Rob has made a significant contribution with his paper on ODP. I came to that conclusion slowly, however, because when I started reading my first reaction was that ODP was nothing new but merely some (generally) good ideas dressed up in complex and convoluted verbiage. As I got deeper into the paper I found by initial impression needed major modification because there really is something new here.

ODP appears to operate at the interface of the strategic and operational levels of war. It is both strategy and a prerequisite for effective campaign planning. What bothered me initially about it was the notion of a Theory of Reality. How, I asked, does that differ from a “strategic appraisal (assessment, appreciation, estimate)”? Answer: it doesn’t. So, is there any justification for creating a new term? The only reason I can see is for the sake of symmetry – and only then if the second concept of a Theory of Action can be justified.

The Theory of Reality/Strategic Appraisal is, I think, key to the successful use of ODP by strategists and campaign planners. It is “intelligence” in its most basic and complete sense. It focuses first on what used to be called basic intelligence with an emphasis on cultural, social, political, economic, and security factors. Most important, it is never a finished product but is always changing as new information requires additional analysis. Thus, it provides a constantly refined moving analysis of the environment, players, and events in the target area. As it changes the individuals charged with developing the Theory of Action must modify their theory or concept.

This brings us to the question of how the Theory of Action differs from strategy or an operational concept. From Rob’s description I get the sense that the Theory of Action encompasses both terms. It addresses the questions of what we want to accomplish, how to go about it, and what resources we must have to do so. But it reaches down into the operational level with its addressing Areas of Effort (AOE) and Lines of Effort (LOE) as well as specific objectives within both. As a result, I can see the utility of the term Theory of Action which, in turn, justifies the notion of using the term Theory of Reality for the sake of symmetry. The only caveat I would suggest is that the equation of the Theory of Reality with the Strategic appraisal be made explicit (so that cantankerous intel weenies like me will be appeased).

The real strengths of the ODP lie in its conception of the players as, at a minimum, Green, Red, and Blue. If that were all, however, it would not be much of an improvement. But it is not all. There are multiple permutations of Green, Red, and Blue and the permutations can change colors thereby changing the Theory of Reality. The second major strength is that the ODP is highly interactive and relies to a very great extent on the practice of free play simulation (war gaming). As a result, the reality created by the simulation is used to gain insight into how to affect the conditional reality of the Theory of Reality. The one danger that I see is that players (strategists and planners) could decide that the simulated reality is the reality of the real world and follow that garden path to a road to disaster. A rigorous AAR process and ongoing use of the FAS test mitigates that danger significantly.

Cheers

JohnT