French military (catch all)

[jmm99]

my post was addressed to "Lagrange" (of Barsoom, and various environs of other planets to remain unnamed), of UN & NGO fame, ancien TdM and the subject of at least one Legion rescue (IIRC) - this guy.

Have no idea what the analysis is under French law, which is why I hailed Lagrange. France has lots of horses to do hostage rescues.

Cheers

Mike

[davidbfpo]

There is background to this issue on the Mali thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9254 and another on the role of non-African powers in Africa: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10188

[jps2]

Please, do not forgot that declarations are both internal (for French people) and external (allied countries/politicals, opponents).

The facts that some French SOF fails to rescue the hostage simply means that intelligence/S2 wasn't able to collect enough data.

The hostage suffers heart disease and had no medicine from weeks : no one can tell (until now) if he was still alive when the raid was launched.

---------------

Regarding French laws, WAR can only be declared against a country.

[Fuchs]

Keep in mind Sarkozy is president. He's a bit "erratic" and also in other regards psychologically "interesting".

[NihilisticZeal]

From what I gathered, it was PM Fillon, not President Sarkozy, who "declared war". Obviously it was mainly nationalistic pathos aimed at domestic audience rather than any concrete "declaration" (in a political, not legal sense) of war against AQIM.

Here's some rather good coverage of it

[M-A Lagrange]

First of all, I did not know the hostage but all my thoughts are with him and his family.
Secondly, David and I flagged the issue on the Mali threat…

About the failure: I would not call it as a failure but as a desperate measure that did not success. Facts are that the hostage was 78 years old and had a hearth disease. Viewing the fact that AQIM did not want to supply him with his drugs and that in the first and last message he gave he mentioned dramatic conditions of retentions, there are good chances that he was already dead several days or weeks before the attack. But this will be confirmed later, I believe.

Concerning Mike’s question, I think that we are here in the case of legitimate use of force due to the imminence of a deadly threat on an innocent victim which goes by both French civilian law and military law.
According to the French Ministry of Defence law, rules and regulation of war, the use of force seems 200% legitimate as an acute imminent threat over either military or civilian French personal or individual has been identified.
The difficulty comes on the fact that the events took place in a foreign country. I am not in the secrets of the bilateral security cooperation agreements between France and Mauritania but I believe this took place accordingly that/those agreements.
In the blog Secret Defence from the daily newspaper Liberation, there is a detail explanation of how the operation took place. French special ops were involved only because there were suspicions of the possible presence of the hostage (but no acute and confirmed presence of him).
Also, it has to be incorporated into a larger picture and linked with the 2 French hostages in Afghanistan case. (That I do not know well). So I believe the message from our president (Which was not really thrilling in terms of dialectic but rather pretty clear for hostage takers) was addressing a much larger audience than just AQIM.
To make a long story short, France had several citizens taken hostages in the past year in Africa and their liberation went fine. With or without COS (the French Special Ops) involvement… I do not know.
Also, 2 years ago (If I do not mistake), 2 French citizens were assassinated by AQIM supporters in Mauritania, which can be considered as an act of war by AQIM. Or at least can be considered as a precedent. Therefore, but I have to make some research on this, technically, France was already at war (even if not considered as such) with AQIM.
Concerning the police/military cooperation in hostage/terrorism management operations:
It is actually true that France tend to treat such situation as a police matter. But the use of military personal and capacity is something which is common. The abduction of the Ponent sailors by Somali pirates and their liberation by military personal is one of the many precedents.
Actually, the standard procedure is to use military capacity (through GIGN from gendarmerie or COS) against terrorist but under a civil legal action. (It is raw, I know). This is quite detailed in Mr Bigo’s book Mike mentioned in the threat on conflict resolution vs "material support for terrorism".

I hope to be able to come with a more detailed response concerning the legal extension of this.

PS: comments on the French president are quite accurate. But it is a personal opinion.

[M-A Lagrange]

This operation can enter in the following frame:
(Knowing that all docs are not public and therefore not accessible and not used in that comment)
Based on ESDP/PESD COSDP 57 27 April 2009
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/...-re01.en09.pdf

G. POSSIBLE CRISIS SITUATIONS REQUIRING A MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE
25. The EU has identified 5 illustrative scenarios from the Requirements Catalogue 05 (RC 05)
(Ref. N) where it may consider using military means to address a crisis:
a. Separation of Parties by Force (SOPF);
b. Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military advice to third countries (SR);
c. Conflict Prevention (CP);
d. Evacuation Operations (EO);
e. Assistance to Humanitarian Operations (HA).
5654/1/09 REV 1 GS/tb 11
EUMS E_
26. These illustrative scenarios identify the types of crisis situations that the EU may wish to address using military means. Although all could be tackled by a Military Rapid Response, some are more likely than others.
27. Typically the first three (SOPF, SR & CP) types of crisis situation may require a more robust and sustainable force to reach the desired objectives rather than a Military Rapid Response.
However, a Military Rapid Response could still be considered during Advance Planning. The latter two (EO & HA) crisis situations are more likely to require a Military Rapid Response. e.g. Evacuation Operations could be in a permissive or non-permissive environment. Assistance to Humanitarian Operations could include prevention of atrocities or consequence management of man-made or natural disasters.
28. In addition the EU may tackle SOPF and CP types of crisis situations with a Military Rapid Response. This may be as an initial entry force to enable a follow-on force.
29. The European Security Strategy (ESS) (Ref. O) includes situations not considered in the RC 05 scenarios: Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Organised Crime. Military response is unlikely to be required for these types of crisis situations. However, military assets may be used in support of the civil authorities for ESS situations. Such involvement is not considered further in this concept.

I believe the operation in Mauritania may took place under the paragraph 27 (But I can be wrong). Also, it can have taken place under the paragraph 29, but the use of military assets in such case (terrorism) is not described in that document.

The following article can also be interresting to have an idea of the legal frame and challenge of French Opex:
http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.f...xion/art15.pdf
(in english)
This article is based on the operation Artemis which took place in 2003 in DRC. The doctrine for the use of force by French military is referred as being set by the EU doctrine on use of force: Use of Force Concept for EU-led Military Crisis Management Operations “ (ESDP/PESD COSDP 342 du 20 Novembre 2002).

But I hope to be able to come with more acurate and detailed info on the legal frame for operations out of French territory. But I may face some difficulties as I am stuck in a dirty rainy hole.