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Thread: Toward Sustainable Security in Iraq and the Endgame

  1. #21
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Default On Consistent Policy and Speed of Change

    The nature of bureaucracy is such that it supports consistency at the price of agility, flexibility,and speed of change. The counterweight to the bureaucracy is the rotating work force reprsented by the politcal appointees. Politcal appointees represent the new blood that brings new ideas; but they demand quick implementations in order to make their mark in the short(er) time they occupy their positions. In order for the system to work well, it needs an equilibrium between these two groups. Sometimes one side or the other seems to acquire more power, which tips the system out of balance. Buy it usually ends up correcting itself. America is currently at a watershed of shorts as baby boomer bureaucrats are exiting government jobs and retire in droves.

    By the way, I suspect that military members observing and/or getting involved in the process tend to get rather frustrated because they, due to the rotational nature of their assignments and the "up or out" promotion policies that are carried out through centralized selection boards, need to make their mark in each assignment rather more quickly (sort of like a first-term President elected on a reform platform) than is common in the slow incremental change process that distinguishes the realm of government policy.

    America could probably do this a different way. However, if we opted for a speedier process, I fear the US would be much more like certain Latin American countries in terms of the turbulence in its national leadership. Or, the US could end up taking as long as the UN or EU to implement watered down policies that really do nothing for any one.

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    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

  2. #22
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default The ways in which we think about security

    Steve,

    Perhaps it is time to change our tactics and use a 'new marketing plan' to advertise this change in emphasis......

    My thesis is that successfully isolating the civilian populace of Iraq from the insurgency has a significant economic component that has eclipsed the security component at this point. Though it may be politically painful for the current administration to consider, it is time for an Economic Surge.
    Steve,
    Great post and I think gets to the real heart of ow what security can mean outside of its physical context.

    What really makes a population resistant to radicalization? or put in another way, what keeps violent competing ideologies from being attractive, taking hold and becoming a movement? What keeps terrorism on the margins - attractive only to the most extreme of the population? What keeps criminal activities from defining the norm? What builds faith in the leadership that they will provide the conditions in which the population can meet its needs?

    Sustainable security in this sense does not exclude the people I think, it is contingent upon them. They must understand the stakes, but to do so they must perceive they have a stake. What makes a state viable? As we start looking at complex social systems we're starting to understand that progress in one area is often contingent on development or reform in another.

    Iraq is starting to develop the monies it will need to develop an economy that could go beyond the hydro-carbon industry. While undoubtedly that will be a chief export (and much of the foundation on which the rest is built), stability probably resides in economic diversity. There is the potential for other mineral industries in the North, agricultural industries, banking, trade, and a history in many cases of a textile industry. Getting physical security to a point where economic development takes hold, and political development to a point where economic development is sustainable and encouraging to more development is the point where Iraq will succeed long term I think.

    Key to realizing a development strategy I think is understanding the how systems interact with one another - and insuring that just because an area is not the concern of the moment, it does not get neglected, but is developed more in tandem with other areas so that one system does not grow so fast that is either unsustainable, or its growth crushes, over shadows, or unbalances the whole system. The challenge may be in understanding that although an immediate challenge may require a disproportionate amount of energy in one system, sustainability eventually comes from greater equilibrium - aka stability. This would seem to be the most important thing we should require from any leader - knowing when to take action (set or change course), and when not to act (remain on course) - this comes from understanding what problems are really problems and what are symptoms, and being able to resist the pressures of the moment, and our own biases - the second may be the leader's ability to set and manage expectations - which is in effect demonstrating the strength to lead.


    Best, Rob

  3. #23
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Public Private Partnerships

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post

    Key to realizing a development strategy I think is understanding the how systems interact with one another - and insuring that just because an area is not the concern of the moment, it does not get neglected, but is developed more in tandem with other areas so that one system does not grow so fast that is either unsustainable, or its growth crushes, over shadows, or unbalances the whole system. The challenge may be in understanding that although an immediate challenge may require a disproportionate amount of energy in one system, sustainability eventually comes from greater equilibrium - aka stability. This would seem to be the most important thing we should require from any leader - knowing when to take action (set or change course), and when not to act (remain on course) - this comes from understanding what problems are really problems and what are symptoms, and being able to resist the pressures of the moment, and our own biases - the second may be the leader's ability to set and manage expectations - which is in effect demonstrating the strength to lead.
    Rob,

    I appreciate the opportunity to think about and discuss this important issue with you (looking at this sentence construction makes me realize it sounds a bit stilted but there it is).

    Understanding the area of operations culturally and tactically is vital to ensuring that we do not experience a Buddy the Elf tries to hug the Raccoon moment while attempting to share the love.

    Business Theory is built upon employing and continually measuring the performance of manageably sized Business Units in order to achieve profitability. This is a good start point for a discussion about ‘how-to’ accomplish sustainability at the local level.

    Witold Rybczynski, in Chapter 14 of his book Last Harvest (ISBN 978-07432-3597-6), discusses how community associations in US neighborhoods have taken on municipal responsibilities such as local security, street cleaning, trash removal, park maintenance, and water and sewage treatment. He notes that 30 million Americans currently belong to such associations.

    The Congressional Research Service (Claudia Copeland) in their February 21, 2007 Report Water Infrastructure Financing: History of EPA Appropriations note that of the $51.3 billion dollars the EPA has used for water infrastructure programs since 1986 average grant sizes have shrunk from $18.1 million in 1995 to approximately $3 million today and are typically as designated special purpose grants rather than for regional projects.

    Since privatization appears to work at the local level it is natural to ask if it works at the national level. Chancelor Adenauer of Germany is remembered for the privatization of Volkswagen, Britain’s Prime Minister Thatcher for the privatization of British Telecom, France’s President Jospin for the privatization of France Telecom, and Japan has (mostly) privatized Nippon Telegraph and Telephone. It is interesting to note that all of these examples come from countries, which enforce a ‘rule of law’.

    Chile privatized Telefonos de Chile and Brazil has privatized Telebras, however we currently see a general backlash in much of Latin America against Privatization of State Owned Enterprises. Both Venezuela and Mexico do not support privatization of their Oil Industries (nor does Russia for that matter).

    Privatization of State Owned Enterprises failed in Iraq, and I would submit that this was due to a number of reasons to include failing to implement a local network to sustain the populace prior to privatization attempts.

    Jeffrey Sachs provides a stunning tour of ‘Why Some Countries Fail to Thrive and On The Ground Solutions’ in his book The End of Poverty (ISBN 0-14-303658-0). The Rand Corporation, in their Monograph # MG 557 The Beginners Guide to Nation Building, throws pearls when it notes, “Establishing workable financial controls without a banking system and in the absence of communications is a tall order. However, simple but robust financial controls can limit corruption. First, every school, clinic, police station, or other operating unit needs a budget.”

    My experience in Iraq was that, on the whole, we favored high priced foreign talent and a top down funding process to our detriment. I was fortunate to be able to operate in an AO in which we had access to a significant amount of CERP funds and force ratios with one maneuver unit and later operate within the same AO with decreased CERP funds and decreased force ratios. It was a painful yet positive learning experience.

    My AAR is that we that must successfully use the energies and desires of local people to develop local solutions to local problems in order to achieve a sustainable security solution in Iraq. Enabling our BCT’s with consistent local SME teams (trained and organized by Civil Affairs Teams, SF Teams, and MTT’s), expert comptroller teams, significant baseline CERP funding and the capacity to surge CERP funding as deemed necessary by the maneuver commander would go a long way towards developing sustainable security solutions. Long term the local maneuver commander will have to transition to the local power structure be it sheik, mukhtar, or group. We need to ensure this person or group is able to receive, manage, and be held accountable for the accounting stream that is the lifeblood of the AO. This is not a simple task as we all know well.

    Regards,

    Steve
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 06-14-2008 at 10:00 PM.
    Sapere Aude

  4. #24
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default

    Steve,
    Have you heard of any units (of any type) partnering with small businesses on this end and linking them up with like businesses on the other end? Have you heard of any types of economic partnering/pairing?

    I've got a friend who worked the Econ LLOO for the Ninewa PRT - I recently did his interview for the Case Study I'm working on - I'm looking to show the relationships between the various types of operations and assistance. What are your thoughts on how to get the most out of these relationships with regards to a grass roots approach? How do we ensure efforts are not in contest with one another, and how do we assist in the coordination of those things which are better from the bottom up with those things that might only happen with top down assistance?

    Thanks, Rob

  5. #25
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Supply Chain Management

    Rob,

    I will send you an ako later today. During my tour my 'portfolio' was engineering & construction but I quickly learned that business (and there are many many facets to this simple word) makes the world go round in Iraq.

    For the board, I would like to talk a little about supply chain management. In my opinion land and air bridges are vital to getting materials in and out of Iraq in order to facilitate commerce between the west and Iraq. Costs, tariffs, and regulatory hurdles are large and adapting to a just in time philosophy (inshallah meets fedex/ups/dhl) currently make this a 1000 meter target for most of Iraq. There is a potential to employ Knowledge Workers (Mosul University is strong but not really disposed to Americans) if someone who was interested would be able to navigate the telecommunications backbone and personal contacts issues and have the financial resources to absorb 'start up and maintenance fees' not normally encountered in the west.

    Kurdistan is another subject entirely that I will cover in a later post.

    Trade with Syria, Turkey, and Iran was robust in my area. Turkey was a powerhouse and from this one country Iraqi's faced significant competition in the arenas of agricultural products, day to day consumer products, and construction products.

    Developing and maintaining a Common Operational Picture for a maneuver commander is tough, but there are some solutions that we (DOD & Interagency) can raid from the business world that we have not availed ourselves to...I use some of these unclassified COTS software products in my day job and I am simply stunned that we have not trained up our folks and made use of them in our day to day across the board operations. Credit card purchases, 30 day classes, and JRTC/NTC/Hoehnfels practice would get us further down the road and provide quantifiable results with these business tested products.

    Long term, we need to help our young soldiers get associates degrees in business, geographic information systems, etc. The cost benefit ratio on this is definitely in our favor.

    Regards,

    Steve
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 06-15-2008 at 03:24 PM.
    Sapere Aude

  6. #26
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Sunday Ruminations on IT

    From Rand Monograph MG 595 Byting Back -- Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents

    U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed to exploit information power, which could be a U.S. advantage but instead is being used advantageously by insurgents. Because insurgency and counterinsurgency involve a battle for the allegiance of a population between a government and an armed opposition movement, the key to exploiting information power is to connect with and learn from the population itself, increasing the effectiveness of both the local government and the U.S. military and civilian services engaged in supporting it. Utilizing mostly available networking technology, the United States could achieve early, affordable, and substantial gains in the effectiveness of counterinsurgency by more open, integrated, and inclusive information networking with the population, local authorities, and coalition partners. The most basic information link with the population would be an information technology (IT)-enhanced, fraud-resistant registry-census. The most promising link would come from utilizing local cell phone networks, which are proliferating even among poor countries. Access to data routinely collected by such networks can form the basis for security services such as enhanced-911 and forensics. The cell phones of a well-wired citizenry can be made tantamount to sensor fields in settled areas. They can link indigenous forces with each other and with U.S. forces without interoperability problems; they can also track the responses of such forces to emergencies.
    In counterinsurgency, the primary field of battle is the minds of the active citizenry. The contest between insurgents and the authorities is largely a matter of persuading the population to support their side: Who is right or wrong? Who will give me a better life? Who can protect me better? Both sides appeal to individuals for operational intelligence. The essence of counterinsurgency, therefore, is not armed conflict between U. S. and insurgent forces but a multifaceted security and economic effort that puts the government in a position to serve its people, protect them from insurgent violence, and, thereby, earn their loyalty. Military power has more complex and subtle purposes in counterinsurgency than in conventional warfare: to protect the contested population, its economy, and its infrastructure; to destroy insurgent forces and will; to weaken popular support for insurgents; to inhibit factional or sectarian hostilities; to bolster faith in local government by enforcing law, order, and justice. According to our own soldiers, engaging the local population, improving public safety, and knowing “the street” depend vitally on timely and reliable information.2
    Sapere Aude

  7. #27
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default

    Steve, thanks for posting -interesting piece. I've been thinking about something sort of related - but as the time table for the baby seems to be moving up fast I may be off the net for awhile and unable to post. Best, Rob

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