French military (catch all)

[sandbag]

I'd argue it's not TTP. Rather, it's TTP (and materiel)-driven. Complex systems (and tactics that use them) require more support. We went through a brief infatuation with "FedEx Logistics", which was mercifully killed in 2004. Corporate management principles are fine, but tend to have unforeseen consequences when applied to an army (especially one in a war).

Why weren't high-echelon support units afield? Talk to the planners about that one, but if I remember the traffic correctly, it was as it usually goes: planners weren't really thinking about that sort of thing. Some had drank the 4ID Kool-Aid and went in very light on the support end in the hopes that corps support units were going to magically quark in from the Twilight Zone to keep non-existent LOCs open. Bottom line is that we paid for our post-DS sins from an MTOE standpoint with horrible post Phase III readiness.

So yeah, I would agree that the unit designs are flawed. I don't think they "want" too much. As both a combat arms and a support weasel, I never have considered a desire by a unit for support to be a "want". However, I think complex weapon systems intrinsically require complex support solutions, unless said support solutions are designed as such that the majority of the support is done on a modular basis further back in the field. Most of our systems aren't built like that, and the Army's attempt to "replace forward, repair rear" only works when the systems themselves can support that.

My crack about the Imperial Army only applies to their desert mobility. I've worked with them in combat, and they do fine. They just can't support themselves or move well.

Risk mitigation as TTP? Okay. Mayhap you're looking at the wrong end.Which brings up two questions; why aren't they there and, more importantly, does that mean the design of units that are on the ground is flawed in that they need (want?) too much 'stuff?' S'okay, most of the bus riders aren't too impressed by the rest of the Army either.

[marct]

worth pulling out in some detail.

The situation has changed in comparison to the 60's - material is extremely expensive, manpower is expensive - but all Western nations have significant unemployment, including the age group 18-30.

[quote=Ken White;49350]True, though I'd say much of that material is more over priced than it is actually expensive. Manpower is expensive because the legislatures of the West have made it so -- unintended consequence of trying to be all things to all people (and buy votes...).

Actually, military equipment SHOULD be getting cheaper, and so should armies.

The IT and solid state electronics evolution and all it's spin-offs should have created considerable savings, and actually has, in terms of procurement and ownership. Civilian cell phones are far more complex than a lot of military radios, yet cost nothing.

There's three "problems" here - cost, distribution systems and "unemployment" - but they are actually all related quite strongly.

Let's set the scene first. In any socio-economic system, you have an integrated production, distribution and accounting system (in the broad sense for all of these). All of these components have cross-cutting sub-components of technology (what you use to achieve X), technique (How you achieve X), and measures of valuation (What X is "worth"). If humans were rationally logical, which we aren't despite Adam Smith and his apologists, we would have a priority chain which has technology as the highest value and accounting as the lowest. What we really have is the inverse of that with accounting as the highest and technology as the lowest.

What this value chain does is priorize accounting systems as the primary ordering schema of cultures. So, for example, when a culture uses money as its primary accounting system, technique and technology will take a back end to making money. When a culture uses "honour" as its primary accounting system, technology and technique again are brought into play to support that accounting system. The reasons why this is so is both simple ("status") and highly complex (achieve X result and you will be happy, rewarded, successful, "self-actualized", etc.). In general, cultural accounting systems are the markers cultures use to keep score in ideological games.

Since we happen to live in a culture that valorizes "money" as its accounting system, let's draw that one out. There are a whole slew of different forms of socio-economic systems that valorize "money" as the cultural accounting system but, in the West, ours is tied in to a general evolution from merchantile capitalism through free market / state capitalism to industrial feudalism (which is roughly where we are now in many sectors of the economy). If anyone is interested in the developmental trajectory, read Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (ebook, sparknotes, Amazon).

The big shift in the past 50 years has been the Third Industrial Revolution (automation, computers and robotics); Wilfs' IT revolution. Between roughly 1910 and 1955 or so, the dominant model was a rational-bureaucratic organization (again after Weber), organized around horizontally and vertically integrated product area silos; the so-called "military-industrial complex" is just one example of this (Sears is another, as is GM). This was a strong form of industrial feudalism that, like most feudal organizations, got the snot kicked out of it by a really highly organized force (specifically, by the Korean and Japanese car industry during the mid- to late 1960's).

The reaction of the North American cultures to this problem was, in many ways, predictable. First, increase centralized government control (governments are "industrial" fiefdoms just the same as any other organization). So we see a rise in social programs to deal with the social dislocation effects of losing massive numbers of economic battles (think about the increase in welfare programs, job retraining programs, etc.). Governments also took over more control of the cultural accounting systems - the social ideologies - while, at the same time, increasingly restricting what ideologies could be talked about in the public arena (compare the political discourse of the early-mid 1930's with that of the early to mid 1970's and you'l see what I mean). Increasingly, these ideologies became more rhetorical and less substantive.

Second, North American cultures searched for the "innovative" answer to their problems. The most obvious ones were in production costs associated with old manufacturing plants and with high cost labour. So, what happens then? Throughout the 1970's and into the 1980's, you see new plants being built with an increasing amount of automation in them employing fewer people. By the 1990's, this is coupled in with a trend to reduce labour costs even further by doing away with high cost North American labour and "exporting" jobs, as Lou Dobbs would say, to third world countries. In order to support this shift, several other shifts were necessary - decreased tariff barriers, increased ability to "import" cheap labour, increased ability to export products, increased capacity for consumers to purchase goods, etc. Note that most of these deal with changes in the distribution system...

At the same time as these changes are going on, there is an increasing trend in the production of personal computers. Computers, of all types, are the sine qua non of setting up and running automation (thereby reducing labour costs). They are also necessary for the implementation of JIT systems (which reduce the logistical tail of corporations and means that capital flows through them faster). They also end up producing a "new" environment for businesses - the Internet.

By 1996 or so (as early as 1982 in some areas and still not yet in others; 1996 is just a marker of convenience), the general social organization has split between rational-bureaucratic industrial fiefdoms with few permanent members and many temporary employees (mercenaries in the true sense), and clusters of fragmented and contingent communities of interest and communities of practice which, on the whole, are organized around a totally different form of cultural organization: reciprocity (vs. the Authority Ranking system of the rational-bureaucratic system and the late industrial feudal groups). In this system, "valuation" (the measure of an accountancy system) is not based on an office held or money (either held individually or controlled by an office) but, rather, on individual skill, knowledge and "trust".

This, in my usual round-about way, comes back to Wilfs' point:

Actually, military equipment SHOULD be getting cheaper, and so should armies.

It all depends on what organizational form the equipment and armies are based on. When your accounting system is based on money - control of vast amounts increased your status - then the equipment and armies should be getting more expensive. The potential for cheaper equipment and cheaper armies is definitely there but, on the whole, is mitigated against by the cultural accounting system. When you compare the actual costs of military equipment and "armies" in an honour based system, the Anbar tribes are a good example of this, they are much cheaper. Compare it also with a reciprocity based system, such as AQ, and again, they are much cheaper.

If you want to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of the actual system, then you have to figure out how to change the basic accountancy system. After all, how many bureaucrats get rewarded for coming in under-budget? They don't; they get penalized by having their budgets reduced with the consequent loss of status and power. If you want to see an analog of the current situation in the US, assuming that the accountancy system isn't changed, then I would recommend an examination of the Byzantine Empire during the 1020 - 1040 period; it's not pleasant reading, but it does clearly show what happens when the bureaucratic accountancy system prevails.

[SWJED]

An Army Falling Apart - Theo Farrell, Kings of War

Internal documents report the French Army to be on the verge of “falling apart”, according to the Telegraph. Less than half of the army’s Leclerc main battle tanks, and less than 40% of its helicopter fleet, are operational. This gives a new spin on French reluctance to do more of the heavy lifting (i.e., combat operations) in Afghanistan. Here was I putting it down to political reluctance. But perhaps it’s as much a case of “can’t do” as “won’t do”.

I did quite a bit of focus group work with French officers in the Ecole Militaire in Paris last year. This is a true war-fighting military. Years of intervention in Africa have given French officer corps combat experience. And crucially, this is a military itching to get back to war. Especially as their last big punch-up, the 1991 Gulf War, proved to be a bit of an embarrassment: the French only able to deploy a light division that was tasked with guarding the far left flank of the coalition advance into Kuwait. This was in contrast to the British 1st Armoured Division, which joined the US VII Corps assault on the Iraqi armoured reserves and Republican Guard...

[Ken White]

...the so-called "military-industrial complex" is just one example of this (Sears is another, as is GM). This was a strong form of industrial feudalism that, like most feudal organizations, got the snot kicked out of it by a really highly organized force (specifically, by the Korean and Japanese car industry during the mid- to late 1960's).

Sad thing is that neither the Mil-Ind complex or US car makers seem to have learned a lesson...

The reaction of the North American cultures to this problem was, in many ways, predictable. ... Increasingly, these ideologies became more rhetorical and less substantive.

Again ignoring history -- and reality...

...In this system, "valuation" (the measure of an accountancy system) is not based on an office held or money (either held individually or controlled by an office) but, rather, on individual skill, knowledge and "trust".

With '"trust" being a relative term more often equal to 'known and can be dominated...'

...The potential for cheaper equipment and cheaper armies is definitely there but, on the whole, is mitigated against by the cultural accounting system...

If you want to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of the actual system, then you have to figure out how to change the basic accountancy system. After all, how many bureaucrats get rewarded for coming in under-budget? They don't; they get penalized by having their budgets reduced with the consequent loss of status and power. If you want to see an analog of the current situation in the US, assuming that the accountancy system isn't changed, then I would recommend an examination of the Byzantine Empire during the 1020 - 1040 period; it's not pleasant reading, but it does clearly show what happens when the bureaucratic accountancy system prevails.

Well said on all counts. Has the problem of being distressingly on target but...

[Ken White]

I'd argue it's not TTP. Rather, it's TTP (and materiel)-driven. Complex systems (and tactics that use them) require more support.

No question; I was suggesting that the issue might better be those tactics which do indeed drive the materiel requirement. I'm pretty well convinced that war is inherently simple and that we humans have complicated it unnecessarily for a variety of reasons. Not least here in the US are an overweening love of technology for its own sake; a budget process and a Congress that promote jobs in Districts at the expense of truly good training; inherent laziness and the stultifying experience of WWI and WW II which is still very much in evidence; there's more but those will do for openers.

In my experience the most important requirement for the conduct of combat operations (and the preparation therefor...) is agility. That is followed by speed and that by effective firepower; way down the list are net power or mass. A massive force will by definition not be agile and will sacrifice speed for mass. Effective firepower is not the same thing as volume of fire or total firepower. That simple.

That's why I say the TTP factors -- which should be the drivers but are not -- are important. The TTP should drive the support process, yet because of a lack of emphasis and thought we have the support process constraining the TTP. The combat arms senior leadership over the years has failed to focus on that issue so I don't really fault the Loggies. That, BTW, is not to say that I'm living in a dream world, I'm well aware of many current constraints but am suggesting that a number of those could have been ameliorated long ago with the proper focus and resourcing. We elected not to do that for various reasons so we are where we are. Just saying we coulda and shoulda done better...

We went through a brief infatuation with "FedEx Logistics", which was mercifully killed in 2004. Corporate management principles are fine, but tend to have unforeseen consequences when applied to an army (especially one in a war).

Blame Robert Strange McNamara and his demand data mentality for much of that; he failed to realize that what worked for static Ford dealerships would not work for military forces at war. Subsequent SecDefs with Corporate experience keep looking for a way to reduce the massive inventory required for wartime readiness -- they apparently do not realize that there is little as cost-inefficient as a Rifle company in peacetime...

Problem is that Rifle Companies are like firearms; one rarely need one but when one does, one need it pretty badly.

Still, was the problem that FedEx logistics did not work -- or that the system did not want it to work? I'd suggest the latter and add the caveat that the mechanical elements to make it work did not exist. Further suggest those elements were not wanted by the Powers that be and Congress because they would have sapped funding from 'more important items.' Wonder how many fewer IED casualties there'd be had we delivery systems that were not roadbound? If we had a far lower requirement for Cl III?

Why weren't high-echelon support units afield? Talk to the planners about that one, but if I remember the traffic correctly, it was as it usually goes: planners weren't really thinking about that sort of thing.

True; no question that post attack thoughts did not intrude on many involved.

Some had drank the 4ID Kool-Aid and went in very light on the support end in the hopes that corps support units were going to magically quark in from the Twilight Zone to keep non-existent LOCs open. Bottom line is that we paid for our post-DS sins from an MTOE standpoint with horrible post Phase III readiness.

I think there was also a strong belief (on the part of many who should've known better) that it was going to be a quick in and out operation. In any event, whoever played with the TPFD erred mightily.

So yeah, I would agree that the unit designs are flawed. I don't think they "want" too much. As both a combat arms and a support weasel, I never have considered a desire by a unit for support to be a "want". However, I think complex weapon systems intrinsically require complex support solutions, unless said support solutions are designed as such that the majority of the support is done on a modular basis further back in the field. Most of our systems aren't built like that, and the Army's attempt to "replace forward, repair rear" only works when the systems themselves can support that.

Agreed -- I am merely suggesting that:

(a) They should be so designed; that we have really known that since Korea; and that we have diligently refused to do that for less than pragmatic reasons.

(b) We are fully capable of doing that but the bureaucracy would and will not be served if we do, ergo we likely will not unless placed in an existential situation.

(c) DOPMA and HRC are part of that problem...

My crack about the Imperial Army only applies to their desert mobility. I've worked with them in combat, and they do fine. They just can't support themselves or move well.

True, design factors again plus the aforementioned failure to design materiel to minimize support requirements. They can get by without an amazing amount of support if they have to and still be more than dangerous but most of the folks there are just as used to the status quo as the rest of the Army so they want their share. They can move better than most Infantry on foot but they're still on foot; the Hittites discovered that foot troops weren't ideal in the Desert over 16 centuries ago. METT-TC applies...

They are quite capable in both realms at what they were designed for (if a little over heavy on vehicles ), when METT-TC factors are ignored no unit does all that well.