft. Our enemies surely aren't. The latest versions of the SU-27 have very sophisticated avionics, radar missiles, and thrust vectoring. Simple aircraft with unsophisticated sensors simply have no chance against a modern fighter aircraft, especially in the BVR arena. The F-22 is defeating F-15s in simulated air combat virtually every time...even a well trained pilot in a 4th-gen machine doesn't have a whole lot of options against a less well trained pilot in a 5th-gen jet.

And the simple fact also remains...our fighters (and every other type) are old...coming apart in mid-air, actually. The design factor for the F-15 was 9g, and the St Louis-based ANG jet that came apart broke after a 7g turn. No matter how much we upgrade our Eagles, we are still talking about 25 year old airframes. Older jets also cost more to maintain, and that cost increases every year, which in turn means less money to buy new aircraft.

One could argue that we won't fight an opponent with 5th-gen jets, which is a possibility. Maybe we won't. Its probably in the unlikely category, even. But, do we really want to take that bet?

[Entropy]

So there could be incremental upgrades to existing designs...correct?

Yes and there have been. Both the F-15 and F-16 have had many upgrades which are designated by letters and then blocks. So a first-generation F-16 is an F-16A. The F-16C is the most common variant, but even that is divided into "blocks." A "block IV" aircraft, for example, is more advanced than a "block I" aircraft.

We could certainly keep upgrading F-16's/F-15's, but you run up against two limitations. First is airframe life. Second is the limitation of the basic design which sets a ceiling for the performance of the aircraft no matter how many bells and whistles you add on.

But as I've said before, the F-22 argument is now moot. Congress has already committed to funding the full buy of 187 aircraft and 2/3 of them are finished or under construction. Congress has also set aside money to either close the production line in 2011 or buy more aircraft and is leaving it to the next DoD to decide.

[Entropy]

I don't disagree about the necessity of the USAF to provide air dominance. The USN and USMC help out here as well. The USAF just doesn't spend it's money wisely from what I can see. I think the C-17's are close to $150M a plane, I've seen numbers as high as $200M a plane for the F-22, and the F-35 is rising by the day (it will be closer to $100M a copy than the $35M a copy that is being claimed). Meanwhile, flight hours are down in training...why do training funds always go by the wayside when it is clear throughout history that the better trained pilot/unit will beat one that is better equipped but less trained? And if we really do get into a drag down knock out fight with the Chinese, there are far worse things to worry about than aircraft. That is really the only possible peer competitor on the horizon, and the PLAF hasn't been in combat since the late 1970's. Are we really that afraid of that potential boogeyman? Geez...

C-17's are more like $220 million last time I checked. This may have come down. F-22 flyaway cost is variable, but the final aircraft in the 187 buy are going to cost about $135m IIRC.

Training is not down because of procurement costs. Training is down because O&M money is being spent on operations. Air-to-air is not in demand so that is where the money gets cut. The fighter guys don't like that, but no one is happy when they don't get the training they think they need.

As for the PLAAF and others, you have too look long term. The F-22 is going to be our main A2A fighter for forty years or more. The AF understands that it's going to have to live with this aircraft for a long time. Yes, it's overkill for today's threats but the gap is already closing and will be much diminished in ten years. A big reason the AF wants more than the planned 187 aircraft is because it's doesn't think that 187 airframes are gonna last that long given the inevitability of accidents and losses in future conflicts.

[Sargent]

I think you're overlooking the time to design. That involves years of system analysis, design and terst. The worst aspect of the problem is staffing up to do the work. Engineers who have spent a career in the civilian sector often have difficulty addressing the completely different set of needs and considerations for defense systems. Engineers who have "escaped" the defense sector usually refuse to return. The conflict would likely be over by the time the new aircraft emerged.

I don't expect that our folks are sitting around twiddling their thumbs during this time period.

With advances in computer modelling, etc., much could be done to have virtual prototypes of weapon systems ready to be pulled "off the shelf" when necessary. I suppose the most apt metaphor for what I envision are the set of strategic plans created for a variety of different conflict contingencies during the 30s. I'd include plans for factories/means of production as well.

Being resource constrained is often a great source of inspiration. Some good ideas have been developed without spending a lot of cash -- during the interwar lean years, Evans Carlson travelled to China to observe the early phase of the Sino-Japanese War and departed with the germ of a new warfighting model that later played a role in the Marine Corps' Pacific campaign (Raiders).

On the other hand, if we'd started in 2001 on an aircraft to support COIN ... we'd have found a way to put the A-10 back in production.

Don't be a tease!

Cheers,
Jill

[slapout9]

Switch to Missiles like the Army said in the 1950's they are cheaper,better and safer.

[Ken White]

.................

[Ken White]

Actually, there are a lot of variants. It's a USAF, USN, USMC and coalition aircraft that is designed to be modular enough to satisfy all those requirements.

Who knew. Why wasn't I informed of thi...

Whoops, sorry. Sarcasm is unbecoming; it's always brought on by condescending tutorials for the uninitiated. I may be old but I ain't uninitiated.

Yep, multiple variants of the US types A, B and C. Then there's the British B (or will it be a C? TBD). The Canadians are talking a C instead of an A, bigger wings and rudder plus stronger gear are handy on ice and snow. Then the Euro variants and the Stryne mods -- they're also talking some Bs. Then the Israeli mod (also mumbling about Bs). Plus Singapore and of course, LM will push for India. But I digress...

I meant the stealth cape and the avionics fit for multiple variants -- multiple as in probably a dozen or more. Further you get from the US, less complex the bird will be.

Regardless, if we are still fighting an air war a year after the initiation of hostilities then we've probably already lost. Air supremacy will be decided relatively quickly.

Totally arguable and not that likely. Depends on the opponent and location, location, location. Among several other things.

Why, it could be a Squid/ Marine, three or four CVW versus them air battle including SM3s and over before the Air Exped Wings even get there...

[Entropy]

Ken,

Didn't mean to impugn your intelligence, which is, in all seriousness, impressive (no sarcasm there). I see the F-35 referred to as an Air Force-only weapons system often enough I let assumption get the best of me. My apologies.

As for an air war, I think we'll have to agree to disagree. You're totally correct that much depends on the specifics of the conflict, but I can envision no likely scenarios where air supremacy by one side or the other would still be in doubt after a year. I admit this may be lack of imagination on my part.

As for the squids/marine's, I agree with you there. I began life as a squid, after all, and it is still the service I love the most. A major problem for the Air Force in any conflict, as I'm sure you know, is basing - no bases, minimal Air Force participation.

[Sargent]

As for an air war, I think we'll have to agree to disagree. You're totally correct that much depends on the specifics of the conflict, but I can envision no likely scenarios where air supremacy by one side or the other would still be in doubt after a year. I admit this may be lack of imagination on my part.

My air power knowledge is a bit rusty these days, but even if we lose the offensive game in the air, there is always the defensive game (surface to airm eg), which has a far lower cost of doing business, both in dollars and development time. If you look at the American air conops (and assume that a future high end competitor would follow our lead generally) there are so many targets it'd be like shooting ducks in a barrel. For fun, go back and look at the air war info that Cordesman put together at the start of OEF. Then plot all of the air asset tracks on a map -- warning, it'll make your head spin. The only problem would be trying to decide which target to start with. Honestly, if I weren't able to get a job teaching when this damned dissertation is done, I'd love it if someone would pay me to sit around and dream up ways to degrade high end air capabilities -- I cannot imagine how I could have more fun if I couldn't have a classroom for a captive audience.

Furthermore, why assume that the air war is the sine qua non of a future conflict? It is entirely possible that a party to a conflict could be the loser on that plain and still prevail in the conflict overall.

Finally, in the end, if we accept that air power isn't the ultimate arbiter of the conflict (which I really think it isn't -- otherwise, what the hell are we still doing fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan), then all that needs to be achieved is the ability to continue contending in the air while the rest of the war is fought.

And I second Ski's assertion that the technology is second to the quality of the pilots. (That goes for land and sea power as well.) Really good people will win a war every time, hands down.

Regards,
Jill

[Ken White]

...I see the F-35 referred to as an Air Force-only weapons system often enough I let assumption get the best of me. My apologies.

and did it tongue in cheek...

As for an air war, I think we'll have to agree to disagree. You're totally correct that much depends on the specifics of the conflict, but I can envision no likely scenarios where air supremacy by one side or the other would still be in doubt after a year. I admit this may be lack of imagination on my part.

We can disagree. See Jill below. You might consider numbers available to opponents vs. quality avaliable. The SU-30 is a tough bird; it's locally assembled elsewhere clones not so much. Fair amount of the latter, not too many of the real deal. As I said, very arguable but not here or now

As for the squids/marine's, I agree with you there. I began life as a squid, after all, and it is still the service I love the most. A major problem for the Air Force in any conflict, as I'm sure you know, is basing - no bases, minimal Air Force participation.

True. I suspect others know that as well...

[Stevely]

And I second Ski's assertion that the technology is second to the quality of the pilots. (That goes for land and sea power as well.) Really good people will win a war every time, hands down.

Regards,
Jill

And on that note, it is telling that the Air Force is cutting 40,000 or so personnel, mostly to pay for F-22. And that buys less than 200 jets. At that rate, it can't be long until we reach the point where questions of keeping ahead of red air and ADA are academic because the service will have long since priced itself out of the war business.

I know we are drifting from the topic of the (overdue) firings of certain USAF senior leaders, but the cost of doing war business is a huge problem for the country and it is most problematic in the USAF and does feed into the leadership problems.

More later - day trips to DC are exhausting.


EDIT: wm - copy all, I was aiming more at the arguments as advanced by USAF leadership more than you specifically... sorry for the confusion. Just used your post as a launch pad.

[Entropy]

My air power knowledge is a bit rusty these days, but even if we lose the offensive game in the air, there is always the defensive game (surface to airm eg), which has a far lower cost of doing business, both in dollars and development time.

That is, indeed, the route most potential adversaries have gone. Buying and operating a ground-based air defense is much less costly in terms of acquisition, operation, maintenance and training, so for most nations, which are more focused on regional adversaries, it is the way to go. On the other hand, both the US Navy and Air Force spend a lot of time and effort analyzing all these systems, discovering their weaknesses and exploiting them.

If you look at the American air conops (and assume that a future high end competitor would follow our lead generally) there are so many targets it'd be like shooting ducks in a barrel. For fun, go back and look at the air war info that Cordesman put together at the start of OEF. Then plot all of the air asset tracks on a map -- warning, it'll make your head spin. The only problem would be trying to decide which target to start with.

I'm not sure what you're referring to here - do you have any links?

Furthermore, why assume that the air war is the sine qua non of a future conflict? It is entirely possible that a party to a conflict could be the loser on that plain and still prevail in the conflict overall.

Naturally - my only point was that in most any conflict where there is a battle for air supremacy, the issue of who will have the advantage will be decided relatively quickly. There simply are not enough air assets on either side - particularly aircraft - to sustain an air campaign for very long in the face of losses.

Finally, in the end, if we accept that air power isn't the ultimate arbiter of the conflict (which I really think it isn't -- otherwise, what the hell are we still doing fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan), then all that needs to be achieved is the ability to continue contending in the air while the rest of the war is fought.

I guess it depends on what you mean by "contending" in the air.

And I second Ski's assertion that the technology is second to the quality of the pilots. (That goes for land and sea power as well.) Really good people will win a war every time, hands down.

That is certainly true up to a point, but technology imposes limits that skill eventually cannot overcome.

And on that note, it is telling that the Air Force is cutting 40,000 or so personnel, mostly to pay for F-22. And that buys less than 200 jets. At that rate, it can't be long until we reach the point where questions of keeping ahead of red air and ADA are academic because the service will have long since priced itself out of the war business.

Some of those cuts were because the Air Force was allowed to remain over its authorized end strength for a few years after 9/11. Then in 2003, a series of end-strength reductions through FY2009 were planned to help pay for recapitalization. Unfortunately, that plan did not anticipate changing requirements as a result of Iraq and so is OBE. Equally unfortunate is that OSD intends to stick with that plan. A decent review of the issue can be found here.

[Entropy]

Belay my last...Just read that Gates is suspending further drawdowns in AF personnel and he fully explains the reasoning behind the firings and why Schwarz and Donely were chosen.

[Ski]

How many total SU-27's exist in the world today? I think the number is less than 100. Has the aircraft seen combat? I don't think so. Do the countries procuring this aircraft have trained and combat experienced pilots? Doubtful. Are the countries procuring this aircraft threats to the US? Doubtful for the short term.

Listen, all services need to take a real hard and honest look at all of their major procurement projects. The FCS is a wishing well. The bottom line is our stuff takes way too long to design, build and is wicked expensive to maintain. Martin Van Creveld stated that aircraft today in the West are almost custom design pieces due to the complexity of the systems. Modern state based warfare is very expensive for a slew of different reasons - I think we are on the very edge of pricing ourselves out of business. The ROI on a $12B month war for us vs a less than $10M a month war for AQ is telling enough. Now that we have a weak dollar, bad housing market, energy troubles, etc...the ball is going to stop rolling towards DoD. People in our country are starting to have trouble making ends meet - I know people who spend over $600 a month in gasoline in the DC area - they were forced to buy 40 miles out because they couldn't afford living in the Beltway. And DC is an affleunt area. It's worse once you get out into "real America."

Good to see that Gates has come out and publically stated why the axe fell. He is such a breath of fresh air - the first decent SECDEF in 20 years.