Ill Informed Blog Post at AM on Advisors

[patmc]

At a Change of Command ceremony yesterday, I ran into my old 1SG when I was an XO, and he is on mid-tour leave from MiTT in Balad. He said he is lucky that he's attached to a good IA unit, that are not hesitant to go out and get the bad guys. He also said they've cleaned up the Balad area. As a former convoy commander, going through the Balad Market area on MSR Tampa was never a pleasant experience, so clearly the IA and US are working well together. His complaints, though, were with the MiTT training. He wondered why he was doing BRM and licensing for a humvee? He is a MSG, he has driven a truck, and zeroed a rifle before. He enjoyed the culture and language classes, but felt the basic Soldier tasks were a waste of time considering the experience level on the team. He wanted more advisor/culture, not check the box training. Anecdote from another friend on MTT, during live fire, their "instructor" advised them to carry a drop weapon in case wrong person was shot. They reported him and he was removed, but that was the instruction they were receiving.

b. What are we training? Military basic skills or advisor skills? A purely military (as in uniformed) effort is a partial answer that works OK if you are concentrating on the former, especially if your trainers are conventional military, few of whom have advisor experience. But it is not sufficient for training advisors; they need to start as a ready for war Soldiers and then go through training. It cannot be a mobilization station or extended EIB camp with advisor tacked on. You need military who have done the mission in different locales and different cultures and you need civilians with skills that come from previous military experiences as well as those who practice the skills of an HTT.

The Army is having a hard enough time filling these teams for 60 days + 12 months, and out. To resource 6 months of training for each advisor, Combat Advisor needs to become a branch or functional area (with that new tab?). Wait, there already is a branch that does FID. Those who want to advise, have already submitted packets and went to selection. Further, many captains do not want to go on these teams because they take you out of the command loop for a year and a half. Could the Army only put key developed (formerly branch qualified) captains in these slots? Good luck finding them, they're already being used elsewhere. Senior NCO's I know on teams look at it like a Korea tour (pretty routine with senior Bragg SGT's), but they mostly wonder what they know about advising and hated the training. Random 13 series NCO's are serving as Fire Support Advisor, even though they have spent their years behind the cannon or MLRS, not calling for fire.

The Army has to "reward" current members with a "say" in their next assignment. If you locked people in at Fort Polk, as an Advisor lifecycle, with 6 months training, 12 months deploy, 18 months trainer, you would take these officers and senior NCO's out of the force for 3 years at a time, and leave them stuck in Polk. How many people would volunteer for that? Also, aside from SOF community and previous MiTT members, where can we find qualified instructors in sufficient numbers? There's already a numbers problem.

c, How long are we going to train advisors? I will tell you that 60 days is NOT enough time even if their soldier skills are up to speed. Six months would be better for novice advsors. Should we do second tier training for experienced advisors? I believe we should especially if we can do that as a parallel and connected effort with novice training. I hammer the point to people that I cannot teach/train experience. I can teach and train you on skills; you have to use them in a meaningful way to develop relevant experience. Recycling advisors as advanced students who serve as trainers would take a step in toward sustaining experience in the advisor force. If we cannot have a standing advisory corps we have to do something to retain hard won experience. Maybe we need a warrant program for advisors?

This is a key mission, but the Army is not resourcing or managing it as such. Training, personnel management, promotions, schools, etc, need to change to reflect the MTT mission. Right now, the Army seems to be paying lip service. If this is going to become a core function of the Army, realize that many people do not want to do it, and the makeup of the Army may change. Effects of GWOT are already hurting Field Artillery branch (all but 2 1LTP in my battalion submitted a packet to change branches). Moving MiTT to Polk, to tie it in with the JRTC resources, is a good plan if all the support (pax, $, training) it needs will actually move with it. If it is just being moved to free up a brigade from 1 ID, then it is essentially doing the same thing over again, "Hey, JRTC, do this now." (Earlier, "Hey, 1st ID, do this now.")


Late night in Fayetteville, so if this is slightly disjointed or rambling, I apologize. Good discussion despite my efforts.

[Tom Odom]

Late night in Fayetteville, so if this is slightly disjointed or rambling, I apologize. Good discussion despite my efforts.

All good points and all tied to the very first question I posted:

a. What is the future of SFA and advisory capacity?

All things flow from that issue. Much of what you describe is US Army culture driven based on a decades-old mindset that dictates how one gets ahead. For instance:

If you locked people in at Fort Polk, as an Advisor lifecycle, with 6 months training, 12 months deploy, 18 months trainer, you would take these officers and senior NCO's out of the force for 3 years at a time, and leave them stuck in Polk. How many people would volunteer for that?

We already lock folks at Fort Polk on a 3 year cycle as OCs. IF advisor success is the key to a strategy of drawdown and turnover, asking for volunteers is not the answer. Your 3 year cycle would be a good way to do it.

The idea that MiTT tours are Korea tours is the same thinking that dogged efforts early on in Iraq; the belief this is not what real soldiers do is at this stage like praising the Maginot Line in 1939. The Army has to put up some of its best and brightest and then reward them for what they are doing. The answer to the issue of captains missing command cycle opportunities is to give priority for command to those who have MiTT tour under their belt as well as using MiTT duties as a discriminator on selection to battalion command. That too goes back to the original question.

Tom

[patmc]

I agree with you, but O/C, AC/RC, etc are suppossed to be post-command (key developed aka branch qualified) jobs. Instead, some junior captains are now moving into these slots, and upon completion, being moved to MiTT or deployment bc of dwell time, not to command slots. BZ MAJ and Functional Area boards are dropping to around 7 years for the first look now, very scary yes, but if you put a junior captain into a 3 year advisor tour, he's not getting picked up, or not getting a command. "Commanding late," which my battery cdr did and recommends bc it better prepares you (which I agree with already as a learning junior cpt), can end up hurting you. Promotions shouldn't be your motivation, but they do impact morale.

My first BN CDR followed the old FA career plan: FSO > PL > XO > ICCC > BN FSO > staff >2x BTRY CDR > JRTC O/C > CGSC > S3 > special staff job > bn command. My current commander did basically the same, minus the OC duty. Its too soon to see what the new path will be, but on paper, it seems to be command if lucky, then whatever job you're given. Not very encouraging.

I'm MI now, which no longer "requires" command, but nobody honestly believes that command is not still the best job. Transformation and GWOT realities have already shrunk MI commands, and the Army is basically saying, "yeah, it sucks, but come on." With near 100% promotions, nobody really needs any job now, but serving on staff with no light at the end of the tunnel, may be too much. May be one of the reasons MI was top tier for the captains bonus.

All things flow from that issue. Much of what you describe is US Army culture driven based on a decades-old mindset that dictates how one gets ahead. For instance:

We already lock folks at Fort Polk on a 3 year cycle as OCs. IF advisor success is the key to a strategy of drawdown and turnover, asking for volunteers is not the answer. Your 3 year cycle would be a good way to do it.

The idea that MiTT tours are Korea tours is the same thinking that dogged efforts early on in Iraq; the belief this is not what real soldiers do is at this stage like praising the Maginot Line in 1939. The Army has to put up some of its best and brightest and then reward them for what they are doing. The answer to the issue of captains missing command cycle opportunities is to give priority for command to those who have MiTT tour under their belt as well as using MiTT duties as a discriminator on selection to battalion command. That too goes back to the original question.

Tom

[Tom Odom]

Pat,

Again you are bringing important issues up but they do not get at the heart of the matter. This thread was and is focused on the issue of MiTT training and how to improve that training.

If we first answer that A. MiTTs and advisory effort is critical and will be a long term effort--lets use 20 years as a start--then we need to improve that training. We cannot do that with a 60 day summer camp approach regardless of where we put it. That means a fundamental change in career culture, one that I have yet to see. Ken loves to say come the revolution first blow up personnel command. This would be a good thing to light a match about.

My point is quite simple: we are still talking the talk rather than walking the issue forward.

Tom

[Ken White]

like nukes.........

[Rob Thornton]

Tom
Good points. I think what needs to be got at is that this and many issues like it are beyond ascribing a temporary value to in terms we are generally comfortable with.

There are some advisory skill sets in high current demand such as those at the ministerial level which take years to grow. These institutional level advisors are key in achieving sustainable capacity, but there is a significant gap in the USG's ability to provide them. In addition to the personal attributes and skills of our 03-06s advising at the tactical echelon in foreign environments, these ministerial level advisors have to have technical skills we might normally attribute to a policy guy or gal working as Assistant Deputy in OSD, or those of an ambassador or senior FSO, etc. Its not so they can come in and impose a template, but so they can have a fundamental understanding of how institutions work and the purposes they serve. From there they can advise and bring assistance to help their foreign counterparts grow their own institutions in a manner that fits their environment and supports their political goals. This is not where we should draft pick up teams of 05s and 06s. If we decide to develop those skills to support 3000.05 then we start now by assigning the right people to assignments where they can get that experience and learn those skills.

We often articulate the components of our defense institutions in DOTMLPF terms. We like to cherry pick from the DOTMLPF tree for the ones that seem easiest and offer the least amount of risk. We like to do it in an ad-hoc fashion for the same reasons. Unfortunately this is the least effective, and I'd argue at a certain point the least efficient. This method of change may even be the one which holds the greater risk as the parts become incongruent and confusing as some evolve and some remain unchanged - but its what we do.

We could be discussing any aspect of DOTMLPF, but we also need to consider the broader USG, and even the US Codes and authorization that allow us to be flexible for long term efforts that change over time through interaction. 1206 and 1207 are examples of authorizations that need to be followed up on and considered in light of what we are trying to accomplish. Without some of the external DoD changes, we'll wind up with capabilities that are hard to employ because of shortfalls and self imposed constraints.

Best, Rob

[Tom Odom]

Tom
Good points. I think what needs to be got at is that this and many issues like it are beyond ascribing a temporary value to in terms we are generally comfortable with. ...

We could be discussing any aspect of DOTMLPF, but we also need to consider the broader USG, and even the US Codes and authorization that allow us to be flexible for long term efforts that change over time through interaction. 1206 and 1207 are examples of authorizations that need to be followed up on and considered in light of what we are trying to accomplish. Without some of the external DoD changes, we'll wind up with capabilities that are hard to employ because of shortfalls and self imposed constraints.

Best, Rob

Agree with all and going back to what prompted this thread in the first place--fixation on movement to Polk as a source of problems--is classic angels on a pinhead analysis. The issue is much larger than do we stay at Riley or do we go to Polk. It is a fundamental question of strategy and the objective of that strategy and the means to achieve it. Right now and for the foreseeable future 2 brigade equivalents of trained and competent advisors are in my estimation much more important than 2 BCTs. That reality is so apparent and so distasteful to many who had rather have the 2 BCTs.

Best

Tom